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chapter 1
The Formation of a Small Polity
1 The Problem
More than two decades ago BarringtonMoore, in his Social Origins of Dictator-
ship and Democracy, examined the paths different states have followed when
moving into themodern age and assessed the ensuing variation in political sys-
tems. Concentrating on a few big countries where a certain social process had
‘worked itself out’,1 he deliberately neglected the small countries:
The fact that the smaller countries depend economically and politically
on big and powerful ones means that the decisive causes of their polit-
ics lie outside their own boundaries. It also means that their political
problems are not really comparable to those of larger countries. There-
fore a general statement about the historical preconditions of democracy
or authoritarianism covering small countries as well as large would very
likely be so broad as to be abstractly platitudinous.2
When inverted,Moore’s observation encapsulates the basic problemexamined
in this book. What are the decisive factors conditioning twentieth-century
politics in smaller countries that are economically and politically dependent
on big ones? Even though the question was dismissed by Moore, it is worth
asking simply because most countries are small, and most people live in polit-
ies that are dependent on distant centres of power. In what ways, then, has
dependenceonpowerful states influencedpreconditions, forms, andoutcomes
of collective action in small polities? How has it affected the occurrence of
revolutions, other large-scale conflicts, and the institutionalisation of political
systems when these polities enter into an era of mass politics?
In this study answers to these questions will be sought based on the experi-
ence of Finland, one of the smaller European polities economically and polit-
ically dependent on big centres. It is also one of the countries called ‘successor
states’ between the world wars. The state structures and internal conflicts of
these polities, which formed a geographically connected area between Russia
1 Moore 1966, p. xii.
2 Moore 1966, p. xiii.
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2 chapter 1
and other major European powers, were dramatically affected byWorldWar I,
and the countries reached a critical point in their political development at one
and the same moment.
These characteristics set this group of polities apart from other small coun-
tries for which this perspective is also relevant, namely the ThirdWorld coun-
tries that have won independence from colonial rule in the twentieth century.
Although it is true that dependence through capitalist commercialisation and
interstate competition has powerfully shaped state-making and political con-
flicts in both classes of polities, only the European cases were dependent on
backward empires, only they were geographically contiguous with the metro-
poles themselves, andonly they experienced a simultaneous, sudden, and com-
plete collapse of the metropolitan country. John Dunn’s distinction between
world war and decolonisation as the twomajor nondomestic processes related
to the important revolutionary challenges in the twentieth century captures
the main difference between the European and the other cases.3
The focus here is on Finland, which means that the problems will be dealt
with in the context of a single country. Themain thrust of the bookwill concern
the nature of political and economic dependence and the particular political
consequences it had in the Finnish case. At the end of the book a few comparis-
ons with other Eastern European polities will be made to show the distinctive-
ness of certain Finnish features. Because Finland is an example of awhole class
of countries, analysis of the Finnish experience, togetherwith the comparisons
with other countries, should help to put political development in this class of
countries into perspective. The analysis may throw some light more generally
on the development of politics in the dependent Eastern European countries
and, ultimately, on how the political and economic impact of the big powers is
reflected in the internal processes of the smaller countries.
2 A Comparative Perspective
From what perspective should early twentieth-century politics in Finland and
other small Eastern European polities be viewed? If the small countries really
are a case apart, various well-known models of political development cannot
be used, because they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the experience of
3 Dunn 1977, p. 98. Actually, Dunn speaks of revolutionary success and of big and small coun-
tries alike. The outcome in the small polities was presumably much more dependent on
outside forces than in the large ones.
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the large European national states.4 Moreover, it is by no means obvious that
even the forms of collective action found in small countries are the same as
those in big, established European states. Thus, if the causes of political trans-
formation in the small European states are substantially different from those
in the larger ones, then both the ‘phases’ or ‘sequences’ of political develop-
ment and the nature of collective action in the two cases may likewise differ
markedly.
During the years since Moore’s work appeared, the problem of comparabil-
ity has been approached in at least two new systematic ways. First, it has been
pointed out that even in large states political transformation is dependent on
the capitalist world-economy and on processes involving other states or the
international state system. In this viewMoore’s distinction is not as unambigu-
ous as he assumed it to be. The analysis of the relationship between states and
the international system should not be confined to small polities but should
be extended to large ones – as Theda Skocpol has forcefully maintained in
her comparison of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions.5 Immanuel
Wallerstein’s and Perry Anderson’s delineations of the rise of the European
world-economy and the European state system can also be seen in this light.6
In both these analyses the emergence of the various individual states depends
on their relations to the entire emerging structure: the trajectories of particular
states are conditioned by their different relations to the system as a whole.
This perspective obviously suggests one way in which Finland can be com-
pared with other states, even large ones. For example, it would appear useful
to view the Finnish revolution of 1917–18 as the outcome of the interplay of
domestic and international processes and in this sense similar to the ‘great’
revolutions examined in Skocpol’s study. This approach, unlike theories of
political development, does not imply that similarities between large and small
countries must be found. Rather, it facilitates comparisons that should enable
us to determine what was specific to the Finnish experience itself. For Finland,
the significance of the international context is obvious; therefore, looking at
other European states and their emergence in an international perspectivemay
help to identify the key features of Finland’s development. This does not neces-
sarily mean that ‘general statements’ will be applicable to Finland, but it may
help us see how the internal and external factors important throughout Europe
were linked together in this particular case.
4 See Tilly 1975c.
5 Skocpol 1979. Also Skocpol 1982, pp. 367–73; Østerud 1978b, pp. 176–8.
6 Wallerstein 1974–80; P. Anderson 1974.
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This approach alone, however, is not sufficient. It hardly suggests more than
a general course for considering a northeastern latecomer state such as Fin-
land. In order to determine what was specifically Finnish as opposed to what
was common with other countries, notably the other small Eastern European
polities, the emergence of Finland should be viewed more concretely and in a
large perspective.
Perhaps themost ambitious effort in this, second, direction is Stein Rokkan’s
‘conceptual map of Europe’.7 In commenting on Barrington Moore’s decision
to concentrate on leading countries, Rokkan argued that the analysis should
not be restricted to large and powerful leading polities when examining spe-
cific regions such as Europe. ‘On the contrary, the purpose is to account for
variations among all the distinctive polities in the region, and this requires
direct attention to the possible consequences of such factors as size, eco-
nomic resource potential and location in the international power system’.8
Thus Rokkan developed schemes that account for variations in the Western
European party systems and in the scope for state-making in Europe.
In his conceptual map of Europe, state-making patterns vary along two
major axes of development. On the West-East axis indicating the economic
resource bases of the state-making centres, Finland is a region where surplus
was extracted from agricultural labour and not, as in the West, from a highly
monetised economy. Together with the Baltic territories, Bohemia, Poland, and
Hungary, Finland was a ‘landward buffer’ in which both territorial centres and
city networkswereweakly developed. On theNorth-South axismeasuring con-
ditions for rapid cultural integration – that is, nation-building – Finland falls
in the same class as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. In these north-
ern countries, national Protestant churches marked off religious and linguistic
areas into which cultural penetration could occur fairly easily. In the South,
in contrast, religious ‘supraterritoriality’ created obstacles for cultural integ-
ration.9 It is in this perspective – of an alliance between statemakers and
landowners for extracting food andmanpower and of separate cultural identit-
ies developing into political entities – that the major characteristics of Finnish
state formation should be viewed.
Clearly, this model relates Finland to other political entities in Europe and
provides a starting point for comparing state-making in Finland with state-
making elsewhere in Europe. It helps us to see that the Finnish state-making
7 Allardt 1981b, p. 264.
8 Rokkan 1969, p. 60.
9 Rokkan 1973, pp. 80–4; Rokkan 1980, pp. 178–183; Tilly 1981, pp. 10–13.
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experience resembles that not only in the fringe between Russia and the other
major European powers but also in Scandinavia. Nonetheless, this approach
has amajor problem: by placing Finland or any other polity in a European con-
text, it fails to take into account the way the entities interact. The international
system is seenas the sumtotal of its componentparts rather thanas anenviron-
ment affecting, perhaps in contradictory ways, the destinies of single entities.
The model is essentially taxonomic; it does not really address Moore’s prob-
lem, that is, the special features of internal developments in small polities that
result from their dependence on big ones. Basically, as Charles Tilly puts it, it
treats national experiences as ‘cases’ that result from different combinations of
certain central variables.10
Sweden, to take an obvious instance, is not simply a ‘case’ located some-
where in the northern reaches of a giant cross-tabulation. The Sweden
which appears on Rokkan’s conceptual map is a shrunken remainder of
the expansive power which at one time or another dominated Norway,
Finland, Estonia, Livonia, and other important parts of the North. Canwe
reconstruct the political development of Sweden – or, for that matter, of
Norway, Finland, Estonia and Livonia – without taking that interaction
directly into account?11
Tilly himself has explicitly suggested that small polities should be viewed as
dependent onbig ones. He also proposes a dichotomy exemplified by the above
distinction between Sweden, on the one hand, and Norway, Finland, Estonia
(Estland), and Livonia (Livland), on the other. The distinction represents the
first two steps in the general movement toward a worldwide state system that
originated in Europe.
The first phase was the formation of the first great national states. This
involved commercial andmilitary competition followed by economic penetra-
tion into the remainder of Europe and parts of the world outside Europe. The
expansive processes were facilitated by the absence of important concentra-
tions of power immediately outside the areas in which the substantial states
were forming, as well as by the availability of new territories for expansion,
conquest, and extraction of resources. What took place in this period, from
approximately 1500 to 1700,was the consolidation of a systemof states acknow-
ledging, and to some extent guaranteeing, one another’s existence. The Treaty
10 Tilly 1981, 16. Also Allardt 1981b, pp. 269–70.
11 Tilly 1981, 16.
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of Westphalia (1648) played an important part in laying the foundation for the
European state system.12 By the end of the period, the substantial powers in
Europe included suchnational states as England, France, Brandenburg-Prussia,
and Sweden, as well as three empires: the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and
the Ottoman.
Whereas the first phase in thedevelopment toward aworldwide state system
involved the formation of a few early national states and empires with eth-
nically distinct centres, the second phase consisted of the division of most of
Europe into distinct national states through wars, alliances, and a great variety
of other manoeuvres. The earlier phase in state-making seriously constrained
the second. New states increasingly came into being as a result of wars between
established members of the state system. The Treaty of Westphalia, the Con-
gress of Vienna (1815), and the Treaty of Versailles (1919) constitute dramatic
demonstrations of this point.13 And Finland is a good example of such a new
state: the two major landmarks in its movement toward statehood were the
NapoleonicWars andWorldWar I.
This pattern of the emergence of a system of a few early states followed by
the regrouping of the remainder of Europe into a system of states subject to
the constraints of the initial system (which by nomeans remained immutable)
helps to place the Finnish and other Eastern European experience in perspect-
ive. It is the final phase of the process that concerns us here, however. In this
phase, it is most important that the three great multinational empires, Russia,
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, were dismembered. Each of them
created somewhat different preconditions for the consolidation of national
minorities.14 The so-called successor states of the empires in the late 1800s and
early 1900s include Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Many of these countries
were ‘unhistoric nations’, in the sense that they were not linked to existing or
even historically remembered polities. This was the last wave of creation of
distinct national states in Europe, and it came about as a consequence of inter-
national crisis and/or conflict between the established members.
The distinction implies that state-making processes in the latecomer states
were different from those in the early substantive states. In the early cases, the
only political units that could survivewere ones privilegedwith a relatively pro-
tected position in time and space, the availability of extractable resources, a
12 Tilly 1975b, pp. 30, 44–5; Tilly 1975c, pp. 636–7. See also Kiernan 1965, pp. 32–6.
13 Tilly 1975b, pp. 46, 74–5; Tilly 1975c, pp. 636–7.
14 The Poles, of course, were divided among various empires, as were the Romanians to a
certain extent.
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continuous supply of political entrepreneurs, success inwar, homogeneity (ini-
tial or created) of the subject population, and strong coalitions between the
central power and major segments of the landed elite.15 The transformation of
these states was largely a by-product of attempts by the central power to con-
solidate its position and to respond to challenges both external and internal.
The state-making process, then, was intimately bound up with the conduct of
war, the building of armies, the levying and regularisation of taxes, and the
growth of the administrative apparatus. Tilly conceives of early state-making
as a process in which the state-makers who were trying to survive and expand
were forced to create standing armies for use against rivals elsewhere as well
as rebels at home: ‘States have grown up as warmaking organizations’.16 The
maintenance of armies made it necessary to squeeze more revenue from the
populace, and the very existence of the army in turn facilitated this process,
thereby contributing to the consolidation of central power. At the same time,
various coalitions were formed between the central power and themajor dom-
inant classes.
In short, the main processes that brought the national state to a dominant
positionwere not only coercive and extractive; theywere also internal. It is true
that the creationof standing armies resulted fromstruggles between states, and
therefore external threats ultimately played an important role. But the relation
of the rulers to the ruledwithin the state was decisive. Territorial consolidation,
centralisation, differentiation of the instruments of government, and mono-
polisation of the means of coercion (that is, the fundamental state-making
processes) were all imposed on the subject population by the emerging cent-
ral power and its main allies.17 This view is in line with other conceptions of
European state formation. It is congruent with Max Weber’s formulations on
big (European) states. He views them in terms of his conception of the state as
an apparatus of domination, which provides a model for analysing, above all,
the internal processes of a political unit.18 According to Perry Anderson, to take
another example, the absolutist states in theWest emerged in response to the
internal decomposition of feudalism. As a new apparatus of feudal domination
against the peasantmasses, absolutism succeeded in obtaining thewidespread
commutation of dues. The same priority of the intra-state power relations was
true in the East, despite the fact that there absolutism was largely a result
of external pressures. The more advanced societies of the West were able to
15 Tilly 1975b, p. 40.
16 Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975, pp. 259–63 (quotation from p. 259).
17 Tilly 1975b, pp. 42, 71; Tilly 1975c, pp. 632–3.
18 Weber 1948, pp. 77–8, 82–3; Collins 1968, p. 48.
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plunder the more retarded areas of Eastern Europe. To protect themselves, the
countries of the East had to raise armies, and strong armies required strong
states.19
This centuries-long process did not repeat itself in the secondphase of state-
making. The later the state-making process, the less adequate the above pro-
cesses are for explaining the formation, survival, or growth of the state. New
states were more or less created by existing ones,20 as a result of crises and
rivalries in the international state system, which led to wars and the break-up
of empires subject to protracted pressures.
This differencemeant that relations between themajor local classes and the
central power evolved differently. In other words, the connection between (1)
state structures and (2) class relationswas not the same as in the early substant-
ive states. In the small dependent polities, class relations were not as institu-
tionalised in political structures, which were in any case recent or otherwise
weak. This difference then shaped the nature of local political organisation and
collective action, whichwere reflected both in (3) national integration – that is,
cultural homogenisation and nation-building – and in (4) class integration –
that is, class-based collective action.
First, the position of the state apparatus vis-à-vis the subject populationwas
dissimilar in the established states as contrasted with the latecomers. In the
former the state apparatus had been consolidated over the course of centuries
and had come to correspond to class relations in the core areas. In the latter
this apparatus was often of recent origin or had been imposed by the metro-
politan country. Prior to independence, the position of the dominant groups
was usually guaranteed by the metropolitan power, and inherited administrat-
ive institutions and state structures did not necessarily correspond to purely
local power relations.Thepost-WorldWar I Baltic countries constitute an excel-
lent example of this situation. The relationship between the dominant groups
and the subject population was much less institutionalised, and the state less
autonomous, than in the early national states.
It is in this context of political structures that the second factor, class rela-
tions, should be viewed. In the last century the expansion of theWestern cap-
italist market dissolved feudal ties and reshaped agrarian class structures in
Eastern Europe. Large numbers of emancipated peasants were allottedminus-
cule holdings or no land at all, except in the Balkans, where backward small
farming became predominant. The consolidation of large capitalist estates was
19 P. Anderson 1974, pp. 18, 196–202; Gourevitch 1978, pp. 427–8.
20 Tilly 1975c, p. 636.
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not immediately accompanied by the growth of an industrial proletariat in the
cities. It was common to see class boundaries imposed along ethnic lines: in a
number of minority areas, local peasantries were confronted with non-native
landlords. The level of literacy was much lower than in the West and Scand-
inavia, and popular organisation was weak.21 All in all, large strata of the peas-
antry inminority regionswere hurt by economic dependence on the developed
West. Examples of the effect of this class structure on collective action are the
extensive peasant unrest in the Baltic Provinces of Russia in 1905 and the great
Romanian peasant revolt in 1907.
Third, ethnic considerations played amuchmore prominent role in the later
cases. The formation of the state was given momentum by the aspirations of
ethnically distinct groups, or, more precisely, by the actions of their elites. In
the earlier phase of state-making, national consciousness, participation, and
commitment generally developed only after strong states had been formed, as
a consequence of deliberate actions on the part of the central power.22 In the
Eastern European latecomer states, the process was reversed: ethnic similarit-
ies led to the emergence of a national consciousness before the formation of
the state.23 This difference should be borne in mind when assessing the role of
nationalism in the two cases.
Fourth, in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, class-
based collective action took place in different conditions in the two classes of
countries. During this period there were increasing demands for the extension
of political rights in Europe, the working-class movement being themain chal-
lenger in the old and new states alike. If, following Charles Tilly,24 collective
action is conceived of as resulting from changing combinations of interests,
organisation, mobilisation, and opportunity, it is particularly the opportunity
that distinguishes the latecomer states from the earlier (Western) European
national states. Thedifferencemerits attentionbecause the bulk of the relevant
literature has,more or less implicitly, taken the experience of the earlyWestern
European states as their starting point.
The Western experience suggests that collective action was the result of a
gradual but painful process running from common interests through organ-
isation and mobilisation to collective action. This conception pervades the
writings of several analysts of political transformations and revolutions: it is
21 Berend and Ránki 1974, pp. 25–58; Orridge andWilliams 1982, pp. 24, 29, 32.
22 Tilly 1975b, p. 70.
23 Chlebowczyk 1980, pp. 21–2, 214; Eley 1981, pp. 96–105; Orridge 1982, pp. 44–5.
24 Tilly 1978, pp. 7–8.
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present in BarringtonMoore’s great book; it figures in the Tilly’s analysis of the
rebellious century extending from 1830 to 1930 in France, Italy, and Germany;
and it is a central theme in E.P. Thompson’s book on the making of the Eng-
lish working class.25 Political rights were gradually won through hard and often
protracted struggles in which the workers slowly learned to organise, mobil-
ise, and act collectively against statemachineries, first in strikes and then, after
gaining some rights, in elections fought with their own parties.26 Each step of
the expansion of rights ‘usually occurred in response to the demand of some
well-defined contender or coalition of contenders’.27 ‘Organization gave work-
ing people the strength to demand their rights. The acquisition of those rights
brought expanded use of them in formulating new demands or pursuing old
ones. The sequence … is a general rule for collective action’.28
In the emerging latecomer polities, the character of collective actionwas dif-
ferent. The state apparatus was usually not ‘internal’ to the same extent, and
therefore major crises did not result from demands made by ethnically dis-
tinct subject populations but rather arose from international conflicts and their
impact on the fragilemother empires. Fluctuation between extreme repression
and temporary liberalisation was much more likely than in the major West-
ern states. Opportunities sometimes changed rapidly and quite independently
of the strength of collective action. It may be argued, for example, that the
Russo-JapaneseWar had a much greater impact on the introduction of univer-
sal suffrage in Finland in 1906 than did the demands of domestic contenders
in preceding years. The collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires
in World War I and the effect of this on the constituent nationalities were the
final results of this process.
It seems reasonable tohypothesise that different opportunity structures pro-
duced differences in organisation and mobilisation. In Finland the peculiar
character of the early working-class movement, which played a decisive part
in the abortive revolution of 1917–18, can be traced to the opportunities at the
beginning of the century.
In sum, the state-making histories of the old and the new polities varied sys-
tematically, and Finland was undoubtedly one of the latter. Its state apparatus
was dependent on the mother empire; it was economically dependent on the
Western market; ethnic considerations played a prominent part in the state-
25 Moore 1966; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Thompson 1963.
26 Abendroth 1965, esp. pp. 51–86; Tilly 1978, p. 113.
27 Tilly 1978, pp. 170–1.
28 Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975, p. 280.
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making process; and finally, opportunities sometimes changed independent
of the strength of domestic collective action. But, quite importantly, Finland
resembled the other new polities in political dependence much more than in
the character of the class structure or the nature of economic dependence.
Among the smaller European regions experiencing a serious revolutionary
challenge at the end of World War I, Finland was practically the only one to
have a decidedly non-feudal class structure.29 Finland’s distinctiveness stems
from the fact that, in the longer run, it was not just a minority region in a mul-
tinational empire; rather, it was a territory between two established members
of the international state system. Before the nineteenth century, the Finnish-
language areas that were to form the bulk of present-day Finland belonged to
Sweden. Finland’s class structure, which was similar to Sweden’s and Norway’s,
had its origins in this earlier period. This fact has direct implications for the
character of subsequent collective action, but it also implies that economic
dependence on the Western market did not have the same consequences as
in the East.
The specifically Finnish combination – a decisive similarity with Eastern
successor states in political dependence on the one hand, and with Scand-
inavia in class structure and economic dependence on the other – makes the
analysis of a political, economic, and cultural interface necessary. The Scand-
inavian countries cannot be omitted, even if the most important comparison
is with Eastern Europe.
3 What Is to Be Explained
In the nineteenth century, Finlandwas characterised by nearly complete social
tranquillity and a very conservative political system. But the first elections
based on universal suffrage were held as early as 1907, and they gave the Social
Democrats the largest share of seats in any European country, even though Fin-
land was one of the most agrarian countries in Europe. Almost nine-tenths of
the votes cast for the Social Democrats came from the countryside. Rural voters
were in the majority in both absolute and relative terms, and the party was
not only strongly supported but also well organised in the countryside. Dur-
29 Bohemia resembled Finland the most in this respect. Whereas peasant landownership
was extensive in the Balkans, farms there were fragmented and scarcely viable compared
to those of the Finnish landowning class. See Berend andRánki 1974, pp. 49–52; and below,
Chapter 3.
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ing the following decade this party was gradually integrated into the prevailing
political system. Nonetheless, in 1918, immediately after Finland became inde-
pendent, it spearheaded an abortive revolution. Finally, a little over a decade
later, a powerful fascist-type movement emerged and attempted to overthrow
the Finnish parliamentary political system.
These are the main processes to be explained in this study: the entrance of
the masses onto the political scene in 1907, the rise and failure of the revolu-
tion of 1918, and the fascist-type reaction of the early 1930s. These phenomena
took place in a region that was or had just ceased to be a politically autonom-
ous part of the Russian Empire and had close economic links with the West.
To make sense of these processes, a number of questions must be answered.
What were the roles of the external and internal forces in the formation of the
Finnish state and in the creation of preconditions for collective action in it?
How did the outside factors and their intertwining with domestic structures
affect, first, early political mobilisation and, second, the outbreak of revolution
in 1918? Finally, what was the impact of the failure of the revolution on state
structures and conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s?
These questions may be viewed as problems involving relations between
the state and class structures in Finland and the organisation at their intersec-
tion – an organisation reflected in the nature of national and class integration.
All four processes should be viewed as dependent on external forces. In this
perspective, the first phenomenon that needs to be examined is the consol-
idation of the Finnish state, and particularly its relation both to the system
of established states in Europe and to the capitalist world economy. Second,
the class structure and the impact of the world market on it are to be con-
sidered. Here the third and fourth processes, linked to the role of the various
classes in the emerging Finnish state, become relevant. In what ways were
political developments in the mother country mediated into the Finnish state
and class structures, thus reshaping their mutual relations? What were the
roles of domestic and non-domestic forces in Finnish nationalism and early
twentieth-century politics?Moreover, how did the endogenous and exogenous
factors influence the process of political mobilisation in 1917 and 1918, after the
collapse of Imperial Russia? Finally, the consequences of the abortive revolu-
tion for the state and the classes in the newly independent republic will be
assessed.
The class relations that were institutionalised in the Finnish state through
specific forms of national and class integration during the nineteenth century
will be delineated first. Then the picture will be fleshed out by an examination
of the suddendisruptions in state control that cameabout because of interstate
rivalries damaging to Russia. The question is, how did earlier Finnish struc-
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tures and forms of integration become effective in the crisis, and what then
happened to them? Reduced to its barest essentials, then, the theme of this
book is the interplay between institutionalised domestic class relations and
fluctuations in the controlling capacity of the state resulting from oscillations
in the mother empire.
After considering these questions it will be possible to judge the relevance
of other Eastern European cases for Finland, as well as the relevance of the
Finnish case for them, in terms of classes, state formation, and problems of
organisation.
4 Plan of the Book
Thebook is divided into four parts, dealing firstwith fundamental state-making
processes and class relations (Part I), national integration and class integration
(Part II), and the rupture of integration in the abortive revolution (Part III).
Then an attempt is made to place Finnish developments in a European per-
spective (Part IV).
In Part I the formation of the Finnish state and its linkages with the devel-
opment of the class structure are delineated. The process of state-making and
the shifting relations among the upper classes bear themarks of Finland’s pos-
ition in the interface between Sweden and Russia. When the Finnish regions
were transferred from Sweden to Russia and made into a separate political
unit, the relations between the dominant groups were redefined. Then, a half-
century later, they were completed andmodified by capitalist development. In
the consolidation of the economy, Finland benefited greatly from its Scand-
inavian social structure and its status as an ‘overdeveloped’ minority region in
amultinational empire. From this double point of departure, aWestern type of
social structure and an Eastern type of dependence, Finland was able to start
a process of economically autonomous development in the latter part of the
nineteenth century (Chapter 2).
In this process close ties developed between the agrarian and the industrial
proletariat. Finland’s main industrial sector, forestry, was strongly and very dir-
ectly linked to the countryside because the peasants owned the bulk of the
forests. Consequently, the capitalist transformation was felt immediately and
profoundly in both town and country (Chapter 3).
Another aspect of the process of state-making and, notably, of the formation
of a national economy was territorial integration. During the Swedish period
the Finnish regions interacted mainly with an external core, Stockholm. In the
nineteenth century, however, after tentative and partial reorientation toward
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St. Petersburg, a domestic core emerged. A geographical division of labour was
established, which tied the various regions together in a more fundamental
sense than ever before and accentuated a number of regional inequalities
(Chapter 4).
Part II lays out the interrelationship between the state and the class struc-
tures in the process of organisation.The starting point is Finland’s resemblance
to Scandinavia, on theonehand, in its basic patterns of organisation andmobil-
isation, and to other minor nationalities in the large empires, on the other, in
its opportunities for collective action.
The national movement was a struggle for self-assertion and liberation, but
at the same time it served for the dominant classes as a ‘civic religion’ for
the emerging state, thanks to the early foundation of the Finnish polity by
the Russian imperial authorities. The latter aspect of the national movement
was intensified by the strength of the Finnish-speaking peasantry; because the
authority of the Swedish-speaking upper classes rested structurally on a fragile
foundation, their national responsiveness was enhanced. It is mainly because
of this combination – so it is argued – that national consolidation occurred in
Finland, and nationalism advanced exceptionally calmly and steadily (Chap-
ter 5).
Although the emerging party system closely resembled the Scandinavian
one, the political opportunity granted by the first Russian revolution in 1905–
6 made the main challenger, the worker movement, focus overwhelmingly on
purely political and, more particularly, parliamentary action, at the expense
of strikes and other forms of collective action based directly on productive
relations. Strong agrarian support for the Social Democratic party worked in
the same direction. The movement rapidly attained membership in the polity
and became a powerful instrument in both class and national integration
(Chapter 6).
The emergence of regionally varying party support is another indicator
of national integration. The persistence of regional conflicts is manifest in
the combinations of party support, which differed from region to region. But
because all important parties played a national role, it is reasonable to view
the regional combinations as the way in which local conflicts were fused on
the emerging national level (Chapter 7).
In Part III the disruption of metropolitan control and its domestic con-
sequences during and afterWorldWar I are brought into play. Arguably, it was
the strong position of the rather reformistworkermovement in the polity, com-
bined with the opportunity for collective action provided by the breakdown of
theRussianEmpire, that led Finland into a revolutionary situation.The Finnish
case illustrates the primacy of changes in conditions for contests concerning
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state power and suggests that whether or not the challengers consider them-
selves revolutionaries at the outset is of secondary importance (Chapters 8 and
9).
The failed revolution marked the creation of an independent country out
of a grand duchy, and especially out of the national and class integration
consolidated in the previous phase of state-making. The earlier national cul-
ture provided the instruments for defining and analysing the seemingly sur-
prising and incomprehensible developments of 1917–18. From this perspect-
ive, the Finnish fascist movement of the early 1930s appears to be basically
a general bourgeois reaction, an attempt to reassert the White victory of 1918
(Chapter 10).
Finally, Part IV (Chapters 11 and 12) focuses both on features that Finland had
in commonwith other Eastern Europeanminority regions and latecomer polit-
ies and on features that differentiated Finland from them. The country’s inter-
face position seems crucial: Finland emerges as a kind of mixed case in which,
curiously enough, a class structure and political system of aWestern type and a
sudden collapse of an Eastern type coincided to ignite a revolution. The former
had granted the Social Democrats a central place in the representative political
institutions of the country; the latter granted them an extremely advantageous
opportunity to use this power. The revolutionary situation emerged when the
labour movement attempted tomaintain power and the particular advantages
it had gained in the face of a resolute bourgeois effort to recapture amonopoly
on power. This was very unlike the Baltic Provinces, where the revolutionaries
really seized power, or Hungary, where they simply accepted it – in both cases
after war had destroyed the state apparatus.
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chapter 2
Dominant Groups and State-Making
1 The Early Nineteenth Century
Purely external factors determined the creation of Finland as a distinct polit-
ical entity. As Edward C. Thaden dryly puts it, ‘Finnish autonomy, and even the
existence of a Finnish nation, can be considered an incidental byproduct of
wars between Sweden and Russia during the eighteenth and at the beginning
of the nineteenth centuries’.1
Prior to 1809 themainly Finnish-speaking territories east of theGulf of Both-
nia and north of the Gulf of Finland were an integral part of Sweden. As on the
other side of the Gulf of Bothnia, the language of the elites was Swedish. The
sea did not separate but rather united the eastern provinces with the hub of
the state, and these were more oriented to Stockholm than to each other (see
Chapter 4). The south-western region of what later became the Finnish state
belonged more or less to the core of the Swedish kingdom, whereas the other
regions remained at the periphery. The concept of Finland existed, but it was
more a geographical term than a political one. Initially it referred to the south-
western region, which had been strongly linked to the core of the state from
the thirteenth century onward. Only later was it extended to cover the Finnish-
speaking peripheries, which in the course of the subsequent centuries came
under the firm control of the Swedish monarchs.2 At the end of the eighteenth
century about 15 percent of the total population consisted of Swedish-speakers,
most of whom were engaged in farming and fishing on the coastal regions.
Themost striking characteristic of Swedish society, in the Finnish regions as
well as in the territorymakingup thepresent-day Swedish state,was a freepeas-
antry, which constituted the backbone of the social structure. Thanks to class
balance in the rural economy, the relations of production were never really
feudalised. Moreover, during the eighteenth century the position of the land-
holding peasants was reinforced markedly. In the double process of increases
in peasant property and of enclosures, a foundationwas laid for the emergence
of a strong market-oriented cultivator class as well as for the internal differen-
tiation of the agricultural population.
1 Thaden 1984, p. 82.
2 Klinge 1982, pp. 23–49; Carlsson 1980.
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The freeholders’ proprietorship was strengthened, and tenants on crown
land were allowed to buy their holdings. Peasants also acquired the right to
purchase noble lands. At the same time, common lands were redistributed to
the landholders, and the repartition of mixed strips and fields into larger shares
was started.3
The extensiveness of peasant property in the Swedish kingdom strongly sug-
gests that the dominance of the nobility was based less on landownership than
on its central position in the bureaucracy – particularly when Sweden is com-
pared to Eastern and Central Europe. By contemporary standards, Sweden was
administered effectively, and the surplus frompeasant producerswas extracted
indirectly, rather than directly by a land-controlling nobility.4 Even in south-
western Finland, that is, in the Finnish-speaking region where manorial rela-
tionships were by far themost widespread, nobles and other gentlemen owned
only one-fifth of the complete farms (in Swedish, mantal) at the beginning of
the nineteenth century.5
The comparatively strong position of the peasantry was reflected in the
political system.The four-chamber SwedishDietwasunique inEurope in that it
included a separate Peasant Estate alongside the hereditary nobility, the occu-
pational clergy, and the burghers – although the Peasant Estate did remain
inferior to the other three chambers.
In 1809 eight eastern counties were separated from Sweden and incorpor-
ated into the Russian Empire. Although this area was populated mainly by
Finnish-speakers, the new border was drawn not on linguistic lines but on stra-
tegic ones. In 1807 at Tilsit, the Russian tsar Alexander I had agreed on zones
of influence with Napoleon. As a consequence Russia conquered Finland, a
territory important for the defence of St. Petersburg, in 1808–9.6 One century
earlier Peter the Great had won Estland, Livland, and the regions surrounding
3 Østerud 1978a, pp. 130–6. One indication of the deep roots of peasant freeholding in Sweden
is that the enclosures furthered independent family farming, rather than leading to a reduc-
tion in peasant land, as was the case in England. The Swedish enclosures were initiated by
the state and were not linked to the agricultural revolution but preceded it (ibid., pp. 144–
9).
4 Mäkelä and Viikari 1977, pp. 166–7.
5 Landownership by the nobles and other gentlemen is measured by combining two percent-
ages for the years 1805–7: the proportion of mantal cultivated by tenant farmers in Finland
Proper, Satakunta, Häme, and Uusimaa (Jutikkala 1939, 39), and the proportion held byman-
orial demesnes in the same regions (Jutikkala 1932, pp. 74–82). The percentages – which are
not fully comparable – are 16.4 and 3.4, respectively.
6 Tommila 1984, pp. 7–12, 54; Klinge 1980a, pp. 38–9.
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map 1 Finland, the Baltic Provinces of Russia, and Scandinavia in the nineteenth cen-
tury (including the border between Sweden and Russia in 1721 and 1743)
the bottomof theGulf of Finland fromSweden and established his new capital,
St. Petersburg, in the newly acquired territories (seeMap 1). From that time on,
the protection of the new capital was of primary importance for Russia. During
the eighteenth century, moreover, Sweden gradually lost her position as a great
power. The conquest of Finland by Russia was the final phase in the shift in
the balance of power between these two establishedmembers of the European
state system.
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Swedish sovereignty in the eastern counties ended in September 1809 with
the Treaty of Hamina (in Swedish, Fredrikshamn), and the conquest was con-
firmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The laws and privileges enjoyed
hitherto by the people of the conquered territory were to remain unchanged
under Russian rule. This was not exceptional: earlier Peter the Great had co-
opted the established institutional structure in annexed regions. The pacifica-
tionmeasures implemented in Finland in 1809were similar to those adopted in
the Baltic Provinces in 1710. The highest local authority was a Russian governor
general. The local administration continued to operate as before, but under
the surveillance of the governor general’s office.7 In the Finnish case, although
there was no prior administrative authority covering the entire region, com-
mon administrative practices had evolved during the centuries of Swedish rule.
These were strictly observed in the new political environment. As early as
March 1809 the tsar met with the assembled Finnish estates in the cathedral
city of Porvoo (Borgå) and declared his intention to make Finland an imperial
grand duchy, a separate entity in governmental, financial, and religious affairs.
Alexander’s interest in experiments with political and social reform had an
influence on the rights granted to the Finns. He believed that Russia hadmuch
to learn from the institutional systems then prevailing in Russia’s western bor-
derlands. But foreign-policy considerations were still more important. Because
of warswith Sweden,Turkey, and France and, in a broader perspective, because
of Sweden’s continuing military power, which allowed it to challenge his con-
trol of Finland, it seemed imperative to tie the new region to the central gov-
ernment by transferring the loyalties of the local elite to the new sovereign.
This had occurred in the Baltic Provinces, and it was the goal in Finland.8 ‘The
imperial policy of autonomy rested on the assumption that political loyalty and
orthodoxy in the northwestern border zone could be best guaranteed through
the employment of local elites and local traditions’.9
The goal was pursued by maintaining and even extending privileges, by
building a central administration, and by creating a Finnish counterpart of
the Swedish four-curia Diet. Among the institutions that were to remain un-
changedwere the fundamental laws, the Lutheran religion, and corporate priv-
ileges. Furthermore, the Finns were not subject to conscription, but they did
become eligible for civil and military office in the empire (whereas Russians
were not eligible for Finnish posts). The grand duchy had a separate budget
and retained its own revenues. The local university in Turku (Åbo), which was
7 Jussila 1981, p. 32; Schweitzer 1984, pp. 202, 203.
8 Thaden 1981b, pp. 15–17; Thaden 1984, pp. 3, 60–1, 231–2.
9 Selleck 1961, p. 52.
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later moved to Helsinki (Helsingfors), was given considerable privileges. Fin-
land formed a separate customs area in the Russian foreign trade system. In
economic affairs, only tariffs, trade relations with foreign countries, and some
features of monetary policy were initially placed under Russian jurisdiction.
The traditional administrative units – the counties and the communes – were
retained, but they were integrated into a uniform domestic administration. As
a further sign of favour, the south-western areas of Karelia around the city of
Viipuri (Viborg), annexed by Russia in 1721 and 1743 (see Map 1), were united
with the grand duchy in 1812.
From 1816 the highest domestic authority was the Senate. Its Economic
Department served as the supreme administrative council, and its Judicial
Department as the supreme court. Thememberswere recruited primarily from
the professional civil and judicial service. The Senate was chaired by the gov-
ernor general, who was the highest official in Finland and commander-in-
chief of the Russian troops stationed in the country. In St. Petersburg, Finnish
matters were prepared and presented by the Committee for Finnish Affairs
(between 1826 and 1857, the State Secretariat for FinnishAffairs), headed at first
by a state secretary, and from 1834 on by a minister state secretary who figured
among theministers of the empire. Significantly, Finnish affairswere presented
directly to the emperor, and the country was not subordinated to the central,
ministerial government of Russia.10
The meaning of Finland’s new position was far from self-evident at the
outset. Its true importance and also a number of its institutional forms were
established, especially in the first decades of the grand duchy, only through
continued and determined efforts by Finnish leaders, for whom the consol-
idation of Finland’s separate status remained a constant preoccupation.11 The
basis that made this work possible was laid in 1809 and the next few years, dur-
ing which time Finland acquired for the first time a politically distinct status.
Militarily its positionwasmore secure than under Swedish rule, and personally
members of the upper echelons of the administration had access to newoffices
under improved conditions.12 Among all Russia’s nineteenth-century border-
lands, only Congress Poland enjoyed greater autonomy, and that was only until
the insurrection of 1830–1.
The various initial measures rapidly produced the desired results. Nearly all
important institutional and Swedish-speaking elites made public declarations
of loyalty and gratitude, and organisation and recruitment for the new central
10 Jussila 1985, pp. 63, 66.
11 Schweitzer 1984, pp. 201–9; Jussila 1984, pp. 97–8.
12 Selleck 1961, pp. 35–7; Tommila 1984, pp. 51, 58–65, 75–6, 105, 113–31.
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administration proceeded apace. For leaders of the Finnish nobility, trained in
the Swedish royal service, it was relatively easy to transfer to the tsar personal
loyalty developed in an earlier era.13 Such shifts of allegiance were quite com-
monduring this period, particularly among the nobility. As E.J. Hobsbawmputs
it, ‘Before the “national” era … various “national” solidarities had only a cas-
ual connection, and were not supposed to have any special connection, with
obligations to the state centre’.14 In 1850, over one-fifth of the adult Finnish
male nobility was in the Russian military service. During the entire period of
Russian rule, the Imperial Army attracted about 3,300 Finns, mostly from the
aristocracy.15
From the Russian point of view, the process was facilitated by the consti-
tutional system introduced by the Swedish king, Gustav III, in 1772 and 1789.
The Gustavian constitution presumed the existence of a strong royal execut-
ive governing by decree through an administrative hierarchy over which the
Diet had very little control. This feature made it easier for the emperor to pre-
serve the fundamental legislation. Moreover, Finland’s autonomy was based
ultimately on his generosity, not on formal recognition of fundamental laws.
Finland never obtained from Alexander I or from his successors formal regula-
tion of its relationship with Russia. The Finnish bureaucratic leaders were well
aware that in the autocratic Russian Empire the constitution ultimately rested
on a tenuous political balance and that the limitations of monarchy were self-
imposed, or rather imposed by considerations of broader policy, over which
Finns had no effective control.16
In a sense the Gustavian system facilitated cultural separation from Sweden.
As a consequence of the war, Sweden’s political system and cultural atmo-
sphere changed greatly, and the former mother country became increasingly
alien to the Finnish elites.17
The fact that the convening of the Diet depended on the monarch was
extremely important for the domestic exercise of power. After 1809, the Diet
was not summoned until 1863. Subsequently, however, it met at regular inter-
vals.Without a parliament to serve as a public forum for political competition,
the bureaucratically organised administration, with the Senate at its top, was
needed to carry out important political tasks. And because the tsar remained
13 Korhonen 1963, pp. 190–214; Tommila 1984, pp. 83, 102; Selleck 1961, pp. 40, 42.
14 Hobsbawm 1972, p. 389.
15 Screen 1976, pp. 287–9; Kirby 1979, pp. 6–7.
16 Thaden 1984, 85, 230.Twobasic studies areKorhonen 1963 and Jussila 1969; see also Selleck
1961, 41, 46–47, 53.
17 Klinge 1980b, pp. 13–14.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
dominant groups and state-making 25
passive in local affairs, the actual exercise of political leadership devolved in
largemeasureon thebureaucracy,withnoclear divisionof political andadmin-
istrative functions in the central government. Early nineteenth-century Fin-
land was, in its upper echelons, a thoroughly bureaucratic society.18
In sum, then, when Russia created the Finnish polity, the position of the
domestic bureaucracy was greatly strengthened. A central administration was
built up, but its rolewas not limited to administrative affairs. By suspending the
Diet for nearly half a century, the Russians indirectly endowed the top of the
administration with vital political functions.
These arrangements were to change status and power relations among the
dominant groups and to create new tensions. Paradoxically, the strengthening
of the bureaucracy, which was the stronghold of the nobility, undermined the
nobility’s traditional position as the first and most powerful estate. Nobility
was becoming more a reward than a prerequisite for bureaucratic success.19
The erosion was symptomatic of a more general change affecting the dom-
inant groups. In the bureaucratic society of the early nineteenth century, the
four estates ceased to reflect adequately social differentiation. The basic social
dividing line came to separate the ‘gentry’ from the masses. The bureaucracy
constituted the core of the gentry (in Swedish, ståndspersoner; in Finnish,
säätyläiset). In Swedish usage, the concept of the gentry initially referred to
the nobility, the clergy, and their social equals. Later the term other gentrywas
used to refer to commoners who had entered the military and bureaucratic
ranks and to any teachers or professionals who did not fall into the tradi-
tional ‘learned estate’ of the clergy. The gentry revolved around the civil service,
which had an internal hierarchy and an official system of ranks. Ultimately the
concept came to refer to a social identity recognised more by custom than by
law. The gentry pattern included exposure to higher education, employment in
the higher levels of the administration, personal association with other mem-
bers of the gentry, an appropriate standard of living, and use of the Swedish
language, which dominated all public services, higher education, and public
life. In other words, the gentry was a status group in theWeberian sense.20
The existence of this status group is an indication of the stability that pre-
vailed in the bureaucratic society of the time. Business and industrial activity
were also under firm administrative control. The domestic government was
the main source of commercial funds for business, and only the state could
18 Selleck 1961, pp. 25–6, 53–4; Wirilander 1974, pp. 105–6, 116, 120.
19 Jutikkala 1956, p. 124; Selleck 1961, pp. 25–26.
20 Selleck 1961, pp. 21–5; Wirilander 1974, pp. 33–6, 105–41, 153–9, 179–82, 409; Weber 1968,
pp. 305–7, 935–8.
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table 1 Percentage distribution of Finnish population by
industry, 1820–1920
Sector 1820 1870 1920
Agriculture and forestry 88% 83% 71%
Industry 4 6 15
Trade and communications 4 5 11
Unknown 4 6 3
Total 100% 100% 100%
N (thousands) 1,178 1,766 3,105
Source: P. Manninen 1976, 81
create an adequate infrastructure. The character of the social structure helped
to preserve social tranquillity. Nearly nine-tenths of the population worked in
agriculture (see Table 1), and the agrarian population was made up mainly of
landowning peasants and crofters (see Table 4, p. 43). Only the former had a
recognised position in the political system, but in many cases the economic
positions of the two groups were very much alike. The agrarian proletariat, in
contrast, found itself under strict control owing to thehiring-out obligation and
other regulations.21
Consequently, during this period the only visible social tension resulted
not from challenges by subordinated groups but from the increased power
and authority of the bureaucracy. This is a central point in Roberta Selleck’s
study of the Finnish political discussion during the half-century preceding the
reconvening of the Diet in 1863.22 Besides the civil hierarchy, the other main
elite section in the gentry consisted of the clerical and academic groups. With
the strengthening of the bureaucracy, their institutional position was slowly
eroded, leading ultimately to dissatisfaction with and opposition to the civil
hierarchy.
The Lutheran church and the national university were vested with powers
of internal self-government and performed important political functions. The
church, through its parish congregations, was responsible for local government
in rural areas, as well as for public education – not only the basic instruction in
literacy required of all Lutheran communicants, but also the secondary system
21 Myllyntaus 1981, p. 178.
22 Selleck 1961.
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leadingup to theuniversity.Therewas a close linkbetween the two institutions:
both scholars and practising clerics made up the church elite.23
Recruitment patterns for the clergy and academic groups were similar and
differed from those for the civil hierarchy. Just as there were family dynasties
within the bureaucracy, so too was there much clerical-academic self- and
inter-recruitment. Another peculiarity was the continuing entry into these
groups by people from outside the gentry as a whole. The small flow of the sons
of the independent peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie into (lower) church
and university posts represented the only regular form of social mobility into
the gentry during this period.24
The creation of a local bureaucratic hierarchy following the events of 1808–9
reduced the relative social status of the clerical and scholarly elites. The tradi-
tional academic emphasis on a broad classical education conflicted with the
bureaucratic view that the university should provide vocational training for
public service.25 More important, because the church and university shaped
public attitudes, not least of all through the educational system, bureaucratic
leaders had to make use of the Second Estate in their efforts to maintain
the precarious balance of imperial policy. These bureaucratic leaders thus
eagerly claimed the right to exercise authoritative control based on their capa-
city to defend autonomy through a combination of rigid legalism, diplomacy,
and strategic compromise. ‘While it was generally sufficient to secure passive
obedience from other social groups, the clerical and teaching personnel were
required to play an active part in the execution of government policy by assist-
ing in the control of public opinion’.26 This was particularly important, at this
time when public discussion was limited by official controls and the Diet did
not convene, because theuniversity provided virtually theonly forumof debate
outside the upper levels of the bureaucracy itself.
23 The institutional connectionswere gradually severed after 1809, but church anduniversity
men, sharing a similar educational background and a similar professional interest in the
educational process, maintained close contacts even after formal separation (Selleck 1961,
pp. 27–9; cf. Wirilander 1974, pp. 256–8, 329–35).
24 Waris 1940, pp. 216, 221–7; Selleck 1961, pp. 25, 29–31. Cf.Wirilander 1974, pp. 201–34, 351–5.
25 As training for the civil service became more important, the university curriculum could
not be left in the hands of clergymen and scholars to the extent it had been before. Civil
service training had been assigned to the university in the previous century, but a decisive
move toward the dominance of bureaucratic considerations occurred after 1810 (Selleck
1961, pp. 74–7; cf. Tommila 1984, p. 132; and Wirilander 1974, pp. 234, 313, 336, 338, 344–5,
350, 360–3, 366).
26 Selleck 1961, p. 67.
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For the members of the Second Estate, and especially for their leaders in
the academic community, these processes implied a loss of freedom of action.
Against various threats to their existence as an autonomous social corporation,
politically conscious members of the academic community slowly began to
assert alternative claims to status and authority:
As institutional criticism of a liberal nature was prevented by censorship,
these claimswere expressed primarily in terms of cultural values. General
education was opposed to routine administrative skill, and the capacity
to contact the depths of the nationwas described asmore important than
the ability to negotiate a defense of legal autonomy.27
To conclude, the creation of a separate Finnish polity did not evoke open
social conflicts in the early nineteenth century. It did not change the relations
between the rulers and the population, as had happened in the early European
states; the earlier system of domination was preserved. But the change was sig-
nificant for the Finnish elites. For the first time they were tied to each other
through a domestic administration. The process of state-making, which was
shaped above all by the country’s dependent position, changed the relations
between the elites and generated tension among them. As Selleck points out,28
the very structure of Finland’s autonomy tended to deflect frustrations arising
out of Finno-Russian relations toward domestic targets, hastening the devel-
opment of opposition within the ranks of the gentry – opposition not to the
empire as such but rather to the local, governing elite of the grand duchy. This
institutional tension played a part in the rise of the national movement from
the 1840s on (see Chapter 5), and it was amplified and altered in the late nine-
teenth century as a consequence of the capitalist transformation.
2 Economic Integration
The early European national states grew up along with capitalism. In these
countries, state-making and the development of capitalism were so closely
intertwined that it is hard to distinguish their effects. In the Finnish case the
relationship is much less problematic. Because the Finnish polity was created
by external decision, economic consolidation could occur only after Finland
had evolved politically. In the earliest phase of economic integration, then,
27 Ibid., p. 87.
28 Ibid., p. 34.
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the state played the principal role, and it remained central when the capitalist
transformation gave further momentum to the process.
Before the 1840s, the efforts of the state were directed more to maintaining
the status quo than to creating an integrated economic unit. Industrial devel-
opment was restrained by mercantilist restrictions, and the surplus extracted
from the peasants provided the fiscal basis for nearly all the operations of
the state. The largest public expenditure item was administration.29 Under
this passive policy a national market emerged rather slowly. There were agri-
cultural regions of both over- and underproduction, but only weak commer-
cial links existed between them. Similarly, the national market for industrial
products was very modest. ‘At present Finnish merchants have more extens-
ive and more active relations with foreign countries than with each other’, a
geography manual stated in 1827.30 Characteristically, the separation of the
Finnish counties from Sweden did not lead to a sudden change in commercial
relations with the former mother country. Sales to Stockholm of Finnish peas-
ant produce remained important after 1809 in the western regions, and Fin-
land’s most important industrial activity, iron fabrication, was almost entirely
dependent on Swedish ore until the 1860s. Until the 1840s commerce with
Sweden resembled domestic trade more than foreign trade. Swedish currency
was accepted along with the Russian silver and paper ruble andwas evenmore
widely used than the latter currency.31 In the east, commercial ties with St.
Petersburg were revitalised (see Chapter 4).
Only in the 1840s and 1850s did the state begin to actively support eco-
nomic consolidation and growth. State revenues were increased in order to
promote industry and the construction of the infrastructure, which in turn
was supposed to stimulate trade in agricultural products. A monetary reform
was carried out, the position of the Bank of Finland (founded in 1811) was rein-
forced, the tariff and land tax systems were reorganised, financing of industry
was facilitated, vocational schools were founded, and the construction of roads
and canals gained momentum. In the early 1840s the country was economic-
ally separated from Sweden as earlier tariff privileges were abolished and the
Swedish currency was replaced by a domestic one.32
29 ‘Administration’ included, above all, the maintenance of (former) officers in the army,
abolished when the grand duchy was founded, as well as the maintenance of a small per-
manent detachment (Myllyntaus 1980, pp. 362–3).
30 Quoted in Mauranen 1980, p. 448.
31 Myllyntaus 1980, pp. 340, 347–8; Schybergson 1980a, pp. 412, 420–1; Schybergson 1980b,
p. 451.
32 Myllyntaus 1980, pp. 338, 342, 353, 355, 358, 365; Schybergson 1980a, p. 432; Schybergson
1980b, p. 457; Mauranen 1980, p. 449.
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The final steps in the repeal of mercantilist restrictions and in the con-
struction of a national economy were taken between the late 1850s and the
late 1870s. The process was accelerated by the crisis of the autocracy follow-
ing the Crimean War and by the added strength of the domestic bourgeoisie
and other interest groups. By revealing both the economic and military back-
wardness of the Russian autocracy, the war made internal reforms urgent and
directed governmental attention to the loyalty of national minorities. To this
end Alexander II, in 1856, initiated a liberal policy of reform in socially tran-
quil Finland. Gradually, however, this policy led to a crisis, because the estab-
lished practices of consultation and administrative decree could no longer
be employed without consultation with the four Finnish estates. Increasing
Finnish demands finally brought the tsar to agree to the resumption and regu-
larisation of Parliament from 1863 on – in the middle of the Polish crisis – and
the basic economic legislation was revised.33 By the end of the 1870s a separ-
ate Finnish currency had been introduced, all industries and trades freed from
restrictions, the craft system and limitations on the free movement of labour
abolished, active railway construction initiated, and the local administration
modernised.
Of decisive importance, however, were the closing decades of the last cen-
tury. Gross domestic product increased fivefold between 1860 and 1913, with the
1890s the period of most rapid growth. The growth ratewas one of the fastest in
Europe. At the same time, the share of industry and construction in the gross
domestic product (GDP) increased from 13 to 25 percent, and the share of the
primary sector fell from 65 to 47 percent. Self-financing played an important
role in the growth of GDP.34 Agriculture was linked to the rapidly expanding
market, the main indication being the changeover from traditional arable cul-
tivation to the much more commercial occupation of stock-raising. The land
tax was replaced by various indirect taxes, mainly tariffs, as the main source of
state revenue. In state expenditure, the construction of the infrastructure and
the provision of social services, notably investments in railways and in educa-
tion, came to predominate along with the administrative expenditures.35
In this way the main obstacles to capitalist transformation were removed –
that is, the state itself began to acquire capitalist features. It no longer merely
collected and distributed the surplus produce of the peasantry, as in the early
nineteenth century. It now began to develop functions involved in the repro-
33 Suni 1979, pp. 59–63, 100–4; Seileck 1961, pp. 178–9.
34 Hjerppe and Pihkala 1977, p. 60; Hjerppe, Peltonen, and Pihkala 1984, p. 44; A. Kuusterä
1985, pp. 144–5.
35 Pihkala 1977.
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duction of the capitalist mode of production.36 The state had proceeded from
controlling economic activity to promoting the process of accumulation both
by establishing the legal and institutional framework conducive to growth and
by carrying out economic activity. Thus a political unit that had been created
by an external decision gradually became economically integrated.
This transformation was greatly accelerated by Finland’s links to the inter-
national economic system.37 Actually, as IvánT. Berend andGyörgy Ránki have
pointed out – and as the importance of tariffs in state revenue makes clear
in the Finnish case – it is just at the intersection of domestic and interna-
tional forces that the state played its part in the capitalist transformation of the
European peripheries and prepared the periphery in question to face the chal-
lenge of the industrialisedWest.38 By the middle of the century, the industrial
revolution inWestern Europe had created a capitalist market of a type that had
never existed before, with a pulling power that attractedwhatever food and raw
material the world could produce and that could transform backward agrarian
regionswithin a fewdecades.39 Finlandwas one of these regions, andwoodwas
the resource exploited. Finland’s resource endowment determined its role in
the international division of labour, andwoodprocessing became the country’s
leading industry. Between 1900 and 1909, wood industry products (essentially
lumber) accounted for 44 percent of the total value of exports, or asmuch as 69
percent including forestry and the more advanced paper industry. At the same
time, Finnish exports had one of the fastest growth rates among the peripheral
countries of Europe, and the value of exports increased fifteenfold from 1860
to 1913. Finland was an ‘open economy’, the share of exports being twenty to
twenty-five percent of the GDP from the 1890s on.40
Finland thus began to industrialise at about the same time as other countries
in Eastern Europe, and its industrialisation was based on a low value-added
export product. Linkages of the sawmill industry with other industrial sectors
were modest. Production was based on the abundance of timber and on a
cheap labour force. Most of Finland’s sawn goods were exported to developed
Western countries, notably Great Britain, and the exports were highly vulner-
36 Mäkelä and Viikari 1977, p. 168.
37 The preceding decades had prepared theway, of course. Between 1810 and 1870 the annual
increase in the volume of foreign trade averaged two percent (Schybergson 1980b, p. 458).
38 Berend and Ránki 1982, pp. 59–73, 106, 141.
39 See P. Anderson 1974, p. 392; and Berend and Ránki 1982, p. 27.
40 Heikkinen andHoffman 1982, pp. 60–70; Pihkala 1969, pp. 63, 74–5; Hirvonen andHjerppe
1983, p. 32; Berend and Ránki 1982, pp. 114–15. The wood and paper industries accounted
at that time for 83 percent of the value of industrial exports, which dominated the export
trade.
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able to international price fluctuations. In short, sawn goods were in many
respects a staple product similar to those exported by weakly developed and
dependent economies.41
Finland, however, escaped the so-called staple trap, that is, dependence
arising from the dominance of a narrow range of exports based on raw mater-
ials. It followed the Scandinavian pattern more closely than that of the East-
Central European agrarian peripheries.42 Economic transformation contrib-
uted greatly to the process of state-making, and Finland emerged as an eco-
nomic unit with a territorial division of labour and an autonomous economic
core.43
What factors provided the initial impetus for Finland’s ‘self-sustained eco-
nomic growth’, especially from the 1880s and 1890s on?44 A comprehensive
answer is beyond the scope of this study, but clearly Finland’s interface posi-
tion determined its room formanoeuvre relative to both theWestern capitalist
market and Russia. First, as far as its Western-oriented export industry was
concerned, the linkages of the sawmill industry with other sectors of the eco-
nomywere themost significant. Activity inmany other sectors was financed by
the income of the sawmill industry, which was largely domestically owned.45
The role of the independent peasantry was decisive in this respect. Finland’s
earlier history as a part of Sweden had led to the consolidation of a large free-
holding peasantry. In the nineteenth century the nonfeudal class structure
differentiated Finland from the other Eastern European agrarian peripheries.
Unlike elsewhere, in Finland thepeasants owned thebulk of the country’smain
industrial resource, the forests, especially in the most prosperous areas of Fin-
land. Consequently, the rise of the forest industry benefited directly the upper
stratum of the peasantry. Their position was quite different from that of other
European peasants who owned less forest land and who did not experience
the enormous rise in the price of land that occurred in Finland. Even com-
pared to Sweden there was a clear difference.46 A symbiotic relationship arose
between farming, forestry, and the forest industry that enabled the spread of
forest incomes to a large number of landowners, contributed to the changeover
to stock-raising, increasedpurchasingpower in the countryside, and stimulated
41 Hoffman 1980, pp. 110–12, 163–5, 173–4; Ahvenainen 1984, pp. 286–96. See also Berend and
Ránki 1982, pp. 116–35.
42 Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987, pp. 12–18; Berend and Ránki 1982.
43 See Heikkinen and Hoffman 1982, pp. 82–7; and below, Chapter 4.
44 Heikkinen and Hjerppe 1981, p. 20; Hjerppe, Peltonen and Pihkala 1984, p. 44.
45 Hoffman 1980, p. 175.
46 Ibid.; Ahvenainen 1984, pp. 244–5; Jutikkala 1963, p. 344.
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domestic industry.47 Agrarian advance was connected with industrial develop-
ment, and in this industrialisation direct foreign-investment capital played no
important role.48
Second, compared to Russia, Finland was a developed region. In fact, Fin-
land was one of the few relatively ‘overdeveloped’ minority regions within the
multinational empires of the time.49 Although most of the Finnish counties
had been peripheral in the Swedish kingdom, their economic and educational
levels were above those of Russia. Finland, long aided by considerable tariff
privileges, became from the 1870s on not only an exporter of raw materials
to the West but also an exporter of processed products to Russia. Between
1900 and 1909, Russia accounted for 28 percent of the total value of Finnish
exports, but its share in the value of industrial exports, excluding sawmill
industry products, was 73 percent. The main imports from Russia were grain
products.50 Exports to Russia, although they lagged behind those to Western
Europe in volume, were of primary importance in stimulating manufacturing,
for example the metal and the textile industries, which were the largest sec-
tors after the wood industry. Metallurgy and textiles, along with papermaking,
had much closer linkages with other industrial sectors than did the sawmill
industry. This connection also facilitated economic consolidation in Finland.51
47 Hoffman 1980, pp. 170–2, 174–5; Soininen 1982, pp. 28, 47–50. Cf. Heikkinen and Hjerppe
1981, p. 22.
48 Hjerppe, Peltonen and Pihkala 1984, p. 45. Foreign loans were of significance, however, for
example in the forest industry and in railway construction.
49 Only Bohemia, Croatia, and the Russian partition of Poland seem similar in this respect
(Nairn 1977, pp. 185–7; Kiernan 1976, p. 120; Berend and Ránki 1982, pp. 107–8).
50 Pihkala 1969, pp. 74–5; Heikkinen and Hoffman 1982, pp. 67–70; Rasila 1982a, pp. 96–9.
51 Preferential tariff treatment in Russia had already helped the Finnish textile and metal
industries in the early nineteenth century (Schybergson 1973, p. 59), but new tariffs, adop-
ted simultaneously with the other post-Crimean War reforms in 1859, paved the way
for the rapid and favourable development of trade. Several Finnish industries gained a
highly advantageous position as compared with industries inWestern European compet-
itor countries. The cotton industry became the first modern manufacturing industry in
Finland, and before 1850 about 75 percent of its production went to Russia (Schybergson
1980a, pp. 416–17). Similarly, the iron industry exported the bulk of its output to Russia
and continuously increased the production of refined iron products as a share of total
output. Russia also became the main market for the paper industry. In 1885, however, the
Russian tariffs were readjusted, and Finland lost much of its relative advantage vis-à-vis
Western countries. The textile industry had to reorient its production to the domesticmar-
ket, and the export of certain processed products became unprofitable. In other respects,
though, the new tariffs had no major negative impact (Hjerppe 1979, p. 131). Particularly
in the 1880s, economic integration proceeded as a consequence of the consolidation of
the domesticmarket. In this decade industrial and other domestic productionwas clearly
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
34 chapter 2
Finland’s role in the emerging international division of labour cannot be
explained solely by its interfacepositionor natural resource endowment: of key
importance was the continuously increasing demand for wood on the world
market. The interface perspective does, however, throw light on those struc-
tures through which international market pressures were transmitted to Fin-
land, and it is therefore essential for understanding the process of economic
integration. Thanks to its ‘Swedish’ social structure, Finland was able to reduce
the dangers arising from dependence on the export of a single product to the
Western market. Moreover, the fact that Finland was ‘overdeveloped’ in rela-
tion to the mother country was decisive for exploiting the Russian connec-
tion. Given this constellation of domestic and international forces, the state
could successfully operate to strengthen Finland’s position both internally and
externally.
3 The Late Nineteenth Century
During the latter half of the century, the capitalist transformation altered sub-
stantially the tensions that had emerged between the civil bureaucracy and the
academic and clerical groups. Most important, the central role of the state in
the process of industrialisation produced close connections between the bur-
eaucratic elite and the bourgeoisie proper, which was made up of a growing
number of owners and controllers of means of production. In economic policy
the interests of industry were generally given priority over those of agricul-
ture.52 Onemajor early indication of this partiality was corporate consultation
in economic planning, as governmental, industrial, and commercial interests
were reconciled in large economic commissions that laid the foundation for
the great reforms of the 1850s and 1860s. There was also considerable interre-
cruitment between the bureaucratic and the commercial-industrial elites.53
less dependent on foreign trade than previously (Hjerppe 1979, p. 27). Increasingly, the tex-
tile, machine, and other industries began to find outlets for their products in the domestic
market (Hjerppe 1979, pp. 35, 131; Hjerppe 1981, p. 223; Hoffman 1980, pp. 34, 92, 116, 174–
5; Heikkinen 1981, pp. 417–18). In a period in which domestic grain production was going
throughaprofoundcrisis andagriculturewas changingover to stock-raising, grain imports
from Russia facilitated structural transformation. These imports were also advantageous
to industry because theymade it possible to keep wages low (Myllyntaus 1980, p. 349; Pip-
ping 1969, p. 23).
52 Harmaja 1933, pp. 213, 219, 221. Cf. Pipping 1969, p. 23.
53 The economic elite came primarily from the gentry. The upper stratum of the burghers,
i.e., the owners andmanagers of the large commercial houses, played a central role, espe-
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Besides the bourgeoisie, another emerging group was the landowning and
Finnish-speaking peasantry, whose wealthiest stratum was on a par with the
landed gentry. Rapid economic rise was accompanied by political and cultural
consolidation when the Diet was reconvened in 1863 and local government
reformed in 1865 (see Chapter 3). In the late nineteenth century this group
often allied itself with the clergy, then on the decline. At that time the educa-
tional system was divorced from the church, and local government from local
parish administration. The decline of the clergy and its coalitionwith the peas-
antry are reflected in recruitment patterns. The sons of the gentry increasingly
rejected clerical careers, and interrecruitment between academic and clerical
groups decreased. Yet at the same time, socially mobile peasant sons joined
the ranks of the clergy, which became the first gentry group with a Finnish-
speakingmajority.54 As a churchhistorian states, ‘When the clergy realized that
its hold on a large portion of the educated class was lost, it tried to find a closer
connection with the peasant folk’.55
With the formation of two clusters among the dominant groups, earlier ten-
sionswere altered.Thedivision emerged in the last decades of the century, after
regular parliamentary meetings had begun to breathe new life into dormant
political life. On one side were the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie with their
Swedish culture, on the other the church and the Finnish-speaking peasantry.
In the Parliament the main cleavage was between most of the nobles and the
burghers on the one hand, and the clergy and the independent peasantry on
the other.
The economic tensions between the new bourgeoisie and the landowners
were similar to those found in Scandinavia,56 but in Finland they were rein-
forced by a cultural cleavage. Not surprisingly, these tensions are important for
understanding the social basis of the national movement (Chapter 5); still, the
cleavages should not be exaggerated. Economic development was undermin-
ing the gentry as a status group, but there was nonetheless a culture common
to all dominant groups except the wealthy peasantry. In absolute numbers the
gentry was small: in 1870, for example, it consisted of only 27,000 persons, fam-
cially in the sawmill industry, but the nobility and the bureaucracy producedmembers of
the upper industrial and commercial stratum as well. There was also a movement from
business to bureaucracy. Systematic information, however, covers only the period 1810–
52 (Hoffman 1980, pp. 77–84; A. Kuusterä 1981; Mauranen 1981, pp. 200, 210; Schybergson
1977; Jutikkala 1974, pp. 24–48, 113; Noponen 1964, pp. 34–8; Waris 1940, pp. 258, 260).
54 Juva 1956, p. 123; Björklund 1939, pp. 33–7; Laaksonen 1962, pp. 36–7; Alapuro 1973a, p. 31;
Elovainio 1972, p. 251.
55 Juva 1960, p. 359.
56 Rokkan 1970, pp. 108–9.
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table 2 Percentage distribution of Finnish
population by estate, 1890
Estate
Nobility 0.1%
Clergy 0.3
Burghers 3.1
Independent peasantry 26.1
Others 70.4
Total 100.0%
N (thousands) 2,380
Source: Éléments démographiques
principaux de la Finlande pour les
années 1750–1890 1899, 261, 262
ily members included, or 1.5 percent of the total population.57 Twenty years
later the share was somewhat higher, as may be seen from the first three fig-
ures in Table 2. All elites shared a similar background; they were educated
at the same university and often knew one another.58 And all were unanim-
ous about the need to maintain and reinforce political autonomy. Conflicts
between the landowners and the rising bourgeoisie seem to have been com-
paratively restricted. The landowning peasantry benefited from the leading
industrial sector, sawmilling, and over a time a certain community of interests
emerged.
These features should also be viewed in the context of the social tranquil-
lity then prevailing. No challenge from below forced the dominant groups to
close ranks. Apart from the last decade, the nineteenth century was a period
in which internal social conflicts were practically unknown (see Chapter 6)59
and external peace continued uninterrupted. The dominance of the landown-
ing peasantry tended tomask the growth of the rural proletariat, and the urban
proletariat increased significantly only in the 1890s. The ultimate guarantee of
stabilitywas providedby the empire, even if imperial troopswere never needed
57 Wirilander 1974, p. 142.
58 Klinge 1980a, pp. 53, 64, 66.Thenumber of studentswas small, around600–50 in the 1870s,
and only grew to about 1,250 at the turn of the century (Klinge 1967–8, 2: 3, 3: 2, 168).
59 The only region of peasant unrest in nineteenth-century Finland was the county of
Viipuri. In this region, the so-called Old Finland, which was united with the ‘new’ Finland
in 1812, Russian nobles had been granted land in the eighteenth century.
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to put down local insurrections, as happened in Poland. Characteristically, only
minor readjustments were made in corporate privileges. At the beginning of
the twentieth century, Finland had essentially the same political system as it
had in 1789.
A final indication of the growing strength of the local dominant groups and
of Finland as a separate political unit was the creation of a national armed
force. Up to the 1870s there was a peacetime Finnish detachment of between
1,600 and 4,500men. In 1878, after general conscription had been introduced in
Russia, the Parliament succeeded in obtaining approval for a separate Finnish
army, a concession necessitated by the conflict in the Balkans and the concom-
itant Russian fear of Swedish intervention.60 This armywas also raised through
general conscription and at full strength never exceeded 5,600 men.61 Thus,
whereas Alexander I’s two other conquests, Bessarabia and Congress Poland,
lost their original status in the course of the nineteenth century, Finland suc-
ceeded in preserving and even strengthening its original position.62
In the last decades of the century, territorial consolidation, centralisation,
and differentiation of the instruments of government and economic integra-
tion occurred, as did monopolisation of the means of coercion. As to central-
isation and the character of governmental institutions, Finland had not only a
legal order but also a centralised administrative apparatus subject to this legal
order – that is, the bureaucracy. In a word, Finnish leaders were increasingly in
charge of, to useWeber’s term, a modern state.63
60 Suni 1979, p. 98.
61 The rest of the conscripts remained in reserve. Young men were chosen by lot only to the
extent necessary to keep the total active force at 5,600 (Lundin 1981, p. 420).
62 Jussila 1984, pp. 99–102; Polvinen 1984, p. 60.
63 According to MaxWeber, the essential characteristics of the modern state are legal order,
bureaucracy, binding authority over a territory, and monopolisation of the legitimate use
of coercion (Weber 1968, p. 56; Bendix 1960, pp. 417–18).
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chapter 3
The Agrarian Class Structure and Industrial
Workers
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, capitalist development
greatly speeded up the dissolution of traditional social structures. New divi-
sions opened the way for conflicts within the agrarian population, and an
industrial proletariat emerged. The two processes were linked in that Finland’s
industrialisation was based mainly on the exploitation of its forests.
1 The Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions in Finland
Stein Rokkan has argued that the considerable agrarian support the Social
Democrats received in Finland resulted largely from the late start of emigra-
tion or, more specifically, from the rapid growth of the landless proletariat,
which was a consequence of this late start.1 This point becomes clear in the
light of more fundamental processes, namely the industrial and demographic
revolutions, which in Finland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, were chronolo-
gically distinct. There, because the onset of the population growth preceded
industrialisation and economic growth, a large ‘surplus’ agrarian population
was created before industrialisation could effectively absorb it.2
This situation was peculiar to the peripheral areas in the capitalist trans-
formation of Europe. In theWest – that is, in the core areas of capitalist devel-
opment – the demographic revolution was a concomitant and constituent
part of the industrial revolution itself. And not only that: population growth
was inseparably linked to the simultaneous modernisation of the whole eco-
nomy, which included both an industrial and a related agricultural revolu-
tions.3 Unlike Finland and the other Eastern regions, the countries of West-
ern Europe industrialised at a fairly steady pace during the latter half of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, deriving most of the
required workforce from the growing landless population. In Sweden, for in-
stance, industrial development (aswell as emigration) absorbed the new agrar-
1 Rokkan 1981, pp. 69–70.
2 Berend and Ránki 1982, pp. 44–8.
3 Ibid., pp. 44–5.
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ian proletariat, which was then becoming established as the population in the
commercialising agricultural sector increased. The agricultural and industrial
revolutions thus managed to keep pace with each other, as they did in West-
ern Europe as a whole: the emerging rural proletariat was gradually dissipated.
Sweden even experienced shortages of agricultural workers in the early years
of the twentieth century.4 In the West, in short, the problems of population
increase were never as acute as they were in the East.
Eastern Europe, with its growing population, remained predominantly agri-
cultural for a longer time. Instead of a ‘balanced’ process of industrialisa-
tion aided by an agricultural revolution, agricultural transformation preceded
industrialisation.This development resulted from the almost unlimitedmarket
in theWest for Eastern European cereals, meat, fruit, and other foodstuffs. The
demandcausedEasternEuropean agriculture to growdependent ondeveloped
Western European capitalism and brought about several agrarian reforms that
were aimed at transforming manorial estates into large capitalist farms.When
the peasants were freed from feudal ties to their landlords, a new class of agri-
cultural wage workers emerged, particularly in Hungary and Romania. These
reforms tookplacenear themiddle of the century and immediately thereafter –
well before the industrial take-off, and therefore well before the increase in
population could be absorbed by industry. As a result, the industrial revolution
was not directly associatedwith the capitalist transformation in agriculture but
was delayed until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twenti-
eth centuries. With one-sided agrarian advance constituting the dynamic and
decisive process, and with no strong links to an overall process of economic
development ‘carrying everything with it’, development in Eastern Europe was
thus mainly dependent on external factors.5
In Finland, however, the interaction of the industrial and agricultural revolu-
tions was different than in the rest of Eastern Europe. Because Finland’s cap-
italist transformation was based primarily on the rise of the forest industry,
changes occurred immediately in the countryside.Therenew industrial centres
grewup and there, unlike elsewhere, peasants owned the bulk of the best forest
lands. The effects of industrialisation were therefore exceptionally direct and
extensive in the rural areas.
This forestry-based industrialisation contributed to the virtual simultaneity
of the capitalist transformation both in industry and in agriculture. The agri-
cultural transformation occurred relatively late, even among the prosperous
4 Carlsson 1968, pp. 252–67; Jörberg 1975, pp. 104–6; Åkerman 1975, p. 173; Blum 1978, pp. 438–9.
5 See Berend and Ránki 1974, pp. 30–9, 53, 67 (quotation), 122–9, 135–47; and Blum 1978, p. 437.
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peasants, only from the 1870s on – later than the great agrarian reforms in East-
ern Europe or, for example, the agricultural revolution in Scandinavia.6 Even
as late as the 1860s, Finland experienced a disastrous famine that resulted in a
population decline of eight percent and demonstrated that traditional arable
farming practices were very much a dead end.7 Thus late industrialisation and
rapid population growth, aswell as the linkage between the industrial and agri-
cultural transformations, led in Finland to the simultaneous and related growth
of the industrial and rural proletariat.
In other words, the situation in Finland was different not only from that in
Sweden, where the rural proletariat had been absorbed as a result of industrial
development, but also from that in Eastern Europe,where the industrial prolet-
ariat emerged only after land reforms had already given rise to a large landless
proletariat.
Finnish conditions were aggravated, moreover, by the small scale of emigra-
tion. The rate of emigration, one indication of the breakup of traditional social
arrangements, was lower than in Sweden. Those who left Finland for Amer-
ica between 1850 and 1910, for example, amounted to 7.7 percent of the 1910
population, whereas the corresponding figure for Sweden was 17.5 percent.8
Furthermore, although emigration to America from East-Central Europe, as
from Finland, began late, its relative importance was much greater.
2 Freeholding Peasants and AgrarianWorkers
Large-scale peasant ownership of forest land, together with the employment
that forestry and the sawmills provided for the landless, accentuated the spread
of capitalism to the Finnish countryside. The integration into the developed
capitalist market system in the late nineteenth century was felt immediately
by the rural population.
Many landowning peasants prospered, and the changeover from arable
farming to stock-raising and dairy farming – the central feature of the Finnish
agricultural revolution – became easier than would otherwise have been the
case. As a well-known commentator described the development, ‘Capitalism
and the spirit of capitalism [began], consciously or unconsciously, to penet-
rate into peasant agriculture … The landowning peasant had to produce more
6 Jörberg 1973, pp. 393–406;Winberg 1975, pp. 33–5; Soininen 1974, p. 412;Østerud 1978a, pp. 189–
94.
7 Strömmer 1969, p. 22; Soininen 1974, pp. 402–15.
8 Rasila 1970, p. 19.
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for the market and to manage his farm like an enterprise; he had to begin to
make calculations and to view economic activity from the point of profitability
… [In the process,] crofters, casual workers, and hired hands were increasingly
exploited on the main farm’.9 At the same time, in 1865, 1879, and 1883, restric-
tions on labourmigrationwere removed, and hiring-out obligations were abol-
ished. The everyday contacts between the freeholding peasant and his workers
also appear to have changed. Contrary to earlier customs, the landowner and
his family began to sleep and eat apart from the workers.10 Moreover, from the
end of the century on, the children of freeholders who could not become farm-
ers themselves increasingly left agriculture, mainly for various middle-class
occupations.11
These observations suggest, first, a transition from peasant to farmer, or a
change in which the landowning peasant entered the market more fully than
before and explored alternative uses for the factors of production. Second,
they suggest that this transformation also altered the relationship between the
landowner and other agrarian groups, workers and crofters, as the landowner
had increasingly to maximise his returns in the context of the market, regard-
less of the immediate consequences of his action.12
Both suggestions are supported by several facts. First, owners of large farms
received enough forest income to make the changeover to dairy farming
markedly easier. As Lennart Jörberg says in a comparative account, ‘The intro-
duction of more modern production methods, new equipment and better
buildings all demanded a great deal of capital. If they had reliedwholly on agri-
cultural yield, Finnish farmers could hardly have come by this capital. Instead
they acquired it to a great extent from the sale of forests and timber’.13 Most
important in this respect, apparently, was the role forest incomes played in
relieving the indebtedness caused by the preceding crisis of arable cultivation.
In 1900, for example, private citizens, essentially peasants, received 90 percent
of the proceeds from the sale of standing timber. From 1860 to 1900 timber
prices rose three or four times as fast as consumer prices. Nowonder, then, that
incomes in the countryside weremore unevenly distributed during the closing
decades of the last century than in the previous period.14
9 Forsman 1912, pp. 19, 26.
10 Myllyntaus 1981, p. 181; Soikkanen 1961, p. 80.
11 According to Haapala’s (1982, pp. 200–1) study of rural communities in the county of
Häme.
12 SeeWolf 1969, pp. xiv–xv, 286.
13 Jörberg 1973, pp. 400–1.
14 H. Kunnas 1973, pp. 87, 98; Hjerppe and Lefgren 1974, pp. 103–4. Cf. Hjerppe, Peltonen and
Pihkala 1984, p. 43; M. Peltonen 1986, pp. 107–12.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
42 chapter 3
table 3 Indicators of market penetration in the countryside, 1870–1910
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Total agrarian population, in thousandsa 1,470 1,659 1,867 1,992 2,143
Area under cultivation, in thousands of hectares – 830 980 1,568b 1,878b
Marketed roundwood, in thousands of solid cubic
meters
2,090 3,370 5,500 11,400 15,970
Milk produced, in millions of kilograms 520 701 963 1,326 1,541
Rural savings banks 17 84 108 160 329
a Includes the population engaged in agriculture and forestry.
b In 1901. Then and in 1910 the definition of land under cultivation was broader than in the
earlier period.
Sources: P. Manninen 1976, 81; Soininen 1974, 130; Recensement agricole de 1910
1916, 1; H. Kunnas 1973, 110–111; Viita 1965, 58–59; Urbans 1963, 449
Land prices also increased. One case study suggests that they increased in
south-western Finland by over three and a half times in the period from 1850
until 1906–10;15 a similar rise also occurred in central Finland:16 further indica-
tions of thewidening gap between landowners and others. It seems reasonable
to agreewith the conclusion of Hannu Soikkanen that, owing to the central role
of wood processing, the impact of industrialisation on life in the countryside
was greater in Finland than in other countries at a comparable level of devel-
opment.17
A number of other economic indicators attest to this change (see Table 3).
Gentry estates were increasingly transferred to the peasants throughout the
nineteenth century, most markedly in its latter half. Differences betweenman-
ors and wealthy peasant farms nearly disappeared. The area under cultivation
was greatly increased. Milk production quadrupled between 1870 and 1910 and
soonbecame the largest source of income for farmers, particularly throughbut-
ter exports. Cooperative dairies controlled by wealthy peasants spread rapidly
at the turn of the century, as did the number of professional farmers’ societies
and savings banks that mainly served peasant landowners.18 At the same time,
the farmers’ tax burden fell significantly, for although their income increased,
taxation remained at the previous level.
15 Kivialho 1927, pp. 118–21.
16 Markkanen 1977, pp. 60–2.
17 Soikkanen 1981, pp. 441–2.
18 See, e.g., Soininen 1982, pp. 40–6; and Alapuro 1980, p. 50.
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table 4 Agrarian households in Finland by class, 1815–1901
Class 1815 1870 1901 1815 1870 1901
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands)
Landowners 57% 39% 35% 75 83 103
Croftersa 28 32 17 38 68 49
Agricultural workers 15 29 48b 19 60 139b
Total 100% 100% 100% 132 211 291
a Includes other tenant farmers as well.
b In 1901 a number of scrapholders, who lived mainly by selling their labour power and who
had previously been classified as crofters, were reclassified as agricultural workers. The relat-
ive increase in the number of households of agricultural workers and the relative decline in
crofters’ households is therefore somewhat exaggerated.
Sources: Kilpi 1913, tables 33–36, 38, 54; Gebhard 1913, 89, 92, 109
The political position of the freeholding peasants improved as well. Local
government reforms instituted in 1865 guaranteed them power in local affairs.
And at the national level they gained a great degree of influence once the Diet
began to convene regularly after 1863 and the Peasant Estate for the first time
gained equal status with the other estates.
These changes in themselves served to alter the relationship between the
landowners and other agrarian groups. Moreover, not only was the wealth
accruing from capitalist development distributed differentially among land-
owners and agricultural workers, but their relationship also changed directly.
The most important factor in this change was that the landowning popu-
lation grew much more slowly than did the number of agricultural workers.
During the last 30 years of the century, worker households grew in number
from less than one-third to nearly one-half the total number of agrarian house-
holds, and the proportion of freeholding peasants decreased from 39 percent
to 35 percent (see Table 4). This trend implies not only that new farmswere not
created on a large scale but also that few new croft leases were arranged. The
significant increase in the amount of land under cultivation at the end of the
nineteenth century, then, was not linked to the establishment of new crofts,
as had previously been the case; rather, the landowner was now ready to cul-
tivate more land personally and to use the farm for commercial dairy farming.
Because the number of crofters did not increase, the growth rate of the agrarian
proletariat accelerated,19 and it became largely a ‘surplus’ population. Accord-
19 According to a local study, only 20 percent of the crofters’ children in the county of Häme
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
44 chapter 3
ing to one estimate, in 1880, 50–60 percent of the then-current labour force
would have been sufficient to maintain the prevailing level of agricultural pro-
duction.20
A study made in the most densely populated and prosperous region of the
country, the south-west, where the leasehold system was the most widespread
and industrial growth the strongest, illustrates the development in the relation-
ship between the landowners and the agrarian workers. Changes in agriculture
and the rise in forest prices led to stricter leaseholds. Moreover, landowners
divided part of their land into a number of small plots with high rents instead
of creating traditional leasehold farms. Thus there emerged a new class of farm
workers who lived by temporary work and lacked the relative independence of
the crofters. As the population grew, the growth was channelled primarily into
this new group, leading finally to an increase in emigration at the end of the
century.21
In other words, especially those groups that remained outside the tradi-
tional peasant community increased. To be a full member of the community, it
was necessary to have a certain rough minimum amount of land. The process
of modernisation considerably increased the number of those who held less
than this minimum;22 indeed, this growing stratum had even less access to the
land than did the crofters. As the landless population expanded without being
effectively absorbed into industry, it remained in the countryside, producing a
large number of agricultural workers. In 1910 there were 2.3 agricultural work-
ers and 0.5 crofters and other tenant farmers for every landowner, and in the
south-west the proportion was much higher, with 4.6 agricultural workers to
every landowner.23
There is no doubt, then, that the commercialisation of agriculture consid-
erably widened the gap between the landowners and the agrarian labourers.
But although the latter became sharply differentiated from the freeholders, it
would be erroneous to consider them badly hurt by the transformation. The
rise of forestry not only benefited the owners of larger farms, but it also eased
the conditions of the agrarian workers. Hence, ‘the “breakdown” of old eco-
nomic forms’ in the 1860s and thereafter did not cause them grave economic
problems. In fact, their wages actually increased toward the end of the cen-
became crofters in the 1870s, whereas 42 percent became agrarian workers (Haapala 1982,
p. 58).
20 Kaukiainen 1981, p. 55.
21 Gylling 1907, pp. 168–70.
22 Cf. Moore 1966, pp. 474–5.
23 Population de la Finlande au 31 décembre 1910 1915, 2:62, 66.
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tury owing both to the work available in logging and floating and to the rise in
agricultural productivity.24 On the one hand, then, the forestry-based capital-
ist transformationmade large groups of the landless a definite and increasingly
distinct agrarian lower class, but on the other hand this change caused themno
real distress. Both these aspects are significant for understanding the character
of the agrarian workers’ political mobilisation in the first decades of the twen-
tieth century (see Chapter 6).
3 The Link between Industrial and AgrarianWorkers
The nature of capitalist development influenced the make-up not only of the
non-landowning agrarian population (both workers and crofters) but also of
the industrial working class. Industrial expansion took place largely in rural
areas, as evidenced by the fact that the industrial population grew more rap-
idly than the urban population in the late 1800s. New plants such as sawmills,
pulp mills, and paper factories spread throughout the countryside, and in 1910
nearly half the industrial workers lived there, with the sawmill industry alone
employing one-quarter, and thewood industry as awhole one-third, of the total
industrial labour force. The maximum sawing period per year is estimated to
have been only about 190 days in 1880, 220 in 1900; thus, seasonal fluctuation
was substantial. Moreover, as just stated, labour-intensive logging and floating
provided significant employment for the landless.25
Internal migration increased toward the end of the nineteenth century. Set
in motion partly by logging and floating jobs, people were gradually pulled
toward industrial communities.Migrationwas facilitated by the fact thatmany
industrial plants, particularly sawmills, pulp and paper factories, and iron
works, employed a large number of unskilled workers. Also, many cities grew
in the latter years of the nineteenth century as a result of the influx of the land-
less. In 1870 a narrowmajority of the young workers in Tampere, Finland’s first
and leading large-scale industrial centre, had come fromnon-landowning rural
families, with an additional 20 percent from the freeholding peasantry. There-
after self-recruitment increased, but in 1910 the proportion of the children of
crofters and the landless was still more than one-third.26 Likewise, at the turn
24 Heikkinen et al. 1983, pp. 24–36, 88 (quotation); Soininen 1981, pp. 97–111; Ahvenainen 1984,
pp. 303–4.
25 Heikkinen andHoffman 1982, p. 55; Peltonen 1982, p. 85;Hjerppe andHeikkinen 1978, p. 22;
Hoffman 1981, p. 118.
26 Haapala 1982, pp. 56–60, 197, 308. In 1910, fewer than 40 percent of the young workers
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of the century nearly two-thirds of the 100,000 inhabitants of the capital, Hel-
sinki, had been born elsewhere. Over half of those who moved to Helsinki
toward the end of the century had previously been part of the landless rural
proletariat.27
All in all, owing to Finland’s late industrialisation and the close linkage
between the industrial and agricultural transformations, the industrial and
agrarian proletariat developed simultaneously and were linked together. For
the great majority of the proletariat – that is, the agrarian workers – the con-
nection with the emerging industrial working class was fairly close, for several
reasons. First, capitalist development changed the relationship of the grow-
ing landless population and the landowners. Through liberal reforms, which
enabled the landless tomove and sell their labour power, and industrialisation,
which contributed directly to the commercialisation process in agriculture, the
landless became an increasingly distinct class vis-à-vis the landed. Second, at
the same time that the agrarian transformation occurred, an industrial work-
ing class emerged that had close connections with the agrarian proletariat.
Indeed, the borderline between these two groups was rather hazy, thanks to
the marked rural expansion of the sawmills and the wood-processing industry
and to seasonal floating and logging. Finally, an overwhelming majority of the
industrial workers had been recruited directly from the agrarian population. In
the first decades of the twentieth century the Finnish industrial working class
was rooted firmly in the countryside.
4 Crofters
The crofters occupied a position different from that of the agrarian workers.
The former were small leaseholders who obtained their main livelihood from
farming. Usually they worked a minimum of three hectares (1.2 acres), some-
timesmuchmore, and kept a couple of cows. Rent was paidmainly by working
a certain number of days for the landowner and, to a lesser extent, by payments
in kind or money. In the early 1800s the position of the leaseholder was often
rather similar to that of the freeholding peasant. The situation changed decis-
ively only toward the end of the century.
The first political protests in late nineteenth-century Finland were by the
crofters. Their collective actions against the landowners – mainly demonstra-
in Tampere were second-generation urban workers who were born there (Haapala 1982,
p. 191).
27 Waris 1932, pp. 298, 300.
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tions and petitions – receivedmuch attention during the 1880s, and by the turn
of the century the so-called leasehold question had become a major political
problem for the dominant groups.28
It may be argued that the leasehold question resulted from pressures caused
by the capitalist development to a pre-capitalist tenancy system. Agreements
concerning rents, rights of occupancy, and length of tenancy were usually oral
and fairly unambiguous – customary and mutually understood – in the period
when the landowner’s connection with the market was limited.With the com-
mercialisation of agriculture, however, the role of the croft in the landowner’s
household changed. Market requirements strained the relationship between
the landowner and the leaseholder; consequently, the oral agreements were
interpreted in conflicting ways and became a subject of controversy.
Toward the end of the century it became common for landowners to evict
crofters and add the land that they had cleared and cultivated to themain farm,
to reduce the crofters’ forest rights, to increase rent, and to reduce the length of
tenancies. Rents were augmented to the extent that the crofters’ incomes grew
very slowly, if at all. At the same time, as noted above, the wages of the agri-
cultural labourers were going up discernibly.29 The number of crofts relative to
freehold farmsdecreased significantly in the secondhalf of the nineteenth cen-
tury (see Table 4). Also, landowners increasingly alleged laziness on the part of
the crofters, a reflection, in part, of the demands of market production.30 The
crofts were losing their significance for the management of the main farm, as
indicated by the increasing replacement of work rent by monetary payments
after 1900. This practice served to weaken the productive link between the
leasehold farm and the main farm. Although day labour remained the main
form of rent, the spread of monetary payments shows that hired labour was
becoming more advantageous than the crofters’ day labour, at least on large
farms. A ‘free’ labour force was widely and cheaply available.31
Late industrialisation seems to have aggravated the conflict between the
freeholding peasants and the crofters, preventing not only the landless but also
the crofters from moving elsewhere. The tenancy system did not fade away
gradually and smoothly, as in Sweden. In Finland crofterswere forced to remain
where theywere and to fight for their rights. In Sweden crofts increased innum-
ber into the 1860s, after which they then began quickly to decline, dropping
by 1900 to two-thirds of the 1860s level. In Finland, in contrast, the number
28 See Rasila 1961.
29 Heikkinen et al. 1983, pp. 24–46, 95, 100–1.
30 Rasila 1970, p. 17.
31 Ibid., pp. 34–5; Haatanen 1968, pp. 105, 172.
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of crofts was slightly greater in 1900 than in 1860, although their proportion
had clearly declined. Monetary payments to landowners were also muchmore
common in Sweden than in Finland.32
To conclude, like the agrarian workers, the crofters had grievances against
the landowners. But in other respects the situations of the two groups were
not similar. The crofters had access to the land, and the principal defence
strategy open to them was to try to strengthen this control. Both similarities
and differences in the two groups’ positions were, naturally enough, to mani-
fest themselves in their political reactions. But the somewhat varying structural
positions only set certain minimum conditions for these reactions. The actual
fusion or dissociation in the crofters’ and the workers’ organisation andmobil-
isation was to be powerfully determined by development of the political scene
at the turn of the century and thereafter.
32 Rasila 1961, pp. 22, 36–9; Rasila 1970, p. 32; Haatanen 1968, p. 176.
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chapter 4
Territorial Integration
‘In the Finland of 1809 the Russians ran into a countrywithout a centre’.1 Before
1809, rather than the various regions being oriented to each other through the
regional division of labour, giving Finland the status of a separate economic
unit, they were oriented mainly to the core of the Swedish state. Only in the
nineteenth century was there an economic reorientation: first, partially, to St.
Petersburg; and then, definitely, to a core within the grand duchy, with the con-
comitant integration of the separate regions into a national whole. The capital-
ist transformation strengthened the ties among the regions and simultaneously
accentuated their differences.
In other words, during the Swedish period the Finnish-speaking regions
interacted with an external core. Later on, however, an internal core emerged.
Both core-periphery processes influenced the consolidation of regionally dif-
ferentiated class structures at the end of the nineteenth century.
1 Finnish Regions up to 1809
In the seventeenth century, Swedenwas a great power inEurope. It had, accord-
ing to Eli F. Heckscher, ‘a strong state power and presumably the most effect-
ive administrative organisation among all countries of that time’; despite eco-
nomic backwardness, ‘politically [it was] an exceptionally solidly-built society,
where therewas no room for particularism’.2 The relatively high degree of cent-
ralisationmay be seen in the relation of the Finnish regions to the state centre.
The basic structure remained the same up to the end of the period.
The political and economic centre of Sweden was Stockholm, which devel-
oped into a metropolis during the seventeenth century.3
All over the kingdom, the peasantry was taxed effectively, especially after
the ‘reductions’ of 1680 had brought back to royal jurisdiction lands previously
granted to the nobles. Finland was not a separate fiscal unit. Like the rest of
Sweden, it was divided into counties whose administration was reformed dur-
1 Klinge 1975, p. 28.
2 Heckscher 1936, p. 367 (cited in Åström 1980a, pp. 295–6).
3 Mead 1981, pp. 86–92.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
50 chapter 4
ing the seventeenth century to better serve the needs of the monarchy.4 In
heraldic contexts, the ‘Swedish’ and ‘Finnish’ provinceswere not presented sep-
arately, but in an order starting from the regions around the core and arriving
at the more peripheral regions at various corners of the state.5 Thus, although
staple, tariff, and industrial policies did prevent various Finnish regions from
developing in the same way as certain ‘Swedish’ peripheries,6 Finland was not,
as a whole, in a colonial position.
Economic centralisation, based on the principles of mercantilism, was
ensured by the rigid regulation of domestic trade and by the concentration of
export trade in Stockholm and the so-called staple towns. In connecting the
hinterlands to the capital (and to foreign countries), the coastal cities obviously
played a central part. In the Finnish territories the city network was located on
the eastern coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and on the northern coast of the Gulf
of Finland (see Map 1, p. 21).
Commerce with Stockholm and abroad was along three main routes. The
principal way station was Turku, in the south-west of what later became Fin-
land. Because this city was the centre of the region with the longest history of
Swedish rule, Turku and its hinterland had, besides exports, other close eco-
nomic connections with nearby Stockholm. The second centre was Viipuri,
farther to the east. Only these two Finnish cities, Turku and Viipuri, had full
and effective rights to trade overseas; their position reflected the basic twofold
division in the Finnish town system.7 Another staple town, Helsinki, was loc-
ated on the southern coast, but its exports remained insignificant. The third
trade centre was on the Ostrobothnian coast, Oulu being the most important
city. No Ostrobothnian city was a staple town, though, and their goods had to
pass through Stockholm or Turku.8
Although the volume of trade remained limited and the regional division of
labour generallyweak, the three trade routes still illustrate the separationof the
Finnish regions. What mattered were connections with the various centres of
trade, not between the regions themselves. Moreover, Finland had no common
front in economic policy. On the contrary, in many conflicts Turku and Viipuri
opposed Ostrobothnian demands, and in other cases they followed different
courses in alliance with certain ‘Swedish’ cities.9 In the eighteenth century,
4 Åström 1980a, pp. 302, 310–11.
5 Klinge 1975, p. 26.
6 Åström 1980b.
7 A. Peltonen 1982, p. 97.
8 See Åström 1977a, pp. 145–60.
9 Ranta and Åström 1980, pp. 258, 259, 262.
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the decline of Sweden complicated the situation, leading to increased Russian
influence and partial domination in the east (see Map 1).
The tripartite division applied not only to trade but also to productive and
social structures. The three regions, their origins going back to theMiddle Ages,
developedas a result of varyingnatural conditions anddifferingdegrees of pen-
etration by the Swedish state.10 In fact, the different trade orientations only
complete the picture. There were even differences in the ideological sphere:
the mobile members of the clergy, for instance, seldom crossed regional bor-
ders.11
Map 2 shows the three main regions, plus eastern Finland, which was an
economic hinterland of Viipuri, and the very sparsely populated northern Fin-
land. This basic division is commonly used in accounts dealing with socioeco-
nomic conditions up to the late nineteenth century.12 It corresponds roughly
with the historical division of the provinces13 and (rather well) with the early
twentieth-century apportionment by county or groups of counties (Map 3), the
onlymajor exceptionbeingOstrobothnia.To south-western Finlandbelong the
counties of Uusimaa, Turku and Pori, and Häme, and to eastern Finland the
main areas of the counties of Kuopio and Mikkeli. Ostrobothnia is composed
of the western parts of the county of Vaasa and of the adjacent coastal areas
of the county of Oulu. Northern Finland is coterminous with the bulk of the
county of Oulu. The regional statistics used in the subsequent pages exist in
most cases only for the counties.
Both geographically and socially, the south-west was closest to the core
of the Swedish state, being the region first colonised and subjugated by the
Swedes. Thus the term Finland referred initially to this area specifically. A con-
siderable Swedish-speaking agrarian and fishing population lived along the
coast, andnot only the largest trading centre,Turku, but also themajority of the
manors in Finlandwere located in this region. Besides the gentry, thewealthier
peasants also began to penetrate the agrarian upper class after enclosures and
other reforms in the late 1700s. In the early nineteenth century crofters, and
especially landless labourers, increased rapidly in number.
10 See Kaukiainen 1980, p. 89.
11 Wirilander 1974, pp. 293–8.
12 E.g., Jutikkala 1963, pp. 371–405; Soininen 1974, p. 19; Sarmela 1969, pp. 251–63.
13 Ostrobothnia is one of the historical provinces. South-western Finland is coterminous
with Uusimaa, Finland Proper, Satakunta, and the southern areas of Häme; eastern Fin-
land corresponds roughly to Savo and North Karelia; and northern Finland corresponds
roughly to Lapland (see Sømme 1968, pp. 6–7).
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map 2 Main Finnish regions and the line between the Reds and theWhites in
the revolution of 1918
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map 3 The counties of Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century
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The other region with close links to the state core, Ostrobothnia, also had a
Swedish-speaking coastal population.An integral part of a largerwhole consist-
ing of the lands surrounding the upper end of the Gulf of Bothnia, geograph-
ically it displayed ‘strong ecological independence’,14 with a ridge separating
it from the other Finnish regions, particularly in the south and southeast. Up
to the mid-eighteenth century its trade was dominated by Stockholm, with
coastal cities serving as way stations between Stockholm and the Ostroboth-
nian hinterland. The main products traded were tar and ships.
Tar was the second Swedish staple product after iron, and in the seven-
teenth century the Finnish regions, particularly Ostrobothnia, had become
the most important tar-producing area in Europe. Because the Ostrobothnian
countrysidewasdominatedbywell-to-do independentpeasants, the tar-selling
peasants evidently had considerable bargaining power in their relations with
the merchants in the cities. The villages were compact peasant communities
with nomanors, and, in contrast with the south-west, thewealth of the peasant
upper class was not primarily dependent on the exploitation of crofters’ labour
power. Rather, the crofters were in a kind of partnership with the landowners,
who needed labour for tar production.
Presumably more important still for increasing peasant wealth, however,
was the flourishing ship-building industry, whichwas also based onOstroboth-
nian forest reserves. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ship-building
was probably themost important branch of themodest industry located in the
Finnish regions, and the Ostrobothnian peasants were its main beneficiaries.15
Moreover, production for the provisioning of Stockholm was quite advanced
among Ostrobothnian peasants, who, together with the south-western peas-
ants, enjoyed greater wealth than in the other regions. Wealth was also more
evenly divided than in the south-west.16 This group was capable of acting
collectively, as powerfully indicated by the so-called Club War against state
encroachments at the end of the sixteenth century. It was the most forcible
peasant rebellion ever seen in Finland, and southern Ostrobothnia was its core
area.
Developments in the early eighteenth century, when Sweden lost its posi-
tion as a great power andwas forced to surrender the area surrounding the city
of Viipuri to Russia, definitely separated and differentiated this region from the
south-west. Russiannobles soondominated large tracts of land, and feudal rela-
14 Sarmela 1969, p. 253.
15 Aunola 1967, pp. 336–42, 372, 376; Åström 1977b, p. 103; Virrankoski 1980, p. 244.
16 Jutikkala 1980, p. 228.
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tionswere introduced in the countryside. At the same time, the proximity of St.
Petersburg linked small peasants directly to themarket. The small landholding
peasants transported their ownproducts to St. Petersburg and performed other
transport jobs year-round. In 1800 the Russian capital, with 220,000 inhabit-
ants, was one of the largest cities in Europe, and the number of Finns living
there was exceeded only by two Finnish towns.17
In the east, or the so-called Savo-Karelian slash-and-burn region, the link
with the dominant external centres was tenuous. Until the eighteenth cen-
tury it remained an economic hinterland of Viipuri. The people were mobile
and lived in dispersed settlements; there were no strong exploitative relations
within the peasant population and, therefore, no strong peasant upper class.
The small local gentry played only a minor role in agricultural production.
Up to the eighteenth century the main export product was tar. In contrast to
Ostrobothnia, merchant-peasant relations in Savo-Karelia seem to have been
exploitative in nature: the merchants were able to squeeze the peasants for
their own advantage.18 After the annexation of Viipuri and its surroundings by
Russia in 1721 and 1743, peasant tradewith the southern centres declined. Tradi-
tional local trade over the Russian border in the east continued, however, now
stimulated by the growth of the new centre of St. Petersburg.19 But the scant
grain and tar trade of this area was forced to turn to the Gulf of Bothnia, bene-
fiting the Ostrobothnian economy.
The extremely sparsely populated north of Finland (including Lapland) cor-
responds roughly to the geographer’s ‘backwoods Finland’ (Luonnon-Suomi).
During the Swedish period and even later, the north was an area of colonisa-
tion. There were also oldmarket connections, based on salmon, furs, andmeat,
along the rivers running to the upper end of theGulf of Bothnia. The north-east
was involved in the market through Russian centres, across borders that long
remained poorly defined.
In 1809, then, the regions of the newly founded GrandDuchy of Finland had
a tradition of linkages to several outside centres. The south-west and Ostro-
bothnia had the closest connectionswith the core of Sweden; the future county
of Viipuri had established close links with St. Petersburg; and in the east the
ties with Viipuri had been partly replaced by connections with Ostrobothnia.
17 About 3,000 Finns lived in St. Petersburg at that time – as many, incidentally, as lived in
Stockholm. The populations of Turku, Oulu, and Helsinki rose to 9,400, 3,500, and 3,000,
respectively. The corresponding figure for Viipuri, which then belonged to Russia, was
3,100 (Engman 1983, p. 389).
18 Åström 1977b, pp. 93–5.
19 Engman 1983, pp. 114–16.
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The weakest links were between the east and the south-west: even by the mid-
nineteenth century, the commercial ties of these areas were ‘quite negligible’.20
Agrarian class relations were most exploitative in the south-west, where the
wealthy peasantry and other agrarian upper classes had long been involved
in the market through cities and maritime trade. In Ostrobothnia, the tradi-
tional peasant society was not severely undermined, and market involvement
made the landowning peasants prosper but did not create exploitative rela-
tionships comparable to those in the south-west. For the small landholding
peasants in theViipuri region, the St. Petersburgmarketwas growing in import-
ance. And in the east, the independent peasantry, less consolidated than in
the south-west or Ostrobothnia, was less involved in the market than else-
where.
2 Reorientation from Stockholm to St. Petersburg
In the first decades of the autonomous grand duchy, Stockholm was replaced
by St. Petersburg in economic importance, althoughmany economic and other
connections with Sweden were maintained. With 524,000 inhabitants in 1863,
St. Petersburg, the largest city in northern Europe, was a huge centre of con-
sumption.21 In eastern Finland, peasant tradewith the southern coast andwith
the Russian capital soon recovered, increasing the transportation of goods in
the county of Viipuri. Butter became themain export from the east to St. Peters-
burg, along with timber and some iron from ironworks owned mainly by mer-
chants and industrialists in St. Petersburg.Therewas considerable seasonal and
permanent migration from both Viipuri and eastern Finland to St. Petersburg
(Map 4).22 A significant connection between eastern Finland and the south,
and at the same time between eastern Finland and St. Petersburg, was created
when the Saimaa Canal from the easternwatercourse toViipuri was completed
in 1856 (Map 5). The railway linking the Finnish centres to St. Petersburg was
completed in 1870.
In other words, both regions in the east had close economic connections
to the St. Petersburg area. To some extent the same development occurred in
other regions as, over the whole country, trade turned increasingly toward Rus-
20 Wirilander 1960, pp. 753, 754.
21 Engman 1983, pp. 97–101, 315.
22 For a large number of smallholding peasants, seasonal migration and transport jobs
became the primary source of earnings, displacing farming proper (ibid., pp. 138–9,
pp. 150–8).
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map 4 Regional distribution of passport-holding Finns living in Russia in 1881, by domi-
cile in Finland (per thousand of the rural population recorded in the census)
Source: Engman 1978, 169
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sia. (An important partial exception was Ostrobothnia, which continuously
maintained active trade connectionswith Sweden).23 As a target formigration,
St. Petersburg totally replaced the other traditional destination, Stockholm: in
1840, the number of St. Petersburg Finns (11,300) nearly equalled the popula-
tion of Helsinki or Turku (13,300 and 13,200, respectively).24
An early indication of efforts on the part of the imperial authorities to
weaken the orientation toward Sweden was the establishment, in 1812, of the
grand ducal capital inHelsinki and the subsequent consolidation of aHelsinki-
oriented town system.25 Thus Turku, during the Swedish period the most
important Finnish centre, where the university, the archbishop’s seat, and the
court of appeals were situated, and now a border city with both economic and
cultural ties to Sweden, was relegated to secondary status, andHelsinki, a small
city situated nearer St. Petersburg on the southern coast, was deliberately built
up as a prestigious administrative centre for the country. For several decades it
was a ‘parade capital’,26 with huge and continuous construction works for the
central administration, the church, and the university.27
3 Territorial Integration in the Late Nineteenth Century
After the middle of the century a development gained momentum which
united Finland economically around a domestic core. Capitalist transforma-
tion, dealtwith above, created a regional division of labour that tied the various
regions to one another in a more fundamental sense than ever before and
accentuated many regional inequalities. Territorial integration was affected
by Finland’s dependent position; but above all it was affected by the varying
internal characteristics of the regions that had been consolidated earlier. This
pattern holds forWestern Europe in general: industrial growth in the rise of the
capitalist mode of production concentrated in those regions that were initially
the more advanced.
The primacy of endogenous over exogenous factors is discernible in the con-
struction of the infrastructure, especially the railways. In the 1850s two plans
23 Joustela 1963, pp. 304, 342–3.
24 Engman 1983, p. 389; Engman 1984, pp. 130–1.
25 A. Peltonen 1982, p. 97.
26 Klinge 1975, p. 29.
27 Klinge 1980b, pp. 18–20. Although the university was moved to Helsinki only after a fire
devastated Turku in 1827, the decision had presumably been made prior to the destruc-
tion.
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were conceived for Finland’s railways. In one, the key idea was the effective
unification of the inland centres with the coasts: a railway system that would
spread radially from an inland hub to the coasts. In this plan the railways were
supposed to serve internal Finnish trade and traffic specifically. In the com-
peting plan, St. Petersburg was the centre of the railway system, with the main
axis running from the south-east to the north-west. At first the former plan held
sway (the Russians did not interfere), and the first railway, running from Hel-
sinki to Hämeenlinna, was completed in 1862 (Map 5).28
In the long run, however, this plan was modified as a result of the capitalist
development that transformed Finland in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In this process, ‘Finland’s economic face turned from the Gulf of Bothnia
to the Gulf of Finland’29 as the south became the core of the Finnish state: the
capital was there, and, being closer to the export markets, it also became the
gravitational centre of industrialisation (Maps 6 and 7). By 1894 three paral-
lel south-north railway lines had been constructed, and a connecting east-west
railway, running as far as St. Petersburg, went along the southern coast. This
infrastructural development not only indicates the consolidation of the south
as the core, but it also reflects the division between the two eastern and the two
western regions; lines connecting the east and the west were constructed only
later.
Territorial integration can be seen in industrialisation as well, as a num-
ber of big firms developed into national enterprises. In the sawmill industry,
for example, the largest companies soon became ‘all-Finnish’. Active in various
regions, above all they progressively acquired their raw materials from every-
where in the country, and not only from the local markets as before.30
Moreover, in the 1880s migration to St. Petersburg began to stagnate. This
situation was partly a result of the city’s changing occupational structure,
which reduced the relative advantages the Finnishmigrants had enjoyed there.
But it was also a result of internal Finnish development, as migration became
increasingly oriented to southern Finland – another indication of its establish-
ment as the core of the country.31
28 Jutikkala 1968, pp. 169–73; Tommila 1978, p. 17.
29 Jutikkala 1950, p. 164.
30 Ahvenainen 1984, pp. 274–5, 299.
31 Engman 1983, pp. 289, 334–7, 360, 390–1.
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map 5 The Finnish railway network by 1918, with the Saimaa Canal
Sources: Jutikkala 1968, 172; Suomen valtionrautatiet 1862–1912 1916,
vol. 2
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map 6 Urban industrial workers, 1884–1885 and 1938
Note: Darkened circles indicate the number of workers in 1884–5, empty ones
the number in 1938. The number of industrial workers in Helsinki in 1938, for
example, was 31,000 (the largest empty circle).
Source: Jutikkala 1959, 61
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map 7 Rural industrial workers, 1884–1885 and 1938
Note: Darkened circles indicate the number of workers in 1884–1885, empty ones
the number in 1938.
Source: Jutikkala 1959, p. 61
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4 Core-Periphery Interaction – the County of Viipuri and Eastern
Finland
Perhaps the most striking indication of the transformation of regional inter-
connections was the new linkage between the county of Viipuri, the coastal
area of which quickly developed into a part of the core, and eastern Finland,
which became a periphery of the emerging Finnish economic entity. In the
mid-nineteenth century the sawmill industry was, apart from a modest iron-
producing sector, the only industry in the east, which accounted in the 1850s
for about two-thirds of Finland’s sawn goods. These goods were transported
to the coast, where the commercial houses of Viipuri, the least-developed
sawmill region in the country, dominated the trade. Simultaneously with the
rapid expansion of forestry, however, the location of the sawmill concentration
changed completely. By the end of the century, those in the eastern region pro-
ducedonly 12 percent of total output,whereas the county of Viipuri became the
main focus of sawmill activity, accounting for about 25 percent of the country’s
production of sawn goods (Table 5).
The introduction of large steam-operated sawmills played a central role in
the redefinition of the regional division of labour. These mills were built at the
mouths of rivers on the southern coast, by new domestic and foreign – notably
Norwegian – entrepreneurs and by commercial houses in Viipuri and other
centres. Most of the timber they required was transported from the eastern
region, where the new steam-operated sawmills remained small and the old
water-powered sawmills served local needs to a greater extent than before. ‘The
small firms fell into the hands of the big firms, and the concentration of pro-
duction in the coastal areas made the former inland centres of industry into
mere sites for delivery of raw material’.32
In other words, industry in the eastern region stagnated in relation to the
south. Not only did the proportion of the industrial labour force living in
this region decline at the turn of the century, but its numerical strength also
fell temporarily in large areas.33 The prevalence of agrarian occupations was
actually accentuated at this time, as was the lack of an urban population
(Table 6).
Perhaps themain indicator of the eastern region’s peripheral position, how-
ever, is the fact that, beginning in the 1890s, the timber companies purchased
large tracts of peasant land almost exclusively in eastern Finland and adja-
32 Ahvenainen 1984, pp. 212, 218–30, 250–62, 283–5; Lakio 1975, p. 105 (quotation).
33 Oksa 1978, pp. 72–3.
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table 5 Production of sawn goods by county, 1860 and 1900
1860 1900
County Standards Percentage Standards Percentage
(thousands) (thousands)
Uusimaa 1.6 4 55.2 9
Turku and Pori 2.1 6 131.0 22
Häme 1.9 5 69.8 12
Viipuri 1.3 3 151.4 25
Kuopio 12.0 31 44.9 8
Mikkeli 13.7 35 24.2 4
Vaasa 1.6 4 50.8 9
Oulu 4.8 12 65.3 11
All counties 39.0 100 592.6 100
Source: Hoffman 1980, 193
cent areas to the north. By 1915 the companies had, in large areas of the east,
purchased 20 percent or more of the land not owned by the state.34 In other
regions, particularly in the south-west where the timber boom greatly affected
the peasants, timber was sold, but not land.
Finally, an important indicator of the intensity and quality of the new inter-
connection was mass migration to the south (see Map 8). As stated above,
whereas St. Petersburg had previously been the main target for migration,
toward the end of the 1800s the county of Viipuri took its place. At the same
time, the volume of migration greatly increased, apparently accelerated by the
completion of railway links in 1889 and 1894.35 The migrants moved largely
to new centres in the county of Viipuri located outside the established towns.
Hence the prevalence of the rural in-migration over the rural out-migration for
this county (Table 6).
Because migration was more intensive in eastern Finland than in any other
region, population increased more slowly there than elsewhere (Table 6). This
situation demonstrates the increasing permeability of regional boundaries
and also reflects the redefinition of the division of labour between regions.
34 Harve 1947, pp. 41–8.
35 Lento 1951, pp. 168–9.
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table 6 Population and migration in Finland by county, late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries
County Population Percentage Percentage Percentage Migrants from
growth in of population of total rural communes
population, engaged in population 1891–1900 as
1865–1910 agriculturea who lived in percentage of
urban areas 1891 rural
population
1865 1910 1865 1910 1865 1910
(thousands) (thousands)
Uusimaa 172.2 362.9 111 64 43 19 42 3.5
Turku and Pori 327.0 477.1 46 73 63 12 15 4.6
Häme 172.1 334.7 94 80 61 2 16 5.5
Viipuri 279.4 494.1 77 85 65 5 9 –5.1b
Mikkeli 163.3 191.9 18 85 82 2 4 5.7
Kuopio 225.9 325.4 44 85 79 3 6 6.4
Vaasa 314.4 439.2 40 84 74 4 8 3.0
Oulu 188.7 296.0 57 78 71 6 8 0.8
All counties 1,843.2 2,921.2 59 79 66 7 14
a The percentages are systematically too low (cf. Table 1); however, this has little effect on the
relative differences between counties.
b I.e., more in-migration than out-migration.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1981, 6; Population de la Finlande
au 31 décembre 1865 1870, pp. 14–15, 20, 36–7; Population de la Finlande au 31
décembre 1910 1915, pp. 26–8; Jutikkala 1963, p. 386
Nearly half the sawmill workers in the county of Viipuri were born elsewhere,
mainly in eastern Finland.36
The development of the eastern region displays significant parallels with the
so-called dependent industrialisation depicted by Michael Hechter.37 Yet the
changemay also be portrayed as amove from the dominance of merchant cap-
ital to that of industrial capital. During the Swedish period the merchants had
dominated the tar-based linkage: they controlled the export of tar, while actual
production remained in the hands of the peasants. The same held true for the
butter trade. From the late nineteenth century on, however, the owners of cap-
ital (still largely merchants from Viipuri) dominated the linkage. Capital was
required to construct modern sawmills and buy land; the peasant population
36 Snellman 1914, Appendix of tables, p. 35.
37 Hechter 1975, p. 33.
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was required mainly as wage labour in felling and floating timber and in the
coastal sawmills. In this way the territorial division of labour was redefined,
accentuating regional inequalities.
Despite the fact that the capitalist transformation seized the region, it did
not enable the growing rural proletariat to move to the towns and industrial
centres in the region, as industrialisation in the core had done. It seems that
even the intense migration of the late nineteenth century did not reduce the
proportion of landless laborers in the east compared to other regions. More
important, the structure of the landless population in eastern Finland differed
greatly from that elsewhere, for in the east rural poverty was much greater and
was presumably on the increase, in relative terms, in the last decades of the
1800s.38
It is also significant that in this region the timber boom did not contribute
to the creation of a strong peasant upper class. True, the landowning peasants
gained by selling timber, but there is no doubt that theywere unable to reap the
benefits of the boom to the extent that the established peasant upper class in
the south-west did. The purchases of peasant land are an eloquent indication
of this difference. A crisis in slash-and-burn cultivation in the middle of the
century had posed great difficulties for the eastern peasants, and although the
butter trade with St. Petersburg eased the situation, paradoxically it also pro-
longed the crisis, because it was based on pastures created by slash-and-burn
practices.39 By the late nineteenth century many peasants, especially those liv-
ing in the east and in neighbouring areas to the north, had fallen deeply into
debt to merchants, and they were often forced to sell their farms and forests.40
5 South-Western Finland as a Core Region
In the transformation, the south-west, along with the southern coast of the
county of Viipuri, developed into the core area of Finland.41 The position of
south-western Finland is indicated in Table 6, which gives information on pop-
ulation and urbanisation both before and after industrial take-off. In both 1865
and 1910, Uusimaa had the smallest percentage of population engaged in agri-
culture, and the greatest percentage living in the cities. (The figures are some-
what distorted by the fact that, particularly in the county of Viipuri, the new
38 Haatanen 1968, pp. 142–3.
39 M. Peltonen 1986; Soininen 1974, pp. 384–5.
40 See Hjelt 1893, pp. 15–17.
41 A. Peltonen 1982, pp. 187–9.
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figure 1 Finnish cities, 1815 and 1910, ranked by population
Source: The figure is based on Annuaire Statistique de Finlande
1922, Table 11
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centres were not classified as cities.) But the higher degree of urbanisation
in the whole of south-western Finland is much more discernible in 1910 than
forty-five years earlier. It was precisely in the three south-western counties (and
Viipuri) that urban growth and the decline in the proportion of the agricultural
population were greatest. The concentration of industry tells the same story
(Maps 6 and 7).
The figures for Uusimaa are highly influenced by the growth of Helsinki.
Only in this period did Helsinki become the capital of Finland, not merely
administratively and culturally but also economically. During the last third of
the nineteenth century Helsinki grew rapidly, and by 1920 it was the dominant
city, as may be seen from the ranking of cities by size in the figure on page 67.42
This change was initiated and givenmomentum largely by the construction
of the railways. The first two railways, one fromHelsinki toHämeenlinna (1862)
and theother fromRiihimäki to Lahti (1870), tied twogreat inlandwatercourses
withHelsinki (Map 5). After the opening of the railways, then, Helsinki became
the leading port for imports, the merchant fleet concentrated there, and vari-
ous industries developed.Turku lost its formerhinterlandof Häme, and eastern
Finland became connected with the capital. In the process, the inland cities
developed at the expense of the coastal cities.43
It is indicative that themigration from the east, oriented in the 1800smainly
to St. Petersburg and the county of Viipuri, was oriented increasingly toward
Helsinki after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the majority of the nine-
teenth-century migrants to Helsinki came from western Finland (Map 8).
For the peasants, and above all for the wealthy peasants, industrialisation
and urbanisation created opportunities to participate more fully in the mar-
ket, especially as sellers of dairy products. Both low-priced imported grain and
a definite crisis in traditional grain production had led to great difficulties in
farming by the 1870s. In this situation the booming sawmill industrywas instru-
mental in the changeover to commercial stock-raising, allowing landowners
to finance the transition in part by selling timber from their forests. Thus the
south-west went through the processmore rapidly and easily than did the east.
In the south-west an established agrarian upper class had existed before the
capitalist transformation. Now the changes in production and inmarket condi-
tions greatly promoted the commercialisation of the agrarian upper class and
thepenetration of capitalist exchange relations into the countryside. Class con-
42 The sizes are plotted by rank, after George Kingsley Zipf ’s (1941, p. 11) log-normal model
for descending population size.
43 Jutikkala 1968, p. 171; Jutikkala 1977, pp. 96, 100.
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map 8 Net internal migration to 1920, by county of birth
Source: Lento 1951, map 8 (appendix)
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flict intensified both between the landowners and the crofters and between the
landowners and the growing number of agricultural laborers.44
6 Declining Ostrobothnia
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the course of events in Ostro-
bothnia in the nineteenth century is the absence of a sudden capitalist upsurge
comparable to that in the south and east, the only exceptions being the region’s
more northerly towns, which developed into sawmill centres. Relative to the
south, this wealthy region declined economically. Moreover, the problems
caused by the decline seem to have been distributed more evenly among
agrarian groups than was the case in the south with the problems resulting
from increasing market involvement.45 The decline was a result, first, of the
cutting off of ties with Sweden. The central areas of Sweden had been themain
market for Ostrobothnian grain and butter, which had increasingly replaced
tar and ships as the main products of the region after the late 1700s. Sweden
remained a central trading partner during the next century, but now sales were
crippled by Swedish tariffs. Second, the timber boom,which affected the south-
west and the east, failed to affect Ostrobothnia, because the earlier tar-burning
and ship-building industries had severely reduced the supply of timber.46 The
Ostrobothnian peasants simply did not have the forest incomes of the wealthy
south-western peasants.
The economic decline resulted in the preservation of many traditional traits
in the agrarian community, such that its structure did not change drastic-
ally during the nineteenth century. Even the very rapid increase in popula-
tion throughout the century affected the social structure less than might be
expected. Part of the increase was channelled into the prevailing structure:
in contrast to developments elsewhere, the number of landowning peasants
in Ostrobothnia increased, because it was a common practice to divide farms
among the heirs of an owner. It was also more common than elsewhere for
some of the children to remain on the home farm as crofters paying nom-
inal rent. The increase in population was also channelled outside the region.
Emigration from Finland to the United States around the turn of the twen-
tieth century was greatest from Ostrobothnia (Map 9), accounting for nearly
44 See Alapuro 1978, pp. 126–8.
45 See Soininen 1974, p. 402.
46 Joustela 1963, pp. 244–9, 304, 342–3; Soininen 1974, pp. 401–2.
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map 9 Overseas emigration from Finland, 1870–1914, by commune
Source: Kero 1974, 51
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two-thirds of total emigration in 1870–1914 and leading to a decline in Ostro-
bothnia’s share of total Finnish population.47
In addition to the economic decline and the persistence of the agrarian
community, the region remained isolated economically. In a sense, in the
nineteenth century Ostrobothnia still ‘did not belong to Finland’.48 Charac-
teristically, whereas the population increase in other regions during the late
nineteenth century led to internal migration, in Ostrobothnia it resulted in
increased emigration. Actually, this was not a new phenomenon. In the pre-
vious period emigration to Sweden and later to St. Petersburg had made the
Ostrobothnian emigration the most extensive in Finland.49 Emigration to the
United States only serves to emphasise the lasting importance of this region’s
external orientation.
The isolation was, of course, relative. Ostrobothnia was linked to the south
by the railways in the 1880s, and many Ostrobothnians migrated to Helsinki in
the last decades of the century. But this connection came about very late, given
the wealthy past of the province. Moreover, the construction of the railways
had considerable adverse effects. The lines’ south-north orientation broke old
ties that reached from the coast to the inland areas, and it harmed business and
industry in the coastal cities. At the same time, the once-thriving ship-building
industry declined and ultimately was largely transferred to south-western cit-
ies.50 Apart from Vaasa, the largest Ostrobothnian towns (Oulu, Kokkola, and
Raahe) lost their former position in the ranking of Finnish cities by size (see
figure, page 67).
The Ostrobothnian experience is in some respects reminiscent of the indus-
trialisation of the periphery portrayed by Sidney Tarrow in his assessment of
the theories of ‘peripheral marginality’. In the earliest stage of industrialisa-
tion, isolated factories and mines grew up wherever there were sources of raw
materials. In the second stage, emphasis was on seeking out agglomerations of
consumers and services; the industrial core developed in other regions, leaving
the periphery in relative isolation and decline. In the third stage, industrial-
isation occurred again in the isolated region, but this time as a dependent
phenomenon.51
47 Kero 1974, pp. 50–2; Valkonen 1980, p. 184. The proportion calculated by Kero covers an
area slightly larger than Ostrobothnia ‘proper’.
48 Kaila 1931, p. 360.
49 De Geer andWester 1976, pp. 30–44.
50 Tommila 1978, p. 26; Rasila 1982c, pp. 114–18.
51 Tarrow 1977, pp. 23–4.
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In Ostrobothnia early prosperity was based on the exploitation of forests –
on tar-burning and ship-building. These activities later declined just when the
Finnish corewas consolidated in the south. In the third phase, during the 1900s,
Ostrobothnia industrialised, but its industrialisation was secondary to that in
the south (and, after World War II, in Sweden). The relative decline of Ostro-
bothnia and its subsequent linkage to the core of Finland are crucial factors
in the analysis of the nature of the religious and political mobilisation in the
region (Chapter 7).
7 Division of Labour and State Penetration in Northern Finland
In the north the connection with the Ostrobothnian cities was redefined and
strengthened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the
region became more closely tied to the integrating state. Yet long distances
and sparse population remained of lasting importance. At the beginning of the
twentieth century the region accounted for 42 percent of Finland’s total area
but only five percent of its population. Landholding was rather evenly distrib-
uted, and small farms predominated. A regional division of labour arose which
resembled that between Viipuri and eastern Finland. The northern Ostroboth-
nian cities, especially Oulu, developed into centres for the sawmill industry,
with the richly forested inland areas in northern Finland serving as sources of
raw materials, particularly along the two rivers flowing west to the towns of
Oulu and Kemi. Timber companies obtainedmore forest land here than in any
region except eastern Finland.52
Before the timber boom the peasants in the Kainuu region, surrounding the
town of Kajaani (Map 5), were exploited by the merchants and tar producers
of Oulu,53 as the peasants in eastern Finland had once been exploited by the
merchants of Viipuri. Similarly, after the growth of the sawmill industry, a large
number of indebted peasants in Kainuu were also forced to sell their lands to
themerchants and ultimately to the timber companies; thus – again as in east-
ern Finland – was created a landless population which then migrated to the
coastal centres to work in the sawmill industry.54
52 Ahvenainen 1984, pp. 236–40, 270–3; Isohookana-Asunmaa 1980, pp. 32–3.
53 See Hautala 1956, pp. 228–39.
54 Kyllönen 1975, pp. 122–3, 131. Kainuu was adjacent to eastern Finland, but because of the
direction of the waterways its historical connections were with the Gulf of Bothnia, not
with the south.
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The sawmill industry, then, tied the northern inland to the coast; but at the
same time connections with the south of Finlandwere also improved. The rail-
way reachedOulu in 1886, and it was extended farther north after 1900; another
railway line was extended to Kajaani from the south-east in 1904. The railway
broke themonopoly of the Oulumerchants in that area55 and somewhat eased
the miserable conditions of the agrarian population. Another factor connect-
ing the north with other regions was the importance of seasonal logging and
floating. After 1900 logging provided work for as many as 10,000 men every
winter, with the workforce recruited not only from the north but also from
other regions, especially eastern Finland.
There is one further indicator of integration with the south. The enclosures,
which elsewhere had been carried out mainly in the decades around the turn
of the nineteenth century, were postponed to the late nineteenth and even to
the present century. Unlike elsewhere, the boundary between state and private
peasant-owned land became a matter of major controversy, only to be aggrav-
ated by the rise of forestry. The local peasants considered the reform a violation
by the state of the peasants’ rights. This was especially the attitude in the east-
ern areas, where ‘people for a longer time than elsewhere had been allowed
to live free from societal “bonds” ’.56 In northern Finland the state was widely
regarded as an intruder in local life, particularly as it became (again, unlike
other regions) the principal forest owner: here both the state and private com-
panies owned large tracts of land.57 Only in the northernmost areas did the
Lapps and others continue to raise reindeer and to trade with centres along
the Gulf of Bothnia, although to be sure, their traditional sources of livelihood
were disturbed by continuing colonisation.58
8 Summary
In the nineteenth century, then, economic integration and state consolidation
caused the class structure to develop in regionally different ways (Table 7).
South-western Finland, with two-fifths of the total population in 1910, devel-
oped into the core, and there the class conflict was heightened both between
the prospering landowners and the crofters and between the landowners and
the growing number of agricultural laborers. The industrial working class,
55 Hautala 1956, pp. 247–9.
56 Kyllönen 1975, p. 279.
57 Isohookana-Asunmaa 1980, pp. 32–3.
58 See Massa 1983, pp. 28–32, 71.
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moreover,wasmorenumerous there thanelsewhere.The coastal areaof Viipuri
was another area that developed into the core. Outside the industrial centres,
the majority of the population consisted of smallholding peasants who were
dependent on the market both as producers and as workers. Eastern Finland
and large areas of the north were forced to accept the role of the periphery.
There the conflict between the wealthier landowning peasants and the land-
less was accompanied and partly confounded by conflicts between the land-
less and private companies, and between the small landholders (both owners
and crofters) and these companies. Ostrobothnia stagnated and remained rel-
atively isolated from the other regions. Many traditional traits of the homo-
geneous agrarian community persisted in Ostrobothnia throughout the nine-
teenth century.
table 7 Finnish regions in terms of core-periphery position and class relations
Region Core-periphery
position at begin-
ning of twentieth
century
Community structure in
early nineteenth century
Class relations at beginning of
twentieth century
South-
western
Finland
Core Well-established hier-
archical structure; stable
involvement in the mar-
ket through manors and
wealthy peasant farms
Traditional community struc-
ture undermined by commercial
farming and the rise of forestry:
sharp class division between an
established freeholding class
and growing nonlandowning
groups; formation of an indus-
trial working class
County of
Viipuri
(Core)a Peasant involvement in
the market as smallhold-
ers and seasonal workers
Peasant involvement in the mar-
ket as smallholders and seasonal
workers; formation of an indus-
trial working class in the coastal
zone
Ostrobothnia Separate region Well-integrated compact
peasant communities
with a wealthy upper
layer involved in the mar-
ket through cities
Traditional community struc-
ture not severely undermined
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Table 7 Finnish regions in terms of core-periphery position and class relations (cont.)
Region Core-periphery
position at begin-
ning of twentieth
century
Community structure in
early nineteenth century
Class relations at beginning of
twentieth century
Eastern
Finland
Periphery Dispersed settlements
with tenuous ties to the
market
A rapid market penetration
through forestry at the end of
the nineteenth century: a weakly
established freeholding class
and a very poor landless popula-
tion
Northern
Finland
Periphery Dispersed settlements
with tenuous ties to the
market; area of colonisa-
tion
Penetration by the market
(largely through forestry) and
by the state: a recently settled
and poor landholding class and
a poor landless population
a Only the southern area of the county of Viipuri developed into a part of the core.
Whereas regional variation was exhibited in the agrarian class structure, in
industry the situation was somewhat different. Despite marked concentration
in the south, industrialisation was creating a modern class of wageworkers all
over the country,59 and by the 1890s the industrial working class had taken
shape on a national scale, yet another indication of the advance of territorial
integration.
Links between the agrarian and industrial proletariat were naturally closest
where logging and floating played an important role. But more significant for
the eventual linkage of the two groups is the fact that the growth of the indus-
trial proletariat so closely paralleled the change in agrarian class relations, with
the great majority of industrial workers coming from agriculture.
59 Regional differences in the wage levels of the agrarian workers decreased in the late 1800s
as well, and at the turn of the century a national market for the agrarian labor force began
to take shape (Heikkinen et al. 1983, p. 91).
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chapter 5
Finnish Nationalism
By international standards, national consolidation advanced calmly and stead-
ily in nineteenth-century Finland. The changes were accompanied by rather
little conflict.1What seems essential, and to a certain degree exceptional, is that
in Finland not only themiddle class but also the upper class had strong incent-
ives for nationalist mobilisation. In explaining this development, the nature of
both Finnish state-making and Finnish class structure – or, basically, the devel-
opment of Finnish nationalism in the interface between Sweden and Russia –
seems crucial.
1 The Dual Nature of Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe
In an influential essay, Ernest Gellner portrayed nationalism as ‘a phenomenon
connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but
with its uneven diffusion’.2 The tidal wave of modernisation has struck vari-
ous parts of the world in succession, mobilising the latecomers in national-
istic defence against those territories already modernised and bringing about
struggles for independence in the territories defined by nationalist criteria. In
the nineteenth century, this wave moved from the west to the marchlands of
Europe.3
In this view, nationalism is inherent in the process of modernisation. In an
industrialising society that is increasingly centralised, specialised, and occupa-
tionallymobile, literacy andeducationacquire an importance greater thanever
before. Near-universal education becomes essential to social mobility, which
requires communication. There is an objective social need for a cultural homo-
geneity. From the individual’s point of view, full citizenship presupposes access
to a common language and culture. Consequently, the language acquires a new
and crucial role in defining social boundaries. If the friction that inhibitsmobil-
ity is not overcome, or is overcome only partially, new ‘national’ boundaries
may be born. This is likely to happen, for example, in a situation inwhich one of
the languages in a state – often the language of the old heartland of an empire –
1 Klinge 1975, p. 54; Thaden 1981a, p. 6.
2 Gellner 1964, p. 166.
3 Gellner, pp. 164–72.
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becomes the language of the modern organisations and the new industrial,
governmental, and educational institutions.4 A hierarchical cultural division of
labourmay arise, asMichael Hechter has called the division of labour in which
ethnic groups are differentially stratified.5
Gellner’s definition of nationalism applies to movements of national self-
assertion and liberation, particularly those not linked to an existing or even
historically remembered polity (the ‘unhistoric nations’), where nationalism
is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness but rather the invent-
ing of nations that never existed. Nationalism arose with the introduction of
mass education in those latecomer regions where language or other ethnic
differentiae provided a strong incentive as well as a means for the backward
population to think of itself as a separate ‘nation’ and to seek independence –
liberation from second-class citizenship. Several nationalist movements in the
nineteenth-century multinational empires are good examples.6
Besides being a mode of confronting the consequences of later modern-
isation, however, nationalism has another aspect, which is also implied in
Gellner’s definition. Nationalism is, to cite E.J. Hobsbawm, a ‘civic religion’
for the modern territorially centralised state. A territorial state that functions
through a direct linkage between the individual citizens and a strong centre
must develop a set of motivations in the citizens that gives them a primary and
overriding sense of obligation toward the state and eliminates the various other
obligations they feel toward other groups and centres within or outside the ter-
ritory. In the era of capitalist economic development andmass participation in
politics, nationalism has functioned as the ideology by which the population
has established a sense of identity with the modern state.7
The two sides of the phenomenon – or, rather, the two phenomena – are
historically linked, at least in the sense that nationalism has functioned as the
‘civic religion’ of the new state after a successful national liberation struggle.8
4 The most detailed presentation of this argument is Gellner 1983. See also Gellner 1964,
pp. 158–64.The idea is implicit in someof KarlW.Deutsch’s formulations of the importance of
language for social mobility in the age of industrialisation; see Deutsch 1953, pp. 75–7, 153–4,
162.
5 Hechter 1978, p. 312.
6 Gellner’s own term for this variety of nationalism is ‘the classical Habsburg (and points south
and east) form of nationalism’ (1983, 97). See also Hobsbawm 1972, pp. 395–401; Chlebowczyk
1980, pp. 123–6; Osvoboditel’nye dvizheniia 1981, pp. 361–6.
7 Hobsbawm 1972, pp. 392, 404; Gellner 1983, pp. 55–8. On the various aspects of the direct rela-
tion of the citizen to the sovereign authority in themodernnation-state, see, e.g., Bendix 1964,
pp. 89–126.
8 Hobsbawm 1972, p. 404; Kiernan 1976, pp. 115–16.
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In nineteenth-century Europe, however, the importance of these two aspects
differed in different parts of the continent, as has been explicitly suggested by
TomNairn.9 In the establishedWestern European states, the ascendancy of the
dominant nationality was maximised during the nineteenth century, whereas
in East-Central Europe nationalism arose as a protest of underdeveloped
peoples. For the latter, nationalism became the way of mobilising and trying
to catch up with the already industrialised areas in theWest.
Nairn links the nationalism of the late developers of East-Central Europe to
the uneven development of capitalism.10 It was, in essence, a forced reaction to
the spread of capitalism. The majority of the better-off groups saw themselves
excluded from the material progress of the advanced lands and mobilised
against this ‘progress’. In the process of mobilisation, amilitant, interclass com-
munitywas consciously formed andmade strongly, thoughmythically, aware of
its separate identity vis-à-vis outside forces of domination. A nationalistmobil-
isation against ‘progress’ was the onlyway for the backward, dominated lands –
or, more precisely, for certain social strata in these regions – to seek access to
this progress.11 As IvánT. Berend andGyörgy Ránki put it, the Eastern European
peripheries had to modernise in their own way in order to protect themselves
from theWest and to successfully respond to theWestern challenge. This pro-
cess presupposed a struggle for nationhood and national self-determination.12
In other words, in the earlier phase of state-making nationalism generally
developed only after the strong states had been formed, as a consequence of
conscious efforts by the central power. But in the Eastern European latecomer
states, the process was reversed: ethnic similarities led to national conscious-
ness before the formation or re-establishment of a state. In this ‘autonomist
nationalism’,13 common culture preceded political structure and provided a
basis for it.
Nairn’s analysis demonstrates the close relationship between the two
nationalist phenomena. Also essential in nationalism as the protest of under-
developed peoples (though in an embryonic form) is mobilisation across class
boundaries, the creation of an interclass community.
9 Nairn 1977, pp. 177–8, 184. Cf. Orridge 1981, pp. 42–7.
10 Nairn 1977, pp. 153–4, 339–40.
11 Yet another formulationof the ‘diffusion’ of nationalism is that of A.D. Smith (1978, pp. 240,
243). He takes, not modernisation or the uneven development of capitalism, but rather
the centralising reform in the ruling bureaucracy and the concomitant demand for a new
type of trained personnel, the secular intellectuals, to be crucial in explaining the rise of
a nationalist movement against domination.
12 Berend and Ránki 1982, pp. 27, 28, 39–40, 63.
13 Orridge andWilliams 1982, pp. 20–1.
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Citing Miroslav Hroch’s study of nineteenth-century nationalist groups,
Nairn states that nationalism as a reaction to underdevelopment normally
involved first the intelligentsia, then wider strata of the middle classes, and
finally themasses.14 Hroch’s study is a unique piece of comparative research on
the structure of ‘patriotic’ groups in the phase immediately preceding nation-
alist mass mobilisation among seven small European nationalities: Czechs,
Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Norwegians, Flemings, and Slovaks. Besides
being small nationalities they are, for Hroch, ‘repressed peoples’, repression
meaning an unequal cultural and political position in a larger political unit.15
The overwhelming importance of such intellectual groups as university
graduates, teachers, and priests was, understandably enough, typical of nation-
alism in these cases. Moreover, petty officials – in contrast to higher bureau-
crats – and small merchants and artisans – in contrast to entrepreneurs and
large merchants – tended to provide activists and supporters to the national-
ist movements in this early phase. The ‘patriots’ studied were predominantly
upwardly mobile, the sons of parents from the lower ranks, who had risen just
as far as was possible for persons of such parentage.16
In Hroch’s study the Eastern European cases in particular displayed these
traits, which fits in well with the suggestions by Gellner and Nairn that nation-
alism is a reaction to underdevelopment. At the same time, the social structure
in these cases bore strongmarks of the feudal past. The activists were recruited
not only from outside the nobility and high bureaucracy or from outside the
ruling class of feudal society (which largely identified itself with the repressing
culture), but also from outside the new rising bourgeoisie, which was likewise
culturally alien to the nationalist groups. It was these activists whowere instru-
mental in spreading the nationalist ideas to themasses and inmobilising them
in the next phase.17 In the core capitalist areas of Western Europe, in contrast,
the main bearers of nationalism were intellectual groups linked to the bour-
geois ruling classes. There the key was nationalism as a ‘civic religion’, the need
for a unifying ideology that would overcome the destabilising effects of class
conflict.18
14 Hroch 1968; Nairn 1977, p. 117.
15 Hroch 1968, p. 16.
16 Ibid., pp. 125–37; also Plakans 1974; Chlebowczyk 1980, pp. 95–105; Koralka 1971, pp. 57–8,
62–7; Portal 1971, pp. 97, 100.
17 Hroch 1968, pp. 16–17, 32–3.
18 Kiernan 1976, pp. 111–12.The idea of a nationhad gradually evolved in thedominant classes
of big absolutist states – notably England, France, and Spain – from the sixteenth century
on, linked to such factors as state consolidation andmercantilism. SeeVilar 1981, pp. 54–8;
and Kiernan 1965, pp. 32–6.
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2 Finland in a European Perspective
At first glance, the position of Finland – or, to be precise, that of its large
Finnish-speaking majority – in this twofold division of nationalist phenom-
ena seems fairly clear: Finland was one of the ‘unhistoric nations’. The Finns
were also one of the ethnically distinct minority groups of the multinational
empires of the time, in all of which there arose national movements – or, more
specifically, an autonomist nationalism that claimed institutional recognition
within a larger state.19 KarlW. Deutsch presents the Finnish development as an
example of national conflict against the predominant language or culture. In
Hroch’s study, the Finnish case appears as an example of national self-assertion
by a repressed people, being more reminiscent of the Eastern than the West-
ern cases. For Hugh Seton-Watson, the Finnish national movement closely
resembles the national movements that arose in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Balkans. The sameholds for AndrewW.Orridge andColinH.Williams’s
list of Eastern European cases of autonomist nationalism.20
In all these respects Finland was certainly one of the late developers of the
East. Yet it is not quite correct to picture Finland as a colonial territory or as
an Eastern European periphery struggling through nationalism to free itself
from the dilemma of uneven development. It may be hypothesised that the
Finnish ‘deviations’ from this pattern, which resulted from its interstitial pos-
ition and are linked to both state structures and class relations, go a long way
in explaining the steady advance of national consolidation and nationalism in
Finland.
First, political dependence was comparatively limited. A Finnish polity was
founded decades before the politicisation of ethnic differentiae, that is, before
the rise of nationalism. In a more fundamental sense than was true for any of
the other small nationalities in Hroch’s study except Norway, Finland was an
autonomous unit, with its own administrative apparatus. Thiswas so especially
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The necessity of fighting for a sep-
arate status, which faced nationalist movements elsewhere, was not a primary
problem in Finland. Moreover, as indicated above, the formation of a national
economy had advanced very far by the end of the last century, to the point
of Finland being economically ‘overdeveloped’ relative to Russia. Whereas the
linguistic and religious distinctiveness vis-à-vis the metropolitan country was
19 Orridge andWilliams 1982, pp. 20–1.
20 Deutsch 1953, pp. 102–7; Hroch 1968, p. 16; Seton-Watson 1977, pp. 72, 430; Orridge and
Williams 1982, p. 21; Orridge 1981, p. 46.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
84 chapter 5
similar to that of many other minor nationalities, institutional and economic
distinctiveness was unusually marked in the Finnish case.21
Second, Finnish class structure was peculiar in two respects. Although ulti-
mate control was exercised in St. Petersburg, domination within the country –
political, economic, and cultural – was in the hands not of the Russians but of
the Swedish-speaking upper class. Thus, although linguistic, social, and educa-
tional barriers coincided within Finland, the local elite was not an extension
of the metropolitan elite. This situation was not common in Eastern Europe,
where the aristocratic upper classes often identified themselves bothpolitically
and culturally with themetropolitan power: in a number of areas, for instance,
German or Magyar landlords confronted Slav peasantries speaking a different,
strictly local language.22
True, some cases did resemble Finland: German nobles in the Baltic Prov-
inces and Polish landlords in Lithuania were, like Swedish upper classes in
Finland, culturally distinct both from the dominant power and from the sub-
jugated population. Yet another feature of the class structure sets Finland apart
even from these cases. During the Swedish period, a non-feudal class structure
with a large and strong indigenouspeasantry had consolidated itself in Finland.
Consequently, the authority of the upper class rested on an exceptionally fra-
gile foundation. This is perhaps the most important divergence in the Finnish
situation. Elsewhere, the power of the upper classes lay on a seemingly solid
basis, thanks not only to the guarantees of the metropolitan power but also to
the prolongation of feudal class domination. In Finland, however, the upper
classes had no solid basis in landownership; rather, their position was based
almost exclusively on the central role they played in the administration of the
emerging state.
To recapitulate, in both types of nationalism mobilisation across class
boundaries or the creation of an interclass community was of central import-
ance.The function of thismobilisation –whether as a civic religion for the state
or as the protest of underdeveloped peoples – was closely connected with the
position of the country or region in the international state system. In the estab-
lished Western states, which were also core areas of capitalism, nationalism
was closely linked to the ruling class; in the periphery, it was linked mainly to
middle-class groups seeking popular support against alien economic and polit-
ical domination.
21 See Orridge and Williams’s analysis (1982, pp. 22–5) on the structural preconditions for
autonomist nationalism.
22 Orridge andWilliams 1982, pp. 24, 29, 32; Kann 1964, pp. 50–6; Brass 1980, pp. 14–19.
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The early phases of the Finnish case resemble the latter type. During the
Swedish period, there arose a hierarchical cultural division of labour, with a
Swedish-speaking upper class. At the same time, most of the Finnish-speaking
regions were backward in comparison both to the core of Sweden and toWest-
ern Europe in general. Immediately before the rise of nationalism, however,
this picture was radically altered. Finland was established as a polity, which
soon began the process of economic integration. It became dependent on an
empire that separated the thin Swedish-speaking upper class from the former
Swedish core and endowed this local class in Finland with the central role in
the administration of the new political unit, the grand duchy. These conditions
point to the possible importance of nationalism as a ‘civic religion’.23
3 The Consolidation of a National Culture
All these factors combined to create a nationalism in which both aspects –
nationalism as protest of underdeveloped peoples and as civic religion – seem
to have intertwined exceptionally closely. Nationalism in Finland did not play
the role of a liberating force in the typical Eastern European way; practically
from the beginning it served strong elements of a ‘civic religion’ for the territ-
orially centralised state aswell.Theupper classes inFinland,with their Swedish
culture, found exceptionally strong incentives to adopt or accept the language
and culture of the large majority of the people, both because of the country’s
political dependence on a great autocratic state, Russia, and because of their
own need, as state bureaucrats, to establish a sense of obligation to the Finnish
polity. As a consequence, a rather unified national culture grew up.
This suggestion implies that in Finland, unlike elsewhere in Eastern
Europe,24 strong incentives for nationalistmobilisation existednot only among
the middle classes, the majority of freeholding peasants included, but also
among the upper classes. This hypothesis is supported by Hroch’s findings. He
focused on the development of nationalist movements in the phase when a
23 It is true that economic ‘overdevelopment’ vis-à-vis an empire contains varying elements.
Nairn (1977, pp. 185–7) cites such overdevelopment as causing nationalist movements for
liberation and self-assertion. But if viewed as a factor in the consolidation of the emer-
ging state, as in late nineteenth-century Finland, it may also strengthen the inculcation
of a sense of obligation to the state.Which aspect predominates depends on how tight or
loose political dependence is and the extent to which this dependence limits economic
freedom of action. In Finland the economic limitations were few.
24 Cf. Molnár 1971, pp. 221–227; Chlebowczyk 1980, pp. 94–5; Eley 1981.
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group of ‘patriots’ had already attempted systematically to spread ‘the national
idea’ but had not as yet penetrated the masses to any extent. In Finland this
phase occurred in the 1840s and 1850s, at the same time as economic and social
reforms were initiated at the administrative level. During these decades the
nationalist movement, or Fennomania, which originated within the Swedish-
speaking upper class, began to take on a clearly sociopolitical character under
the leadership of J.V. Snellman. According toHroch, upper-class representation
among the nationalist activists of the period was larger than among corres-
ponding activist groups elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The proportion of nobles
and high bureaucrats was particularly high. This picture is completed by the
pattern of recruitment of activists in Finland, where recruits were less often
sons of parents from the lower ranks and less often geographicallymobile than
elsewhere.25
Hroch’s results are highly suggestive, even though the role of bureaucrats
seems a bit exaggerated. He treats as patriots all members of the Finnish Lit-
erary Society, which brought together many high bureaucrats in the 1830s.
At that time the society played a role in government efforts to promote the
Finnish language and thus weaken traditional ties with Sweden, in accordance
with a ‘bureaucratic-patriotic idea of Finland’ adopted by the leading stratum
during the first decades of autonomy.26 Actually, in the 1840s and 1850s the
nationalist activists in the intellectual community came into open conflictwith
the domestic administration by redefining the language question in explicitly
social terms. Institutional tensions between the academic community and the
high bureaucracy (see Chapter 2) appear to have played a significant part in the
rise of Fennomania in this period.
This qualification should not be taken as casting doubt on the upper-class
character of the activists. Hroch’s conclusion is supported by an analysis of the
leading Fennomans associated with the editorial boards of Helsinki’s newspa-
pers. Unlike the ‘Old’ Fennomans of the 1850s, who in many cases had been
upwardly mobile and to whom the Finnish language was familiar from child-
hood, the so-called Young Fennomans of the late nineteenth century were def-
initely of upper-class origin. They became spokesmen for Fennomania in the
new political phase, after 1863. ‘It was the younger men of solid gentry back-
ground, with Swedish as their initial language, who laid the basis for conscious
25 Hroch 1968, pp. 83–167 passim; also Klinge 1969, pp. 189–98. Hroch’s results for Norway
(1968, pp. 95–100) are largely similar to those for Finland, but because Hroch focuses on
thewhole Storting (the NorwegianDiet)membership in the decades after 1814, the results
for Norway are not fully comparable to the other analyses in the study.
26 Korhonen 1963, pp. 207–14, 218.
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political organization and took the initiative in defining an exclusive party pro-
gram opposed to that of the Liberals’.27
Snellman’s aim was to establish national unity on a Finnish cultural found-
ation. He urged Finns with university training to adopt Finnish as a working
language and to create cultivated literature that was both popular and patri-
otic. Over a longer period, national unity and patriotic indoctrination were to
be achieved through revision of the school system. A Finland united in lan-
guage, culture, and loyaltymight resist the dangers resulting from the country’s
dependent position and might also develop further. The concept of the nation
as the natural unit of human achievement in history, the identity of nationality
and language, and the belief in the power of national culture and conscious-
ness to determinenational evolution receiveddefinite expression in Snellman’s
writings.His philosophy of nationalitywas refined and extended, but not basic-
ally altered, by later Fennomans. Complementing Snellman’s ideas was the
publication in 1835 (enlarged edition, 1849) of the Kalevala, a compilation by
Elias Lönnrot of ancient folk poems, which was immediately to consolidate
itself as the Finnish national epic.28
Concrete demands were mainly cultural in nature. The emphasis on culture
is reflected in attitudes toward popular groups, which in the Fennoman ideo-
logy were equivalent to the independent peasantry. As discussed in Chapter 2,
church and university intellectuals, together with the independent peasantry,
formed the backbone of themovement. Leaderswere typically from the church
and university, which had been undermined by economic development in the
late nineteenth century: a shift away from the corporate distribution of power
tended to put the clerical groups at a disadvantage relative to new commercial
and industrial groups. In these circumstances the nationalist activists turned
more or less consciously to the independent peasantry. The connection of this
group with the (lower) clergy was manifest in the vigorous revivalist move-
ments which, in contrast to the situation in Sweden, were soon accepted by
the church.29 For Snellman, the peasantry constituted the core of the nation,
and the landowningpeasants had a central place in the Fennomanprogramme.
The goal that they be activated and brought into public life was realised in part
in 1863, when their participation in the Diet was revived. But other modalities
were also needed: the adoption of Finnish as an administrative language, the
establishment of public elementary schools in rural districts, and the develop-
ment of local parish government. All these contributed to the civic education
27 Selleck 1961, pp. 166–8 (quotation from p. 168); Lundin 1981, pp. 400–1.
28 Selleck 1961, pp. 131, 144.
29 Juva 1962, pp. 192–3; Selleck 1961, p. 170; Suolinna 1975, pp. 18–19.
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of the freeholding peasants, making them aware of the needs of the nation and
their patriotic duties, which transcended the narrow interests of any particular
parish or class.30
This programme did not include any substantial demands for structural
change, however. The new measures were intended to increase the political
consciousness of the peasantry without altering the group’s agrarian character.
The Fennomans’ aim was the linguistic conversion of the existing gentry, to be
completed, it is true, by men of peasant origin, who would then be personally
assimilated into the gentry. The new gentry was to differ only on the vital point
of language. A Finland united in language and culturewas to establish itself not
by dismantling the traditional structure of power, but by subjecting it to guid-
ance by a patriotic intelligentsia.31 As one student of the phenomenon puts
it: ‘The fact that the Finnicisation movement was directed against the exclus-
ively privileged Swedish-speaking upper class of that time did not imply that
the upper class should have been eliminated in order to found a democratic-
ally organised society, but that the upper class speaking Swedish and oriented
to the Swedish culture should have been replaced by an upper class speaking
Finnish and oriented to the Finnish culture’.32
The above elements of the Fennoman programme provide further support
for the view that the two aspects of nationalism were closely intertwined
in Finland. On the one hand, Fennomania clearly worked for national self-
assertion and liberation from Swedish cultural dominance and against the
dangers arising frompolitical dependence on an external power. In this respect
the Fennomans’ advocacy of both the adoption of Finnish as an administrat-
ive language and the establishment of public elementary schools in rural dis-
tricts was essential, for it allowed the cultural emancipation of the independ-
ent peasants. Upward social mobility from the peasantry to the educated class
was not insignificant either, although it became important only in the recruit-
ment of the clergy. Another group that benefited directly from the reform of
the school system was the small but rapidly growing Finnish-speaking middle
class.33 The Fennomans also created the first Finnish mass organisation, the
temperancemovement, from the 1880s (see Chapter 6). All in all, by urging lin-
guistic reform and the broadening of the social basis for school attendance, the
Fennoman movement contributed to the emancipation of new groups and to
their recruitment into the upper class in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
30 Selleck 1961, pp. 173–4.
31 Ibid., pp. 147, 173–7, 184, 189, 204; Lundin 1981, pp. 400–1.
32 Wuorinen 1935, p. 273.
33 Ojala 1962; Waris 1947, pp. 242–3; Alapuro 1973a, p. 9.
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tury. The movement also acted for the consolidation of the country vis-à-vis
Russia. It is true that preference for linguistic over institutional reforms led the
Fennomans to ally themselves tactically with imperial interests and to display
a loyalty that was quite pronounced when compared with that of the liberals.
At a more fundamental level, however, it was linguistic and cultural unity that,
in the Fennoman view, enabled the country to resist Russian dominance. The
thin and culturally isolated upper layers of societywere far tooweak to perform
this task alone.
On the other hand, the movement strove to create an integrating ideology
for the state. The linguistic conversion of the gentry was necessary in order
to establish a sentiment of solidarity with the large Finnish-speaking masses,
which in turn would help to make the people accept the prevailing relations of
power and authority. For all their populism, the Fennomans revealed a strong
tendency toward social conservatism, and their view of society was essentially
paternalistic. For them, the state had a central role to play, and the long-range
goal of linguistic development took precedence over the short-range aim in
institutionally guaranteed freedoms. The movement was highly critical of the
more volatile urban and industrial groups, which seemed to threaten the tradi-
tional structure of society, which was based on corporate representation.34 In
the last decades of the century the Fennomanmovement provided an agrarian
and religious ideological alternative for the emerging state.
The calm and steady pace of national consolidation characterised the atti-
tude of the liberals, who from the 1860s on constituted the main group oppos-
ing the Fennomans. (In the 186os a Swedish nationalist movement also arose,
leaning ideologically on the Swedish-speaking agrarian and fishing popula-
tion in the coastal areas; its significance remained limited, however.) The lib-
erals derived their support from the rising bourgeois groups, and even from
the bureaucracy, the interconnections between which were consolidated dur-
ing the late nineteenth century (see Chapter 2). Thus the changeover from
a ‘bureaucratic-conservative’ upper-class ideology to a ‘bourgeois-liberal’ one
proceeded in Finland with little tension, and many elements of the bureau-
cratic culture were transferred to the liberal one.35
Although mainly Swedish speakers, the liberals did not focus their main
opposition on the cultural aspirations of the Fennoman movement. They
opposed the creationof a unilingual Finnishnational culture, but for themcon-
stitutional legality – that is, the preservation of existing political institutions –
34 Klinge 1968, pp. 74, 114; Selleck 1961, pp. 147, 177, 184, 189, 204.
35 Klinge 1980b, p. 40.
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and the continuity of the cultural heritage of the Swedish period were more
important than language.36 Consequently, they were prone to stress Finland’s
position as a separate political unit more sharply than the Fennomans did. It
was particularly in liberal circles that the use of some central national symbols,
such as the so-called Maiden of Finland, was proposed. They also preferred a
national flag that would have been definitely more un-Russian than the one
suggested by the Fennomans.37 Moreover, dominant tendencies in the nation-
ally oriented cultural life fit poorly in the strictly political division. To take only
one example, the central artistic movement toward the end of the century, the
national-romantic Karelianism, was politically mixed – or, rather, the openly
political front lines were irrelevant to it.38
In these circumstances, both the Fennoman and the liberal nineteenth-
century upper-class cultures shared certain central elements. Structural cleav-
ages remained limited, moreover, notably between the prospering Finnish-
speaking peasant landowners and the rising, largely Swedish-speaking indus-
trial and commercial class (see Chapter 2). Finally, the continuing advance
of the Finnish language soon began to reduce tensions between the domin-
ant groups. By the end of the century, Finnish had achieved a strong or even
predominant position in the central institutional spheres of society. The aim,
crystallised in the Fennoman movement, of creating an upper class cultur-
ally united with the majority of the people, largely by linguistic conversion,
was materialising rapidly.39 As has been pointed out, there was some upward
mobility into the elites, but in the main the old upper stratum, consisting of
established noble, burgher, and, in particular, clerical families, was to remain
in charge up to independence in 1917 and far beyond.40
In the long run all these factors led, despite the linguistic division, to the
emergence of a comparatively united nationalistic culture among the upper
classes and such middle-class groups as teachers and lower civil servants. The
threemain party groupings belonged to this culture, and in the 1880s and 1890s
the (Old) Finnish party of the Fennomans, the Young Finnish party of ‘Finnish-
minded’ liberals, and the Swedish party consisting of liberal, aristocratic, and
Swedish nationalist elements were consolidated.
36 Klinge 1975, p. 20.
37 Reitala 1983, pp. 61–85; Klinge 1981, pp. 41–8.
38 Sihvo 1973, pp. 252–60, 286–8.
39 Klinge 1968, pp. 331–2.
40 Klinge 1975, p. 17.
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4 Conclusion
In the ‘small’ nations … the dissolution of feudalism was accompanied
by the predominance of a bourgeoisie whose culture evidently diverged
from that of the ‘people’. Such ‘small’ nations had a very distinctivemake-
up: they lacked a native aristocracy and were subject to a landed class
with an alien language and an already-formed nationality; they lacked a
claim to historic statehood or political independence; they had no strong
or continuous tradition of high culture in the native language; and they
frequently lacked a strong native bourgeoisie. In these circumstances the
nationalist movement necessarily drew on a familiar popular coalition: a
new secular intelligentsia … eventually mobilizing large numbers of the
petty bourgeoisie and peasantry.41
This summary of Hroch’s central findings allow us to sketch the similarities
and differences between Finland and other small nations in which autonom-
ist nationalism arose.42 Like the others, Finland lacked a native aristocracy; the
tradition of high culture in Finnish was weak; and for a long time the Finns
had no strong native bourgeoisie. But unlike the others, there was a distinct
political unit (though onewithout any claim to historical statehood); the ‘dena-
tionalised’ aristocracy was weak as a landed class; and the central landed class
consisted of native freeholding peasants.
Eventually the gentry’s weakness as a landed class and their position in the
state structures led them to adopt Finnish as their own language. This devel-
opment was exceptional among the small nations: the gentry was nationalised
without coercion. Indeed, it promoted the process. The fact that central parts
of the Finnish dominant class actively sought an interclass community and
national integration on a common cultural basis with popular groups is in line
with Barrington Moore’s hint that the degree to which a dominant class res-
ists popular demands depends on the extent to which its own livelihood is
based on the incentives and opportunities it has to use political power – or
state structures – to subordinate labour. In Finland both the incentives and
the opportunities were modest compared with Eastern Europe. First, few of
the gentry ran large agricultural establishments dependent ondisciplinedwage
41 Eley 1981, p. 103.
42 Orridge and Williams (1982, p. 21) consider most of the Balkan states, Czechoslovakia
(especially Bohemia), Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland to be Eastern
European examples of countries displaying autonomist nationalism that achieved inde-
pendence permanently or temporarily.
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labour, and even fewer ran large manufacturing establishments. Second, they
had an interest, as state bureaucrats, in generating tax revenues thatwere likely
to increase with peasant commercial activity. And third, they needed, as man-
agers of a vulnerable state apparatus, allies against Russian domination.43 In
this perspective it seems clear that the dominant class in Finland had no strong
incentives to attempt the subordination of the peasants or the workers with
repressive politicalmethods, but rather had good reason to promote the attach-
ment of the popular groups – notably the freeholding peasantry – to the emer-
ging state. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the relatively tolerant approach of the
Finnish dominant class was to manifest itself more clearly a little later, in reac-
tion to incipient mass organisation at the turn of the century.
In the Finnish context it is understandable that linguistic and political rad-
icalism long remained separate. Early Fennomania was grounded in tensions
within the upper classes. On thewhole, the church and the large peasantry sup-
ported the movement, while the industrial and commercial class stayed apart
or opposed it. Fennomania greatly contributed to the rise of an independent
peasantry and of a Finnish-speaking middle class, but it was also a movement
of traditional intellectuals who felt their position threatened by the emerging
coalition of bourgeois, technical, and aristocratic interests associated with lib-
eralism. The liberal programme of constitutionalism and of increasing eco-
nomic freedom meant a reduction in the influence of traditional intellectuals
and the corporations they represented. The language issue was employed both
to forestall this change and to seek countervailing support from the independ-
ent peasantry.Understandably enough, itwas the gentry, andnot thepeasantry,
that initially required new language skills. As Roberta Selleck concludes in ana-
lysing the pre-1863 situation:
By identifying linguistic division as the basic source of social tension, and
prescribing linguistic reform as a corrective, the Fennocists were able to
maintain two important positions. On the one hand, they carried on a
contest with the bureaucracy for the exercise of political power through
traditional institutions. On the other hand, they were able to resist Lib-
eral attempts to alter these institutions. The linguistic issue concentrated
attention upon the cultural identity of persons exercising power, but
minimized the importance of governmental structures regulating power.
43 Cf. Moore 1966, pp. 433–5, 438, 444. I am grateful to Charles Tilly for suggesting the signi-
ficance of the specifically economic aspects in the gentry’s attitude. Obviously the decline
in the role of the land tax toward the end of the century, indicated above, is no evidence
against the second proposition.
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Thus, the Fennocist party, by 1863, was in effect attacking the bureaucrats
while implicitly defending the administrative system of government.44
Only with the rise of the Finnish language to a predominant position toward
the end of the century did Finnish political liberalism find its expression in a
party grouping – the Young Finnish party. In a sense, then, Fennomania was
a cultural response to the challenge of modernity: it used cultural means to
defend the traditional agrarian and corporate societal structure against the
threats of industrialisation.The conflict never reachedgreat dimensions. By the
early years of the twentieth century, with the advancement of the Finnish lan-
guage in the upper classes, with the increase in Russian pressure, and with the
organisation andmobilisation of the working class, linguistic conflicts receded
into the background.
44 Selleck 1961, p. 203.
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chapter 6
Before the Revolution: Organisation, Mobilisation,
and the Role of Russia
The Social Democratic working-class movement and its relation to bourgeois
organisation andmobilisationwere crucial for the process of national and class
integration in the early twentieth century. The workers’ party, founded in 1899,
developed within six years into a huge, markedly agrarian mass movement in
which purely political activity nearly eclipsed collective action in the trade uni-
ons. In the first parliamentary elections based on universal suffrage, in 1907, the
Social Democrats gained 80 of the 200 seats, and their position stabilised dur-
ing the following decade.
The movement will be analysed in terms of four factors.We will look first at
the process of large-scale organisation that occurred at the end of the last cen-
tury and the beginning of the present. Second, the split among powerholders,
both domestic and Russian, that facilitated the movement’s initial organisa-
tion will be considered. Third, structural and cultural preconditions conducive
to strong agrarian socialism will be analysed. And fourth, the part the Rus-
sian revolution of 1905 played in determining the role and character of the
movement in the process of national and class integration prior to 1917 will be
discussed.
1 Early Mass Organisation
In Finland the right to organise into associations, including trade unions that
initiated strikes, never became a matter of serious controversy. Mass organisa-
tions were formed relatively freely during the late nineteenth century, before
the right to establish them was formally acknowledged in 1906. This tolerance
was unusual even in comparison with Scandinavia, where the basic trend was
nevertheless similar.1 But it was totally different fromdevelopments inWestern
Europe, where industrialisation had occurred earlier. There the idea that any-
body, including the propertyless, could organise freely and on formally equal
terms to promote common interests in voluntary associations outside the dir-
1 Stenius 1980, p. 198.
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ect control of the state and church was accepted only after a hard struggle,
notably in the economic and political spheres. In Britain and several other
countries it was principally the trade unions that won, through strikes, recog-
nition of the principle of mass organisation. In nineteenth-century Europe the
struggle for the right to organise freely was marked by demonstrations, strikes,
and violent encounters with the police and the military. MostWestern govern-
ments finally made strikes legal between 1860 and 1900, under pressure from
organised workers and their parliamentary allies.2
In Finland the organisation into voluntary associations was preceded, and
partly paralleled, by the revivalist movements of the 1830s and 1840s and then
again in the 1880s and 1890s. Thesemovements emphatically avoided the regis-
tration of their adherents – that is, organisation in the sense of formally con-
stituted associations – but nevertheless, they gathered tens of thousands of
people, mainly independent peasants and their offspring, into regular devo-
tional meetings, creating a common identity and unifying structure among the
followers. In other words, they organised them.3 Because their organisation
was based on a direct linkage between individuals and religious leaders, these
movements undermined the traditional, corporate relationship that linked the
members of an agrarian household to the church through the head of the
household or through the village community. They contributed to a process
which, according to Reinhard Bendix, is central to the creation of the modern
nation-state.When activating members as individuals, they inculcated a sense
of solidarity that disregarded traditional intermediate agencies of corporate
society, thereby playing a pioneering role in the process of national integra-
tion – all the more so as they transcended narrow local boundaries and soon
spread over the country (see Chapter 7).4
These movements were an expression of the growing self-awareness of the
freeholding peasants, whose position and relationship with the gentry and
other agrarian groups were changing fundamentally but whose political influ-
ence remained small until the Diet resumed meeting in 1863.5 As stated in
Chapter 5, this group allied itself closely with the clergy toward the end of the
2 Bendix 1964, pp. 98–9; Abendroth 1965, pp. 51–62; Tilly 1978, p. 147; Stenius 1977, pp. 80–2;
Stenius 1980, p. 197.
3 Tilly 1978, p. 54.
4 Sulkunen 1983, pp. 2, 12–13; Suolinna 1975, pp. 7–11. On the direct linkage of citizens with
the state centre as a characteristic of the modern nation-state, see Bendix 1964, pp. 96–
122.
5 Ylikangas 1979, pp. 275–92.
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century; one indication is that the church soon accepted all revivalist move-
ments. This alliance of course means that the peasantry remained under the
church’s control, but it also means that religious solidarity toward the church
was to be more of an individual matter than before.6
The second phase, accompanying the continuing dissolution of the corpor-
ate societal system, extended organisation to popular groups other than the
independent peasants. The first voluntary organisations grew up in the towns,
where fire brigades were founded after the post-CrimeanWar period of social
and economic reforms. The dissolution of the legal bonds of the guild system
and the resumption of parliamentary activity had made urban liberals amen-
able to volunteer fire brigades, for they propagated the new ideal of a respect-
able and industrious worker and recruitedmembersmainly from artisanal and
other lower-middle-class occupations.7
On a larger scale, however, mass organisation gainedmomentum somewhat
later, in the 1880s and 1890s. After the reform of municipal self-government in
the countryside (1865) and towns (1873), the local administration represented
civil societymore adequately than the national political systemdid.The former
was based unambiguously on personal wealth, whereas the latter was based
on traditional corporate representation. For the freeholding peasants, the new
power in local affairs was accompanied by rapid economic and professional
organisation through savings banks, cooperative dairies, and farmers’ societ-
ies. Elementary schools grew rapidly in the 1890s as well, as did the industrial
working class. At the turn of the century nearly half the children of school age
attended elementary school.8
The first voluntary mass organisation at the national level was the temper-
ance movement, founded in 1883; it remained the largest such group up to the
mid-1890s, when it had about 8,500 registered members in towns and in the
countryside, mainly workers and artisans. It was then overtaken by the youth
associations, made up mainly of sons and daughters of the independent peas-
antry.9
Only in 1905 did the Social Democratic party recruit more members than
the youth associations or the temperance movement. Moreover, the party,
not the trade unions, dominated the working-class movement. ‘Unionization
and strikes came in the wake of the political organisation of workers’, even in
6 Cf. Sulkunen 1986, pp. 277–8.
7 Stenius 1980, pp. 203–4, 211–14.
8 Halila 1980, p. 185.
9 Sulkunen 1977, pp. 53, 73–5, 80–8; Sulkunen 1981, p. 100.
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Tampere, the country’s principal industrial centre.10 The first serious strikes
had occurred late, in 1896, and during the next ten years trade union activity
was concentrated in traditional artisanal and skilled construction occupations.
The national organisation was founded only in 1907, after the first Russian
revolution.11
Themembership figures for the threemain organisationswere not very large
even in 1905. In 1902, for example, there were 20,000 members in the temper-
ance movement, 30,000 in the Finnish youth associations, and 8,000 in the
SocialDemocratic party.Tradeunion activity brought 5,000 to 8,000 adherents,
who were largely members of occupation-based sections of party branches.12
The importance of these organisationswas nonetheless considerable: they rep-
resented the advance guard of opposition to the principles of corporate society.
In all of them the common people enjoyed formal equality with members of
higher strata. This was true even for the trade unions, which included employ-
ers until the late 1890s.13 In the temperance and youth organisations, positive
values linked to God, the fatherland, the emperor, the family, and cultural and
material progress dominated.14 These groups inculcated a sense of solidarity
based on a direct linkage between individual citizens and the national whole,
and for their part promoted national integration.
Collective claims gained in importance in the 1890s. In the temperance
movement this could already be seen in the 1880s, when the movement vehe-
mently attacked themanufacture and sale of alcohol andmade drink a central
political issue at the local level.
The three movements became increasingly militant, and although this act-
ivism was particularly evident in the emerging working-class movement, it
could also be seen in other organisations as well. Of great importance was
that the emergence of the working-class movement was not followed by a split
between it and earliermass organisations.Whatmatteredmostwas the conflict
between the defenders of the freedom to organise and their opponents, mainly
in the bureaucracy: this was the main division. ‘The working-class movement
did not remain alone in its stand. In concrete situations – strikes, prohibition,
the franchise reform, the politics of tsarism in Finland – the youth association
10 Haapala 1982, p. 235. See also Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 68–70, 115–27.
11 Mattila 1969, pp. 85–8, 118–61, 166–9; Sulkunen 1981, p. 100; Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982,
pp. 94–6, 114, 128–9.
12 Sulkunen 1981, p. 100; Mattila 1969, p. 104. The figure for trade unions represents the situ-
ation at the turn of the century.
13 Mansner 1981, pp. 32–3; Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 79–87.
14 Stenius 1977, p. 85.
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movement, for example, went largely along the same lines’.15 All principalmass
organisations asserted proactive claims, to use Charles Tilly’s terminology.16
In this controversy influential and even dominant sections of the upper
classes defended the right toorganise freely. Employers’ attitudes toward strikes
at the turn of the centurywere characteristic of the economic elite, who largely
accepted the trade union organisation. Although there are parallels with the
history of mass organisation in Sweden, Finnish employers tried to restrict the
workers’ organisation far less than did their Swedish counterparts. Similarly,
the Fennoman press opposed attempts to restrict the workers’ right to form
trade unions.17 ‘Thanks to the parallel efforts of the government, society, and
the industrial workers themselves, the worker question has not taken on here
as sharp and gloomya character as in other countries’, saidAlexandraKollontay
in her 1903 work on the living conditions of the Finnish workers.18
Whydid the Finnish upper classes so easily accept the right to organise, even
among the workers? Employer discussions of trade unions at the turn of the
century provide a clue. Not only was the importance of regulation admitted in
labour relations, but also an influential body of bourgeois opinion considered
free organisation by workers to be one way to reduce conflicts, believing that
mass organisations could eventually help in educating the working class and
making it more responsible. Related ideas were cherished among university
intellectuals.19
This amounts to saying that there existed a belief in the ultimate solidarity
of the people, a belief that, before 1905, had not been seriously challenged. Two
fundamental facts seem to have contributed to this belief: late industrialisation
and the social predominance of an independent peasantry. Only in the 1890s
did an industrialworking class begin to emerge in urban centres; thus, themain
occupations responsible for strikes before the end of the century were artis-
anal. Second, because the strong freeholding peasantry was a central structural
buttress for social calm in nineteenth-century Finland, the mass organisations
were not seen as a serious threat.
15 Ibid., 89. According to Hannu Soikkanen (1961, p. 23), ‘especially in the countryside the
distinction between a worker association and a youth association remained vague [in the
1890s]’. See also Vattula 1976, pp. 49–51, 54, 58, 86, 95. On the links of religious associations
with the other early mass organisation in this period, see Heikkilä 1979, pp. 63–84.
16 Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975, pp. 51–4.
17 Mattila 1969, pp. 179–83, 190–1; Stenius 1977, pp. 91–2. Cf. Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982,
pp. 142, 146, 148.
18 Kollontay 1903, p. 4.
19 Mattila 1969, pp. 190–1; Stenius 1977, pp. 91–2; Mansner 1981, pp. 40–6; Klinge 1968, pp. 196,
201–2, 206–7; Viikari 1984, p. 38.
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This latter feature may be formulated in more positive terms. The belief in
the ultimate solidarity of the people was reinforced by the development of
the national movement in the preceding decades. There was a strong faith
in the ‘peasant folk’, those who had given rise to the revivalist movements
and were now organising both professionally and economically. This faith
undoubtedly facilitatedmorepopular organisation aswell, as FrancisG. Castles
says happened in Scandinavia during this period. There, the emergence of
the nascent popular organisations (Castles speaks specifically of the labour
movement) coincided with the achievement of influence by the peasantry,
which also lent popular legitimacy to the former.20 In Finland, with the strong
peasant-based national movement, the conditions for mass organisation seem
to have been at least as favourable in this respect.
On a more fundamental level, the position and character of the Finnish
gentry seems to have been of great importance. As suggested in the previous
chapter, the gentry’s position not as a landed upper class but as bureaucrats
of a dependent state made for a considerable tolerance of demands by other
segments of the population for organisation and, finally, even for a popular
say in national politics. This tolerance and its linkage to the dominant class’s
state-making efforts are demonstrated by the relation of the popular organisa-
tion to the state. The Finnishmass organisations became strikingly centralised
and stable, and only in a few cases did they split into competing organisations.
There was no notable tendency toward organisational fragmentation as there
was, for example, in Sweden. An important part of the explanation seems to lie
in the effortsmade from the very beginning by the Finnish elite to tie the organ-
isations to the state. The Fennomans, especially, had an integration strategy
that aimed to eliminate all ‘sectarian’ tendencies in the name of national unity
and, at the same time, to establish closer connections between ‘Finnish’ civil
servants and the ‘Finnish’ people.21
The state orientation of the process of popular organisation is another
dimension of the main proposition advanced in Chapter 5 – that Finnish
nationalism was both a movement for national self-assertion and liberation
and a civic religion for the state, and that (somewhat of an exception in small
European polities) both middle- and upper-class groups were active in the
national movement. The upper classes were attempting to build the state and
the nation, and the Fennomans in particular felt it was imperative to do this
by linking the emerging civil society to the state. Characteristically, in the old
national state, Sweden, the popular organisations were not nearly as close to
20 Castles 1978, p. 14; Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987, pp. 10–11, 21.
21 Stenius 1983.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
100 chapter 6
the state as in Finland.22 The Fennoman attitude may be seen in the rise of
the temperancemovement. Its expansion was the work of the Fennoman elite,
who seized a largely spontaneous activity and attempted to use it to achieve
national integration of theworkers. Links between the state and themovement
were thus deliberately forged. The founders of the local branches included a
number of wealthy peasants, but above all included ministers and elementary
school teachers, that is, officials of the state church and civil servants. Most of
the adherents were artisans and workers.23 Also, the first modern mass move-
ment, revivalism, was soon integrated into the church; indeed, several leading
figures were ministers.
As stated above, the Fennomans were not the only group active in the
process of popular organisation. Connections also developed between other
important political organisations and various mass movements.24 It was no
accident that the temperance movement and other mass organisations were
created in the 1880s, the decade in which linguistically based party formation
took place within the upper classes.
Besides internal Finnish factors, there was perhaps an external one. In the
Western countries that industrialised earlier, strikes and the right to organise
had been largely legalised by the time the elites in Finland became aware of the
need to regulate relations with the popular masses. Using existing models was
natural in a situation in which no serious social conflict seemed imminent: the
workers’ challenge in Western Europe was known, but it seemed avoidable in
Finland.25
For all these reasons it is understandable that the mass organisation prin-
ciple was accepted without extensive agitation by the workers. Yet conditions
were different from those not only inWestern Europe but also in other Eastern
European regions. There, the expansion of similar organisations began later
than in Finland. In the Baltic Provinces, for example, they grew up only in
the opening decades of the twentieth century (see Chapter 11). In East-Central
Europe the obstacles were still greater than in the Baltic Provinces, where
the level of popular education was comparatively high. Political organisation
of workers was opposed or strictly controlled. As suggested in the preceding
chapter, in the East the authority restedmore on repressive feudal class domin-
ation as such, and the upper classes felt less need to develop national solidarity.
22 Stenius 1983, pp. 112–16, 118–23.
23 Sulkunen 1981, pp. 105–6; Stenius 1981, pp. 52–3.
24 Sulkunen 1981; Stenius 1981, pp. 48–58.
25 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 22, 27, 33–4, 37; Alapuro and Alestalo 1973, pp. 88–9, 102. Cf. Sulkunen
1980, p. 39.
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In short, then, in Finland – and to a lesser degree in Scandinavia26 – the
working-class movement came to be closely linked to other early mass organ-
isations, emerging from an essentially cultural process of organisation. Where
the workers were forced to struggle for their right to organise (that is, in West-
ern Europe), they did so in the context of production, where their common
interests crystallised andwhere they had resources to act collectively. Butwhen
large-scale organisation was initiated by the upper classes, as was the case in
Finland, it began in the cultural sphere. The open challenge to the political
and economic system emerged later, strongly influenced by the early cultural
organisation. A third pattern is discernible in other Eastern European coun-
tries, where up to World War I all political mass organisation remained under
strict control.
Most striking is the linkage between the Social Democratic party and the
temperance movement, ‘the first mass organisation of the Finnish workers’.27
Theworking-class associations in the 1880swere startedunder thepaternalistic
supervision of the employers. By the end of the century, however, the linkage
of the working-class movement, which was now gathering momentum, to the
temperance movement proved to be organisationally at least as important as
that with the paternalistic working-class associations. The openly political arm
of the workermovement developed largely fromwithin the temperancemove-
ment,which at the beginning of the twentieth century still had a far largermass
base than the party. In the 1880s and 1890s, the temperance movement ener-
getically attacked the production and distribution of drink, and during the last
years of the century anti-capitalism became a stronger theme in its collective
activism. Political reorientation took place in both the temperance movement
and the working-class associations in 1896. In 1898, that is, before the founda-
tion of a nationwide party, the social democratic leaders organised within the
temperance movement a so-called strike for temperance, which was suppor-
ted by about 70,000 people. The aim was to get the masses to support not only
prohibition but also the social democratic demand for equal and universal suf-
frage. For the leading organisers the ‘strike’ constituted ameans to promote the
creation of a working-class party,28 and this party, which was ‘far from social-
ist’,29 was founded the following year, at first mainly in towns and industrial
centres. Even after the turn of the century the boundary between the party
and the temperance movement remained quite vague among party adherents.
26 See Lundkvist 1980; Svåsand 1980;Wåhlin 1980; also Castles 1978, p. 13.
27 Sulkunen 1980, p. 39.
28 Sulkunen 1980.
29 Kirby 1971, p. 19.
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There was a marked evangelical tinge to the speeches of party agitators, with
socialismoften called the ‘evangel of labor’.30 In themassmeetings held in con-
nection with the general strike of 1905, suffrage and prohibition were often the
twocentral popular demands.Theparty’s prohibitionprogrammewas themost
radical among the European labour parties, and in 1907, after the introduction
of universal suffrage, the party played a decisive role in the passage of prohibi-
tion legislation (which came into force only after Finlandbecame independent,
however, because the emperor vetoed it).31
The temperance movement was not the only mass organisation that facil-
itated or otherwise marked political organisation by the workers. Often the
volunteer fire brigades had the same role as the temperance associations.32
Workers also participated actively in the consumer cooperatives that expan-
ded rapidly in the first years of the twentieth century. In 1910 the cooperatives
had 87,000 members, of whom a number were landowning peasants but most
were agrarian and industrial workers and crofters. Together with local officials
and wealthy peasants, worker representatives often had seats on the governing
bodies.33 Sports organisations among Finnish workers were also closely con-
nected with the political worker movement – arguably even more closely than
elsewhere in Europe – but significantly, the workers’ sports clubs were part of
a bourgeois central organisation until 1917. In addition, sports were often a key
part of the activities of worker associations, very much as in the temperance
movement, the youth associations, and the volunteer fire brigades.34
In sum, then, by 1905 the working-class movement had only recently and
partially separated itself from cultural and economicmass organisations. Ideo-
logically the movement remained vague even after the new party adopted, in
1903, the SocialDemocratic label andadefinite socialist programme,whichwas
an amalgam of the moderate principles in the 1901 programme of the Austrian
Social Democratic party, on the one hand, and the concrete demands in the
1891 Erfurt programme of Karl Kautsky, on the other.35 An element of ‘left Fen-
nomania’ could also be observed in the movement. In the expansion beyond
the early core – the industrial working class and the artisans – this orientation
was to prove important.
30 Kirby 1971, pp. 23–4.
31 Sulkunen 1986, pp. 253–4; Sulkunen 1981, pp. 98–9, 114.
32 Unfortunately, no systematic study exists on the degree of this interconnection, butmany
local examples can be easily found.
33 Suonoja 1968, pp. 75–7, 136–47.
34 Laine 1983, pp. 379, 484–485, 493–509, 519; Hentilä 1982, pp. 31, 39–44, 48–63.
35 Borg 1965, pp. 63–8.
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2 The Finno-Russian Conflict
Another factor that facilitated the emergence of the working-class movement
was the conflict between the imperial authorities and the dominant groups in
Finland. The ‘administrative Russification’ at the turn of the century was mild
in comparison with what occurred elsewhere, but to the Finnish political class
it seemed utterly outrageous and unjustifiable because Finland had enjoyed
exceptional economic and cultural florescence and an exceptional degree of
internal autonomy.36
Toward the end of the nineteenth century both the Finnish state and the
nation had become increasingly consolidated. Finland had developed most of
the characteristics of a self-governing state, with an integrated economy and
a high degree of national self-awareness in its upper strata. Not surprisingly,
politically active Finns considered their country to be a separate state andwere
eager to limit the scope of general imperial legislation in Finland. A doctrine
was developed and generally accepted which held that in 1809 the Finns had
acquired irrevocable constitutional guarantees for the country’s autonomy.37
At the same time, Russia was slowly modernising and striving to create a more
uniformadministration. In the 1890s Finlandwas the only remnant of the areas
conquered by Alexander I with a specific status, ‘a uniquely privileged posi-
tion in the Russian Empire’.38 Centrifugal forces were considered particularly
dangerous in view of Germany’s rise in Central Europe. It became increasingly
clear to the imperial government that Finnish autonomy was incompatible
with Russian autocracy and that, for reasons of security in the St. Petersburg
and Baltic regions, Russia was obliged to defend her national interests in Fin-
land without compromise. After all, the south-eastern border of Finland lay
only about twenty miles from the Russian capital.39
In 1890 the Finnish postal system was incorporated into that of the empire
without the consent of the Finnish estates. The conflict really broke out, how-
ever, in 1899 with the integration of Finland into the empire’s general system of
military service. In order to force this plan through, the emperor reserved for
himself, in the FebruaryManifesto of 1899, the right to determine the final form
of all legislation for Finland in matters of ‘general Imperial concern’, while the
36 Thaden 1981a, pp. 7–8; Thaden 1981c, p. 462; Polvinen 1984, pp. 342–4.
37 Jussila 1979a; Jussila 1984, pp. 98–9; Schweitzer 1978, pp. 4–5, 18–30; Thaden 1984, pp. 91,
211–12, 229–30.
38 Pipes 1964, p. 4.
39 Polvinen 1984, pp. 52–7; Jussila 1979b, pp. 31, 35; Lundin 1981, pp. 357–8, 373; Thaden 1981b,
p. 76.
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FinnishDiet onlyhad the right to give its opinion.40 Froma strictly legal point of
view themanifesto did not greatly change the character of Finno-Russian rela-
tions. But the flexibility of the earlier period hadmade the Finns overconfident
about the separate status of their country, and consequently themanifesto was
unanimously felt to be a glaring injustice. The estates were ‘brought back to
earth’.41
Several measures integrating Finland more closely into the Russian Empire
were carried out by 1905. In 1900 the Language Manifesto extended the use
of the Russian language in the administration, particularly at the expense of
Swedish. The Russian system of conscription was extended to Finland in 1901;
it was followed by passive resistance. The actual consequences for the great
majority of the people were minimal, thanks partly to the effectiveness of
the ‘army strikes’, whereby conscription into the Imperial Army was dodged.
But the extension of the scope of general imperial legislation remained highly
offensive to the Finnish political class.42
The Finnish upper classes reacted immediately, in 1899, by looking – for
the first time – for popular support to counter the Russian demands. Several
petitions were collected, the largest of which, the so-called Great Address, con-
tained 522,000 names, representing more than one-fifth of the total popula-
tion in 1899. The first Finnish reaction was unanimous, but soon the bourgeois
groups adopted different attitudes toward the Russian demands. The Finnish
party of the Fennomans (or the Old Finns, as they were generally called), in
line with its earlier policy, followed a course of compliance or appeasement,
whereas the Swedishparty and the liberalYoungFinns adopted apolicy of pass-
ive resistance, forming the constitutionalist bloc. A coalition across the lan-
guage boundary emerged, and party strife became increasingly tense, connec-
ted directly to cooperation or non-cooperation with the imperial authorities.43
The constitutionalist Young Finns now sought the support of the working-
classmovement, inwhich theyhadbeenactiveduring the 1890s: now theYoung
Finnish Left unconditionally backed the right to strike and in certain cases also
supported universal suffrage, the first and foremost goal of the working-class
movement. At the same time a strong faction within the workers’ party itself
sought cooperation with the Young Finns. The introduction to the 1899 party
programmespecifically stated that thepreservation andprotectionof Finland’s
national independence was an essential condition for gaining economic and
40 Thaden 1981b, p. 82; Polvinen 1984, pp. 108–9.
41 Jussila 1979b, pp. 37–8. See also Polvinen 1984, pp. 110–11.
42 Jussila 1980; Lundin 1981, pp. 439–40.
43 Paasivirta 1981, pp. 176–7; Thaden 1981c, p. 460.
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social liberties.Theparty considered itself ‘patriotic andnational, butnot chau-
vinist’. In many worker associations in both the countryside and small towns,
these early years were marked by a struggle for control between the socialists
and the remaining bourgeois radicals, and relationswith other parties were rel-
atively close. Some of the Social Democratic leaders and many workers even
actively resisted the Russians under the leadership of bourgeois radical groups
that had split off from the constitutionalist bloc in 1904.44
The working-class movement was treated with sympathy by the opponents
of the Young Finns as well. In 1904–6 the Old Finnish Left approached and
to a certain extent joined with the Social Democrats. The Fennoman ‘love of
masses’ was revived even before the Russian crisis finally spread to Finland
in the autumn of 1905. In June of that year, the Old Finnish party accep-
ted the principle of universal suffrage, though not the need for a unicameral
assembly.45
The Russian pressure on the bourgeois parties and their deep internal divi-
sions evidently provided some leeway for the working-class movement, which
was able to press for its central demands more forcefully and to differentiate
itself from the bourgeois partiesmore sharply than before. Theworking classes
increasingly felt that the resistance was being engineered by the Finnish ruling
classes as a means of protecting their own interests. The effects of Russifica-
tion were felt most keenly by the professional and educated classes, whereas
the workers were not so directly affected. Although passive resistance prom-
ised franchise reform once the threat to Finnish liberties had been averted, the
working-class movement increasingly rejected this order of priorities.46 This
considerable freedom of activity vis-à-vis the bourgeois parties soon made the
party’s line more independent and tenacious, though by no means revolution-
ary.
Not surprisingly, the imperial authorities were favourable to the rather small
labour party, considering it less dangerous than the more restive bourgeois
groups and even hoping to use it against them. The Russians also tried to drive
a wedge between the Finns by proposing social reforms, which they thought
would strengthen popular allegiance to the empire.47
To conclude, the various interests, both Finnish and Russian, having a share
in the Finnish government came into conflict. The cleavage led different groups
44 Paasivirta 1981, p. 189; Jussila 1979b, p. 25 (quotation), pp. 50–1; Kirby 1971, pp. 19, 21, 25.
45 Stenius 1981, p. 63; Paasivirta 1981, pp. 189–90.
46 Kirby 1971, pp. 29–30. Cf. Paasivirta 1981, p. 182.
47 Polvinen 1984, pp. 287–301; Jussila 1979b, pp. 24, 39–40, 49, 171–2. Cf. Rasila 1961, p. 193;
Lundin 1981, pp. 429–33.
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of powerholders to seek the support of the emerging working-classmovement,
or at least to accept it. The situation is familiar: when a split develops among
the dominant groups, some of them seek support from popular groups. This
pattern has frequently preceded revolutionary situations (for more detail, see
Chapter 8), but it has also paved the way for the non-revolutionary extension
of political rights. Developments in Finland prior to 1905 point clearly to the
latter situation. The workers’ party took shape, consolidated its position easily,
and remained moderate.
There was one potentially dangerous development for the indigenous dom-
inant groups, however. Heretofore the empire had remained the ultimate guar-
antor of overall stability in the grandduchy. In addition, theFinnishpowerhold-
ers controlled a national armed force. In the new situation, however, not only
did imperial support become uncertain, but also, in consequence of the new
system of military service, the domestic troops were disbanded. In 1901–5 all
Finnish units were gradually dissolved, and the Finnish state was left without
a coercive apparatus of its own other than the police.
3 The General Strike of 1905, Parliamentary Reform, and the Rise of
Agrarian Socialism
The revolutionary situation in Russia extended into Finland in October 1905.
Earlier that year demonstrations and other protests were limited to the towns,
and no violent events comparable to those in the Baltic Provinces, for example,
took place.48 Even the Russian general strike of October reached Finland only
after ten days, despite the proximity of St. Petersburg. Butwhen it finally spread
to the grand duchy, it led to substantial mobilisation in both towns and coun-
tryside. The strike in Finland began in a national and patriotic spirit, with the
constitutionalists and the Social Democrats working together in many towns.
As the strike progressed, however, the differences between the two factions
grew. Both agreed on the need to reverse the Russian integration policy, but the
bourgeois groups and the imperial authorities opposed the Social Democrats’
demand for universal suffrage and a unicameral assembly.49
The situation was revolutionary in important respects. During a short but
decisive period, the government, which had previously been under the con-
trol of a single polity, became the object of effective, competing, and mutually
48 Jussila 1979b, pp. 58–60.
49 Jussila 1979b, pp. 74–86; Kirby 1971, pp. 49, 58.
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exclusive claims by two distinct polities – to use Charles Tilly’s definition of
a revolutionary situation.50 The Social Democrats were able to push through
their demands for universal suffrage andaone-chamber legislaturebecause the
state was paralysed, first by the inability of the autocracy to call on the police
and the armed forces, and later by the necessity to fight other enemies within
the empire. The crisis resulted in the working-class movement being able to
access the polity. The creation of anunofficial armedmilitia in the first fewdays
of the strike also indicates the state’s paralysis. Both the bourgeois civil guards
and the Red Guards, which were linked with the worker movement, evolved
from the militia. Some of the guards remained in existence well into 1907.51
The emperor authorised the transformation of the political system on 4
November 1905, together with the suspension of the February Manifesto, the
conscription law, and other integrationmeasures. The newpolitical systemwas
confirmed the following year by the estates, under pressure from the social-
ists. The estates were replaced by a unicameral assembly based on univer-
sal and equal suffrage for both men and women. Finland thus experienced
‘Europe’s most radical parliamentary reform’, in which ‘Europe’s most conser-
vative estate-based Parliament’ was superseded by ‘the most democratic’ sys-
tem in the whole Continent.52 The great leap from the corporate conception of
representation to one based on the individual was made all at once, whereas
elsewhere this fundamental change took at least several decades.53 True, there
was an essential constraint: the final decision on legislation remained in the
hands of the emperor. In the old system only a few thousand persons had had
a voice in choosing representatives to the noble and clerical estates, and the
latter was the last of its kind in Europe. In the two other estates, those of the
burghers and the freeholding peasants, the electoral basis wasmuch larger, but
still the reformmultiplied tenfold the number of qualified voters from 126,000
to 1,273,000.
The Russian autocracy had guaranteed the quasi-immutability of an anti-
quated system of corporate representation. Its temporary collapse led in one
stroke to a fully democratic electoral system. This sudden extreme leap was
intimately bound up with fluctuations in the strength of the imperial author-
ity.
50 Tilly 1978, p. 191.
51 On the guards, see Jussila 1979b, pp. 116–39; and Salkola 1985, 1: 45–7.
52 Quotations are from, respectively, Jutikkala and Pirinen 1962, p. 242 (cf. Rokkan 1970,
pp. 84–5); Wirilander 1974, p. 21; and Lundin 1981, p. 445. See also Allardt 1981a, pp. 62–
3.
53 Bendix 1964, pp. 112–22.
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table 8 Distribution of seats in Parliament won in Finnish
general elections, 1907, 1916, and 1917
Parties 1907 1916 1917
Social Democratic party 80 103 92
Agrarian Union 9 19 26
Finnish party 59 33 32
Young Finnish party 26 23 24
Swedish People’s party 24 21 21
Others 2 1 5
Total 200 200 200
National turnout 70.7% 55.5% 69.2%
Source: Élections pour la diète en 1917 1919, 13, 41–2
In the first general elections, in 1907, the turnoutwas 71 percent – a figure not
surpassed until 1945 – and the Social Democrats gained more than one-third
of the vote. With 80 of the 200 seats in Parliament, they became the largest
socialist party in Europe (Tables 8 and 9). In agrarian Finland this achievement
necessarily required enormous rural support, and indeed, the party received
almost nine-tenths of its votes from the countryside. Rural voters were in the
majority even in relative terms: the Social Democrats received 34 percent of
the urban vote and 38 percent of the rural vote. The success was spectacu-
lar, exceeding to some degree even the party’s own expectations.54 Among
the bourgeois parties, the Old Finnish party gained a much larger vote than
the Young Finns. The former was supported mainly by the independent peas-
ants and the Finnish-speaking educated class, the latter bymiddle-class groups
in both towns and countryside (see Chapter 7). The Swedish party (now the
Swedish People’s party) received nearly all the Swedish-speaking vote in the
coastal areas. Unlike the other parties, the populist Agrarian Union emerged
only after suffrage reform in 1906. It was markedly more radical than the other
bourgeois parties and was supported above all by the smallholders. Like the
Social Democratic party, the Agrarian Union was able to rest on earlier mass
organisations – the youth associations and, in some regions, the professional
farmers’ societies. At first, however, it grew only slowly.
54 Soikkanen 1961, p. 363.
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table 9 Rural and urban party support in Finnish general elections, 1907, 1916, and 1917
Countryside Cities
Parties 1907 1916 1917 1907 1916 1917
Social Democratic party 38% 48% 45% 34% 44% 45%
Agrarian Union 7 11 15 0 0 0
Finnish party 29 18
} 32a
20 14
} 34a
Young Finnish party 14 12 13 14
Swedish People’s party 11 10 7 26 25 19
Others 1 1 1 7 3 2
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N (thousands) 770 690 840 121 111 158
National turnout 69.6% 56.8% 69.5% 72.7% 49.0% 67.9%
a Because of party alliance between the Finnish party and the Young Finnish party, their
respective votes cannot be distinguished in the 1917 elections.
Sources: Élections pour la diète en 1907 et 1908 1909, 8; Élections pour la diète
en 1916 1917, pp. 42–9; Élections pour la diète en 1917 1919, 16, pp. 38–9
The most important and unique feature of the enormous mobilisation in
1905–7 was the rise of agrarian socialism. True, there were certain similarities
with the Baltic Provinces in 1905, as will be seen in Chapter 11. Comparisons
with some rural regions in Italy and France can also bemade.55 But as an organ-
ised phenomenon that spread throughout the entire country, Finnish agrarian
socialism is unique. How can the strong agrarian base of the Social Democratic
movement be explained, and how did it affect the movement’s overall charac-
ter?
As to the first problem, anumber of significant structural factors canbe iden-
tified. Obviously the agrarian response was linked to the fact that the landless
population, forced to remain outside the traditional agrarian community, had
grown rapidly at the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the lease-
hold question also emerged, with crofters trying to defend themselves against
the increasinglymarket-oriented landowners (see Chapter 3). These two devel-
opments created a foundation for the rise of agrarian socialism. Yet they alone
are insufficient to explain either the strength of the movement or its relatively
high level of organisation. Eric Wolf has emphasised that the success of peas-
55 Linz 1976, pp. 388–92, 402–12, 421–2.
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antmovements depends notmerely, or even primarily, on the grievances of the
participants, but on the connections between the agrarian groups and other,
non-agrarian groups. ‘Poor peasants and landless laborers … are unlikely to
pursue the course of rebellion, unless they are able to rely on some external
power to challenge the power which constrains them’.56 It may be argued that
in Finland such an external power existed and that it was made up of, to an
exceptionally high degree, the industrial proletariat, or, rather, its party, the
Social Democrats. As discussed earlier, the capitalist transformation in Finland
took place simultaneously in industry and agriculture. Hence, both the indus-
trial and the agrarian proletariat increased at roughly the same time.Moreover,
an exceptionally close link seems to have developed between the two groups,
because the industries were mostly located in the countryside, seasonal work
was common, and the overwhelming majority of the industrial workers had
come directly from agrarian occupations.
It has been argued, to be sure, that the prevailing conditions hampered,
rather than helped, the political organisation of the working class. It was diffi-
cult, so the argument runs, for the new ideas advanced in the workers’ associ-
ations to percolate into isolated rural communities. In addition, industry itself
was young, and because the workers had been in industrial employment for
only a short time, they were still influenced by traditional agrarian values.
Finally, because employment was seasonal and the level of skill required gen-
erally low, a sense of solidarity was difficult to create.57
This argument, however, focuses exclusively on the industrial workers. From
the perspective of agrarian workers, the situation appears very different. After
all, there is nothing peculiar in the radicalisation and organisation of the indus-
trial working class. The process in Finland followed much the same pattern
observed in several other European countries, even though the dispersion of
Finland’smain industries throughout the countrysidemayhave retarded it.The
real point is that Finnish conditions facilitated, to an exceptionally large extent,
the radicalisation of the agrarianworkers, and therefore of the greatmajority of
the working class. The situation furthered the rise of class consciousness in the
agrarian proletariat, making it easier for the industrial and agrarian workers to
forge an alliance.
Moreover, these conditions apparently facilitated the incipient radicalisa-
tion of the crofters as well, or at least tended to shape the political form their
already manifest but not yet crystallised grievances were to take. Crofters had
56 Wolf 1969, p. 290.
57 Soikkanen 1961, p. 5.
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been the first to express their discontent in the countryside (Chapter 3), and
their strikes multiplied in the years immediately preceding the general strike
of 1905. Likewise, they were the only group that indisputably dissociated itself
from the bourgeois-led national protests against the Russian integrationmeas-
ures at the turn of the century. Crofterswere reluctant to sign theGreat Address
in 1899, and they took part in the ‘army strikes’ only passively.58
The previous institutional, organisational, and cultural connections be-
tween town and country also seem to have played a part in forging the political
alliance between them. Themost important links were provided by the expan-
sion of the elementary school system and the earlier process of mass organisa-
tion. Of the members of the temperance movement, which originated in the
towns, one-half lived in the countryside at the end of the last century, and sub-
sequently theproportionof ruralmembers increased considerably.Thepropor-
tions in the volunteer fire brigadesweremore or less similar.59 Common organ-
isational frames presumably facilitated the passage from common interests
to explicit political organisation encompassing both towns and countryside –
especially because the industrial working class was still weakly structured and
therefore without a strong working-class culture.60 Various cultural activities –
theatrical and musical performances, social evenings, athletic events, and so
forth – played a central role in theworking-class associations, as they did in the
temperance movement and the volunteer fire brigades. Indicative of the link
or, rather, the continuity is also the fact that the temperance movement began
to lose members rapidly as the Social Democratic party expanded after 1905.61
This cultural connection helped to link the rural and urban poles in the worker
movement, all the more so as the face-to-face relationship between agrarian
workers and crofters on the one hand and their employers on the other bore
little resemblance to the collective conflict between worker and employer in
the industrial centres.
In these respects Finland differed from other Eastern European countries.
First, although Eastern Europe too had a large landless proletariat, no sectors
other than minor groups in the intelligentsia allied themselves with it. There,
it was not until the upheavals of World War I that the rural proletariat was
58 Ibid., pp. 345–8; Tommila 1967, pp. 150–60; Jutikkala 1970.
59 On the temperance movement, see Sulkunen 1986, p. 106. In the 1880s the number of
rural volunteer fire brigades already exceeded that of urban brigades (Stenius 1981, p. 23),
even though the number of urban firefighters was presumably greater at that time. Later,
moreover, the number of rural brigades grew many times over.
60 Alestalo 1977, pp. 109–10.
61 Sulkunen 1981, p. 114.
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radicalised. As feudal relationships between the landless and the landlords
disintegrated, they were only slowly replaced by new class relationships. Land-
less and poor peasants may have been freed from the old, but they were not
integrated into the new. Consequently, the peasant movements were mainly
outbursts lacking clear political organisation.62 Second, no popular organisa-
tional network covering both town and country existed in Eastern Europe prior
to the emergence of the worker movement.
Structural and institutional factors appear tohave created conditions favour-
able to the Finnish Social Democrats. But the nature of the crisis of 1905 – that
is, immense mobilisation and subsequent parliamentary reform – was decis-
ive. The Social Democratic party was the only political movement with an
organisedmass base when the general strike extended into Finland. The previ-
ous stability of the political system had meant that other political groupings
were formed almost completely within the dominant groups. In 1905 differ-
ent grievances were suddenly fused within the organisational framework of
the Social Democratic party. A link was forged between the early adherents
in urban centres and new adherents in the countryside, and also between a
number of intellectuals who joined the party and the great agrarianmass. Now
an originally urban and industrial-based organisation could directly mobilise
large agrarian masses, a fact which Joel S. Migdal, Theda Skocpol, and others
maintain is crucial in explaining the rise of political movements among peas-
ants. As in a number of Third World countries, a political movement gaining
extensive peasant support was created in Finland as the result of an impetus
originating outside the peasantry.63 But in Finland the factors discussed above
contributed to the fact that the urban-rural alliance took shape very rapidly and
on an exceptionally large scale.
The spread of worker associations at the beginning of the century indicates
both the leading position of the industrial proletariat and the link between
town and country. The associations were first established in big towns, then
in smaller towns and industrial and commercial centres in the countryside,
and finally in the countryside itself. Rural associations were first set up in key
villages in the communes andnear sawmills and railway stations.With the gen-
eral strike the focus of the labourmovement shifted away from the towns to the
industrial centres in the countryside and an agrarian setting.64
Agrarian workers joined the party in large numbers. In this atmosphere the
Social Democrats were able to attract support from the crofters as well, indeed
62 Galaj 1974, pp. 322–6; Chirot and Ragin 1975; Erényi 1975, pp. 57–61.
63 Migdal 1974, pp. 231–6; Skocpol 1982, pp. 361–7.
64 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 183, 202, 340.
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becoming the only party able to create a noteworthy crofter organisation.65
Party membership went from 16,000 to 45,000 in 1905, and to 85,000 by the
end of 1906. In October of 1906 membership rose to 107,000, but after that it
began to decline; in 1910membership stood at 52,000. In 1906 the Social Demo-
cratic party was the strongest socialist party in the world in relative terms, and
69 percent of its members were from the countryside. Between 1904 and 1906,
moreover, the number of worker associations increased tenfold, fromabout 100
to nearly 1,000.66
All in all, the Finnish situation obviously provides support for Eric Wolf ’s
contention about peasant revolutionary activity: ‘It is probably not so much
the growth of an industrial proletariat as such which produces revolutionary
activity, as the development of an industrial work force still closely geared to
life in the villages’.67 In Finland conditions were favourable for commonmobil-
isation and collective action by the agrarian and industrial working class. But a
short-term factor, the Russian revolution of 1905, activated them.
Howdid the large agrarian response affect the overall character of themove-
ment? First, and understandably enough, the huge rural majority in the party
based much of its action on local traditions. The worker movement became
distinct from the other popular organisations, but generally the relations with
these latter remained reasonably good or even close. The sites for cultural and
political activity were the workers’ halls, constructed jointly by the members –
and arguably the most peculiarly Finnish phenomenon in the whole move-
ment.68 In this period ‘the working-class movement was to a large extent a
cultural movement, with the workers’ halls as its centres’.69 They were a major
factor behind the cohesiveness of the movement: the party functioned above
all ‘as the organisational, political, and ideological bond linking the network
of workers’ halls’.70 The number of halls rose from 47 in 1905 to 683 in 1910,
and to 940 in 1916, with social evenings, various performances, and contests
occupying a central place in their utilisation.Although theworking-classmove-
ment now increasingly distinguished itself from other mass organisations, its
internal division of labour wasmodest. Actually – and again, understandably –
political, economic, and cultural aspects were not really differentiated.71 Seen
65 Rasila 1961, pp. 309–11, 412.
66 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 338, 340; Soikkanen 1978, p. 354.
67 Wolf 1969, p. 292.
68 Hentilä 1982, p. 48.
69 Hako 1974, p. 143 (quotation); Hentilä 1982, pp. 47–8. Cf. Alestalo 1977, pp. 98–106.
70 Kettunen 1984, p. 39.
71 Ibid.; Hentilä 1982, pp. 47–8.
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from this perspective, William C. Martin’s conclusion seems only a little exag-
gerated: ‘The educational activities of the Workers’ Party carried the ideas of
nationalism outside the literate classes and effectively created a national con-
sciousness among urban workers and landless rural workers’.72 It is evident
that the large agrarian response that assured the labour movement’s penetra-
tion into the polity influenced the movement in a reformist direction. This is
certainly not unique as such,73 but the scale of agrarian support was without
parallel, and so too was its overall impact on the worker movement. In 1913
J.K. Paasikivi, a leading Old Finnish politician and later a president of Finland,
thought that, with time, the Social Democrats presumably would develop into
a ‘radical progressive party’.74
Second, rapid and powerful penetration into the polity made the Finnish
working-class movement focus on the state rather than on direct confronta-
tionwith the capitalist class.75 Before 1905 both the politicalmovement and the
tradeunionmovementwereundeveloped in comparisonwithWesternEurope.
The first Russian revolution brought about a complete and easy victory in the
political sphere, but the relations between workers and employers in such an
agrarian country as Finland were not greatly affected. Unlike Sweden in 1902,
for example, Finland’s strike for the franchise was not a manifestation of the
power of organised labour. That is, rather than being an internal encounter
based on resources arising directly from organisation within the production
process,76 it was a direct result of the country’s political dependence.
Strike activity increased temporarily between 1905 and 1908; in other words,
it took a political crisis to bring about expansion of the trade unionmovement.
In 1907 both the national trade union organisation and the national employers
organisation were founded, but these played only a limited role. The employ-
ers did not really recognise the right of organised labour to bargain, and the
trade union movement soon adopted the role of a sort of mediator, viewing
labour conflicts in a narrow economic perspective.77 From 1907 to 1916 the
membership figures of the national trade union organisation varied between
30 and 60percent of the Social Democratic party’smembership; in theWestern
countries, in contrast, the ratio was usually the inverse, with the trade unions
72 Martin 1970, p. 320. See also Hamalainen 1978, pp. 30–1.
73 Take France, for example; see Gallie 1982, pp. 169–72.
74 Paasikivi 1957, p. 180.
75 See Kettunen 1979, pp. 71–98; Alestalo 1977, pp. 103–6; Hodgson 1974a, p. 30.
76 Hentilä 1979, pp. 127–36; Kettunen 1979, p. 79.
77 Kettunen 1979, pp. 92–3; Mansner 1981, pp. 80–2, 101–16; Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982,
pp. 273–80, 322–5, 337–40.
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serving as the backbone of the labour movement. Even among the industrial
proletariat, trade union organisation lagged behind political organisation.78
Therefore, although it is true that the political and economic spheres were
not really differentiated, nonetheless, the political wasmuchmore in evidence.
Characteristically, in the countryside trade union activity was normally incor-
porated into the activities of the worker associations, sometimes in separate
occupation-based sections.79
The relationship between politics and trade union activity resembles in
some respects what Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly have, in their analysis
of strikes in France, called ‘sparkplug unionism’.80 In new industries and semi-
skilledworker occupations that entirely lacked collective traditions and habits,
activity was directed at the central forum of national politics as much as at
local problems,which, for their part,were above all economicbread-and-butter
issues. At the local level a weak union organisation was run by ‘sparkplug’ mil-
itants, an organised nucleus that sparked strike activity. At the national level
union activity was in the hands of radical political parties and industrial fed-
erations. The solidarity born of sparkplug unionism was usually short-lived:
the participants in collective disputes quickly lost interest and drifted back to
work. In Finland, workers who were active in unions and strikes lacked tradi-
tions of collective action; the entire industrial working class had only recently
come from an agrarian base, and the just-created unions owed their expan-
sion to a great political crisis. (In France, sparkplug unionism exploded in 1936,
after the stunning electoral victory of the parties of the Left.) Locally, economic
demands predominated, and strikes were organised by militants who often
acted quite independent of the central organisation.81 What mattered nation-
allywas politics, if only because at that level theworking-classmovement really
had a say, whereas at the local level it had none.
If the class experience is seen as determined by productive relations, and
if class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in
cultural terms,82 the two display rather loose links in the Finnish case. In Fin-
land the ‘political’ class struggle was not based on the ‘economic’ one.83 This
situation resulted, however, more from the extraordinary extensiveness of the
political organisation than from the weakness of the trade unions. As a matter
78 Kettunen 1979, pp. 71–6; Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 230–8.
79 Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 111, 124, 243–51.
80 Shorter and Tilly 1974, pp. 127–37, 181, 217.
81 Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 200–8, 260–9, 301–37.
82 The formulation is E.P. Thompson’s (1963, pp. 9–10).
83 Kettunen 1980b, p. 6.
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of fact, the trade unions recruited as many workers as could be expected in a
countrywith so few industrial centres.84 Internal factors – the degree and char-
acter of industrialisation – set an upper limit on the trade union organisation,
but they did not restrict political organisation, the upper limit of which was
determined by Finno-Russian relations.
This specific opportunity structure resulted in collective action different
from that in themajorWestern countries and in Scandinavia. The trade unions
were above all auxiliary instruments of the party. The movement’s strength lay
in its electoral success, not in its capacity for concerted mass action, notably
strikes. The party’s whole organisation was geared to secure votes in elections,
and the typical voters were by no means actual or even potential trade union
members: they were agrarian workers or crofters whose relations with their
employers were largely traditional and whose political activities were concen-
trated in the local workers’ hall. The only way for them to voice their opinion
was to vote in national elections; the local administration remained as before.
In practice the movement grew into a large parliamentary party, with some
intellectual leaders, mainly Old Finns who had joined the party in 1905–6; with
over a dozen local newspapers; and with a large number of functionaries who
concentrated entirely on the electoral work. The Red Guard, which had been
formed during and after the general strike of 1905, was disbanded by the party
leadership prior to the first elections, in compliance with the Finnish govern-
ment’s suspension order.85 The parliamentary orientation was certainly not
weakened by the fact that the Finnish Social Democratic party was the first
and only socialist party in the world to attain an absolute majority before the
Russian revolution of 1917. Typically, very few official contacts existed between
the Finnish party and the Russian revolutionaries.86
In theory the partywas revolutionary, awaiting the struggle foreshadowedby
the events of 1905 and building up its strength. It paid little attention, however,
to how the revolution was to be achieved and what its substance was to be. It
was generally believed that a revolution in Russia would produce a bourgeois
democracy and that the immediate task of the Finnish Social Democratswould
then be to press for a more democratic form of government. Consequently, the
socialists came to visualise their party more and more as the leading protag-
onist in the struggle for democracy, and the meaning of revolution remained
extremely vague.87
84 Cf. Kettunen 1986, pp. 73–81.
85 Salkola 1985, 1:47; Soikkanen 1961, pp. 246–8.
86 Kirby 1970.
87 Kirby 1971, p. 125; Jussila 1979b, pp. 170–1; Hodgson 1974b, pp. 22–4.
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Aware that their chances to act were fundamentally dependent on develop-
ments in Russia, the Social Democrats came to accept a role of ‘class-conscious
revolutionary passivity’.88 The party combined revolutionary rhetoric and
reformist practicemuch as the German Social Democrats did, and Kautskywas
indeed the master theoretician for Finnish socialists as well. In contrast with
the German movement, however, the backbone of the Finnish movement lay
less in the collective organisation of theworkers andmore in the individual vot-
ingbehaviour of theparty’s followers, the greatmajority of whomwere engaged
in agriculture. For them the idea of revolution certainly remained much more
vague than for party activists.
To conclude, the working-class movement became a powerful instrument
for both class and national integration. True, the events of 1905 had bred some
familiarity with a revolutionary situation and a diffuse belief in the coming
of revolution. But the class conflict was limited, as is reflected in the primacy
of parliamentary activity and the rooting of the movement in the general
process of mass organisation. In addition, the movement had a pronounced
cultural and even national orientation, most obviously at the local level: the
worker associations were part and parcel of the rapidly expanding local organ-
isational network, which contributed to a vision of Finland as a political and
cultural entity. At this level the labour movement was basically a way of link-
ing the workers with the emerging civil society. Even the great strike of 1905
was important in this respect: as a powerful catalyst in the ‘nationalisation’ of
political life.89
The imperial authorities in Finland never seriously doubted the reformist
character of the movement. In 1907 administrative Russification was reintro-
duced, but unlike in theBaltic Provinces therewasno repression, and the actual
impact had scarcely gone beyond its initial stages by 1914.90 Even after the
Social Democrats’ spectacular success in the elections, the Russiansweremuch
more alarmed by small bourgeois groups thought to be advocating separatism
than by the Social Democrats.91 Still, the restrictions the imperial authorities
imposed enhanced the national orientation of the labour movement. In the
Social Democratic opposition to Russian autocracy, national and class aspects
were necessarily linked.92
88 Kirby 1971, p. 129 (quotation); Kettunen 1980b, p. 13.
89 Cf. Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975, 53–4.
90 Thaden 1981a, 11; Thaden 1981c, 459.
91 Jussila 1979b, 171–80.
92 Esp. Jussila 1979b, 226–9, 240.
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chapter 7
Regional Consolidation of Party Support
The character of the territorial integration (seeChapter 4) explainsmuchof the
basic variation in Finnish political ecology. It created crucial preconditions for
the national and class integration consolidated after the political mobilisation
of 1905.
1 Regions as Loci of Party Systems
Interpretations of regional variations in political mobilisation commonly start
with mobilisation itself. They begin by looking at geographic voting patterns,
for example, and then compare themwith other distributions – the proportion
of the rural proletariat, or the areas of small, medium, and large farms, and so
forth. If the fit between the two maps is good, the latter structural variables
serve to explain the distribution of the vote.1
In Finland, explanations given for the main regional variation in party sup-
port are based, naturally enough, on differences in the social structure of the
agrarian population in various regions. It has been shown that the areas of
greatest Social Democratic support were those with the largest proportion of
crofters, industrial and agrarian workers, and people without permanent occu-
pations,2 making up a zone running from the south-west to the north-east and
extending into the far north. Similarly, the fact that the Agrarian Union (and
before it the Young Finns) received greater support in the zone running from
the south-east to the north-west, and also extending into the far north, than
in the country as a whole has been explained by reference to the large num-
ber of medium-sized and small farms in this zone. And finally, the existence of
Finnish party strongholds in the west has been explained by the prevalence of
large landholdings in this area.3 As the Finnish historian Eino Jutikkala sums
it up, ‘In order to explain the geographical distribution of party support it is
necessary to determine the largest common factor from which different atti-
tudes [to fundamental political issues] may be derived’.4
1 See ‘Editorial Essay’ in the first issue of Political Geography Quarterly (1981, 8).
2 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 368–89.
3 Von Bonsdorff 1954, pp. 54–5, 131–2, 175–80; Salokangas 1975, pp. 175–8.
4 Jutikkala 1974, 143.
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The problem is that a similarity of causes is inferred from a similarity of
final outcomes. Logically, however, this situation does not necessarily hold.
The inference is unjustified if the same outcome can be derived from different
starting points. This variability is exactly what the state-making approach to
politicalmobilisationmaintains. National political integration is closely linked
to state-making, which amounts to the hypothesis that in the process of polit-
ical integration locally defined conflicts are fused together on an emerging
national level. ‘Indeed’, Charles Tilly has pointed out, ‘the process of urbaniza-
tion facilitates the reforming of persistent local rivalries along lines that have
some significance throughout the society’.5
This approach suggests that one and the same party may have been sup-
ported in various regions for somewhat different reasons. In the mobilisation
process different local issues took on a uniform national form. For example, in
one area the vote was divided between the Social Democrats and the Finnish
party, and in another between the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Union.
The Social Democratsmay have gained support in both areas, but their backing
was basically linked to two different local conflicts. An approach that focuses
on territorial integrationmakes one aware of the possible regional character of
politicalmobilisation institutionalised in the party system. This does not imply
that structural explanations of the type cited above should be abandoned, but
if one is interested in the formative phase of a particular political ecology, it is
desirable to look at the parties within the framework of the established regions
rather than that of the state as a whole. The state-making perspective suggests
a common framework for analysing both the consolidation of various regions
and regional variations in political mobilisation.
Table 10 shows the combination of party support in the countryside in five
regions. As stated above, these regions had different roles in the national divi-
sion of labour, and this situationwas reflected in differences in class structures.
At the same time, the capitalist transformation increasingly generalised the
industrial class conflict (see Chapter 4). Various regional conflicts were soon
fused at the emerging national level – as indicated by the small number of
nationally important parties – but they displayed their importance by forming
regionally different combinations of party support. The initial regional differ-
ences in the strength of the various parties have persisted largely unchanged. It
is to be noted, however, that in the 1920s, after the abortive revolution and the
foundation in 1918 of the Communist party, support from the worker move-
ment was split between the Social Democrats and the Communists. Also, the
5 Tilly 1964, p. 64.
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table 10 Regional variations in political mobilisation in the Finnish countryside, 1907–1932
Region Political parties supported Role in abortive revolution
of 1918
Role in Lapuamove-
ment of 1930–2
South-western Finland Social Democrats and
Finnish party
Actively revolutionary Active
County of Viipuri Agrarian Union Passively anti-revolutionary
Ostrobothnia Finnish party and Agrarian
Union
Actively anti-revolutionary Active
Eastern Finland Social Democrats and
Agrarian Union
Passive
Northern Finland Agrarian Union and Social
Democrats
Passive
Agrarian Union did not succeed in making itself into a national party – at the
expense of the liberal Young Finnish party (the Progress party), especially in
eastern and northern Finland – until the 1910s and 1920s.
The areas where the Swedish party was strongest (omitted from Table 10)
were contiguous with the boundaries of the Swedish-speaking regions on the
western and southern coasts. The party even attracted the vote of Swedish-
speaking workers. For this linguistic minority, then, the relevant conflict was
determined not regionally, but rather relative to the Finnish-speaking major-
ity.6
2 The South-Western Core Region
In the south-west both the industrial and the agrarian proletariat were numer-
ous. Together with the crofters, they brought the Social Democrats 43 percent
of the vote in 1907. More than anywhere else, the socialist challenge was here
organised both in population centres and in the countryside, as indicated by
the great number of ruralworker associations. BarringtonMoore’s discussionof
radical or rebellious solidarity among peasants seems applicable here.7 To cre-
ate this solidarity, institutional arrangements must be such as to spread griev-
ances throughout the peasant community and turn it into a solidarity group
6 See Allardt and Miemois 1982, pp. 266–7, 276–8.
7 Moore 1966, pp. 475–7.
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hostile to the overlord. This may happen if property arrangements require a
minimum amount of property, usually land, in order to be a full member of the
village. As Moore points out, the process of modernisation may considerably
increase the number of those below thisminimum, creating a radical potential.
In the south-west, with the increase in the population this number did steadily
grow, making the struggle for landmore acute than elsewhere and presumably
increasing the radical potential. Land prices rose not only as a result of the tim-
ber boom but also as a result of attempts by crofters and smallholders to buy
land.8
Both crofters and landless labourers generally supported the Social Demo-
crats in the elections. Despite their commonhunger for land, however, no close
alignment into a solidarity group was effected: after the first wave of mobil-
isation few crofters were active in the rural worker associations.9 This circum-
stance may be accounted for by the fact that the crofters were still able to
maintain de facto control of the land they cultivated,whereas the landlesswere
forced to compete for this asset.10
The Finnish party, that is, theOld Finns, gained 25 percent of the total vote in
the south-west and soon developed into a distinctly conservative party, receiv-
ing its main support from independent peasant landowners, who, along with
the clergy and the Ostrobothnian peasants, had earlier constituted the core
for Fennomania. Indeed, the prosperous peasants of the south-west especially
helped to delineate the agrarian and religious ideology of the late nineteenth
century.When themodern capitalist class conflict emerged in this core region,
not only in industry but also in agriculture, the conflict soon reproduced itself
in the division between the socialist and the conservative parties.
The religious character of the Finnish party is understandable. It is not
uncommon for the agrarian upper classes to defend their position in religious
and other moral terms during large-scale political transformations accompa-
nying the rise of capitalism.11 But here religion was characteristically not as
revivalist as in most other regions. Whereas religion had traditionally been
essential in the south-western countryside for the maintenance of hierarch-
8 Kivialho 1927, pp. 181–6.
9 This situation is striking for the agrarian commune of Huittinen, which is representat-
ive of crofter areas in the south-west (Alapuro, unfinished study [appeared in 1994: Risto
Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä, Helsinki: Hanki ja Jää]). The crofters’ meagre
participation in the Social Democratic organisation for the tenant farmers is well known
(Soikkanen 1975, pp. 114, 119, 152).
10 Cf. Soininen 1974, p. 398.
11 Moore 1966, pp. 490–3.
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ical relationships in peasant society,12 now, as class conflict became open, it
acquired new importance in the form of ‘church religiosity’. It became part of
the new ideological equipment of the agrarian upper class.
3 The County of Viipuri
The strengthof theAgrarianUnion in the county of Viipuri seems to result from
the fact that the peasants, as small producers and sellers of their labour power
who worked in transportation and different seasonal jobs, were dependent on
themarket.13 The proximity of St. Petersburg remained important, but between
1867 and 1891 the domination of large areas by Russian nobles was eliminated
as their lands were purchased by the Finnish state and allotted to the peasants.
This process freed a large number of peasants from feudal relations.
The Agrarian Union was anti-capitalist and very hostile to bourgeois soci-
ety, whichwas seen as dominated by urban elements. As the party’s ideological
founder expressed it, ‘Townshave become fortresses for bourgeois society, from
which the surrounding countryside is dominated’; large-scale industry and big
business had endowed the towns with power and influence. The first party
groupings emerged on a local basis in Ostrobothnia and the county of Viipuri
immediately after the parliamentary reform and quickly gained a large share of
the vote.14 The generalisation in Table 10 is less valid for the county’s western
areas than for its eastern areas, where the Agrarian Union gained 24 percent
of the rural vote in 1907 and 54 percent in 1919. In the industrial centres of the
western areas, the Social Democrats had several strongholds.
4 Ostrobothnia
Michael Hechter insists that relative isolation only rarely gives rise to a region-
ally distinctive culture that defines itself in active opposition to the culture of
the core. He describes this exceptional case: ‘Hypothesized conditions for the
emergence of territorial counter-cultures include: the peripheral group must
have a territory which facilitates intercollectivity communication; the peri-
12 Schmidt 1956b, pp. 25–6; Schmidt 1956a, pp. 86–7.
13 On the peasants’ dependence on the market, see Engman 1983, pp. 149–58, 162.
14 Arter 1978, pp. 7–9, 48–58, 63–5. The leader cited is the Ostrobothnian Santeri Alkio (1919,
p. 151).
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
regional consolidation of party support 123
pherymust be culturally and economically isolated from the national core, and
oriented to some extra-national center; and the periphery must not engage in
extensive trade, or other economic transactions, with the core’.15
Each of these conditions was met in nineteenth-century Ostrobothnia. It
was a territory where intercollective communication was relatively easy
because of its geographically separate plain areas. It became increasingly isol-
ated culturally because it remained outside the sudden transformation affect-
ing other regions and therefore preserved its traditional communities. During
the Swedish period it had been economically oriented toward Stockholm, and
in the nineteenth century its main trading partner was still Sweden. Lastly, the
network of railway lines developing from the south failed to provideOstroboth-
nia with new trade connections before the 1880s.
Relative stagnation and isolationpreserved the self-conscious spirit of enter-
prise characteristic of Ostrobothnian peasants. The tradition remained un-
broken throughout the capitalist transformation,16 persisting in the rather
homogeneous social structure.The stagnation seems tohavebeen conducive to
the preservation of the agrarian community as an effective frame for collective
action, or to the rise of what Barrington Moore has called conservative solid-
arity among peasants, whereby those who have actual or potential grievances
are tied into the prevailing social structure through a division of labour that
provides a legitimate, though lowly, status for persons with little or no prop-
erty.17 Something like conservative solidarity seems to have arisen in Ostro-
bothnia, where much of the growth in population was either channelled to
areas outside the region via emigration or else tied to the prevailing structure
by dividing the farm among the heirs or leasing a part of it to some of them at
a nominal rent. Obtaining the wherewithal to buy a farm was often one of the
most central motives for emigration, moreover, and a great many among the
one-third who returned realised this wish.18
In Ostrobothnia, both strong parties – the Finnish party and the Agrarian
Union – defended the agrarian way of life. In 1907 they gained two-thirds of
the total vote in the Finnish-speaking areas. The Finnish party, which first pre-
dominated, receivedmuch support from the larger farms,whereas theAgrarian
Union found backing among the smaller farms.19 Both displayed a verymarked
15 Hechter 1975, p. 231 (italics deleted). Hechter derives these conditions from Lipset and
Rokkan 1967, p. 42.
16 Cf. Ylikangas 1981.
17 Moore 1966, pp. 475–9.
18 Toivonen 1963, pp. 26, 84–6, 189.
19 In the elections of 1907 the Finnish party received 52 percent and the Agrarian Union 12
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local colour, and the proudly provincial character of political mobilisation in
this region was further accentuated by the strength of revivalism, which was
stronger here than anywhere else at the end of the nineteenth century. Reviv-
alism was connected with Finnish party support, and it was rooted in a viable
traditional society. Typically, members of the clergywere central in bothOstro-
bothnian agrarian society and the revivalist movement. Youth associations, an
advance guard of earlymass organisation, were alsomore strongly represented
here, particularly in the south, than anywhere else in the country.
The same point may be made in a slightly different fashion. In Ostroboth-
nia it was not essential to defend one’s position and way of life in a situation of
accentuated class conflict within the community, as was the case in the south-
west. Rather, it was essential to defend the Ostrobothnian community and
way of life inside Finland as a whole. Both the self-conscious provincial spirit
and themoral indignation discernible inOstrobothnian politics and revivalism
may be attributed to the fact that the agrarian cultural pattern they represen-
ted was being irrevocably supplanted by the antagonisms and ways of life of
capitalist society, which was advancing the integration of the rest of Finland.
5 Eastern Finland
In the first general elections the Social Democrats became the largest party in
eastern Finland, gaining 49 and 44 percent of the vote in the counties of Kuo-
pio and Mikkeli, respectively. Since then the support for the left has remained
strong in this region.
In the county of Kuopio and in some neighbouring communes in the county
of Vaasa, the liberal Young Finns became the second largest party, and together
these two parties collected four-fifths of the vote. Elsewhere in the country
this constellation was virtually unknown. In the late 1910s and early 1920s the
province of Mikkeli definitely followed this pattern. Support for the Young
Finns was not to be sustained to the same extent as that for the Social Demo-
crats, however, and it was largely replaced by support for the Agrarian Union,
which gained ground more slowly than in the county of Viipuri, Ostroboth-
nia, and the north. In the county of Kuopio the Young Finns lost ground to the
Agrarian Union around 1920; in the county of Mikkeli this happened only in
1927, when the Agrarian Union was also advancing elsewhere.
percent of the total vote in the Finnish-speaking areas of Ostrobothnia ‘proper’. On the
social structure of the supporters of the respective parties, see Salokangas 1975.
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By and large, the Social Democrats, followed by the Young Finns and then
by the Agrarian Union, were dominant in eastern Finland, and particularly in
the county of Kuopio. During the formative period of the party system, this pat-
ternwas limited almost exclusively to this region. As in the south-west, support
for the Social Democrats indicates the sharpness of class conflict. In the core
region, class conflict becamemanifest especially in relations between agrarian
groups, and support for the Social Democrats was accompanied by support for
the conservatives. In eastern Finland the class conflict was affected by depend-
ent industrialisation, making the region a periphery in the emerging territorial
division of labour: Social Democrat support was accompanied, with a certain
delay, by support for the Agrarian Union with its populist ideology. In both
political tendencies a strong anti-capitalist feeling was evident; besides being
socialist, anti-capitalism also had a peasantist base.
As in Ostrobothnia, the east experienced a revivalist movement, especially
in the 1830s and 1840s, simultaneously with a distinct crisis in traditional slash-
and-burn cultivation.At the endof the century themovementwas still alive but
weaker than inOstrobothnia, and the religious andpoliticalmobilisationswere
not as closely connected as in Ostrobothnia. Here isolated or scattered farm-
steads predominated, and the agrarian society was undergoing fundamental
change as the previous structure was undermined without being satisfactor-
ily replaced. Hence, the eastern agrarian community seems to have had little
potential for functioning as an effective frame for collective action.20
6 Northern Finland
The northern party division grew to resemble the eastern one in important
respects, except that the Agrarian Union was stronger than the Social Demo-
crats. As early as 1907 the Agrarian Union collected one-fourth of the vote, and
in 1919 it gained an absolute majority. The Social Democrats’ share in 1907 was
22 percent.
In this region there was, not surprisingly, distinct anti-state mobilisation,
which during the general strike of 1905 became manifest in violence against
and removal of state officials.21 Also, the parties had different ties with the
social structure than elsewhere –which is one indication of the regional nature
of party support. Here the crofters’ vote was not as clearly linked to the Social
20 Cf. Moore 1966, p. 475.
21 Kyllönen 1975, pp. 147–8.
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Democrats as in other regions but was divided among the main parties. The
Agrarian Union, especially, had a strong regional character, having in its early
days a distinctively northern colour, owing mainly to its strength in northern
Ostrobothnia and neighbouring areas in the north.22 An anti-state tendency
has been identified also in the strong revivalistmovement, Laestadionism, that
obtained a strong foothold in the last decades of thenineteenth century both in
northern Sweden and northern Finland. Politically, Laestadionism came to be
linked mainly with the Agrarian Union.23 Finally, voter turnout remained the
lowest here: in 1907 it ranged between 30 percent (in Lapland) and 63 percent,
whereas in the country as a whole it was 71 percent.
7 Conclusions
In his study of the role of internal colonialism in British national development,
Michael Hechter has distinguished two types of sectionalism: peripheral and
functional. Peripheral sectionalism applies to situations in which a region’s
political distinctiveness results from cultural factors. In this case, the cause of
political differences results fromwhat is socially defined as the specific culture
of the region. All political actors, whatever their class or occupational position,
tend to unite behind the common elements of a regional culture, such as a
distinctive language or religion.24 Functional sectionalism, in contrast, results
from variations in the social-structural composition of a territory. In this case,
class or occupational position determines the actor’s political alignment, but
certain strata – peasants, or industrial workers, for instance – are dispropor-
tionately located in particular regions. Hechter’s evidence supports the view
that the class-based party division gains strength following industrialisation
in culturally homogeneous regions, regardless of whether these regions are
advantaged or disadvantaged.25
In Finland it was functional sectionalism that became predominant fol-
lowing the capitalist transformation. Only the political distinctiveness of the
Swedish-speaking regions can be attributed to cultural factors, and even here
it is doubtful whether peripheral sectionalism applies. All this notwithstand-
ing, it is nevertheless reasonable to view Finnish party formation in a regional
perspective. The regional perspective seems reasonable, first, because, as indic-
22 Isohookana-Asunmaa 1980, pp. 51, 59, 227, and passim; Arter 1978, pp. 7–9.
23 Suolinna 1977; Kyllönen 1975, p. 161.
24 Hechter 1975, pp. 208–12.
25 Ibid., pp. 208–12, 331–40.
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ated above, it helps us see that the formation of an all-encompassing party
structure was simply the way in which national integration was realised in the
political sphere. The somewhat differing regional conflicts were reconstituted
so that they could be dealt with in the framework of a single national sys-
tem. Second, this perspectivemay enhance awareness of the parties’ persistent
regional peculiarities and the local conflicts that still exist. Both aspects, the
advancement of national integration and the simultaneous preservation of cer-
tain regional traits, are discernible in the revivalist movements, in early mass
organisations, and in party support.
One revivalist movement was active both in eastern Finland and in south-
ern and central Ostrobothnia and was able to cross the cultural line tradi-
tionally separating these two regions.26 This was one of the first important
signs of national integration among the peasants.27 Yet the movement’s role
in the two regions was different. Characteristically, in Ostrobothnia the lead-
ing figures were churchmen, who traditionally had a central role in the local
community, whereas in eastern Finland the leaders were mainly laymen. In
southern Ostrobothnia revivalism was linked to support for the Finnish party,
in eastern Finland to support for the Agrarian Union. Similarly, Laestadionism
had a distinctly regional character in the north, but it also expanded into cent-
ral Ostrobothnia.
The early mass organisations spread throughout the country, but they had
regional strongholds and different linkages in various regions. The tenacity
of the underlying regional structure is perhaps most clearly discernible in
the case of Ostrobothnia. There, all central mass organisations – the temper-
ance movement, the youth associations, the farmers’ societies – had a strong
foothold. Local society organised itself into severalmutually supporting organ-
isations and into two main parties, each of which had a consciously provin-
cial character. Both parties reflected peasant resentment against the upper
gentry (although the gentry wasmore visible nationally than in Ostrobothnia).
The provincial tone may even be seen in the consumer cooperatives.28 Fur-
thermore, contacts between different organisations were not unknown: unlike
youth and worker associations in the southwest, those in Ostrobothnia were
able to cooperate long after 1905.29
In the peripheral north the dominant party, the AgrarianUnion, took amore
anti-urban and anti-bureaucratic stand than elsewhere, and the early party
26 Ylikangas 1979, pp. 201–8.
27 Suolinna 1975, pp. 7–11.
28 Suonoja 1968, p. 94.
29 Ylikangas 1981, p. 231.
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programme was confined mainly to local problems.30 In its other stronghold,
the county of Viipuri, the party was firmly rooted in the local structure as well.
There, too, it arose in close connection with other mass organisations, notably
the youthassociations.Andbecauseof the county’s smallholder basis, theparty
advocated the cause of small farmers more distinctly than in other regions, a
situation that created some tension in the first years of the party’s unification.31
In the south-west and in eastern Finland, the regional characteristics of
political organisation were less obvious. In the south-western core class-based
functional sectionalism was more evident than elsewhere. Conditions in the
east illustrate how local conflicts can be moulded along nationally significant
lines. There, the average farm was nearer the size of farms in western Finland
than of the smallholdings in the county of Viipuri.32 Still, the eastern peasants
were to vote mainly for the Agrarian Union. This may well be explained by the
adverse effects of capitalist penetration in this region, but it is significant that
the party’s advance was slower there than in other Agrarian strongholds. The
partywas able to attract the support of the eastern farmers only after it had con-
solidated itself at the national level. One indication of the region’s dependent
position vis-à-vis the core of the country perhaps lies in the fact that only in the
county of Kuopio can no correlation be found between support for the Social
Democrats in 1907 and the proportion of households owning land.33 Landown-
ership, in other words, did not necessarily lead to an anti-socialist stand.
30 Isohookana-Asunmaa 1980, pp. 51, 233.
31 Mylly 1975, p. 100; Arter 1978, pp. 37, 57–8.
32 Mylly 1975, p. 95. In contrast to the south-west, however, a distinct class of wealthy peas-
ants did not exist in the east.
33 Soikkanen 1961, pp. 366, 368, 385.
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chapter 8
On Preconditions for Revolutionary Situations
In 1917–18 Finland experienced a revolutionary situation, with the worker
movement being themain challenger to the established order. I will argue that
the response of the movement to the revolutionary opportunity – which was
initiated by the sudden collapse of Imperial Russia – followed rather directly
from the process of mobilisation described in the preceding pages.
In Chapter 9 the coming of revolution itself will be analysed in the light
of the process of Finnish state-making and nation-building. Both long-term
and short-term developments are important. On the one hand, the relative
weight of structural and institutional preconditions for the revolutionary pro-
cess must be assessed. The characters of, first, the polity and the class structure
and, second, the national movement and the working-class movement, all of
which affected the preconditions for collective action in 1917–18, were shaped
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the other hand, the intric-
acies of WorldWar I must also be taken into account. The two groups of factors
interacted and induced the relatively well entrenched and non-revolutionary
working-class movement to a revolution. Chapter 10 will examine the impact
of the failed revolution on the existing state structures and on the processes
of national and class integration. In short, Part III will delineate the impact of
certain structural preconditions on an event, the Finnish revolution, and the
repercussions of this event back on those structures.
Of use here is Charles Tilly’s model of the proximate causes of revolution-
ary situations,1 which is linked to his conception of organisation, mobilisation,
and collective action, employed earlier. In deliberately focusing on revolution-
ary situations in general, not only on successful revolutions, hismodel suggests
comparisons between all cases of serious revolutionary activity, irrespective of
their outcome. This is particularly important in the analysis of small polities
such as Finland. Although international factors have played a part in nearly all
revolutions,2 only in the small polities has the final success or failuremost evid-
ently depended on fluctuations in international power constellations. In other
words, it is specifically the rise of revolutions that is of interest here.
1 Tilly 1978, pp. 200–2.
2 See Dunn 1972, 1977; Skocpol 1979.
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In Tilly’s view revolutions involve the seizure of control over a govern-
mental apparatus by one class, group, or, more likely, a coalition of several
groups. The revolutionary situation itself is defined by what Lenin and Trot-
sky called ‘dual power’ and Tilly terms ‘multiple sovereignty’: the fragmenta-
tion of governmental authority into two or more centres, each of which claims
exclusive legitimacy.Multiple sovereignty has often emergedwhen the polity –
consisting of the collective action of those groups routinely making success-
ful claims on the exercise of government in their interest – splits into con-
flicting factions. Such a fragmentation of the ruling establishment, moreover,
may provide challengers from below with tactical opportunities to press their
demands.3 By definition, there are three proximate causes of multiple sover-
eignty:
1. the appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advan-
cing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government
which is currently exerted by the members of the polity;
2. commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the sub-
ject population (especiallywhen those commitments arenot simply
acknowledged in principle, but activated in the face of prohibitions
or contrary directives from the government);
3. incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to
suppress the alternative coalition and/or the commitment to its
claims.4
The causes in Tilly’s model are largely consecutive. They form the beginning of
‘an idealized revolutionary sequence’: first, gradualmobilisation of contenders;
then, rapid increase in the number of people accepting those claims or rapid
expansion of the alternative coalition; and finally, unsuccessful efforts by the
government to suppress the alternative coalition.5
This ‘idealised sequence’, simple as it is, provides a helpful framework for
analysing the Finnish case. It helps to relate existing forms of organisation and
mobilisation to the opportunities created by the intricacies of World War I.
Because the revolutionary situation was, in a sense, a conjunction of internal
structural factors and short-term external factors (that is, the crisis in Russia),
the framework also helps in assessing the relative importance of domestic and
3 Tilly 1978, pp. 190–3. The formulation here is based on Rod Aya’s summary (1979, p. 44).
4 Tilly 1978, p. 200.
5 Ibid., pp. 216–17.
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foreign developments. It will be suggested, for example, that the third proxim-
ate cause, the incapacity of the government to suppress the emerging polity,
was particularly important in Finland.
In a more general perspective the specific features of the Finnish case may
be clarified by Barrington Moore’s discussion of the preconditions for ‘major’
revolutions.6 Moore concentrates on three preconditions in the dominant
classes. The first is the decay of legitimacy: the whole intellectual and emo-
tional structure that makes the prevailing order seem natural, legitimate, and
inevitable begins to crumble in the face of embarrassing questions for which
the prevailing orthodoxies gradually cease to provide satisfactory answers; in
other words, an intellectual challenge arises for which conventional categor-
ies and explanations increasingly fail to make sense. Second, sharp conflicts of
interest develop within the dominant classes. These appear as insoluble fin-
ancial problems but are basically acute disagreements about how to resolve
problems arising from new social relationships and, more specifically, about
which social groups should pay the costs of these new arrangements. The third
precondition is, however, decisive: the loss of unified control over the instru-
ments of violence, that is, over the army and the police. They may refuse to
obey, or a section of the dominant classes may break off and take with it a part
of the armed forces, or a mixture of the two processes may occur.
Clearly this list is reminiscent of Tilly’s.7 Particularly similar are the loss
of unified control over the army and the government’s incapacity to suppress
commitment to alternative claims. But Moore’s time perspective is longer, and
he obviously delineates the central preconditions for so-called Great Revolu-
tions – those of France, Russia, and China. In France, an intellectual structure
fundamentally critical of the prevailing order developed well before 1789: the
revolutionwas, in essence, a realisation of the intellectual vision of the Enlight-
enment, which swept through French culture in the late 1700s. Moreover, dis-
agreements between the absolutist Bourbon monarchy and the aristocratic
upper classesmounted during the decades preceding the revolution and finally
led to a sharp conflict between the government and the Estates General. Third,
in 1789 the monarchy lost control of the instruments of violence; it was unable
to use the armed forces to impose its will.
The Russian sequence resembles the French one. ‘Artists and intellectuals
… had long [before 1917] sung the coming of the revolution’ is the way Marc
Ferro expresses the first precondition.8 Also, the imperial state had started a
6 Moore 1972, pp. 170–5.
7 Cf. Tilly 1978, p. 201.
8 Ferro 1967–76, 1: 143.
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process of industrialisation that furthered thedisintegrationof old roles in vari-
ous segments of society and displaced the gentry.9 Nonetheless, the ensuing
conflicts among the dominant groups certainly were not as bitter as in France.
World War I dealt the death blow to the autocracy, contributing especially to
the dissolution of the army; after the devastating losses inwar, the armed forces
refused to obey.
The initial phases of the Chinese revolution are comparable to the other
cases. The May Fourth Movement of 1919, a mass movement of intellectuals,
was ‘a kind of Chinese Enlightenment … [that] foreshadowed and paved the
way for 1949 just as Voltaire had for 1789’.10 Besides, discontent among the priv-
ileged was rife before the onset of the revolutionary process, that is, before 1911.
Many of the members of the revolutionary organisations were from the priv-
ileged classes. Soon the new republic crumbled, and rival warlords took over
parts of the old armed forces and created their own private armies.
The three preconditions, pertinent as they are for the analysis of the two
established European states and China, are less relevant for the revolution-
ary situations in Finland and other European latecomer states. In Finland, for
one thing, thewhole intellectual structure legitimising the prevailing order had
only recently been constructed, and at the beginning of the twentieth century
there was unanimity among all intellectual groups about the basic character of
national integration. National identificationwas clear in the newworking-class
movement as well; it has even been seen as an outgrowth of the national tradi-
tion that originated with Snellman.11 Moreover, only a handful of intellectuals
were active in the Social Democratic movement, and most of them had joined
the party between 1904 and 1906. Second, nomajor conflicts of interest existed
within the dominant classes. Indeed, the rise of the working-class movement
caused them to close ranks in the decade following the general strike of 1905.12
In these two respects the situation in the Eastern European polities was
not too different. To be sure, certain countries, such as Hungary and Romania,
had dissident intellectual groups, but it seems fair to say that conflicts within
the dominant groups remained limited. With respect to national minorities,
the preconditions do not really apply. True, national movements struggled for
9 Skocpol 1979, pp. 91–2.
10 Bianco 1971, pp. 27–8.
11 Palmgren 1948, pp. 184–204. Cf. Hamalainen 1978, pp. 30–3 and passim; andHodgson 1967,
pp. 7–8.One indication of thenational identification in theworkermovement is the active
participation of certain socialist leaders in the nationalist organisation Suomalaisuuden
liitto (League for the Finnish Culture) after 1906 (Hamalainen 1978, p. 135).
12 This tendency was particularly clear in the cultural sphere. See Murtorinne 1967, pp. 90–
104, 222, 229, 231.
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self-assertion and liberation, and consequently came into conflict with dom-
inant local groups that identified with the metropolitan country, but minority
regions were not usually polities to the extent that Finland was. These move-
ments strovemore for the creation of new polities than for power in an already
existing one, and severe conflicts remained rare within minority groups until
WorldWar I.
The third precondition, however, was absolutely crucial for revolutionary
situations in all the latecomer states anddependent regions.The collapse of the
twomultinational empires inWorldWar I led to thedisintegrationof the armed
forces not only in the core areas of Russia andAustria-Hungary but also in their
minority regions. The samewas true, at least for brief periods, in Romania, Bul-
garia, and Serbia.13 Opportunities to act collectivelywere thus thrust upon only
modestly organised and mobilised nationalities.
The three preconditions highlight the differences between the established
and the new European states delineated in Chapter 1. In the early cases, as
exemplified by the French and Russian revolutions, long-term internal pro-
cesses that prepared the ground for revolutionmay be discerned, involving not
only conflictswithin the dominant classes or between the elites and the central
governments but also structural preconditions conducive to collective action
amongpeasants andworkers. The twoprocesses – state/elite conflicts andpop-
ular uprisings – coincided in the revolutions.14 To cite Barrington Moore, a
certain social process ‘worked itself out’ in these cases.15 This view is also in
line with Theda Skocpol’s analysis,16 although she systematically incorporates
the international environment in the analysis of the three Great Revolutions.
Actually, Skocpol studies long-term internal processes – that is, how domestic
class structures and political institutions ultimately made it impossible for
the imperial states to cope successfully with competition or intrusions from
abroad. The decomposition of the armed forces under international pressure
shouldbe viewedagainst thebackgroundof these long-term internal processes.
In Eastern European latecomer polities, opportunities changed quite inde-
pendently of the strength of domestic collective action. In these cases a short-
term external event,WorldWar I, was crucial for the rise of revolutionary activ-
ity.
13 Steiner 1967, pp. 183, 189; Nagy 1967, p. 162; Moore 1978, pp. 291–309; Schärf 1967, pp. 200,
223–4.
14 See Goldstone 1982, pp. 194–200.
15 Moore 1966, p. xii.
16 Skocpol 1979, esp. pp. 112–17.
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The situation of these countries also seems to be systematically different
from that of the small non-European polities that have experienced serious
revolutionary activity in the twentieth century (that is, the colonial countries).
These revolutionary situations have usually emerged after a hard, painful, and
often slow process of organisation and mobilisation – accompanied, it is true,
by repeated disruptions in colonial control. In typical cases a revolutionary
situation was created only after decades or at least many years of ‘patient
institution-building’.17 In this comparison too, then, the small European polit-
ies emerge as unique cases in which the rapid dissolution of the armed forces
played a central role, while the other twopreconditions andpossibly even ante-
ceding popular organisation were relatively unimportant.
The collapse of the most powerful continental states in 1917–18 created an
exceptional opportunity for local forms of organisation and mobilisation to
developwith aminimumof hindrance. It should be stressed that local attempts
at revolution were genuinely internal: they took place within a polity, and the
main contenders were indigenous groups. But there was no long-term ‘prepar-
ation’ for revolution comparable to that preceding the Great Revolutions or
the anticolonial revolutions, and thus, in the Finnish case at least, this implies
that there were few intellectual instruments for coping with the revolutionary
attempt in the post-1918 culture. This qualification helps to relate the previous
process of national and class integration not only to the revolution 1917–18 but
also to the period following it.
In the next chapter the interplay of internal and external factors leading up
to the revolutionary situation will be examined. The central task is to consider
how the special characteristics of the internal revolutionary processes in Fin-
land resulted from the country’s external dependencies, given the long-term
structural and institutional background presented above.
17 Migdal 1974, pp. 229–56, 265 (quotation). For an illuminating example of the slow process
of revolutionary institution-building, see Popkin 1979, pp. 223–42.
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chapter 9
The Abortive Revolution of 1917–1918
1 Socialists within the Polity
The working-class movement penetrated into the polity easily as a result of
the 1905 revolution in Russia. It considered itself the leading protagonist of
the extension of democracy, its conception of revolution was extremely vague,
and it was dominated by a party – the largest in parliament – that devoted
its energies to parliamentary activity. But although the party had access to
government-controlled resources, this access was not routine, as it was for the
other members of the polity. Much like its smaller Scandinavian sister parties,
it was not (yet) a full member.1 The working-class movement had not secured
a position for itself in the upper echelons of either the government or the
administration, much less civil society, and consequently the party was largely
isolated.
The February 1917 revolution in Russia was a great relief for all Finnish polit-
ical groups, and the ensuing reactivation of the political system was especially
important for the Social Democrats. One week after its formation, the Provi-
sional Government in Russia issued a manifesto restoring full constitutional
rights to Finland. In the parliamentary elections of 1916, the Social Democrats
had gained an absolute majority, 103 seats out of 200, but parliament had not
been allowed to convene. Now the party’s foremost goal became not only the
guarantee of rights gained in 1905 but also their extension. The party wanted
full internal autonomy for Finland, leaving only foreign and military policy
and mutual relations between Finland and Russia to the Provisional Govern-
ment. The party programme also included several legal reforms championed
unsuccessfully in the previous decade, particularly the eight-hour workday, the
democratisation of local government (which had not been reformed in the
countryside since 1865 and in the towns since 1873), and the enfranchisement
of the crofters and other tenant farmers.
The party entered the government (the Economic Department of the Sen-
ate), in which it had six ministers (senators) out of twelve, including the prime
minister – the first time in any country that a socialist had become the head
1 Tilly 1978, p. 52; Elvander 1980, pp. 33, 35–47; Castles 1978, pp. 17–22.
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of a government.2 (The otherministers came from the large bourgeois parties.)
The Social Democratic party was now clearly a member of the polity, and its
demands for reforms certainly did not constitute ‘exclusive alternative claims
to the control over the government’.3 Cooperation between socialist and bour-
geois ministers remained good well into the summer.4
The socialists had begun to share political power in a bourgeois state at a dif-
ficult moment. The economic and social situation was becoming worse. Grain
imports fromRussia were drying up, foreshadowing a shortage of food; the cut-
back in the Russians’ fortification and military procurement programmes in
Finland contributed to mass unemployment; and inflation accelerated. These
short-term problems aggravated a more profound, institutional problem,
which the Social Democrats had to face. The prevailing conditionsmade effect-
ive execution of political decisions necessary, but there could be no guarantee
that the existing administrative apparatus would prove to be a pliable instru-
ment for Social Democratic policy. The Social Democrats led the government
and had a parliamentary majority, but the apparatus they were supposed to
workwithwas solidly bourgeois.Nineteenth-century Finlandhadbeenbureau-
cratically organised, and the bureaucracy remained strong – with the Senate
still at the top (see Chapter 2).
Civil society, likewise, had remained highly stable. Unlike much of the rest
of Europe, Finland was still institutionally intact in March 1917; economic and
social structures had not been undermined by the post-1907 integration meas-
ures (as in the Baltic Provinces, for example) or by the war, even though short-
term problems were inevitable. Thanks to the suspension of conscription in
1905, the Finns were not called to arms to defend the empire.
If this had been all, the Social Democrats would have shared political power
under conditions rather similar to those in manyWestern European countries,
such as Sweden in 1917, for example. But the Finnish state had suffered damage
in one essential respect as a result of the February revolution: itwas leftwithout
control of the principal concentratedmeans of coercion.5 After the dissolution
of the domestic troops from 1901 to 1905, the only armed forces the state could
rely on in a possible crisis were, in the last analysis, the imperial troops sta-
tioned in the country – and the Russian revolution largely paralysed this force.
The Finnish police also disintegrated. In the years following the revolution of
1905 the police had been largely ‘Russified’, that is, reorganised to comply with
2 Ketola 1981, p. 29.
3 Tilly 1978, p. 200.
4 Upton 1980, p. 35.
5 Cf. Weber 1948, p. 78; and Tilly 1978, p. 52.
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imperial policy. Immediately after the February revolution policemen and rural
police officialswere again forced to resign,much as they had been in 1905. Until
the endof 1917 Finlandwasnot tohaveapolice force strictly constitutedaccord-
ing to prevailing legal stipulations.6 The reorganisation of the police force was
to obscure the borderline not only between the state and the working-class
movement but also between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity
in the labour movement.
Symptomatic of the relationship between the state apparatus and the
working-class movement was the replacement of the police by the militia in
March and April. As in 1905, workers participated actively in the militia. Ini-
tially, however, theywere far from alone. The democraticmaintenance of order
was a generally supported goal after the dismissal of the ‘Russified’ police.7 At
the same time, specific worker militias were founded in a few urban centres.
These were often rudimentary and transient in character, organised largely
to maintain order among the workers themselves. In several cases they over-
lapped partly or wholly with the communal militias, or else the latter were
supervised by committees in which the Social Democrats were represented
through the worker councils that had been founded in many towns in the
spring. Hence, the distinction between public and private maintenance of
order was not clear immediately after the February revolution.8
At first the bourgeois groups did not oppose the setting up of communal
militias,9 because they considered them necessary in the short run and, in
any case, provisional. Soon, however, they began to call for a return to ‘nor-
malcy’, and in the spring all bourgeois parties agreed on this demand.10 In the
towns the militias were partly disbanded in early summer. The bourgeois min-
ister for the interior, without consulting his Social Democratic colleagues, sent
a circular calling on local authorities to appoint chiefs of police who would
cooperate with local militia committees to get the police back ‘on a regular
footing’. Because these efforts were not supported by the Social Democrats
and because the workers were generally not well represented in local gov-
ernment, it is no wonder the workers were usually not ready to disband the
militias.11 The line between public maintenance of order and the workers’ own
6 Salkola 1975, pp. 30, 54–5, 145; Piilonen 1982, p. 65; Kirby 1971, pp. 203–4, 206–7; Soikkanen
1975, p. 229; Lindman 1968, p. 123.
7 Salkola 1985, 1: 45, 73–7; Soikkanen 1975, pp. 228–9.
8 Salkola 1985, 1: 53, 64, 74–80, 95–6, 185, 188, 377–80; Kirby 1971, pp. 206–9.
9 Piilonen 1982, pp. 65, 73; Salkola 1985, 1: 77, 131.
10 Salkola 1975, pp. 147–8.
11 See Piilonen 1982, pp. 66–7; Salkola 1985, 1: 77–78, 199; Upton 1980, p. 60.
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initiative remained vague: militias continued to beworker-controlled, but they
were often paid by the local authorities.12
In other words, from the winter of 1917 on, the agents of government would
have been incapable of suppressing an alternative coalition – if there had been
one. The dominant Finnish groups had lost the ultimate protectionwhich con-
trol of the armed forces gives, at the very moment that the Russian autocracy
collapsed. And theywereunable to rebuild the instruments of violencewithout
the consent of the socialist parvenus. Contrary to the ‘idealised sequence’, the
decomposition of the armed forces and the dismissal of the domestic police
had not been the last stage in the movement toward multiple sovereignty. The
means of coercion collapsed because of events outside the Finnish polity, and
no contender presenting exclusive alternative claims existed.The SocialDemo-
crats had penetrated into a polity unable to resort to force but still rooted
in a solid bourgeois institutional structure. In the long run, the absence of
the instruments of coercion, together with shared control of the provisional
arrangements for maintaining order, was an asset for the Social Democrats, a
potential weapon for exercising pressure on the state power.
Themilitias, however, whichwere official, semi-official, or private to varying
degrees, were of value to the party only if they could be kept under control –
that is, only if the movement, headed by the parliamentary party, could con-
trol extra-parliamentary activity. In the spring this did not appear too difficult:
the party was well organised, most militia members were also members of the
party, and the overall number of distinct worker militias remained small.13 But
serious problems were in sight. Unemployment was increasing and the food
situation deteriorating. As a result of the revolution in Russia, wartime regula-
tionswere repealed and strikes were again permitted. All this contributed to an
enormous wave of organisation and mobilisation, which had already started
in 1916. At that time the party’s adherents had grown in number from 52,000
to 73,000; by the end of 1917 this number was to rise to between 120,000 and
130,000. The growth in the trade unionmovement was faster still: in 1916mem-
bership figures increased from30,000 to42,000, andbyDecember 1917 theyhad
climbed to 165,000, a fourfold increase. For the first time in Finland trade union
membership exceeded that of the Social Democratic party.14 In the spring and
summer the figures were still far from their peak, but the balance between
the established leaders and older members on the one hand and the new
12 Salkola 1985, 1: 74–76, 80–1; Piilonen 1982, p. 72.
13 Piilonen 1982, pp. 65–9, 73; Salkola 1985, 1: 148–149, 201–5, 377–80.
14 Soikkanen 1975, pp. 193–5, 260–2; Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982, pp. 406–10.
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adherents on the other was becoming delicate within both the party and the
working-class movement as a whole.
The party did not – and possibly could not – take a clear-cut stand when the
rapidly mobilised masses presented the state with their demands. The party
had not consolidated itself in the polity; therefore it needed the support of
themasses. Characteristic of the ambiguous situation is the fact that the Social
Democratic ministers were not leading figures and that the party did not form
the government alone, although it could have in March. Thus the government
did not have the whole-hearted support of the movement.
The party’s ability to solve the short-term problems and carry through the
reforms it considered central was extremely important. Party objectives could
be achieved only if life continued in an orderly fashion, and achieving these
objectives would make it easier to maintain order. At first everything seemed
quite satisfactory, even though some untoward incidents occurred.
The eight-hourworkday, local government reform, and the enfranchisement
act were presented to Parliament, and their consideration proceeded rapidly.
In April, however, just as the eight-hour-day legislation was being considered,
strikes spread in industry, and soon employers in a number of industries were
forced to accept theworkers’ demands. In earlyMay the strikes spread into agri-
culture, continuing into early June. The Social Democrats were surprised and
disturbed by the farm strikes. The main party paper urged the agrarian labour-
ers not to waste their energies in strikes but to build up solid trade unions, and
the government, which had become a ‘mediator in labour disputes’, issued a
statement urging the strikers not to intensify their action and to come to terms
with the landowners.15 But strikes broke out again at the end of June and con-
tinued here and there until August; they had, however, practically no effect on
the harvest.16 The workers also exerted pressure on local government, which
was dominatedby theurbanbourgeoisie orwealthy landowners. In these cases,
too, the party tried both directly and indirectly, through the government, to
control the movement.17
In the spring the government took up the impending food crisis. Finland
had escaped the war, and the scarcity of food was not comparable to that in
the countries devastated by battle. Modest measures of rationing had been ini-
tiated only at the end of 1916, and even in spring 1917 grain, the main staple,
15 Ketola 1981, p. 59 (quotation); Upton 1980, pp. 58–9; Ala-Kapee andValkonen 1982, pp. 393–
403.
16 Kirby 1971, pp. 226–7.
17 Piilonen 1982, pp. 44, 48–56, 64; Upton 1980, pp. 60–2.
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was not rationed.18 But when grain imports from Russia began to dry up, the
situation deteriorated. In June a food law was enacted which regulated con-
sumption, controlled prices, and made the expropriation of food possible. The
government announced that all grain reserved for home consumption was to
be confiscated and began to organise its distribution. The problem of assur-
ing support of inventory-taking and rationing on the part of producers and
consumers alike was solved by co-opting the various ‘social forces’ into the
organisation responsible for rationing. This system was controlled by the gov-
ernment, which urged the formation of local food committees ‘according to the
local social structure’. On the whole, the strategy proved successful: the invent-
ory appears to have provided fairly accurate statistics, even though the farmers
supplied the information on their own. In other words, despite the farm strikes
in May and June, the grain confiscations and the rationing of consumption
were tacitly approved. The rationing worked moderately well: grain and other
foodstuffs were available, and there was no real shortage in the summer, even
in the towns.19
All in all, no serious disorders occurred in the spring or summer. The Social
Democratic party strove tomaintain calm, andby and large it succeeded. In this
the workermilitias, based on party cadres, played no small role. Their principal
task was to prevent possible disturbances in strikes and demonstrations held
in support of the new communal law and the eight-hourworkday.20 In June the
party ignoreddemands –whichwere few– to call a general strike.21 AsAnthony
F. Upton sums it up, ‘Until August 1917 the situation in Finland, in spite of the
revolution and the disorders it had occasioned,was still recognizably normal. A
legitimate Finnish government and parliament governed the country, however
unsatisfactorily, within the bounds of the constitution and the law’.22
Nevertheless, it is no wonder that by the summermaintenance of order had
become themajor problem confronting the bourgeois groups. The dismissal of
the police had deprived the state of the only apparatus that truly safeguarded
individual andproperty rights, and interventions by themobilisedworkers, few
as they were, seemed to constitute a great potential threat. But in the situ-
ation that prevailed there was no legal recourse to ‘traditional repression to
deal with disorders’. When in June the bourgeois minister for the interior was
asked about legalising the bourgeois counter-militias or setting up a paramil-
18 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 54–62, 69.
19 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 71–87.
20 Salkola 1985, 1: 197, 203, 206.
21 Piilonen 1982, p. 44; Upton 1980, pp. 52–3.
22 Upton 1980, p. 102.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
the abortive revolution of 1917–1918 143
itary police force, he rejected both ideas: the bourgeois militias would be an
incitement to civil war, and the Russianswould not permit the raising of a para-
military police.23
These impediments notwithstanding, there were grounds for a bourgeois
paramilitary organisation, whose rise would eventually accentuate the private
character of the worker-controlled militias. Even if it had had an official or
semi-official status, a militia could not have avoided a choice when confron-
ted with mass demonstrations for the eight-hour day, the democratisation of
local government, the control of prices, the confiscation of grain stocks, or
communal relief work for the unemployed. The problemwas aggravated by the
fact that the bourgeoisie continued to exercise power at the local level, as Par-
liament had not yet passed the new communal law. Often the situation was
inherently ambiguous. For example, the government’s injunction to set up the
food committees in line with the numerical strength of local social groups was
only a recommendation. If the local powerholders did not comply, disagree-
ments and conflicts between the landowners and the organised workers were
imminent, whatever the status of the local militia. Also, the reorganisation of
the urban police, mentioned above, incited the workers to set up militias of
their own, or at least not to disperse the existing ones.24
Because the working-class movement had a share in political decision-
making at the top of the polity and in the maintenance of order, every bour-
geois attempt to restore the pre-March situation was bound to lead to private
organisation – that is, outside the governmental apparatus. Civil society was
in good shape, so this kind of organisation was easy. A telling example is the
Farmers Congress in Helsinki at the end of May, during the first wave of farm
strikes. The farmers were contemptuous of the government and its measures,
which they said were leading to the breakdown of law and order; the congress
therefore asked the farmers to organise their own defence. For the most part,
however, ‘anti-hooliganism’ organisations existed only on paper until August,
in all regions except south-western Finland. There the farmers established ‘fire
brigades’ and ‘security corps’ in answer to the farm strikes.25
Another factor contributed to the establishment of a bourgeois force. A
group of ‘Activists’ had worked for Finnish independence since 1915. Until the
spring of 1917 the most nationally oriented Social Democrats were numbered
among their supporters.26 The Activists looked to Germany for help. In 1915
23 Upton 1980, pp. 51 (quotation), 60.
24 Salkola 1975, pp. 53–70, 133–58, 277–8; Salkola 1985, 1: 377–80.
25 Salkola 1985, 1: 246–259, 290–310; Upton 1980, pp. 59, 62.
26 Ketola 1981, pp. 254–4; Hodgson 1967, pp. 21–2.
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and 1916 Germany had created a Jäger battalion consisting of 1,500 Finnish
volunteers, which fought onGermany’s eastern front andwas, given opportune
conditions, supposed to act to separate Finland fromRussia, withGermanhelp,
using an organisation to be set up in Finland. The Activists considered their
principal enemy to be the Russians stationed in Finland, who at the beginning
of 1917 numbered 40,000 and by August had reached a peak of 100,000men. In
the summer of 1917, however, the Activists received only limited support; some
anti-Russian security guards were created by August, mainly in Ostrobothnia,
a region with many Russian troops. Although Finnish independence was the
Activists’ objective, the fact remains that they envisioned an armed bourgeois
organisation. Therefore their efforts were potentially linkedwithmore popular
bourgeois efforts to ‘restore internal order’: both had as their ultimate goal the
protection and fortification of the bourgeois state and civil society.
The working-class movement’s position in the polity was put to an explicit,
even decisive, test when Parliament took a stand on Finnish independence and
the way in which exercise of the imperial prerogative should be transferred to
the Finnish government after the February revolution. This event was to be the
single most important step toward multiple sovereignty.
In the grandduchy the laws passed by Parliament needed the emperor’s con-
firmation. The government, moreover, was not a sovereign executive: it was
rather a committee of departmental heads, appointed by and answerable to
the emperor, whose representative, the governor general, could preside over
its meetings. After the February revolution these rights of supervision and
approval were transferred to the Provisional Government.
The Social Democrats aimed at the extension of autonomy and, if possible,
full independence. This as such would have enhanced their room for man-
oeuvre. The party was also willing to raise Parliament to a politically dominant
position, which would have strengthened the socialists’ institutional hold on
the state, although the state would have remained unquestionably bourgeois.
National orientation in the party was now accompanied by increasing nation-
alist fervour among the masses. In the working-class movement, orientation
toward independence and the goal of extending political democracywere seen
to be intimately connected.27
The party worked for independence both in government and outside, ignor-
ing the negative attitude of the Provisional Government. After having made
contacts with various political groups in Russia, the party finally pushed
27 Soikkanen 1975, pp. 208–18; Ketola 1981, pp. 93, 118–19, 276–8; Salkola 1985, 1: 49–50; Ferro
1967–1976, 2: 171–5.
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through a so-called law on authority (valtalaki) on 17 and 18 July.28 This law
proclaimed the full internal autonomy of Finland and the transfer of imper-
ial prerogatives to Parliament. Only foreign policy andmilitary affairs were left
under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government.
There were protagonists of independence in the bourgeois parties as well.
Disorder in Russia ledmany people to strive for at least an extension of internal
autonomy, if not full independence. The Activists and some other supporters
of independence at first backed the Social Democrats’ efforts. But the bour-
geois groups generally opposed the valtalaki, notably because it would have
increased the socialists’ grip on the state, but also because the Provisional Gov-
ernment could have used the armed forces to suppress it. When the decisive
votes were cast, though, most bourgeois representatives backed the law: they
followed a course they believed was massively supported by the population.29
The socialists had envisioned the formation of a purely Social Democratic
government after the approval of the valtalaki. Once the Provisional Govern-
ment had endured the so-called July Days, however, it refused to approve
the law, dissolved Parliament, and ordered new elections. It was of utmost
importance that all bourgeois groups sided with the Provisional Government.
Many bourgeois proponents of the valtalaki dissociated themselves from it,
and opponents of the law actively cooperated with the Provisional Govern-
ment in order to make sure that it was rejected and new elections ordered.30
By the same token, the eight-hour workday and local government acts, which
had already gone through Parliament, were left unconfirmed.
In a sense, the valtalaki led to a bourgeois coup d’état. For besides the prob-
lem of law and order in 1917 Finland, there was the relationship with Russia,
and thebourgeois groups utilised this secondambiguity to their advantage.The
Social Democrats’ position in the polity was challenged in amanner unaccept-
able to all tendencies in the socialistmovement.Thus, because the valtalakihad
beenpassedbyParliament in accordancewith regular procedures, andbecause
it rejected the authority of the Provisional Government, the Social Democrats
were never to regard the new elections and the subsequent developments as
legal.31
Just what was and was not legal in that spring and summer is of secondary
importance here. What is essential is that both the socialists and the bour-
geois groups utilised the state’s prevailing ambiguities and weaknesses in their
28 Upton 1980, pp. 86–92.
29 Ibid., p. 92; Lindman 1968, p. 83.
30 Polvinen 1967, pp. 91–3; Upton 1980, pp. 94–6.
31 Cf. Lindman 1978, p. xix. For one exception, see Lindman 1968, pp. 136–8.
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struggle to gain control. After the February revolution in Russia the state had
been damaged and was incapable of guaranteeing some of the basic condi-
tions of the prevailing order. Now the conflictwith the ProvisionalGovernment
broke its fragile structure, and the way was paved for the struggle between the
social classes to grow. In the late summer and the autumn, two polities began
to take shape. And both had troops which sought arms.
2 The Rise of Multiple Sovereignty
In practice, the socialists had to confront the fact that the valtalaki had been
rejected and Parliament dissolved. The bourgeois groups sided unanimously
with the Provisional Government, which presumably would also have been
able to resort to force. No open conflict occurred, however.
First the socialist ministers left the government. Only the bourgeois min-
isters stayed, and their first objective became ‘achieving a powerful security
force for the country’. The government was willing to dissolve the militias and
re-establish the regular police, but because the ministers feared that the rad-
icalised Russian soldiers would intervene, it did not do so. And certainly the
militias themselves would not have disbanded voluntarily. Therefore, the gov-
ernment resorted to semi-secret operations. In August it was decided to raise
a clandestine police force in Helsinki, and in September the government ini-
tiated the training of a mounted police force. The latter plan was official, but
the socialists learned about it only afterward. It met with difficulties mainly
because the Russians did not deliver arms.32
Links were soon forged between the government and the Activists. An Act-
ivist entered the government, replacing the former socialist minister for food,
and the government set up a committee composed of Activists ‘for establish-
ing our own domestic armed force’. The secret police force in Helsinki was
placed under its jurisdiction, and these police were to be integrated into the
proposed armed force.33 In addition, Activists attempted to create a nation-
wide organisation, but really succeeded only in Ostrobothnia. On 31 October
the first noticeable shipment of arms from Germany arrived in Ostrobothnia.
Other efforts specifically intended to restore internal order also gained
momentum after the collapse of the valtalaki, and the distinction between
these attempts and Activist efforts to achieve independence nearly disap-
peared: both were aimed at fortifying the prevailing societal system, including
32 Upton 1980, pp. 107–8 (quotation from p. 107).
33 Upton 1980, p. 112 (quotation from the same page).
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its constellation of political power. The economic elite and other groups sup-
ported both types of activity, but they saw the Activists as struggling against
‘hooliganism’ within the country. The organisation for restoring internal order
gained the upper hand and soon mushroomed: by the end of September there
were considerably more bourgeois guards than worker militias or guards.34
The bourgeois parties’ main theme in the electoral campaign preceding the
October elections was law and order. The largest bourgeois parties agreed to
support a common ticket and concentrated all their efforts on achieving a
bourgeois majority. The Social Democrats, for their part, campaigned on the
valtalaki – that is, on independence – and did not say much about their social
objectives. They thought that they would succeed simply as proponents of
independence.35
The socialist party was defeated, however. It lost eleven seats, and the bour-
geois parties won a majority. The defeat made the party confront the problem
that the leadership hadbeenwell aware of since the failure of the valtalaki: how
to control the rising revolutionary mood of the masses. Above all, the Social
Democrats feared that the ‘attempted bourgeois coup’ would reverse the gains
that the workers had made since March.36 Many leaders had been wary about
withdrawing from the government in August because they saw participation
as a means of holding off the masses. The same idea was expressed during the
electoral campaign. O.W. Kuusinen, one of the leading figures of the party, saw
the implications of losing in this way: ‘What will happen if we are defeated in
the elections? Then a revolution could be sparked off amongst the people. But
there is no knowing how such a revolution would end. It could bring disaster
to the whole labour movement, and that is one reason why we should endeav-
our to win victory in the elections’. After the elections were over, but before the
results were known, Kuusinen said that ‘a general rising of the people must be
held off until the election is declared’.37
34 Fol 1977, pp. 220–1; Upton 1980, pp. 109–10; Salkola 1985, 2: 164. According to Marja-Leena
Salkola, by that time bourgeois guards had been set up at the most in 271 of the 509 com-
munes, and workers’ militias or guards in 29. The comparison gives only a rough idea of
the relative strength of the organisation on both sides, because the available sources for
the bourgeois guards seem to exaggerate their number. Another formof workers’ organisa-
tion,morewidespread but normallymuch looser and largely transient, consisted of picket
marshals, whose principal duty was tomaintain order during strikes. If thesemarshals are
included, the number of communes inwhich the problemof maintaining order had led to
organised activity by workers by the end of September rises to 202 (Salkola 1985, 1: 243–4,
298–9).
35 Soikkanen 1975, pp. 236–7; Upton 1980, p. 122.
36 Upton 1980, pp. 130, 137; Salkola 1985, 1: 52.
37 Cited in Kirby 1971, p. 248; and in Upton 1980, p. 126, respectively.
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Less than a fortnight after the results were announced, a national Worker
Security Guard was established. There were, of course, worker militias, and
in Helsinki some members of the 1905 Red Guard had attempted to revive
that organisation. But, despite popular pressure, the party had been able to
prevent the establishment of militant guards. In the early fall, however, after
the suppression of the valtalaki, and particularly with the proliferation of
the bourgeois guards in August and September, conditions began to change.
Organisation started from the grassroots: militant security guards, willing to
acquire their own arms, tended to form within the existing militias and other
groups. They were conceived as protecting workers, mainly against the bour-
geois guards but also against the state (often seen as synonymous with these
guards). In early September the formation of a nationwide armed workers’
organisation was proposed, and the party began to acquiesce, mainly because
a central organisation seemed the only way of controlling the swelling move-
ment. The decision was made before the movement got off the ground outside
the biggest centres: by 20 October, when the decision was published as a state-
ment of the trade union organisation, only Helsinki, Tampere, and Turku had
substantial security guards.38
According to the rules, the worker security guards were to be disciplined,
and the traditional working-class movement was to have complete control
over them. Actually, the party’s authority in the movement was on the decline.
Sometimes, notably in the largest population centres, the guards were started
by militias or other groups with only loose connections to the party. But this
decline was by no means a loss of authority. Despite radicalisation and rapid
expansionof other branches of themovement, thepartywasnot overwhelmed.
Even though its authoritywas questioned, it was able tomaintain a central pos-
ition. Defence of the rights won after the February revolution remained the
main task of the national Worker Security Guard, the core, probably even the
majority, of which consisted locally, the sudden expansion notwithstanding, of
establishedmembers of theparty and tradeunionbranches.39Theparty’s dom-
inant role in the working-class movement and its central role in the nation’s
political life could not be eliminated overnight.
Theworsening food shortage played a central role in radicalising themasses.
In late September the party leaders stated that themasses were getting restless
38 Salkola 1979, pp. 352–3; Salkola 1985, 1:320, 335–45, 365–6, 373, 484–8, 2:31; Upton 1980,
pp. 114–18. By 20 October, worker security guards or militias existed in 37 of the 509 com-
munes (Salkola 1985, 1:122).
39 Salkola 1985, 1: 350–2, 375, 2: 41, 68–76, 82–93, 142; Klemettilä 1976, pp. 40–1, 130, 141, 162–6,
177–8, 189, 196–7.
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about the food situation, and a few days before the foundation of the national
security guard organisation, party and trade union leaders unanimously agreed
that the workers could not be held back if the government did not take action
on food. Thus the call of 20 October for the workers to join the security guards
was accompanied by an ultimatum concerning food.40
Toward autumn, grain imports from Russia declined even from the low
level of the preceding months, but conditions did not yet appear critical to
the authorities. (For example, rations of grain products were increased in
August.)41 At the same time, however, the whole system of rationing began
to break down. After the valtalaki had been rejected and parliament was dis-
solved, mass meetings and demonstrations against the food supply policy
became common. Social Democratic members began to resign from the local
food committees, which were accused of rationing food in a perfunctory man-
ner and raising prices without reason. In early August the first food riots
occurred in Turku and Helsinki. Yet it was not a food shortage, and especially
not a shortage of grain, that caused the disorders. In Turku no butter had been
distributed for a week, and the rioters believed it had been hidden in the hope
that the price would rise. In the same month several mass meetings deman-
ded a reduction in controlled prices and an end to speculation and urged that
‘representatives elected by the consumers’ find and distribute food. As a con-
sequence, the organisation in charge of butter distribution ceased operating,
and the central committee on food, which was subordinate to the ministry for
food, resigned.42On this note the SocialDemocrats also began theirwithdrawal
from the government as the socialist minister for food resigned – one week
before the party decided to leave the government altogether.
It was more difficult to take an inventory of the harvest in the autumn than
in the spring; because the shortage was expected to worsen, causing prices to
rise, considerably more grain was hoarded. Statistics based on the inventory
amount to only about 60 percent of the grain shown by the official statistics
collected with more reliable methods.43 In towns, serious fears about scarcity
began to arise. The rural food committees delivered grain only reluctantly, and
the central organisation was unable to rectify the situation. Moreover, the new
Activist minister for food felt that his foremost task was to make preparations
for ‘the futuremilitary operations’,44 and the steps he took to augment the food
40 Upton 1980, pp. 117, 131–2.
41 Rantatupa 1979, p. 94.
42 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 88–90, 92.
43 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 96–7, 99.
44 Rantatupa 1979, p. 98.
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stocks in the towns only increased disorder. Prices continued to rise, and farm-
ers delayed their sales in the hope that prices would rise even more.45
But although the situation was alarming, it was far from catastrophic. Des-
pite all the problems, the food committees were able to administer the distri-
bution of grain even in the towns,46 and the shortage was by no means out
of control. Rather than being ruthlessly present, scarcity was stealthily lurking
around the corner.
The last step preceding the beginning of the revolutionary situation was
taken on 1 November, when the Social Democrats issued a programme called
‘We Demand’. It stated that the dissolution of parliament had resulted from a
conspiracybetween theFinnishbourgeoisie andRussian reactionaries and that
the old parliament was still the only legal one. The central demands included
the election of a constituent assembly, immediate action on food and employ-
ment, implementation of the reforms passed by the previous parliament, and
the dissolution of the bourgeois civil guards. The party was fully aware of the
strong pressure from below; thus, the programmewas issued above all in order
to relieve this pressure and find an escape from the situation – as a last chance
for the bourgeoisie to avert a revolution.47 It did not constitute a challenge
to the basic structure of capitalist society but rather appears to have been a
genuine attempt to settle the political crisis,48 motivated by the party’s desire
to stave off the revolution. As a leader pessimistically prophesied a few days
before the programwas issued: ‘We cannot avoid the revolution for very long…
Faith in the value of peaceful activity is lost and the working class is beginning
to trust only in its own strength… If we aremistaken about the rapid approach
of revolution, I would be delighted’.49
But, understandably enough, the bourgeois groups had no intention of giv-
ing in to the central demands. Notably, they were not ready to dissolve the civil
guards, to admit the illegality of the new parliament, or to have a constituent
assembly elected.
In a word, multiple sovereignty had begun to emerge. In one polity the act-
ive role was played by the bourgeoisie and the peasant landowners, who had
regained control of a state that still suffered from the lack of an armed force.
The other polity was composed of the various parts of the working-class move-
ment. It had originated in the period when the Social Democrats had particip-
45 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 98–100, 106.
46 Rantatupa 1979, p. 105.
47 Upton 1980, pp. 134–5.
48 Upton 1980, p. 135; Salkola 1985, 2: 144–5.
49 This leader was Kullervo Manner; cited in Upton 1980, p. 133.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
the abortive revolution of 1917–1918 151
ated in the government owing to the necessity of establishing a (temporary)
force for maintaining order. This polity began to take shape rapidly after the
socialists were debarred from political power and after the bourgeois organ-
isations promoting law and order had proliferated. It had three constituent
elements: the party, the trade unions, and theWorker Security Guard. The role
of the party and the trade unions was clear: to consistently hamper the guards
from advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government.
Although they succeeded in this effort for several months, in early November
their position became critical.
Developments in Russia played a part in the Finnish situation in three main
respects. First, the Social Democrats’ penetration into the polity had been facil-
itated by the state’s lack of amonopoly on physical force. Second, the bourgeois
groupshad forced the socialists out of thepolitywith thehelpof theProvisional
Government. And third, Russian troopswere in the country. Their number rose
to about 100,000 by August 1917 and then began to decline rapidly. The Activ-
ists believed that considerable German support was needed to rid Finland of
these troops and achieve independence, and theywere actually ready to reduce
the country to the status of a German protectorate.50 Themajority of the bour-
geoisie, however, saw theRussian soldiers as only another element contributing
to the mounting disorder. In the autumn of 1917 there were only a few effective
military units; often the soldiers confiscated food or caused other disruptions.
Especially irksomewas the socialists’ alleged fraternisationwith them–a claim
that carried some truth: Russian soldiers often took part in the workers’ mass
meetings and demonstrations, and they even raided a bourgeois security force
stronghold on behalf of the Social Democrats. Some worker guards or militias
succeeded in obtaining a few Russian rifles. Party representativesmade similar
attempts but met with no success.51 Conditions were so chaotic, however, that
the Russians also sold arms to bourgeois purchasers andwere often not trusted
by the working-classmovement. Frequently, fear of Russian soldiers, the desire
to prevent the soldiers’ possible interference in the maintenance of order, and
the socialists’ wish to promote the national cause were among the main reas-
ons why the worker militias were set up. In fact, this last, national, motive was
one reason why more militias emerged in localities where there were Russian
troops than in those where there were none.52
50 Upton 1980, p. 113.
51 Kirby 1971, pp. 212–14; Salkola 1985, 1: 363–4, 2: 61–7, 147–50, 161–3; Upton 1980, 47–8, 60–1,
108–9, 118, 131–2; Ketola 1981, pp. 85–9, 92–103.
52 Tanskanen 1978, pp. 105–9; Upton 1980, pp. 111, 211; Salkola 1985, 1: 225–32, 238–40, 270–84,
384. In this light it is no wonder that in a number of communes the worker guards and
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On the whole, though, direct intervention in Finnish affairs by the Russians
remained very limited –which is not to say that their presencewas not strongly
felt, notably by the bourgeois groups. Another important factor was the Social
Democrats’ connections with the Bolsheviks, who, alone among the Russian
political groupings, supported the socialists’ demand for Finnish independ-
ence. Thanks to this attitude, the Bolsheviks were, paradoxically, able to press
the ‘social-patriotic’ Finnishparty to join the radical Zimmerwald International
in the summer of 1917. But otherwise they had little effect on the Finnishworker
movement.53 Among the Russian troops in Finland the Bolsheviks gained a
majority in late September.
3 The Revolutionary Situation
The general strike in November sparked off the revolutionary situation. Al-
though it was not until one and a half months later that hostilities broke out,
the revolutionary situationwas imminent from the general strike on as the gov-
ernment became the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims
by two distinct polities. True, the effectiveness of the contenders’ claimsmight
be questioned before late January, but placing the starting point in November
focuses attention on an important feature of the Finnish revolution: no one
date or single event marks its beginning. The country drifted into revolution,
and from early November it became virtually impossible to avert.
The new Parliament convened at the beginning of November. The party and
trade union leaderships had decided to urge acceptance of the ‘We Demand’
programme, a programme for recapturing the party’s hold on the government.
The Bolshevik revolution had just taken place in Petrograd, and there was
no fear that the Russians would intervene to suppress the separatist claims
of the valtalaki, or any other analogous demands. Pressure from below was
still increasing, and the only real alternative envisioned by party and trade
union leaders was that ‘the organizedworkers would take power into their own
hands’.54 But at the same time there was ‘no clear idea of what to do with the
power’.55
the bourgeois guards were seen as parallel organisations and were even able to cooperate
well into the autumn (Salkola 1985, 1: 291–6).
53 Ketola 1981, pp. 283–91, 292, 300 (quotation); Upton 1980, pp. 85–6, 126–7, and passim.
54 Cited in Upton 1980, pp. 140–1. See alsoWiik 1978, pp. 23, 25–31.
55 Written in the diary of one of the Social Democratic leaders, 10 November 1917 (Wiik 1978,
p. 29).
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
the abortive revolution of 1917–1918 153
Because the bourgeois parties stood firm against the socialists’ demands,
the party leadership was forced to consent to a general strike. The strike call,
containing largely the same points as the ‘We Demand’ programme, was pub-
lished on 14 November. Now the party leadership had to face the problem of
the seizure of power. Many trade union leaders had urged such a course in the
meeting that preceded the strike, and the militant worker guards in Helsinki
and other centres backed their proposal.56 The party, which was still in com-
mand of the movement despite all the opposition, was now forced to make a
decision.
Insofar as the control of everyday activities was concerned, the strike was
enormously successful. Revolutionary councils were set up in most areas, par-
ticularly in population centres, to oversee the orderly execution of the strike,
to maintain calm, and to control the local worker guards. The bourgeoisie was
unprepared, disorganised, and poorly armed, and as a result the guards usually
gained control. In somecases theRussianswerewilling to lend–but only lend–
rifles to the guards, but on the whole the Russians, the only real armed force in
the country, were reluctant to get involved, and their basic attitude toward the
worker guards was one of ‘benevolent neutrality’. The strike was also effective
in that the local government bill was finally passed and the eight-hour workday
established by Parliament.57
Soon the Social Democratic party took a clear stand: it would do all it could
to prevent the strike from turning into a full-scale seizure of power. There is no
reason to marvel at this attitude, whether in light of the situation at hand or
of the party’s earlier history. The Bolsheviks had taken power only one week
before the general strike, and for the Finns the events in Petrogradweremainly
a nearby struggle, the outcomeof which remainedunknown.58At thatmoment
no one could be sure about the future: ‘During the days which preceded the
October insurrection, nobody imagined, and certainly not the Bolsheviks, that
Lenin’s party would seize the power for itself all alone and forever’.59 One week
later the situation had not greatly changed. The Bolshevik revolution had in no
way provoked the general strike in Finland, and the two events were not con-
nected, as they were in the Baltic Provinces. Of the World War I revolutionary
situations not directly connectedwith theOctober revolution, only the Finnish
one began at virtually the same time that the Bolsheviks seized power. The
Bolshevik takeover did not really figure in the Finnish socialists’ calculations, as
56 Salkola 1985, 2: 145–56, 173–6.
57 Upton 1980, pp. 150–1, 152–3 (quotation); Salkola 1985, 2: 158, 165–76.
58 Upton 1980, p. 147; Hodgson 1974a, p. 67; Salkola 1985, 2: 135, 148.
59 Ferro 1967, p. 24.
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it was to do a little later inHungary andGermany,where the revolutionary lead-
ers had witnessed at least the temporary stabilisation of Soviet power. There,
only the final collapse in war created the revolutionary situation; in Finland,
it was the disappearance of dependence on Russia in the spring, summer, and
autumn of 1917 that was critical.
The Finnish Social Democrats could not envision a socialist revolution ‘in
tiny, underdeveloped Finland in isolation’.60 If power were seized it would be
held only until a constituent assembly could be elected, which would then
enact laws in a country that would remain capitalist but in which the rights
theworkers had gained in 1917were guaranteed.While an alternative politywas
taking shape, a total seizure of powerwasnot feasible: taking care of the admin-
istration and of other basic tasks of the state seemed to be beyond the party’s
capacity. Even themilitantworker guards did not envision a social revolution.61
As one SocialDemocratic leader put it in his diary during the strike: ‘The revolu-
tion is preposterous, we cannot force the civil servants to obeywhenwe cannot
even force them to go on strike …As a consequence of our lack of intellectuals,
we shall not be able to master the machinery of government’.62
This was so because the alternative polity did not result from the fragment-
ation of the existing polity but from its penetration by the working-classmove-
ment at a moment of weakness. The party leaders were compelled to parti-
cipate in the general strike, but they had no real vision of what should be done
with the power they obtained. Thus in a sense, although the objective causes of
revolution existed, the subjective causes – the instruments of revolution –were
lacking. Favourable as the situation was, no revolution occurred, for want of an
organised revolutionary movement armed with a doctrine, long-term object-
ives, and a clear political strategy – to paraphrase Lucien Bianco’s analysis of
the Chinese revolution. The contrast is at least as striking if the Finnish Social
Democrats are comparedwith theBolsheviks.63The entire earlier history of the
Finnish movement spoke against organised revolutionary action: it could not
be created in a few months.
60 Cited in Upton 1980, p. 162. Cf. Kirby 1971, pp. 305–6; and Salkola 1985, 1: 49.
61 Upton 1980, pp. 144, 147–8; Salkola 1985, 1: 56, 2: 174–6, 179–80.
62 This leader was K.H.Wiik; cited in Upton 1980, 156. See also Lindman 1978, pp. xxi–xxii.
63 Bianco 1971, p. 203. The difference between the Bolsheviks and the Finnish Social Demo-
crats is graphically reflected in the wide gap between Lenin’s State and Revolution, writ-
ten in the early autumn of 1917 (when Lenin was, incidentally, hiding in Helsinki), and
O.W. Kuusinen’s views in 1917–18, when hewas the party’s theoretician and apparently the
most powerful leader of the Finnish revolution (seeHodgson 1974b, chap. 3). Themost elo-
quent testimony of irresolution among the Social Democratic leaders before the outbreak
of the revolution is the detailed diary kept by K.H.Wiik (1978).
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Within a couple of days, confrontedwith disorder and uncertainty about the
final goal, the party and trade union leaders tried to stop the strike. Although
inmost regions the strike was peaceful, the party leaders’ fears were justified in
a number of cases: sixteen murders were committed during the strike, notably
in Helsinki and its surroundings. Fourteenmembers or supporters of the bour-
geois guards and threemembers of the worker guards died in encounters. Also,
as the strikewent on, demands for a full-scale seizure of power became increas-
ingly forceful: ‘We cannot have two governments’, insisted the Tampere worker
guard.64 Of great importance, the strike emphasised for the first time the exist-
ence of a few revolutionary Red Guards in Helsinki and elsewhere, as distinct
from the party-dominated worker security guards. The division had begun to
evolve in September, but only now did the militant – largely anarchic – line
openly challenge the authority of the party.65
Although the bourgeois groups made no concessions, the strike was called
off on the fifth day. The mobilised masses accepted the decision, but with
great resentment and bitterness.66 The general strike showed that an altern-
ative polity really existed, but it also showed this polity’s limits.
The strike closed the ranks of the bourgeoisie more effectively than any-
thing else: the government began towork firmly and resolutely, and civil society
considerably increased its material and other support for the maintenance of
order; moreover, the two efforts were united. Only a week after the end of the
strike a coalition government of all bourgeois parties was formed, with the
Activists well represented. The most important tasks were identified as ‘the
securing of Finland’s political independence’ and the establishment of a strong
force for the maintenance of order.
The issue of independence was brought to the fore by the October revolu-
tion, which caused utter dismay among the Finnish non-socialist politicians.
Bymid-November, when parliament assumed the exercise of sovereign powers
in the country, independence was supported also by all bourgeois parties, for
which, however, this question was inseparable from the problem of internal
order. The bourgeois leaders wanted to exploit Germany’s and the Entente’s
anti-Bolshevik feelings in order to win independence. For them, Germany’s
64 Salkola 1985, 2: 186–8; Upton 1980, p. 155 (quotation).
65 Salkola 1985, 2: 178–81. To be sure, the terminological distinction between the worker
security guard and the Red Guard, although corresponding to an increasingly discernible
division, was not systematically made in the autumn of 1917. Officially, after 1905–7 the
term Red Guard was first used only when the Helsinki worker security guard declared its
independence from the party in early January 1918 (Salkola 1985, 2: 346–54).
66 Kirby 1971, p. 308.
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attitude was crucial. In early January 1918 the Germans were secretly asked
to provide arms and to send the Finnish Jägers home. The bourgeois leaders
wished to mobilise Germany in order to compel the Bolsheviks to recognise
Finnish independence and withdraw the Russian troops from Finland. Only
then would they be free to restore internal order.67
Independence was proclaimed on 6 December and recognised by the Bol-
shevik government, at the Finns’ request, three weeks later. It was decided to
form the force for maintaining order from the civil guards, which had grown
considerably after the general strike and were now increasingly supported by
businessmen and local authorities. (In this respect it was helpful that theActiv-
ist leadership had close linkswith the country’s economic elite.)68Trainingwas
provided by former domestic army officers and by Jägers who returned home
before themain body of troops. Their impact has been considered incalculably
important.69 By the end of January they were able to train a cadre having mil-
itary skills their opponents lacked.
On 9 January 1918 the government, despite fierce opposition by the Social
Democrats, sought, and a few days later received, authorisation from parlia-
ment for the creation of a strong security force. Civil society again provided
abundant support, especially in the form of rapid financial aid.70 The last step
was taken on 25 January when the civil guards were officially declared the
troops of the government. On the morning of 28 January their supreme com-
mander, a former general of the Imperial Russian Army, C.G.E. Mannerheim,
began to disarmRussian garrisons in Ostrobothnia. Thus began the revolution-
ary war on theWhite side.
By this action the state apparatus, put on the defensive in a revolutionary
situation, co-opted one of the two class-based organisations that had taken
shape in civil society during the summer and autumn. On the one hand, it was
perfectly clear that in the long run the country could not ‘have two govern-
ments’, and after the general strike the bourgeoisiewas fully prepared to restore
its monopoly on physical force by invoking the civil guards, that is, to exercise
a kind of coup d’état. On the other hand, it was just as clear that the working-
class movement would not voluntarily comply and dissolve the alternative
polity. During December and January the socialist leaders repeatedly spoke
about bourgeois aggression and the intended seizure of power by government.
67 Upton 1980, pp. 140, 170, 183; Hodgson 1967, p. 33; Fol 1977, pp. 236–7.
68 Upton 1980, pp. 170, 210; Fol 1977, pp. 216, 218, 220–1, 327–30, 885, 908–9; Salkola 1985, 2:
271.
69 Upton 1980, pp. 210–11.
70 Fol 1977, pp. 353, 355; Upton 1980, p. 237; Mannerheim 1953, pp. 135–6.
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The rules of the worker guards, confirmed in late December, stated that their
purposewas the defence of theworking class from armed attack, a formulation
imposed by the party. In practice, however, a more militant view stressing the
guards’ active role in opposing the bourgeoisie rapidly gained ground.71 Raid-
ing parties searched for food and arms or exerted pressure on local bourgeois
authorities. More important, revolutionary tendencies were gaining ground in
the worker guards, and in mid-January they came to predominate when the
government received authorisation to create a strong security force.72 Even the
party leadership could not ignore the government’s intention to put down the
worker security guards as soon as it felt strong enough. After encounters with
the bourgeois guards in several localities, and after the civil guards gained offi-
cial status as governmental troops, it was decided, with great reluctance, to
launch the revolution on 27 January. Not surprisingly, it was described as hav-
ing ‘a defensive character’.73 Revolutionary spirits ran generally low among the
party leaders, but despite misgivings and opposition in previous months, few
felt that they could distance themselves from the attempt.74
But the Red Guards – as all guards were now called75 – were far from ready
to wage war. On the contrary, they were very much in disarray. The central
organisation was inchoate, and the local branches often had not the slightest
idea of the most elementary rules of military conduct. Unlike the Whites, the
Red Guards had no military cadre. The first commander in chief was an ex-
lieutenant from the Imperial Army, the only former Finnish officer among the
Red troops, who, however, was demoted at the beginning of the hostilities. Ini-
tially the Red Guards had no military plans. Also, arms were in short supply –
to a considerable degree they were obtained only after the war had broken out,
and then thanks to Russian deliveries.76 Otherwise the Russians’ contribution
was minimal: they confined themselves mainly to giving advice and exhorta-
tion. For them, getting their own disorganised troops home was a demanding
enough task. Their primary concern lay in Petrograd and the situation there.77
The revolution began right in the core of Finland. It was declared at the Hel-
sinki headquarters of the Social Democratic party, and in a couple of weeks
the southern core regions of the country were established as the revolutionary
71 Lappalainen 1981, 1: 18–21; Upton 1980, pp. 219–22.
72 Lappalainen 1981, 1: 20; Salkola 1979, p. 361.
73 Upton 1980, p. 265. See also Salomaa 1983, p. 183; Salkola 1985, 1: 57–9, 2: 372–381.
74 Salkola 1985, 2: 374, 377; Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 66–72. Cf. Wiik 1978, pp. 118–37.
75 Salkola 1985, 2: 388–9.
76 Lappalainen 1981, 1: 29–48, 52–8, 155, 205–28; Upton 1980, p. 267.
77 Upton 1980, pp. 187–9.
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stronghold (seeMap 2, p. 55). TheWhites’ strongholdwasOstrobothnia, partic-
ularly southern Ostrobothnia, the largest city of which, Vaasa (Vasa), became
‘the capital of theWhite Finland’.
At first the two armies had roughly the same number of men, although
later the Red Guards had a slight edge. In the beginning the revolutionaries
had 12,000–15,000 troops, by the end of February 40,000, and in late March
76,500. Frontline troops, however, numbered far fewer: 35,000 in mid-March,
for example, but even these could not be used effectively because of poor
organisation and a shortage of weapons. Although armswere obtained bymid-
February, the command’s poor performance was not rectified, and it became
the most fateful problem for the revolutionary army.78
Under these conditions, thehelp that someRussianofficers offered the ‘ama-
teur Red army’ had only a modest impact.79 Russian soldiers played a minor
role in the battles: at its highest their number at the front was only about 2,000
troops, just a few percent of the total Red Guard strength; after early March
the number declined to less than 1,500. In addition, the Russians continued to
send their troops home throughout thewar: after onemonth of armed conflict,
which at first was fairly mild, only 6,000 Russian troops were still in the coun-
try. Russian arms deliveries – received both fromPetrograd and from the troops
stationed in Finland – were, however, critical.80
One indication of the revolution’s defensive character is the passivity of the
military operations. After Helsinki and southern Finland were in their con-
trol, the socialist leaders considered the revolution more or less over: they
thought the situation was similar to the one in November at the time of the
general strike. The socialists, unlike the Whites, therefore devoted consider-
able attention to consolidating the administration at the expense of military
development. To be sure, to a certain extent this task was necessary. Practically
the entire central administration had deserted, and the Social Democrats had
to work hard to keep it running81 – another indication that the revolutionary
polity did not result from the fragmentation of the old polity but that power
was being seized by another polity whose members had been only marginally
involved in the old one.82
Also, the goals of the revolution are expressive of its character: they were
not very ambitious. Governmental organs were established largely following
78 Lappalainen 1981, 1: 173–6, 205–28.
79 Tanskanen 1978, p. 207 (quotation); Lappalainen 1981, 1: 150–3.
80 Lappalainen 1981, 1: 167–8, 2: 259; Tanskanen 1978, pp. 39–42, 206; Hodgson 1967, pp. 74–80.
81 Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 90–3; Piilonen 1982, pp. 114–19.
82 Cf. Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 75–86, 160–71.
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the organisational principles of the earlier government and the parliament.83
Civilian and military functions were separated, and after the revolution Fin-
land was to become a democratic, parliamentary republic with a controlled
capitalist economy. In linewith theseplans (andbecause of the revolutionaries’
need to secure allies), tenant farmerswere enfranchised andbecame independ-
ent smallholders. The constitution – worked out mainly by O.W. Kuusinen and
proposed by the revolutionary government (called the People’s Deputation) –
envisaged a political system modelled on the Swiss one.84 In the short run,
existing practices were maintained. Despite the war, legal principles were usu-
ally respected, even to the extent that the ‘repression of the internal enemy by
the Red regime was suicidally lenient’.85 Each local takeover was to be decided
case by case and was always considered a temporary necessity made inevit-
able by the war. The worker movement captured full power in only three of
every five communes in the region dominated by revolutionary forces. In a
number of communes local elections were held in which bourgeois candidates
ran, and often the bourgeois chairman of the communal board kept his post.86
Consolidation was attempted without the usual instruments of revolutionary
dictatorship, such as a powerful police force or monopoly over the diffusion
of ideas.87 All in all, life went on fairly normally for most of the bourgeois cit-
izens.88
Of course, this does not necessarily imply that only limited changes would
have followed if the revolution had really been successful. Revolutions have
often concluded with results not intended or foreseen by their principal
makers, and radical designs for thorough change have often been as much the
products as the precursors of revolutionary upheaval.89 This line only shows
that in the winter of 1918 the revolutionary polity followed the course that the
Social Democratic party had adopted in the previous decade.
Undoubtedly, themaintenance of legality wasmotivated in part by the hope
to win allies outside the working class. This feature, too, is distinctive of the
Finnish situation. The building of a new socialist economic and political order
83 Salomaa 1983, pp. 184, 188.
84 Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 58–66; Martin 1970, 389–94, 466–77; Lappalainen 1981, 1: 122–7; Soik-
kanen 1975, pp. 273–75, 279–81; Salomaa 1983, pp. 188–92; Upton 1980, pp. 303–4; Hodgson
1974b, p. 51.
85 Upton 1980, p. 381. Cf. Fol 1977, pp. 403–4; and Piilonen 1982, pp. 119–24, 207–8.
86 Piilonen 1982, pp. 44–5, 82–4, 124–8, 135–8, 160, 167–73.
87 See Barrington Moore’s discussion of this problem (1978, pp. 291–9); and Salomaa 1983,
pp. 185–8, 194–6.
88 Upton 1980, p. 382.
89 Aya 1979, pp. 46–7.
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was not envisioned; rather, the leaders of the revolution clung to the views they
had adopted in previous years and advocated during the general strike. The
Finnish revolution was really a defensive revolution that strove more to secure
the advantages gained in 1917 than to create a fundamentally new society.
The governmental troops were also poorly prepared for war. At the end of
January the new security forces were not yet ready for action, and the govern-
ment had tried to postpone armed confrontation for as long as possible. In the
early phases of the war, theWhite army was roughly as strong as the Red, with
about 12,000 to 15,000men.90 But because society had not been seriously dam-
aged during the earlier revolutionary process, White Finland remained super-
ior in resources and organisation. Most important, the upper echelons of the
White army consisted of professional soldiers – former Imperial Army officers,
Swedish officerswhohad volunteered, and, especially, the 1,200 Jägerswhohad
returned home in late February. Weapons were acquired first from disarmed
local Russian troops, but above all fromGermany. In late February general con-
scription was enforced, and at the beginning of May White troops numbered
about 70,000.91
Germany contributed decisively to the Whites’ warfare. Not only did it
deliver arms and send home the Jägers who had been trained in Germany, but
it also intervened in the war. In February the Activists presented a request for
intervention and then made the politicians approve an agreement reducing
Finland to the status of a German vassal.92 At the beginning of April, Ger-
man troops landed on the southern coast andmarched into Helsinki; at nearly
the same time, the Finnish Whites won their first decisive victory by taking
Tampere. In a couple of weeks the revolutionary troops collapsed, and by early
May the entire country was inWhite and German hands.
4 The Aftermath
During the war neither the Reds nor theWhites were able to prevent a number
of terrorist acts. Despite repeated and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism
by the People’s Deputation, about a thousand White sympathisers had been
killed outside the battles bymid-April; with the collapse of discipline in the last
two weeks of the war and early May, 600 to 650 more murders were commit-
90 Upton 1980, pp. 242, 263; Lappalainen 1981, 1: 176.
91 Upton 1980, pp. 325–30, 335–6, 342–3; Fol 1977, pp. 388–90, 438, 444, 554; Lappalainen 1981,
1: 176 (70,000 is the maximum figure).
92 Upton 1980, pp. 336–42; Fol 1977, pp. 448, 452–3, 459.
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ted.93 Wartime terror perpetrated by the Whites was somewhat more regular
andmore extensive, the number of killings rising to at least 1,200–1,300 bymid-
April,94when theRedswere in chaotic retreat.Then, at and following the endof
thewar, a large-scale reign ofWhite terror broke out. During the first week after
the war the Whites executed on average 200 people a day, and the total num-
ber of Reds executed in the last weeks of the war and immediately thereafter
rose to about 5,600. In addition, roughly 12,500persons died in prison camps, in
which the victors incarcerated about 82,000people.95 In a country of 3.1million
people, the executions and camp deaths were so extensive that they exceeded,
both relatively and absolutely, the contemporaneous ones in Hungary.96
In the short run, the attempt at revolution was followed by a distinct coun-
terrevolution. The Social Democratic party was prevented from participating
in the political system, and the Communist party of Finland, founded by emig-
rants inMoscow, was declared illegal. During the war theWhite supreme com-
mander, GeneralMannerheim, had assumed nearly dictatorial powers because
the bourgeois political leadership, partly in Vaasa and partly hiding in Hel-
sinki, had been unable to act jointly. For example, the prime minister, Svin-
hufvud, managed to escape from Helsinki and arrive in Vaasa only in March.
But the arrival of the German troops and the end of the war changed the
balance of power in favour of Svinhufvud, who worked to create a monarchy
dependent on Germany. In autumn 1918, a German-born prince was prelim-
inarily elected king. After Germany’s defeat, however, the Entente-oriented
Mannerheim became head of state in Svinhufvud’s place. Democratic general
elections – one of the Entente’s conditions for the recognition of Finnish inde-
pendence97 –were held in 1919, with reasonable Social Democratic success and
great advances by the Agrarian Union (see Table 11, p. 206). In the same year,
a republican constitution was confirmed, and a Liberal was elected president,
supported by the Social Democrats.
Just as the international power constellation had decisively contributed to
the revolutionary situation, so too did it influence the post-war political system
in Finland. When the revolution was crushed, the counterrevolutionary forces
(which, it is true, had no deep roots in the social structure) were the first to
93 Paavolainen 1966–7, 1: 94–5, 271–313. Because of Paavolainen’s rough periodisation, the
figures are only approximations. Cf. Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 211–14; Piilonen 1982, pp. 207–8;
Upton 1980, pp. 376–82.
94 Paavolainen 1966–7, 2: 192–3; Upton 1980, pp. 314–18; Fol 1977, pp. 428–31, 472–4.
95 Paavolainen 1966–7, 2: 192–3; Paavolainen 1971, p. 332. The total number of victims of the
White terror rose to 8,380.
96 See Barta et al. 1971, pp. 454–7.
97 Fol 1977, pp. 687–8, 692, 795–6, 817.
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gain the upper hand. But then, thanks to the Entente victory, the protagonists
of the republican constitution and political democracy moved to the fore, and
soon a part of the elite was forced to surrender the counterrevolutionary gains.
Both Svinhufvud and Mannerheim, the two leading figures in putting down
the revolution, were compelled to step aside, leaving a significant potential for
discontent within the dominant groups. In 1919 Mannerheim and an influen-
tial rightist group had a plan not only for an attack against Petrograd but even
for a coup d’état in Finland. The opponents of the new political system were
mainly formerActivistswhohadkeypositions in thenational civil guardorgan-
isation, established after the war, and, to a lesser extent, in the army and the
state police.98
5 The Social and Regional Basis for the Revolution
In the parliamentary elections of 1916, the Social Democratic party had won
103 seats out of 200 and 47 percent of the total vote, being backed mainly by
industrial workers, agrarian workers, and crofters. Yet what effectiveness did
this coalition of interests have in the revolution itself? Both weak and strong
organisationmay produce electoral success, but presumably only strong organ-
isation can provide a basis for effective action in a revolutionary situation.
The question is, were all voter groups mobilised in the revolution? The
answer is clear: the industrial working class andmany agrarianworkers backed
the revolution, but the crofters were rather passive; and typically, the intellec-
tuals provided no support.
A crucial indicator of revolutionarymobilisation is the social composition of
theRed troops: here, the industrial andagrarianproletariat dominated.99These
two groups’ grievances were fused to a large extent after the 1905 revolution,
as the spread of the worker associations indicated. There were also important
institutional and cultural linkages between town and country (see Chapter 6).
In the countryside, the worker associations presumably consisted much more
of agrarian workers than of crofters, not only absolutely but also relatively. The
98 Ahti 1982, pp. 175–80; Ahti 1984a, p. 240.
99 Rasila 1968, pp. 32–3; Lappalainen 1981, 1: 168–73; Soikkanen 1975, p. 299. Various groups of
rural workers made up 21 percent of the revolutionary dead, but the proportion of ‘work-
ers’ without more specific description was 48 percent, most of whom lived in the coun-
tryside and were largely sons of crofters and other workers closely involved with agrarian
life. The proportion of industrial workers, craftsmen, and artisans among the dead was 12
percent (Rasila 1968, pp. 34–48).
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worker security guards in 1917 and the Red Guards during the war appear to
have recruited their troops notably from among the members of the worker
associations and other Social Democratic organisations.100 And, as had been
the case when the worker associations were set up, the towns and other indus-
trial centres took the lead, with the countryside soon following.101 The char-
acter of the revolutionary sequence, moreover, probably helped to maintain
linksbetweenvariousworker groups. Because themassmobilisationof late 1917
and the rise and culmination of the revolutionary situationwere largely defens-
ive, there was little room for serious cleavages among the core supporters, the
industrial and agrarian workers. It may be hypothesised that an active seizure
of power might have divided various elements of the working-class movement
but that a defensive revolution instead caused them to close their ranks.102 This
situation may be clearly seen in the attitude of the leadership. Despite serious
disagreements before thewar, virtually every top leader took part in the revolu-
tion once it broke out; some stepped aside, but nobody worked against it.103
Also, local government was built using experienced party cadres.104
The crofters, however, remained ‘passive’, not even reacting to their enfran-
chisement at the beginning of the war. Their attitude – that is, strong electoral
support for the Social Democrats on the one hand and relatively weak political
organisation and limitedmobilisation during the revolution on the other –may
be explained by viewing the crofters as a pre-capitalist group suffering from the
intrusions of capitalism.
Eric Wolf has observed that the middle peasants have played a central role
in most important revolutionary wars of the twentieth century, as the stratum
‘most instrumental in dynamiting the peasant social order’.105 Paradoxically,
at first sight, the Finnish crofters had many characteristics of the middle peas-
ants, asWolf defines them. For him,middle peasants are thosewhohave secure
access to land of their own and who cultivate it with family labour, as well as
many of thosewhose holdings liewithin the power domain of a superior. These
cultivators are able to protest because they possess the ‘minimum tactical free-
dom required to challenge their overlord’.106 But even somewhat poorer groups
maybe in a similar position: ‘The same…holds for apeasantry, poor or “middle”,
100 Klemettilä 1976, pp. 40–1, 130, 141, 162–6, 177–8, 189, 196–7; Lappalainen 1981, 1: 157–64;
Soikkanen 1975, pp. 299–300; Salkola 1985, vol. 1, chaps. 3–5 passim.
101 Salkola 1985, 1: 121–2; Lappalainen 1967, p. 86. Cf. Klemettilä 1976, p. 241.
102 Cf. Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 72–4; and Salkola 1985, 1: 173–4.
103 Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 66–72; Soikkanen 1975, pp. 270–2.
104 Piilonen 1982, pp. 322–5.
105 Wolf 1969, p. 292.
106 Wolf 1969, p. 291.
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whose settlements are only under marginal control from the outside. Here
landholdings may be insufficient for the support of the peasant household;
but subsidiary activities such as casual labor, smuggling, livestock raising – not
under the direct constraint of an external power domain – supplement land
in sufficient quantity to grant the peasantry some latitude of movement’.107
Peasants of this kind have more resources than the landless, but their interests
do not tie them to the prevailing economic and political system, as is the case
with the wealthier peasants. At the same time, the economic position of these
middle peasants is based on pre-capitalist relations of production, and their
social relations remain encased within the traditional design. They therefore
tend to be quite vulnerable to the economic changes wrought by commercial-
isation. Their ‘balance is continuously threatened by population growth; by the
encroachment of rival landlords; by the loss of rights to grazing, forest, and
water; by falling prices and unfavorable conditions of market; by interest pay-
ments and foreclosures’.108
During the twentieth centurymiddle peasants in ThirdWorld countries par-
ticularly have been hurt by capitalist development and have been able to react
collectively. By protesting, they have tried to regain their lost rights. ‘Thus it is
the very attempt of the middle … peasant to remain traditional which makes
him revolutionary’.109Thiswas true in revolutionaryRussia aswell: theBolshev-
iks were supported not only by the industrial proletariat but also by the peas-
antry, all except the upper strata. The peasants fought against the restoration
of the landowners’ repression, not for a socialist society.110
Wolf ’s description throws light on the leasehold question in Finland. The
Finnish crofters were poor or ‘middle’ peasants whose holdings were subject to
the power of a superior. Significantly, the first indication that agrarian conflicts
were worsening lay in the reaction of the crofters (not the agrarian workers)
from the 1880s onward. Leasehold was made an issue by a group whose posi-
tionwas based on pre-capitalist relations of production, a group especially vul-
nerable to the economic changes brought about by commercialisation. At the
same time, the crofters had more resources and capacity for collective action
than the landless population.
Unlike the countries in Wolf ’s analysis, however, Finland was not in a colo-
nial position, nor was it as dependent on ‘North Atlantic’ capitalism.111 Finland
107 Ibid.
108 Wolf 1969, p. 292.
109 Ibid.
110 Wolf 1969, pp. 88–99; Ferro 1967–76, 2: 211–29.
111 Wolf 1969, p. 276.
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was developing into a capitalist country; the peasants were becoming farmers,
that is, commercial producers. The crofters’ demands did not stand in real con-
tradiction to this development. By the early years of the twentieth century, the
crofters were becoming progressively bound to the market as small producers,
all the limitations notwithstanding.112
The crofters wanted to strengthen their access to the land – to improve the
conditions of leasehold or to become landowners. In the countryside, social-
ismwas often understood to involve the redistribution of land.113 This objective
was not inconceivable for the bourgeoisie in the 1910s, a significant part of
which supported, at least in principle, the conversion of the crofts into the
property of the leaseholders. The Social Democrats also had to concede to the
crofters’ demands. The party strove to strengthen the crofters’ position and, at
onemoment in the 1910s, proposed that the crofters should in practice become
landowners. The crofters’ political strength can be seen in the fact that up
to 1918 their position was safeguarded by various measures. Most important,
their leases were prolonged for seven years from 1909, and extended again in
1915 until the legislation defining the crofters’ position had been prepared and
approved. By January 1918 a law had been prepared that would have allowed
the crofters to become the owners of the land they cultivated.114
This perspective explains both the importance of the leasehold question at
the turn of the century and the crofters’ passivity during the revolution, or, put
another way, both the electoral support the crofters gave the Social Democrats
and theminor role they played in thewar of 1918. Their problems never became
so serious that they would have become ‘instrumental in dynamiting the peas-
ant social order’. If theworking-classmovement had actively attempted to seize
power, the crofters might well have dissociated themselves still more from the
revolution.
But it is not only the crofters’ passivity that is important. In a larger per-
spective their reactionmeant that the ‘middle’ and ‘poor’ peasants did not join
forces in Finland: the two groups proved unable to engage in concerted collect-
ive action in the revolutionary situation. The Finnish revolutionary challenger,
the Social Democratic party, could not create a common front of various peas-
ant groups. As many commentators have pointed out, an appeal to different
peasant strata has been paramount in all successful revolutionarymovements,
the central role of the middle peasants notwithstanding. In these cases the
112 M. Peltonen 1985, pp. 7–9.
113 Soikkanen 1978, p. 354.
114 See Rasila 1970, pp. 21–2, 122–4, 209–12, 230–2, 390.
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revolutionary parties have been able to stimulate demand for, and then sup-
ply, tangible collective benefits at the local level, such as local political power
or redistributed land, thereby uniting different kinds of cultivator and landless
groups. In the next phase the parties have profited from the peasants’ willing-
ness to act together in defence of the collective benefits they have gained.115 In
Finland the alliance between the party and the peasants was different because
of the non-revolutionary character of the party as well as the limited scale of
agrarian class conflicts. On the one hand, the Social Democrats advocated pro-
letarian policies for the workers, but on the other, they were forced to take into
account the crofters’ aspirations for their own farms. Even if some of the bene-
fits proposed to the two subgroups, the landless and the crofters,were collective
(such as thedemocratisationof local government), otherswerenot (such as the
strengthening of the crofters’ position, which was not accompanied by a cor-
responding demand that land be redistributed to the landless).116 Besides, even
in 1917 the party was only just starting its work: it had not yet supplied collect-
ive benefits; it had merely been stimulating demand for them. Finally, these
attempts had taken place notably at the national level, in the Parliament, and
were by 1917 little based on direct collective action at the local level, within the
agrarian communities themselves.
On the bourgeois side, the independent peasantry provided the backbone
of the army, which was rightly called a ‘White peasant army’; there were many
crofter and worker recruits as well, especially after the introduction of gen-
eral conscription.117 The upper and middle classes, including the intellectuals,
were also in the White camp. There had been no long-term loss of legitim-
acy among the Finnish intellectuals who had created and consolidated the
national culture only a few decades earlier, nor had sharp conflicts of interest
115 Skocpol 1982, pp. 364–6; Goldstone 1982, p. 198. A case in point are the Vietnamese Com-
munists; see Popkin 1979, pp. 223–42.
116 See Rasila 1970, pp. 95–105, 120–5.
117 Workers numbered less than one-sixth, and crofters and other tenant farmers a littlemore
than one-tenth, of the total number of theWhite troops (Rasila, Jutikkala, and Kulha 1976,
p. 87). Ohto Manninen, in his study on theWhite conscripts, does not explicitly deal with
the impact of conscription on the social composition of the White troops, but obviously
those who were most unwilling to be conscripted – who tried to avoid or resist military
service – came overwhelmingly from the popular groups (O. Manninen 1974, esp. chaps.
6 and 7). Manninen’s conclusion that the ‘White army was not a class army in its aims,
nor was it in its composition’ (1978, 239) seems grossly misleading. Conscription was star-
ted in late February, as Manninen is well aware. Barrington Moore’s remark about a Latin
American country whose army is made up mostly of peasant conscripts is relevant here:
the fact that casualties on both sides of a revolution are mainly peasants is certainly no
indication of the absence of class conflict (Moore 1966, p. 518).
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developedwithin the dominant classes. A telling example is the role of the uni-
versity students, who have been conspicuous in several revolutions. According
to one study, in Finland only two students were among the revolutionary dead,
whereas on the bourgeois side the corresponding figurewas 251. The entire Red
local government,moreover, recruited only a dozen peoplewhohad passed the
university entry examination,118 and only onemajorwriter rallied to the revolu-
tion.119
The main regional variations dealt with in Chapters 4 and 7 were reflected
in the consolidation of Red and White Finland. The revolution was declared
in Helsinki, and the revolutionaries seized the entire core of the country (see
Map 2, p. 55), where a certain radical solidarity among agrarian workers seems
to have developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eastern
Finland, although it strongly supported the Social Democrats in the elections,
was, with only few local exceptions, immediately dominated by theWhites.120
As was stated above, the dissolution of the agrarian community appears to
have provided little basis for collective action in the east, and the Social Demo-
crats’ rural organisation remained weaker than in the south-west. The region
also lagged behind the core in industrialisation. The Whites’ real stronghold,
however, was in Ostrobothnia. In that region the local peasant capacity for col-
lective action had already manifested itself, notably in the great peasant rebel-
lion of the late 1500s, in powerful revivalist movements, and in other processes
of popular organisation in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Now the peasants’
conservative solidarity led them to play a prominent role in the ‘White peasant
army’ and also to influence theWhite side ideologically.121
Regional variations in both organisation and the nature of solidarity can
be seen in the spread of the worker militias and security guards and the
civil guards in 1917. The worker militias were first set up in the largest towns
and other centres in the south. The rural worker militias, for their part, were
strongest in the three south-western counties, where the farm strikes had been
concentrated. The White organisation grew most rapidly in Ostrobothnia: in
the summer of 1917 this province had far more civil guards than did other
regions; in central and southern Finland they gained ground only later, the
most important exceptions being localities where bourgeois ‘security corps’
were formed after the farm strikes.122
118 Rasila 1968, 34–35; Piilonen 1982, pp. 316–18.
119 This writer was Algot Untola; see M.-L. Kunnas 1976, pp. 25–37.
120 O. Manninen 1975, pp. 433–9.
121 E.g., Ylikangas 1981, pp. 232–4.
122 Salkola 1985, 1: 246, 480–1, 520–7; Piilonen 1982, pp. 65–74.
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Finally, the same pattern may be seen in the regionally varying conceptions
of the nature of the revolution. In the core the war was, naturally enough, con-
ceived of in class terms. But in Ostrobothnia, where the strong, conservative
solidarity of the peasant community had been preserved and wheremore Rus-
sian troops were stationed than elsewhere, it was defined in different terms.
During the fighting the Ostrobothnian newspapers depicted the war above all
as a ‘struggle for liberation’, whereas in otherWhite Finnish regions it was often
called a civil or internal war.123 For the Ostrobothnian peasants, it was a war of
liberation against the Russian troops still in the country; the revolutionaries
were traitors to the nation. Moral indignation was directed against disruptive
class antagonism in the south and against the increasing indifference to reli-
gion that accompanied it. Characteristically, ‘for the revivalists, this war was a
holy war’; ‘one made his way to the liberation war as to a prayer meeting: the
war was also a war against the devil and the godless’.124
6 On the Character of the Finnish Revolution
The Finnish revolutionmay be viewed as the outcome of the long-term factors
dealt with in Parts I and II of this study and the short-term factors laid out in
this section. It was an encounter, on the one hand, of the class relations insti-
tutionalised in the state and, on the other, of the domestic consequences of
Russia’s collapse.
As to the long-run developments, it was argued above that the nature of
class relations, the strength of the domestic state structures, and the character
of national and class-based political organisation at their intersection encom-
pass the main processes in Finnish state-making and nation-building by the
early twentieth century.What, then, was their role in the abortive revolution of
1917–18?
It is helpful first to look at colonial peripheries, where these three factors
seem to have been paramount in giving momentum to the development of
revolutionary challenges and situations. Theda Skocpol has pointed out that
the two major consequences of globally expanding capitalism for peasant-
based revolutions have been shifts in (agrarian) class relations and disinteg-
ration of the metropoles’ controlling capacity. The capitalist expansion has
caused market economics to impinge on agrarian strata, arousing peasants to
123 T. Manninen 1982, pp. 135–51.
124 Rosenqvist 1952, p. 45; Vilkuna 1950, p. 172.
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defensive revolts or creating new social strata prone to revolution. It has also
created interstate rivalries, which have loosened the grip of large powers on
smaller ones.125
It is in this twin context that the third long-term factor, the role of the
organised challenger in the rise of revolutionary situations, should be assessed.
The first two long-term factors have placed constraints on challengers in their
political struggle to bridge the gap between peasants and the national state
or a nationally distinct but dependent region. Success in the countryside has
depended on the specific features of local class and institutional arrangements
among the peasantry and on the degree of political control faced by the native
challengers. Both local class relations and state controls have played their part
in determining what strategies have been feasible in the mobilisation of the
peasantry – whether challengers have been in a position to successfully offer
collective benefits for various strata of the peasants and thereby activelymobil-
ise them to a revolution, or whether the challengers have been well advised to
offermoremodest, economic benefits to particular subgroups within the peas-
antry.126
Viewed in this triple perspective of class relations, state structures, andpolit-
ical organisation, the Finnish revolution seems a very unlikely event. Peasants
in colonial states have been hurt by capitalist commercialisation to a much
greater degree than peasants in Finland. Preconditions for forming a revolu-
tionary alliance between peasants and political parties were therefore from
the outset much more favourable in the colonial cases. Increased market par-
ticipation by peasants – stemming from economic crises and accompanied by
corruption, monopoly, and the lack of viable, well-regulated institutions – has
enabled revolutionary organisations to absorb peasants and thereby expand
power. Just these conditions have made not only the middle peasants but also
various other segments of poorer peasants amenable to revolutionary mobil-
isation.127
Finland is peculiar in that a revolution occurred without either similar
threats from capitalist penetration or a comparable revolutionary party. In Fin-
land the worker movement was obviously advised to offer economic benefits
to various subgroups in the peasantry – that is, it was ready to improve the con-
ditions of the landless and to strengthen the position of crofters even up to the
125 Skocpol 1982, pp. 367–73.
126 Ibid., pp. 361–7; Migdal 1974, pp. 231–6.
127 Migdal 1974, pp. 230–2, 247; Popkin 1979, chap. 5; Skocpol 1982, pp. 364–6; Goldstone 1982,
pp. 197–9.
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point of supporting de facto landownership. This course was reasonable not
only because of the crofters’ incipient changeover to commercial production
but also because of rather loose political control – in other words, because of
the opportunities offered by the political system after 1905.
The revolution’s hesitancy, even defensiveness, is verymuch a result of these
conditions. No revolutionary alliance existed between the peasantry and an
organised revolutionary movement headed by intellectuals, simply because
few peasants were amenable to revolutionary mobilisation and because there
was no truly revolutionary party. The problem was recognised by the two fore-
most leaders of the revolution, who later concluded that its failure could be
traced to weak support by the ‘toiling peasantry’ and to the reformist character
of the party.128
But, paradoxically, the same set of factors is important in explainingwhy the
revolution broke out. The extensive but ‘reformist’ mobilisation in the coun-
tryside helped the Social Democratic party secure a comparatively solid posi-
tion in the polity by 1917. At that time the simple fact that they had access to
political power proved paramount in producing the revolutionary situation.
Whathaving suddenaccess topolitical power in 1917 implies, however, is that
in the end a fourth factor was decisive for the outbreak of the Finnish revolu-
tion: the mode and timing of the final collapse of the metropolitan power.
This feature – together with the simultaneous disintegration of the apparatus
of coercion in the small polities themselves – differentiates all the European
revolutionary challenges from the mainstream of the Third World situations.
The breakdown of three European empires in the world war, combined with
direct pressure the war exerted on local structures of dominance, was so thor-
ough and abrupt that it is hardly equalled by any other favourable situation
faced by revolutionaries in smaller countries seeking liberation from polit-
ical dependence. Also unlike many colonial countries, the collapse took place
before any widely organised revolutionary challenger had emerged in the East-
ern European countryside (see Chapter 11). Although, to be sure, defeats in
wars and international military interventions have often created favourable
situations in colonial countries as well, generally the revolutionary organisa-
tions have grown up earlier, with recurrent disruptions in metropolitan con-
trol.When the favourable situation has finally come, the organised challengers
have been ready to exploit the situation. Unlike several colonial cases, the local
challengers among the smaller European nationalities were generally poorly
128 Kullervo Manner (1924, pp. 3–6) discusses both problems, O.W. Kuusinen (1919, pp. 1–14)
the latter one.
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organised or concentrated in urban areas and played no role whatsoever in the
sudden disappearance of external control.
With this fourth factor added to the character of class relations, state struc-
tures, and political organisation, the specificity of the Finnish case becomes
obvious.With the abrupt end of the Russian Empire and the sudden disappear-
ance of state control, the reluctant but strong Social Democrats were finally
pushed to revolution. Yet the whole nature of the alliance between the party
and the peasantry made the attempt hollow, or at best half-hearted. Its tragedy
was that it was so hopelessly ambivalent.
The specific character of the Finnish revolution may also be formulated in
terms of both Moore’s view of the preconditions for major revolutions and
Tilly’s model of the proximate causes of revolutionary situations. A revolution
was attempted despite the fact that the country had long avoided war, with
its accompanying threat to the integrity of both the polity and civil society,
and the fact that the Social Democratic party did all it could to prevent the
revolution. Nor was the Finnish revolution preceded by a decay of the pre-
vailing system’s legitimacy among the intellectuals. With few exceptions, the
Finnish educated class unanimously shared the categories and explanations
developed in the national culture during the previous seventy or eighty years.
No insurmountable contradictions existed between the educated class and the
tiny socialist intelligentsia, or, for that matter, within the dominant classes,
which were basically united. Moreover, the developments leading up to the
revolutionary situation did not begin with the gradual mobilisation of con-
tenders making exclusive claims to governmental control, followed by a rapid
increase in the number of people accepting these claims, and finally by the
incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the
alternative coalition.
What initiated the process in Finland was governmental incapacity, which
was followed only slowly and painfully by mobilisation and an increase in the
number of people accepting exclusive alternative claims. Of crucial import-
ance was that the Social Democrats happened to enter into government just
when the state lost the instruments of coercion. The essential precondition for
the onset of the whole process was the existence in 1917 of a worker movement
that was well organised and comparatively well entrenched in the political sys-
tem.The February revolution in Russia led to thismovement’s acquiring a cent-
ral political role, corresponding to its electoral strength. Multiple sovereignty
resulted only when the movement was deprived of institutionalised political
power. In the summer of 1917 all the Provisional Government and the Finnish
bourgeois parties could do was expel the socialists from power: they could not
eliminate or control them.This expulsionunited and consolidated the alternat-
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ive socialist coalition, and dual power accordingly emerged. The revolutionary
determination that existed – and there was not much – mattered little. What
did matter was, first, the labour movement’s strong grip on state power, which
had no coercive apparatus of its own, and, second, the contested loss of this
control.
The Finnish revolutionary sequence, then, did not fully follow the ‘idealised
sequence’ depicted by Tilly, and the third proximate cause played a far more
central part than the first two. According to Barrington Moore’s perspective,
then, the loss of unified control over the instruments of violence proved to
be decisive. This framework helps us see how the specific features of internal
revolutionary developments resulted from Finland’s external dependence. The
process was genuinely internal in that it took place within the Finnish polity
and themain contenders were Finnish groups; it was initiated, however, by the
collapse of imperial authority, onwhich themaintenance of internal order ulti-
mately depended.
7 Breakdown of Society or Contest for State Power?
The treatment of the revolution in the historical literature may be commented
upon briefly using the above perspective. Conceptions of the prime reasons
for the revolutionary situation, the role of the Social Democratic party, and the
social basis for the revolution are crucial to an overall assessment.
Understandably, all students of the revolution have portrayed it as a coin-
cidence of both the crisis in Russia and domestic factors. In this view a critical
role was played, first, by long-term internal strains, which the Russian collapse
allowed to come to the surface: ‘The Russian revolution with its consequences
had released the forces pent up inFinnish society, giving themachance toburst
out’.129 Reference has been made to the grave problems of the industrial and
agrarian workers and of the crofters; the political stagnation resulting from the
reintroduction of Russification and the state of emergency duringWorldWar I,
which had stopped social and economic reforms; the weakening of social and
cultural restraints on violence because of the continued struggle against Rus-
sia; and the example and memory of mass action in 1905.130
129 Paasivirta 1957, p. 59.
130 Kirby 1971, pp. 382–4; Paavolainen 1966–7, 1: 23–9; Paasivirta 1957, p. 59; C.J. Smith 1958,
pp. 6–7; Soikkanen 1975, pp. 191–3, 220; Rasila, Jutikkala, and Kulha 1976, pp. 76–8; Martin
and Hopkins 1980; Martin 1970, chaps. 2–5, esp. 117–22, 237–9, 324–32.
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Usually, however, attention has focused on short-term problems. In full
accordance with the opinion of the contemporary Social Democratic leaders,
the food shortage has been seen to be decisive, as the primary factor respons-
ible for the establishment of the worker security guards. More generally, the
fear of starvation, accompanied by the increasing unemployment and infla-
tion, has been thought to be the single most important factor behind the pop-
ular unrest and, ultimately, the revolution.131 Because of the food shortage and
the Bolshevik revolution, ‘the party was rolling down tracks, like a heavy train,
and the leaders had only to avoid being crushed’.132 In this view themain causal
chain begins with the collapse in Russia (which led to the drying up of the
Russian grain supplies, mass unemployment because of the stopping of the
Russian fortification works and military procurement programmes, problems
in the maintenance of order, disturbances caused by undisciplined Russian
troops, and general economic dislocation) and runs to the fear of starvation, to
large-scale unrest, to the organisation of the militant Red Guards, and finally
to the outbreak of the war.133
Essential to this perspective is the idea that the food shortage and related
problems brought existing social strains to the surface. As Viljo Rasila con-
cludes his study of the social background of the war: ‘Only the events linked to
the two successive revolutions in Russia, particularly the unemployment and
starvationprevalent in themost industrialized areas, could aggravate [the long-
term internal tension] to suchanextent that it brokeout asCivilWar’.134 Studies
based on this perspective vary only in the relativeweight given to the long-term
preconditions and the short-term aggravation of the economic and social situ-
ation.
This approach seems tohave one fundamental problem: it does not take seri-
ously the fact that the arena of a revolution is the state– the state understood in
Weber’s sense, that is, as the institution that claims amonopoly on the legitim-
ate use of physical force within a given territory.135 Revolutions are contests for
state power. Significantly, the upheaval is commonly called the CivilWar in the
131 Soikkanen 1975, p. 224; Salkola 1985, 2: 432; Paavolainen 1966–7, 1: 31–54; Kirby 1971, p. 384;
Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 6–8; Fol 1977, pp. 87–8, 127–8, 184–6, 225–6; Upton 1980, pp. 18, 64–5,
66–7, 123–4, 222–3; Holodkovski 1978, pp. 12–18, 132–8; Lappalainen 1967, pp. 55–8; Paas-
ivirta 1957, pp. 59–60; Polvinen 1980, pp. 117, 118; Rasila, Jutikkala, and Kulha 1976, pp. 80–1;
Jokipii 1981, p. 41; Hamalainen 1978, pp. 7–9, 115.
132 Hodgson 1967, p. 32, referring to Matti Turkia, the party secretary.
133 This sequence is implicit or very incomplete in a number of studies because they focus
predominantly on the narration of political events.
134 Rasila 1968, p. 153; also Rasila 1982b, p. 165.
135 Weber 1948, p. 78.
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Finnish scholarly literature andpractically never, in the strict sense of theword,
the revolution.136 The state has not been totally ignored, of course, but over the
long run it figures mainly through Russification and legislative dependence on
Russia (the emperor’s veto stopped several political reforms). And in the short
run, the disintegration of order as a consequence of Russia’s collapse figures
only as one more factor responsible for general social disruption.
Basically, the long-run argument as it is presented above states only that
the contenders on opposite sides in 1917–18 were largely from different social
classes and that therefore (long-term) strains related to the social structure
must have existed. In this view it appears self-evident that the pre-1917 Social
Democratic party adopted a ‘radical line’ focusing on the ‘class struggle’ – that
is, that it was ‘revolutionary’.137 The assertion, however, is retrospective: the
strength of previous conflicts is simply deduced from the social basis of the
revolution. Actually, the nature of earlier conflicts should be assessed inde-
pendently of the revolution itself, and in particular they should be related to
the state, which determined the preconditions for collective action on the part
of the working classes in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. In
Chapter 6 it was argued that although the class conflict was pervasive, in the
sense that the structural preconditions for collective action were favourable,
the easy penetration of the working class into the polity in 1905–7, aided by
those very same structural factors, led to its increasing integration into the state
by 1917. In a comparative perspective this tendency seems much more charac-
teristic of the pre-revolutionary period than an existence of acute tensions (see
Chapter 11).
Similarly, the state should be taken into account in analysing short-term
problems. There is considerable evidence that starvation has not been a central
factor leading up to revolutionary situations.138 Starvation has afflicted much
of humankind for centuries, often in conjunction with more general disorder,
but a revolution is something very exceptional. In Finland the disastrous fam-
ine of 1867–8 led to the decimation of eight percent of the population without
provoking the slightest sign of revolt. The same goes for the fear of starva-
tion: it can be seen as a prime reason for revolution, or even revolutionary
unrest, only if an extremely narrow perspective is used. The state, however,
provides the necessary context for an analysis of the fear of starvation and
relatedproblems.The food shortage played an important role, but only because
136 It is a revolution especially for Holodkovski (1978) and Upton (1980). See also Martin 1970
and C.J. Smith 1971. The term also figures in the title of Piilonen’s study (1982).
137 Soikkanen 1967, pp. 190, 196–8; Lipset 1983, p. 15.
138 E.g., Aya 1979.
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of developments in the state, that is, only because of the government’s inab-
ility to suppress alternative claims. Governmental inactivity became clear in
early August. At that time, the scarcity of food itself was not critical, but the
decomposition of the system for rationing was. The system could not work
because the governmental apparatus was disintegrating, and it was disinteg-
rating because the government’s capacity to act effectively depended entirely
on the Social Democrats’ continued presence in the government. This depend-
ence, furthermore, resulted from the working-class movement’s share in the
maintenance of order or, ultimately, from the absence of the established instru-
ments of coercion. By the early autumn a rudimentary alternative polity had
grown up, partly outside the state and partly under its protection, owing to the
Social Democrats’ position in the state. When the party was ejected from the
established polity, an alternative polity gradually consolidated itself, gaining
strength from the fear of starvation. In these institutional conditions, rumours
of food scarcity and starvation easily spread. Basically, though, it was the emer-
ging multiple sovereignty or dual power that mattered, and the food shortage
(which was not actually critical in 1917)139 only acted as tinder. Indeed, it is
highly significant that the only exhaustive local study of the worker security
guards in existence accords the food shortage and related factors only a very
minor role.140
The character of the revolutionary process has a considerable bearing on
the Social Democratic party’s position in the alternative polity. Students of the
revolution have generally portrayed the party as being unable to resist the mil-
itant Red Guards, and consequently as being largely responsible for the war.141
In this view, the party gradually crumbled and finally capitulated to the guards
in the period running from the general strike to the end of January 1918. In a
larger perspective, however, exactly the opposite seems true: the party was able
to postpone the outbreak of the revolution until long after the beginning of the
revolutionary situation. True, it could not confine the guards strictly within the
rules, but it was able to neutralise their militancy until the government had
definitively decided to restore order and had energetically begun to make pre-
parations for doing so – up to the point, that is, when the government decided
139 Rantatupa 1979, pp. 106, 108, 114–15.
140 Klemettilä 1976, pp. 171–2, 175–7.
141 Paasivirta 1957, pp. 65–71; Lappalainen 1967, 86–8; Rinta-Tassi 1972, pp. 21–41; Rasila,
Jutikkala, and Kulha 1976, pp. 80–5; also Hodgson 1967, pp. 39–50, 53, 67. D.G. Kirby (1978,
pp. 32–5) andV.M. Holodkovski (1978, pp. 55–82) stress the inability of the party to pursue
a revolutionary course. So does Anthony F. Upton (1980, pp. 160–1 and passim), but in the
last analysis he portrays the party as gradually capitulating (1980, pp. 206–8, 232–3).
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to make the bourgeois paramilitary organisation the core of its armed forces.
Theworker guards didnot launch a revolution inNovember,when theworking-
classmovement was playing an active role, but only in late January when it was
forced to react to the bourgeois initiative (as O.W. Kuusinen noted in a sharp-
sighted comment written in the summer of 1918).142 The Finnish abhorrence of
fragmentation in popular organisations, the early development of theworking-
class movement in amore general process of organisation, its easy penetration
into the polity in 1905–7, its strength based on extended agrarian electoral sup-
port, its focus on the state and on reforms in the framework of the prevailing
political system – all these factors make it perfectly understandable that the
core of the movement, the party, was able to postpone the revolution for so
long. Ultimately the working-class movement was drawn into it. The Finnish
situation is radically different from what took place in Estonia and Hungary.
There, the working-class movement became linked with a newmilitant group-
ing and was rapidly and rather easily overwhelmed.
The Social Democrats’ role raises a more general question about the char-
acter of the Finnish revolution. Practically all scholarly studies see the devel-
opment leading up to the revolution as a breakdown or a sudden release of
dark forces. Many of the above citations testify to this view.143 The image is
‘hydraulic’, as Charles Tilly has called it: ‘hardship increases, pressure builds up,
the vessel bursts’.144 Rod Aya has termed this view the ‘volcanic’ model: ‘The
onrush of uncontrolled changes in the structure of society begets multiplex
tensions which, if unrelieved, erupt into mass violence where and when social
controls relax or weaken’.145
In the study of revolutions and collective violence, the ‘hydraulic’ or ‘vol-
canic’ approach involves many insurmountable empirical and other diffi-
culties. Themost serious problems arise from concentration on states of mind,
impulses, strains, and other ultimately psychological factors and the corres-
ponding neglect of structural and institutional factors.146 The present study
holds that the conditions that lead to violent protest are similar to those that
lead to other kinds of collective action in the pursuit of common interests.147
This approach suggests, for example, that the revolutionary crowds were re-
cruited fromgroups thatwerewell integrated into theworking-classmovement
142 Kuusinen 1919.
143 The only clear-cut exceptions are Holodkovski 1978 and Salkola 1985, vol. 2.
144 Tilly 1975a, p. 390.
145 Aya 1979, p. 51.
146 See, e.g., Aya 1979.
147 See Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975, pp. 2–13, 239–45; and Aya 1979.
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rather than from the marginal, floating population in the towns and coun-
tryside. Recent findings seem to support this view,148 but the implications have
not yet been completely worked out.
One qualification, however, is needed. The disappearance of the army and
thepolice in thewakeof theRussian collapsewasmore essential for theFinnish
revolution than were other factors. Like other Eastern European latecomers
in 1917–19, Finland was suddenly presented with the opportunity for collect-
ive action. This makes comprehensible the Social Democratic leaders’ fear that
they would not be able to restrain the masses. It would be groundless to deny
the existence of ‘impulses and their release’ in the summer and autumn of 1917.
But the ‘release of tensions’ should be put in an institutional context in order
to make it understandable.
The favourable opportunity for collective action is also reflected in the social
basis of the revolution. The Red troops and the entire revolutionary organisa-
tion were predominantly proletarian. The Finnish revolution has even been
called ‘perhaps Europe’s most clear-cut class war in the twentieth century’.149
Of the more than 3,500 Reds killed in battle, 78 percent were workers. More
than 90 percent of the worker security guard of Tampere, admittedly an indus-
trial town, were from the working class.150 And the most serious problem in
battle was the nearly total absence of trained leadership.
This situation contrasts strikingly with several other revolutions. As RodAya
puts it, ‘Popular movements have been led, staffed, and supported by, not the
altogether downtrodden and oppressed segments of society, but groups that,
while having plenty to fight for and against, had something to fight with’. The
‘masses’ in various revolutionary upheavals ‘were people of local standing and
substance, however modest – small proprietors, mostly, peasant landowners,
shopkeepers, artisans, journeymen, and snugly entwined in community net-
works’.151 Besides grievances, then, tactical power was necessary, as Eric Wolf
has pointed out in analysing the middle peasants’ prominent role in various
revolutions.152
Reasons were given above to explain why the support of Finnish ‘middle
peasants’ for the revolution was so limited. The revolution had a strong pro-
letarian character, which of course did not prevent the industrial workers, par-
148 Klemettilä 1976; Salkola 1985.
149 Martin 1970, p. 412.
150 Rasila 1968, pp. 34–5, 41; Klemettilä 1976, pp. 154–5. On the largely similar composition of
the revolutionary local government, see Piilonen 1982, pp. 309–14.
151 Aya 1979, p. 74.
152 Wolf 1969, p. 290.
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ticularly the most resourceful groups among them, from taking the lead.153
The proletarian character may be seen as resulting from the linkage to Russia.
Thanks to fluctuations in imperial authority, the labour movement was able
to gain access to the polity in 1905–7 and subsequently to tighten its grip in
early 1917with relative ease – andwithout assistance fromallieswithin the polity.
This is significantly different from Scandinavia, for example, where the early
struggle to extend democracywas a joint enterprise of theworking-classmove-
ment and the Liberals.
In late 1917 and early 1918 the working-class movement tried basically to
maintain the power and advantages it had gained in 1917, not to seize power.
As such, this attempt is not unique. ‘Revolutions commonly commence with
efforts at conservative restoration’, Rod Aya states. And when in certain revolu-
tions the workers ‘took up arms and marched under radical banners, it was to
defend recent reformist gains against reactionary violence’.154 But in Finland
thedefenceof recently gainedadvantageswas linkedwith ahighdegreeof class
integrationmanifest in the working-class movement, an absence of a coalition
partner for the Social Democrats among the establishedmembers of the polity,
a revolutionary sequence starting from the governmental incapacity to make
use of the means of coercion, and finally an irresolution of the revolutionar-
ies after they had gained power. In this combination lies the specificity of the
Finnish revolutionary situation.
153 The central role of the most resourceful industrial workers is evident in Klemettilä’s
exhaustive study on the worker guard of Tampere (1976, pp. 153–7).
154 Aya 1979, pp. 46–47, 73.
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chapter 10
State and Nation after the Failed Revolution
Chapter 9 examined howcertain structures (and the intricacies ofWorldWar I)
affected an event, the Finnish revolution. In this chapter the opposite ques-
tion will be considered: that is, what effect this failed revolution had on certain
structures. To answer this question the revolution will be viewed as part of a
long-term development going beyond the event itself. The question is, what
was the role of the abortive revolution in converting the grand duchy into an
independent republic, and in particular what was its impact on the existing
state structures and the process of national and class integration? The Russian
revolution had provided the opportunity, the Finnishworking-classmovement
had initiated a revolution that failed, and then the earlier nationally oriented
culture provided the instruments for defining and analysing, in theWhite Fin-
land of the 1920s and 1930s, what had taken place in 1917–18. How did the
attempt at revolutionmodify the conditions governingnational and class integ-
ration? What was to be the role of the entire national heritage in the newly
independent country?
An answer to these questions requires both a state-making perspective and
a conception of the specificity of the revolutionary situation in Finland. It also
requires an analysis of Finnish fascism. Finland’s interface positionmeant that
a country with a Scandinavian social structure had confronted the collapse of
amultinational empire, a situation unique in post-world-war history.1 A largely
Eastern European fear of disorder and revolution was present, but dissimil-
arities in the social structure and state-making made it appear and function
differently.
1 The Failed Revolution and the Nation
During the abortive revolution, a conception of the struggle emerged and was
immediately consolidated in the dominant culture, where it took root and
flourished well beyond World War II. The conflict was defined above all as a
war for freedomor liberation (vapaussota), implying that it had primarily been
a struggle for the liberation of Finland from Russian imperialism, which took
1 The closest case is Czechoslovakia, which, however, did not go through a revolution.
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the form of Bolshevism after the autumn of 1917. In this light, Finnish revolu-
tionaries were seen to be traitors who had conspired with the Russians to undo
the newly won independence of their fatherland. The war thus acquired a cer-
tain internal character too, becoming, secondarily, a civil war (kansalaissota).2
In many ways this conception is understandable. The administrative Russi-
fication in the previous years had generated resentment, and fear of undiscip-
lined Russian troops had grown among the bourgeois groups in 1917. A revolu-
tionary Finland could hardly have escaped some sort of dependence on Soviet
Russia. Also, when the Communist party of Finlandwas founded inMoscow in
1918, it was run by leaders of the failed revolution. But farmore important were,
first, the character and role of the national culture and, second, the specifically
Finnish characteristics of the revolutionary situation.
As stated above, no signs of dissolution were discernible within the domin-
ant classes prior to the outbreak of the revolution.Nomajor conflicts of interest
existed, and a far-reaching consensus about national integration prevailed.
Only a few decades earlier, the intellectuals had formulated somewhat vary-
ing versions of nationalism as a civic religion for the emerging Finnish state,
and the fundamentals of this nationalism were accepted fairly unanimously.
Also, the Finnish educated class had become a bureaucratic intelligentsia: it
participated actively in the construction of the state, and the university elite
playeda central role inpolitics and thebureaucracy.3This distinguishes Finnish
intellectuals radically from, say, their French counterparts under the ancien
régime or the unemployed intellectuals in various pre-independence colonial
countries.4 In Finland, because no powerful section of the elite was decisively
outside the state bureaucracy, the variety of intra-elite conflicts that is appar-
ently a key precondition for the emergence of a revolutionary situation did not
exist.5 As to the socialist intellectuals, they were a tiny group, their revolution-
ary conceptions were quite vague, and they were nationalists who had actively
propounded political democracy and Finnish independence since the spring
of 1917.
A tradition that provided few means for handling class conflict thus pre-
vailed in the intellectual culture. It was this intellectual and emotional struc-
2 An example, as well as a prominent codification, of this view can be found in TheMemoirs of
Marshal Mannerheim (1953, chaps. 6 and 7). See also Ketonen 1983, pp. 23–4, 30–4.
3 Rommi 1964, pp. 129–30; Klinge 1970, p. 26.
4 These intellectuals were not only critical of the prevailing order but also isolated from polit-
ical decision making. The classical analysis of France is Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the
French Revolution.
5 Goldstone 1982, pp. 194–7.
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ture that, in 1917–18, was suddenly and without premonition forced to react to
and try to comprehend a revolutionary situation. The revolutionwas a horrible
and nearly total surprise for the entire intellectual culture – as it was a surprise
for the great majority of the revolutionaries themselves. A revolution occurred
which was not preceded by long-term fissures within the dominant classes or
by deterioration of the social and economic fabric in the world war, but which
was a result largely of Finland’s dependence on Russia for the maintenance of
order. The solidarity of the people with the ‘national’ educated class, one of the
basic tenets of the national ideology, seemed to break down all at once, and in
amanner that could not have been reasonably expected given the nature of the
previous Social Democratic challenge.6
The ‘catastrophe’ was interpreted, naturally enough, within the framework
of the national ideology. Although the White military and political leaders as
well as the White press were fully aware of the domestic character of the war
from the outset,7 this conception did not take root. Immediately after the war
broke out, a notion emerged that portrayed it as a struggle for the ‘fatherland’,
for ‘freedom’, and for the ‘whole Finnish people’, against ‘dark forces’, ‘crim-
inal bands’, and ‘chaos’.8 The Russians fit into this perspective admirably. The
existing distrust toward them grew to totally new – racialist – proportions. The
Finnish challenge to state authority was seen as resulting from the ‘Russian
plague’ that had ‘infected’ the revolutionaries.9 Soon this conception evolved
into the idea of a ‘war for freedom’ against Bolshevik Russia. Although ini-
tially formulated in the Activist propagandameant for both the foreign and the
domestic audience,10 the conception corresponded first and foremost to long-
run trends in the prevailing culture, and not merely to the short-run character
of the revolutionary situation. This notion explained in the simplest possible
way the seemingly inconceivable revolt of a part of the people ‘against itself ’.
In the nationalist perspective, seeing the armed conflict as a war for freedom
certainlymademore sense than any alternative interpretation: it preserved the
idea of a single national entity, precious for the national ideology, by projecting
6 There were exceptions, mainly in the Swedish-speaking intelligentsia. Some of its rep-
resentatives had adopted racial ideas from Western Europe or even had visions, in the
prerevolutionary years, of a socialist holocaust. See Hyvämäki 1971, pp. 33–49, 58–9; and
Klinge 1972, pp. 51–3, 96, 105–8. Another matter concerned the fissures left by the 1905
revolution in the idealised conception of the people. See below, n. 12.
7 T. Manninen 1982, pp. 30–2, 73–5, 83–8, 141–7. The Ostrobothnian newspapers were a par-
tial exception (ibid., pp. 135–40).
8 Ibid., pp. 154–64; M.-L. Kunnas 1976, p. 52. See also Paavolainen 1966–7, 2: 27–39.
9 T. Manninen 1982, pp. 164–79; Upton 1980, pp. 311–13; Kena 1979, pp. 83–9.
10 T. Manninen 1982, pp. 95–7.
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the cause of revolution outside the nation. It minimised Finnish participation
in the conflict, thus concealing its class character.
In this perspective the Finnish Reds are seen as ‘misled’ – misled by the
Russians or, more commonly, by their own leaders who were infected by the
Bolsheviks.11 A related view asserts that they were easily misled because of a
specific purported national character. In this view, Finns are sullen and suspi-
cious but, if angered, totally uncontrollable, insidious, and ready to stab their
compatriots in the back. The view had older roots, notably in the fissures left
in the idealised conception of the people by the 1905 revolution. But now it
seemed enormously more persuasive than ever before.12 It was as if Russian
incitement had released the dark forces hiding in the Finnish soul, causing
some Finns to join forces with the foreign enemy.
This is obviously a specifically Finnish version of the volcanic model of
revolution –which, as RodAya says, is apparently themost persistent (and per-
sistently misleading) way of seeing the revolutionary process.13 But although
the conception does not adequately explain the Finnish revolution, seeing the
revolutionaries as misled may still catch something important. F.E. Sillanpää’s
masterly novelMeekHeritage expresses this beautifully.Written in the summer
and fall of 1918 and published in 1919, this book was profoundly sympathetic
to the defeated, whom it portrayed as being at the mercy of greater forces. The
leading character is a cottager executedby the victoriousWhites.This naive and
passiveman, having no idea of the political implications of hismodest services
to the local administration, is finally shot due to a misunderstanding, and thus
is ‘drawn into the swelling turmoil of the times’.14 He is an ‘unconscious’ victim
of a revolutionary process that is totally beyond his comprehension. Certainly
there are people like him in all major uprisings, but the characterisation cap-
tures something essential in the Finnish revolution. The revolutionaries were
really drawn into revolution, and when it began they had no clear idea what
to do with the power they obtained. Among the masses, the confusion, lack
of enthusiasm, and irresolution were at least as grave as among the leaders.
In a word, the Finnish revolution was underdetermined: there were no deep
endemic grievances among the masses that would have made them complete
the destruction of the old order spontaneously.15 Sillanpää’s novel may be seen
11 See ibid., pp. 178–9; M.-L. Kunnas 1976, p. 171.
12 Klinge 1972, pp. 105, 108–10;M.-L. Kunnas 1976, pp. 65, 102, 108–9;Hamalainen 1978, pp. 95–
97, 121–2; Sarajas 1962, pp. 135–80.
13 Aya 1979, p. 50.
14 Sillanpää 1938, p. 222.
15 Certainly the action of the Finnishmasses was very far from the spontaneous and autono-
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as characterising a revolution whose participants were seriously at a loss about
how to use the power they had.
In accounting for the White terror, the character of the revolutionary situ-
ation and of the dominant culture also appear important. It is true, of course,
that bloody repression has frequently accompanied the crushing of revolutions
and other upheavals. But the fact that the revolutionary challenge remained
incomprehensible and even insulting to the victors may explain some of the
large-scale and summary killing (and also the continuousmassacre of captured
Russians).16 Ilmari Kianto, the author of a famous novel dealing with the 1906–
1907 political mobilisation in the eastern backwoods (see p. 213), was not alone
when he wrote toward the end of the war: ‘Is it not prejudice or downright
short-sightedness to leave unpunished precisely those who, simply by adding
to their families, strengthen the enemy force? Would it not be a correct tactic
to take some stated percentage of the second sex of the enemy?’ He went on
to say that those who carried out such a work would be ‘creating a great new
Finland, the vigilant representatives of the fatherland and high idealism’.17
2 The Persistence of the Volcanic Model of the Finnish Revolution
The process of disengagement from the original ‘volcanic’model of the Finnish
revolution has been slow and painful, reflecting the continuing difficulty of the
dominant culture to come to grips with the conflict. Today, although the ori-
ginalmodel has practically no advocates, its long shadowmay still be discerned
in the historiography (see p. 176).18 For decades the academic community was
incapable of dealing with the encounter, and it is thus perhaps no wonder
that literaryworks have been instrumental in reinterpreting the revolution and
making it comprehensible for the dominant culture.19 Sillanpää’s novel caught
mous violence James C. Scott argues is characteristic of the peasantmovements that have
instigated rebellions or contributed to the rise of revolutionary situations. See Scott 1976,
pp. 193–203; and Scott 1977, p. 243.
16 See Upton 1980, pp. 311–13.
17 Cited in Upton 1980, p. 314. See also T. Manninen 1982, pp. 157–61.
18 The conception of the war as a combination of an outburst, an insurrection of the misled
against the legal government, and a war for liberation from Russia was widely accepted
among historians as late as the early 1960s (see Stormbom 1963, pp. 207–15). Today histori-
ans stillmayportray the revolution, in the last analysis, as a challenge to ‘legal government’
(Jokipii 1981, p. 48) or to ‘lawfully elected government’ (O. Manninen 1975, p. 471; see also
O. Manninen 1978, p. 229). This perspective is understandable given that the challengers
lost, but it does not seem helpful in analysing a social conflict.
19 This is perhaps particularly true of the period before the 1950s, when the most percept-
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something essential long before any serious professional study.20 It also exerted
some influence, even though it couldnot really breach thebourgeois hegemony
of the time.21 Significantly, the definite fall of the original volcanic model was
effected – four decades later – by another literary work, the second volume of
Väinö Linna’s great three-volume novel Here Underneath the North Star (1960).
In this fresco of the year 1918 in a south-western agrarian community with
a large crofter population, the conflict is crystallised in the vicissitudes of a
crofter’s son, who is an active member of the local workers’ association, a Red
Guard leader, and finally one of the tens of thousands of prisoners in theWhite
camps.
This work so changed the atmosphere that the academic historians of the
1960s and the 1970s were encouraged to study seriously various aspects of the
conflict. Linna’s book was well grounded in historical fact and consciously
‘sociological’.22 Most important was his portrayal of the revolutionaries, not
as misled or misbehaved, but as sensible and responsible people acting reas-
onably in their own interest. In the novel this characterisation added force-
fully to the tragedy of the conflict and served as a distinct departure from the
mainstream of earlier thinking. But Linna also saw the outbreak of the revolu-
tion as a reaction to unbearable circumstances, a release, made possible by
the two subsequent revolutions in Russia, of the forces that had been blocked
during the previous period.23 This perspective seems quite natural in a novel
that details the behaviour and motives of individual human beings in a social
microcosm. And indeed, there were grievances among the landless and the
crofters, grievances that certainly came into the open in the revolution. But
as noted above, this view, when seen from a larger historical perspective, fails
to take into account the institutional context and therefore does not permit an
adequate assessment of the overall significance of the ‘release of tensions’. In
the absence of an army and a police force, even comparatively minor griev-
ances may eventually grow into overpowering claims. Consequently, Linna’s
interpretation, powerful as it was, did not cause historians and other students
to question the very foundations of the volcanic view of the Finnish revolution.
ive analyses of the societal conflicts in twentieth-century Finland were made by writers
rather than historians or social scientists. Sillanpää is only one example.
20 The first serious historical study came out in 1957 (Paasivirta 1957).
21 Rajala 1983, pp. 207–9, 212–14; Paavolainen 1966–1967, 2: 396–7.
22 Stormbom 1963, pp. 230, 271–2.
23 See also ibid., pp. 196, 204.
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3 On the State, the Nation, and Class Balance
After the revolutionwas crushed, the class balance in the country changed rad-
ically. The Communist party was, naturally enough, declared illegal, and there
was no question of the Social Democratic movement acting in a framework
similar to the one that prevailed between 1907 and 1917. The most eloquent
indication of bourgeois domination was the position of the Civil Guard, which
after the war was instituted as a nationwide organisation and maintained over
and above the regular army, allegedly to secure the country against external and
internal threats,24 and from which the Social Democrats were excluded.
Nevertheless, Finland experienced greater institutional continuity in state
structures than practically any other inter-war Eastern or East-Central Euro-
pean state. A new independent state, it had a constitution and a political party
system closely linked with pre-World War I developments, even though its
preservation had been guaranteed by Entente pressure. The republican con-
stitution, confirmed in 1919, had been prepared for the most part in late 1917
in keeping with the constitutional tradition, and it helped to fulfil the bour-
geois objective of a ‘strong governmental power’. The highest executive, the
president, had substantially more prerogatives than in most other contempor-
ary parliamentary political systems.25 Nothing strange was seen in linking the
Civil Guard with the state machinery and in giving it considerable autonomy
in internal matters.
In the inter-war bourgeois perspective, the war was only a tragic interlude in
theunfoldingof thenation. Itwas from this perspective that the victors attemp-
ted to reconstruct the broken national integration, to re-create an inter-class
community bringing all the Finns together.
Efforts to create a strong national Gemeinschaft predominated on the right.
The inspiration came fromFennomania,whichwasmodified in light of prevail-
ing conditions. Peasant values were revived, and a Finland united in culture – a
‘national entity’ – was to be built up and fortified against internal and external
threats. Muchmore than ever before, Fennoman ideas were used to inculcate a
civic religion for the state, and now strict ideological conformity was required.
For example, the ideal world revealed in native folk poetry (particularly the Ka-
levala), so central for the national ideology, was reinterpreted to correspond to
24 See Tervasmäki 1964, pp. 61–71. On the intertwining of internal and external threats in the
postwar period, see Ahti 1984b.
25 Lindman 1968, pp. 331–43, 369–72; Jyränki 1978, pp. 19–21, 24–47. There was a marked
resemblance between the Finnish and the new German constitution.
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the claim for a rigorous martial unity, both outward and inward.26 As in other
upper classes threatened by political upheavals, moral regeneration and the
inculcation of moral virtues were seen to be central, and the church gained
much in importance among the Whites.27 Politically the conception was rep-
resented by the National Coalition party, formed in 1919 from the monarchist
majority of the (Old) Finnish party and the monarchist minority of the Young
Finns, and largely supported by the Finnish-speaking wealthy landowners, the
industrial and commercial elite, the higher bureaucracy, the military, and the
clergy. In the 1920s, this party was the staunchest opponent of the ‘unnational’
working-class movement.
But another view of national integration emerged, stressing a certain degree
of conciliation with the working class. Politically its proponents belonged to
the liberal Progressive party, made up mainly of former Young Finns, and to
the Agrarian Union, which in 1919 became a large party. The sixteen parlia-
mentary seats the Agrarians had in 1916 grew in 1919 to forty-two, and in the
1920s they became the largest bourgeois party (Table 11). During the early pop-
ulist period after 1905, the Agrarians, feeling affinity for the nineteenth-century
national movement, had considered it their task to be the revival and further
development of that movement’s democratic traditions. In the post-1918 situ-
ation, then, they presented the agrarian-national ideology, with the peasants
as its foundation, as the only programme capable of reconciling the two main
challengers of the war. A far-reaching agrarian reform, making landowners of
the crofters and many cottagers, was implemented, largely because of pres-
sure from the Agrarians. Plans for land reform had been prepared before the
outbreak of the revolution, but now it was explicitly presented as a way of for-
tifying the nation and protecting it from further upheavals. For rehabilitating
the rebels the Agrarians and the Progressivists envisioned amnesties and soci-
opolitical reforms.28
The distinction between the two views of national integration is remin-
iscent of the difference between the conservative ideology prevalent among
the agrarian upper classes of Central and East-Central Europe and the popu-
list or peasantist agrarian ideology found in the same areas. In the inter-war
period there was a corresponding difference between the authoritarian and
fascist ideologies.29 But although this distinction may be reasonably applied
to Finland, it was of less importance there than elsewhere. What seems char-
26 See the detailed study of William A.Wilson (1976, esp. pp. 103, 107–11, 115–72).
27 Kena 1979, pp. 66–73; Alapuro 1973a, pp. 37–8.
28 For more detail, see Alapuro 1973a, pp. 24–6, 39–40; Kettunen 1979, pp. 284–94.
29 Ionescu 1969, pp. 99–19; Moore 1966, pp. 448–52; Fischer-Galati 1980.
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table 11 Distribution of seats in Parliament won in selected Finnish general elections,
1919–1933
Parties 1919 1927 1929 1930 1933
Social Democratic party 80 60 59 66 78
Socialist Workers’ partya – 20 23 – –
Agrarian Union 42 52 60 59 53
National Coalition party 28 34 28 42 18
People’s Patriotic Movement – – – – 14
National Progress party 26 10 7 11 11
Swedish People’s party 22 24 23 21 21
Others 2 0 0 1 5
Total 200 200 200 200 200
National turnout 67.1% 55.8% 55.6% 65.9% 62.2%
a Communists and left-wing socialists.
Sources: Élections pour la diète en 1919 1920, 27; Élections pour la diète en
1929 1930, 25; Élections au parlement de Finlande en 1933 1934, 7, 28
acteristic, rather, is a more-or-less united political culture – arguably a more
unified bourgeois hegemony than in other countries influenced by the col-
lapse of a multinational empire. A relatively united nationalistic culture had
arisen by the first decades of the twentieth century, and it was solidified by the
revolutionary experience and concomitant fear of a new Soviet state. The char-
acter of the landed class provided a solid basis for such unity. No clear-cut lines
differentiated the wealthy peasants from the less prosperous ones, and when
the Agrarians won over conservative-voting farmers in the 1920s, the party’s
populist image was obliterated, showing that no wide gap separated the two
nationalist programmes. Both exalted the independent peasantry and peasant
virtues.
The most revealing sign of the bourgeois consensus is certainly the Civil
Guard. Unlike other bourgeois paramilitary organisations in inter-war Europe,
the Guard was unanimously supported by all bourgeois parties, whether
Finnish or Swedish. Its potential in a crisis can be seen from the fact that
between 80,000 and 100,000 armed men served in the Civil Guard, as com-
pared with some 25,000 to 30,000 in the army.
Another feature of the consensus is the overwhelming domination of a
single organisation, the nationalist Academic Karelia Society (AKS), among the
Finnish-speaking students. No other student movement could seriously com-
pete with this group, and both nationalist views on integration, with some
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degree of tension between them, flourished in the AKS. True, the students cam-
paigned against the use of Swedish by the upper strata and thereby irritated
the bourgeois front, but in this effort they gradually became isolated. Even
the Agrarians followed them only half-heartedly, not to speak of the Coalition
party.30Moreover, the position of the Swedish languagewas guaranteed in both
the constitution and language acts in a manner satisfactory to the Swedish-
speakers.
Equally important for the political atmosphere was the attitude of the
working-classmovement.The SocialDemocratswere allowed to act, butwithin
limits set by the dominant bourgeoisie. The very existence of the Civil Guard
definedwhat was ‘reasonable’ political activity. The Social Democrats accepted
these basic conditions and backed the centrist line, avoiding any encounters
that would have brought the Centre closer to the right. They defended and
worked for the consolidation of representative political structures, following
a consistent policy of ‘class peace’. Significantly, in 1919 the constitution of the
new, and independent, republic had granted the Social Democrats access to the
polity, and not only at the national level but now also at the local level.31
Social Democratic compliance may be seen most concretely in the party’s
overwhelming concentration on political activity. This was, of course, consist-
ent with the movement’s earlier orientation, and therefore it is no surprise
that the Social Democrats suffered a loss of key trade union positions to the
Communists, who for their part had great difficulties in the political arena (see
Table 11). Basically, however, the limits to the Socialists’ trade union activity
were imposed by the existing order. In inter-war Finland employers had no
need to accept collective agreements in the labour market, and they never
did. A strike-breaking organisation was active and effective throughout the
1920s. Individual voting actswere recognised, but collective action in the labour
market was not. The Social Democrats’ role in labour struggles thus remained
minor, and ultimately, in 1929–30, they founded a new, purely Social Demo-
cratic trade union organisations.32
30 Rintala 1972; Alapuro 1973b, pp. 116–19, 124–7.
31 Kettunen 1979, pp. 328–51; Rintala 1969, pp. 55–6, 63–4 (the term class peace is from Rint-
ala); Kettunen 1980a, pp. 131–43.
32 Kettunen 1979, pp. 154–6, 203–17, 279, 353–75, 412–13, 465–85. The Social Democrats
formed a minority government in 1926. Its policies were far from socialist, and the Com-
munists found no difficulty in attacking it. Interestingly, however, it was widely supported
by the workers; what counted were not real achievements or the lack of them but the
apparent recognition of a certain decency in the working class, reflected in the fact that
its party had been accepted as a governmental party (Kettunen 1979, pp. 323–6, 343).
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The party’s active involvement in parliamentary action by no means pre-
cluded the emergence of a ‘camp mentality’ among the workers: political and
economic second-class citizenshipwas accompanied by cultural isolation.This
isolation was reflected in an organisational network parallel to the bourgeois
one. In the 1920s the workers not only voted for their own parties, but they also
played, read, sung, participated in sports, shopped, and deposited their savings
primarily in their own organisations and enterprises. The deep and pervasive
concentration of popular activities around the workers’ halls on the one hand
and the civil guardhalls on the other, so characteristic of local life in this period,
reflects this polarisation better than anything else. The workers also definitely
drew away from the church’s sphere of influence.33
All in all, despite the revolution and its suppression, Finland had preserved
the political system instituted in 1906, fortified now with a domestic presid-
ent and a government. The Social Democrats could act, and were willing to
act, within the prevailing system, and on the bourgeois side the only distinct-
ively anti-parliamentary group, with roots in the counterrevolution of 1918–19,
was quite small. Political consensus on fundamental questions ran from the
Agrarians all the way throughmost of the right. In other words, the reactionary
tendency was of little importance. This unanimity meant, however, that the
entire bourgeois front was strongly anti-socialist – thanks to the fact that its
ideological point of departure was a national heritage fromwhich the working
class was cut off and into which the traumatic experience of 1917–18 had been
incorporated.
4 The LapuaMovement, 1930–2
The post-revolutionary quest for national integration climaxed in a Finnish
variant of fascism, which, as in many other European countries, gained a real
foothold during the Great Depression. The so-called Lapua movement greatly
affected politics and nearly dominated the country in 1930,more than a decade
after the abortive revolution. Itwas nationalist and anti-Russian in the extreme,
held the party-based political system in contempt, succeeded in having all pub-
lic activities by Communists – understood in a very diffuse sense – banned,
and watched over the final disintegration of the trade union movement. After
crushing the Communists, themovement attacked the Social Democrats, envi-
33 Suonoja 1968, pp. 59–60; Kena 1979, pp. 103–4, 121–3; Hentilä 1982, pp. 68, 70, 81, 83; Sep-
pänen 1972, pp. 165–7, 171; Kettunen 1984, p. 38.
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sioning a reduction of political rights that would guarantee bourgeois suprem-
acy in politics. At times, a seizure of power was not out of the question; the
most serious threat appears to have been in the summer of 1930.34 In 1932, the
movement attempted a coup d’état. Its failure led to the foundation of a polit-
ical party, the People’s Patriotic Movement, which held from eight to fourteen
parliamentary seats from 1933 until WorldWar II (see Table 11).
The Communists had succeeded in maintaining a presence in parliament
and local politics under various labels throughout most of the 1920s (Table 11),
and in the late 1920s real and putative Communist activity led to a num-
ber of strikes. Meanwhile, the bourgeois parties were able to form only weak
minority governments, demonstrating the deficiencies of the parliamentary
system. In these ominous conditions, reminiscent of other pre-fascist situ-
ations, the Lapuamovement emerged at the end of 1929, with anti-communist
riots serving as its starting signal.35 Themovement received its strongest imme-
diate support from the Coalition party, but it found considerable sympathy
in the political centre as well. From the end of 1929, the government, com-
posed mainly of Agrarians, gave in to the Lapua movement constantly. Com-
munists and those considered to be Communists were denied the freedom
to form associations, and the government suppressed their publications after
riots and other forms of pressure. In the summer and early autumn a fairly
organised wave of terrorist acts, notably abductions, was undertaken, in which
the police connived. The terrorists were civil guards, but as an organisation
the Civil Guard itself stood aloof. Three people were killed. The total num-
ber of abductions and assaults rose to 254, with four-fifths of the victims being
Communists (actual or alleged), the rest being Social Democrats. Among those
abducted were members of local government bodies, party branches, public
agencies, trade unions, newspaper staffs, candidates for andmembers of Parlia-
ment (including the deputy speaker), and even the country’s first president.36
Through abductions and other pressure, the movement forced the replace-
ment of the centrist government by a definitely rightist one in early July 1930,
backing Svinhufvud as the new prime minister. Although he had been com-
pelled to step aside in 1918, Svinhufvud nonetheless had enormous prestige as
a symbol of victoriousWhite Finland. He offered representatives of the Lapua
movement portfolios in the government, but because of internal dissension
its members refused. The cabinet arranged for the arrest of the Communist
34 Hyvämäki 1977, p. 135; Siltala 1985, p. 498.
35 Actually, at that time the Communist party was nearly paralysed.
36 Siltala 1985, pt. 1, and pp. 319–33, 357–67; Rintala 1962, pp. 167, 174–5.
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deputies, and all organised activity considered to be Communist was system-
atically put down. These measures were later confirmed with anti-Communist
laws, which were effected by ensuring a sufficiently large non-socialist major-
ity in Parliament through new elections, held under heavy pressure from the
Lapua movement. Communists and related groups were hindered in running
for office.37
The culmination of this activity was reached in the pre-election period. In
July 1930, 12,000 Lapua movement members, mainly farmers, marched on the
capital with their demands, recalling the Whites’ victory parade in 1918.38 The
Peasants’March, as it was called, was carried out under the auspices of the Civil
Guard, and Mannerheim as well as Prime Minister Svinhufvud and the presid-
ent, the Agrarian Relander, were present at the main demonstration.
After the elections and confirmationof the anti-Communist laws, conservat-
ive support for the movement began to decline. The movement turned against
the Social Democrats, calling for the extermination of every form of ‘Marxism’
in Finland. Although the movement had elevated Svinhufvud to the premier-
ship as its ownman, friction arose almost immediately after he assumed office.
Moredistinct differences came to the surface in 1931whenSvinhufvudwas elec-
tedpresident as aCoalitionparty candidate.Themovement, tobe sure, strongly
supported him during the electoral campaign; it is also evident that the Civil
Guard exercised pressure on members of the electoral college, and especially
on the Agrarian electors, before the final vote.39
The differences became irreconcilable, however, at the time of the so-called
Mäntsälä revolt, which led to the dissolution of the Lapua movement, at least
in its original form. In the spring of 1932 themovement’s leadership lent its sup-
port to a revolt inMäntsälä, a community near the capital, attempting to secure
the backing of the civil guards there.40 Among its demands was a call for the
government’s resignation and the establishment of a new, ‘apolitical’, ‘patriotic’
government. The aim was apparently to make Mannerheim head of state and
to appoint a conservative industrialist – a former general and a member of the
Lapua movement leadership – as prime minister. Numerous Coalition party
leaders, a large portion of the Civil Guard leadership, including its commander,
and many officers of the armed forces rallied to the movement’s cause.
Thanks to resistance personified notably by Svinhufvud and the commander
in chief of the army, the Lapua movement failed, however. At the crucial
37 Siltala 1985, pp. 112, 144–86.
38 Siltala 1985, p. 122.
39 Rintala 1962, pp. 177, 189; Kalela 1976, p. 117.
40 On the Mäntsälä revolt, see Rintala 1962, pp. 191–4.
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moment it could not mobilise the rank and file of the local civil guards, in
which rural elements constituted a clear majority; the commercial and indus-
trial elite had withdrawnmuch of its initial support for themovement; and the
non-conservative bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats had, of course,
increasingly opposed the movement since late 1930.41
The mass following of the movement was centred mainly in the peasantry
and certain middle-class groups. From the beginning it was considered to be
basically a peasantmovement: a rising against a conception of communist doc-
trine that damned everything the religious and patriotic peasants held sacred.
As case studies consistently show, the big andmiddle-sized farms provided the
main rural backing.42 The conservative Coalition party’s strong support for the
movement certainly resulted at least in part from the attitude of the large farm-
ers. Among the Agrarians, however, small farmers appear not to have become
involved.43 Ideological features point in the same direction. In defending ‘old
values’44 themovement wasmore conservative thanmost other fascist groups.
Characteristically, the archbishop publicly adopted a favourable attitude to the
movement in its initial phase.The absenceof anti-capitalist demands in its pro-
clamations, too, is rather exceptional. Although the movement was based on a
peasant Weltanschauung that was alien to capitalism, it did not focus on the
workings or threats of the capitalist system; rather, it stressed almost solely the
manifestations of capitalism in class struggle. The Lapuamovement felt that its
main task was the continuation of the ‘war for freedom’ against the Commun-
ists, Social Democrats, and even the Russians. Its rhetoric repeated the most
extreme images of 1918White propaganda,45 capped by its two main symbolic
figures, Svinhufvud and Mannerheim, the two most prominent White leaders
of 1918.
Moreover, although themovementwas supported in rural areas nationwide,
it had two clear-cut regional strongholds, and these were not small-farmer
regions. It was in the southernOstrobothnian commune of Lapua that the anti-
Communist riots took place in 1929. In this province peasantist moral indigna-
tion, springing from threats to a way of life, reappeared forcefully. As stated
above, there was a marked contrast between the way of life here and in other
41 Upton 1968, pp. 209–10; Siltala 1985, pp. 143, 187–97.
42 E.g., Siltala 1984, pp. 22–4; Nieminen 1981, pp. 159–64.
43 Only in the county of Viipuri was there distinct small-farmer Agrarian support for the
movement. But there the reaction was both weaker and less extreme than in Ostroboth-
nia and the south-west. See Siltala 1984, pp. 23–6.
44 Hyvämäki 1977, p. 134.
45 Siltala 1985, pp. 443–9, 455–69.
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regions. The provincial character of various revivalist and xenophobic mani-
festations of themovement is known: it was as if Ostrobothnia wanted tomake
it clear that when Lapua speaks, all of Finland must listen.46 The second bas-
tion of support was in the south-west,47 the most prosperous farming region.
The reasons why agrarian support came mainly from large- and medium-
scale farmers can presumably be traced back to the abortive revolution. These
groups had provided the backbone of the ‘White peasant army’. Moreover, the
movement’s strongholds corresponded to the two regions where the farmers
had beenmost involved in thewar as enemies of the revolution or subject to its
rule (seeTable 10, p. 120). The completion of the ‘war for freedom’was an essen-
tial part of the movement’s ideology, and the Coalition and Agrarian parties
had played a central part in the subsequent national integration. But appar-
ently a third ingredientwas needed aswell: theGreatDepression.This crisis did
not merely affect farmers in general, but it also first hit large and middle-sized
farms, which experienced a decline in forestry income as early as 1928. Soon
grain prices declined, aggravating the problems and leading to a great number
of compulsory auctions at the turn of the decade.48
There is also evidence that the grievances of the small farmers were not
channelled through the Lapua movement during the Depression. This group
was hit by economic malaise later than others, for the forest work on which
they so heavily depended was not decisively reduced until the early 1930s.
Only subsequently were small farms sold at auction in large numbers. It was
among these cultivators that the so-called Depression movements erupted in
the winter of 1931, concentrated in regions where small farmers had, to a larger
extent than elsewhere, cleared land for cultivation, gone into debt, and been
forced to give up their farms. In contrast to the Lapuamovement, some of these
amorphous and dispersed eruptions had distinct anti-capitalist features.49 In
the 1933 elections various small parties linked with Depression movements
won five seats in Parliament (Table 11). These movements had helped the
Agrarian Union to dissociate itself from the Lapua movement, which con-
sequently came more under the influence of the Coalition party.50
Various middle-class groups in liberal professions, commerce, and admin-
istration also provided support for the Lapua movement. It is indicative that
46 See, e.g., Rintala 1962, pp. 165, 169, 175–176.
47 Siltala 1984, p. 22.
48 P. Kuusterä 1979, pp. 3, 108–13.
49 P. Kuusterä 1979, pp. 4, 19–38, 108, 119, 132–6, Table 13 (appendix); Lackman 1985, pp. 209–
25, 284–9.
50 Kalela 1976, p. 120.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
194 chapter 10
not only the Coalition party but also the more definitely middle-class Progress
party went along with the Lapua movement in its initial phase. The role of the
university-educated was very conspicuous. They were well represented among
the organisers and supporters of the abductions, and they dominated the lead-
ing organs of the movement. A third of the members of the central council
and of the district boards came from professional and governmental groups
with higher education; together with people from the managerial and pro-
prietary classes, they constituted a clear majority. It is no wonder, then, that
the courts were reluctant to sentence the terrorists.51 Students and young aca-
demics, too, notably the Academic Karelia Society, the dominant organisation
among Finnish-speaking students and the young educated class –were import-
ant supporters of the Lapua movement.52
The attitude of the educated middle classes differed from that of the peas-
ants in one important respect, however. Rural support was based on a deep
anti-communism, which was exacerbated by the Depression, and it declined
soon after the elimination of the Communists from public life. But after mass
support waned – and with Hitler’s rise to power – fascism continued to attract
the educated middle classes. In this, the permanent quest for national integ-
ration appears pivotal. The recovery of national integrity, lost in 1918, had
been sought by the AKS throughout the 1920s. The Lapua movement seemed
to provide an opportunity to restore solidarity between the people and the
national educated class. Correspondingly, the new party, the People’s Patriotic
Movement (Isänmaallinen kansanliike, or IKL), which considered itself to be
the heir of the Lapua movement, had a strong academic hue in its upper ech-
elons. Its ideology, moreover, was more overtly fascist than that of the Lapua
movement, with minor direct borrowings from German and Italian fascism.53
5 TheMass Movement and the Dominant Classes in Finnish Fascism
As I have described it, the Lapuamovementwas relatedmainly to the state and
the various social classes, which are of the greatest relevance when assessing
the role of fascism in Finnish state-making and when comparing it to fascist
phenomena in other countries. The crucial problem is the relation of the fas-
cist movement to authoritarian or conservative forces, or, in slightly different
51 Siltala 1984, pp. 22, 30; Siltala 1985, pp. 403–19; Alapuro 1973a, p. 223.
52 Alapuro 1973b, pp. 128–9.
53 Alapuro 1973a, pp. 53–4, 125–36, 144–6; Rintala 1963, pp. 308–10; Heinonen 1980, pp. 693–4.
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terms, the role of the dominant classes in the mass movement. Commonly,
the former exploited the latter, but the two are generally more or less distinct.
Fascism was not conservatism so much as ‘an attempt to make reaction and
conservatism popular and plebeian’, as BarringtonMoore puts it.54 Or, in Rein-
hardKühnl’swords: ‘In order for the coupd’état tohave a chance tomaterialize,
a supply, i.e., a fascist mass movement created by socio-economic crisis, must
bemet by a corresponding demand, i.e., the hope by the ruling class for a fascist
power system’.55 Kühnl’s remark brings to mind Germany in particular, where
the dominant classes came to look on fascism as a potentially valuable ally
against the workers only after it had proved its strength, its right to be taken
seriously.
In characterisations of this kind, the relative autonomy of the fascist mass
movement is stressed. Its specific character may be seen in its ideology, which
to some extent differed from the ideology of the dominant classes, even if the
two often had common roots.56 It is also known that the fascist movements
drew their main support from the middle classes and, in the countryside, from
the small farmers – that is, from outside both the working-class parties and the
traditional conservative parties.
What was the relation between the mass movement and the dominant
classes in Finland? Although it was supported by middle-sized farmers and
to some extent by the middle classes, the Lapua movement was from the very
beginning also a movement of the conservatives, including the large farmers.
As time passed, the conservative or reactionary character of the movement
became increasingly evident. And what is more, the small farmers, the back-
bone of rural fascism in a number of other countries, remained outside the
movement, expressing their dissatisfactions through other channels.
It is characteristic of the phenomenon that the Lapua movement was not a
political party and that its leadership remained vague. Rather, it was a loosely
organised pressure group or faction within several parties, notably the Coali-
tion party and, to a lesser extent, the Agrarian Union. The Swedish People’s
party, too, gave the movement considerable support. Differences in the atti-
tudes of the bourgeois parties began to crystallise only in the course of time:
in the initial stages acceptance and even enthusiasmwere widespread, though
not universal, in all of them. Finnish fascism assumed a more distinct middle-
class character only aftermass support hadpetered out. The IKL bore the stamp
54 Moore 1966, p. 447.
55 Kühnl 1971, p. 103.
56 Kühnl 1971, pp. 84–99; Moore 1966, 448–52.
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of the middle class, even if most of its adherents were former conservative
voters.57 It also cooperated closely with the Coalition party up until the latter
half of the 1930s.
What all this means is that in Finland, the relation between the fascist mass
movement and the dominant classes was intimate from the very beginning. In
its initial stage the Lapuamovementwas basically a general bourgeois reaction,
though whether the mass movement arose spontaneously or was instigated by
the dominant classes has been a subject of controversy.58 In the present per-
spective this question is not very relevant. The rise of the mass movement and
the dominant classes’ need for it were closely interconnected. The view of fas-
cism as an agent called in to restore order only after it had proved its right to
be taken seriously is not accurate in the Finnish case.
The connection seems to result from the character of the bourgeois front
after the abortive revolution. As stated above, a united, nationalistic polit-
ical culture existed, despite different national integration strategies. On the
one hand this unity implied that there was considerable rightist potential in
the bourgeois groups, all prone to react strongly to any threat against central
national values. On the other hand, noting the strength and cultural unity of
the bourgeois front is merely another way of indicating the absence of strong
and salient reactionary forces in the bourgeoisie. In this situation, the emer-
gence of an extensive fascist-typemovement was easy, but it was therefore also
destined to remain rather shallow, without a distinct profile of its own. It was,
as has been said, ‘the political extension of the civil guard ethos’.59
In the end, no German- or Italian-type basis for a fascist takeover existed in
Finland. In Germany and Italy, World War I had left the capitalists in control
of the economy but at the same time accorded the working class a share of the
political power and the right to organise and agitate for its own ends. In Finland
rather the contrarywas true: theworking class had been defeated in 1918.When
the Lapuamovement eliminated the Communists in 1930, moreover, it thereby
emasculated the trade union movement, which in the 1920s had been fairly
active.60 During the Depression workers’ wages fell in Finland more than in
Scandinavia, mainly because of trade union weakness: in themid-1930s, wages
57 In the general elections of 1933, the Coalition party and the IKL formed party alliances in
almost all constituencies. Small towns were the most typical IKL strongholds (Djupsund
and Karvonen 1984, pp. 51–4, 79–81).
58 SeeWahlbäck 1967, pp. 107–10.
59 Siltala 1985, p. 497.
60 The final blow against the trade union movement was preceded by a deep internal crisis
in 1929, resulting from conflict between the Communists and the Social Democrats. See
Kettunen 1979, pp. 309–11, 453–73.
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were generally less than half what they were in Sweden or England.61 Thus
the interests of industry were very well taken care of by the existing political
and economic system. The export industry in particular maintained its com-
petitiveness, escaping theDepression comparatively unscathed, and economic
growth in the inter-war period was very rapid.62 The conflicts in the economy,
with the accompanying turmoil in the labourmarket and in society as a whole,
never polarised the population in Finland as they did in Germany, where the
dominant classes felt even more urgently the need to find an agent to restore
order.
The stand of the peasantry was at least as important. Although peasants
responded enthusiastically to the Lapua movement, they soon began to disso-
ciate themselves from it. For one thing, the early proscription of the Commun-
ists satisfied most of the peasants’ demands, and the Depression movements
caused the Agrarians to withdraw their support. In 1932, too, the Depression
began to abate. Finally, the Agrarian Union showed no sympathy for themove-
ment’s agitation against the Social Democrats, who, in the centrist view,were to
be reintegrated in the national body and who in the 1920s had confirmed their
non-radical orientation. In this respect the Finnish Social Democrats differed
greatly from certain brother parties, which responded to the rise of fascism
with a revolutionary counter-mobilisation.63 Indeed, the exclusionof the Social
Democrats would have unbalanced the political system to the advantage of the
right, a development that would have been unacceptable to the centrists.
The solid position of the independent peasantry and their party in the state
and society was largely responsible for this pattern of events.64 To a very large
extent, both the rise and fall of the Lapua movement were determined by the
peasantry – as the failure of themovement’s leadership tomobilise the peasant
rank and file of the civil guards during the Mäntsälä revolt indicates: the peas-
antry, influenced by the preceding Agrarian propaganda, obeyed Svinhufvud’s
exhortation to stay at home. The fear generated by the attempted revolution,
combined with the proximity of the consolidating Soviet state, laid the ground
for an extensive fascist-type movement, but the weak position of the working
class, the strong role of the executive, a political system that had been firmly
anchored in social groups since 1906, and, ultimately, the Scandinavian social
structure placed constraints on it.
61 Knoellinger 1960, p. 85.
62 Pollard 1981, p. 289; Raumolin 1981, pp. 3–5.
63 Linz 1978, pp. 162–7, 178; Simon 1978, pp. 104–6.
64 Cf. Ahti 1984b, pp. 35–7.
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chapter 11
Eastern European Revolutionary Movements
By the timeWorldWar I broke out, various political organisations existed in the
smaller Eastern European polities and theminority regions, but nowhere had a
well-organised revolutionary party emerged in the countryside, as such parties
didprior to anumberof anti-colonial revolutions. Certainlynoneof these smal-
ler polities or nationally distinct regions was predestined to social revolution
in the following years. But revolutions did occur in some of them between 1917
and 1919, and in nearly all other cases such a conflict seemed possible at one
time or another.
In order to determine the factors that account for these challenges, all of the
smaller Eastern European polities should, at least in principle, be taken into
account. In this chapter, the nature of the conflicts will be discussed in terms
of the three-part perspective utilised above: (agrarian) class relations, political
dependence, and organised challengers as expressions of national and class
integration.
Nearly everywhere a subordinate position in the capitalist world-economy
and increased demographic pressure had transformed traditional agrarian
class relations and created an incipient industrial proletariat. In some cases
local upper classes were closely tied to the metropole culturally or economic-
ally; in other cases the ties were looser. Regions also varied markedly in the
character of political dependence. A notable transition occurred, of course,
in the Ottoman Empire, which was forced to abandon its control by 1914.
Moreover, the degree of local autonomy varied considerably within each
empire as well. These two conditions shaped the third factor, the character of
popular political organisation before the world war.
As in the case of Finland, a fourth, short-termcondition shouldbe added: the
mode and timing of the collapse of themother empire, combined with the dir-
ect pressure of war on the local structures of power. The three long-term factors
determined the nature of the challenge on the eve of the final breakdown of
themetropole, whereas the long- and short-term factors together affected both
the ability of the challengers to mobilise the masses after 1917 and the way the
existing local authority disintegrated.
This perspective makes it easier to identify the major differences between
the European cases and the majority of the colonial cases and to situate Fin-
land among the Eastern European dependent nationalities.
Between 1830 and 1918, twelve nationally distinct independent states
emerged in Eastern Europe as Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman
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Empire disintegrated: Finland (1917), Estonia (1918), Latvia (1918), Lithuania
(1918), Poland (1918), Czechoslovakia (1918), Hungary (1918), Romania (1878),
Bulgaria (1908), Yugoslavia (1918), Albania (1913), and Greece (1830). All these
cases cannot be examined here, not even all the so-called successor states, cre-
ated or re-created at the end of the war. Presumably the most relevant cases
for comparison are two other cases of autonomist nationalism in the Russian
Empire:1 the neighbouring Baltic Provinces, soon to be Estonia and Latvia. The
rudimentary polities of these regions, too, were directly affected by the revolu-
tion of 1905 as well as by the February and October revolutions.
In the Habsburg Empire dismemberment brought about a revolution in
Hungary2 and, together with substantial help from the labour movement, the
birth of the Czechoslovak state. In the Balkans the war eliminated the vestiges
of the Ottoman period and led to a major territorial expansion in Romania, a
kind of peasant revolution in Bulgaria, and the expansion of Serbia in the new
state of Yugoslavia. Yet no outright social revolution occurred in the Balkans,
despite some critical moments. The same holds for Poland, which had been
divided among three empires.
Finally, inter-war fascism in Eastern Europe bears strong marks of local
social structures, of problems created by the reformation of political systems
afterWorldWar I, and of the memories of revolutionary unrest in 1917–20. The
rapid re-establishment of traditional elites and economic dependence on the
more developed countries of Western Europe appear to be key factors influen-
cing the Eastern variant of fascism.
1 National Movements in the Baltic Provinces
Three conditions that paved the way for the steady advancement of Finnish
nationalism were mentioned in Chapter 5. First, Finland was an established,
separate political unit, whose distinctiveness was consolidated in the course
of the nineteenth century. Second, its upper classes had adopted neither the
native Finnish nor the metropolitan Russian culture but rather the Swedish
language and culture; therefore, external political domination on the one hand
1 Orridge andWilliams 1982, p. 21. Despite a revolutionary situation in 1918–19, I decided to omit
the other Baltic territories, or the Lithuanian-speaking areas, from this discussion because
they were occupied by the Germans in 1915–18. Besides, they did not have a separate political
structure even to the degree the Baltic Provinces had.
2 No other revolutionary situations occurred elsewhere in East-Central Europe, except the
short-lived Slovak Socialist Republic created by the Hungarian revolution.
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and internal cultural and economic domination on the other were not super-
imposed on one another. Third, because a non-feudal class structure with a
large, strong indigenous peasantry had been consolidated during the Swedish
period, the dominant position of Finland’s upper classeswas not based primar-
ily on landownership. Baltic deviations from this pattern seem to explainmany
of the differences between the Estonian and Latvian national movements and
the Finnish movement. In the former, the first and third conditions were not
fulfilled; only the second one was. But because the three conditions interacted,
even this seeming similarity had different consequences in the two cases.
In the three Baltic Provinces of Estland, Livland, and Kurland, populated
by Estonians and Latvians (see Map 10),3 noble landownership was the most
extensive, and capitalist development in agriculture the most intensive, in all
of European Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century the average size
of estates in the gubernii of Estland and Livland was 2,677 and 3,232 desiatinas
(one desiatina being the equivalent of 2.7 acres), respectively, whereas the cor-
responding figure for EuropeanRussia as awholewas 496desiatinas.4Although
members of the estate-owning German nobility were less than one percent of
the agrarian population, they owned about half the available land.5 To keep the
labour force in place large tracts were leased to the peasantry, especially after
internal passport reforms in the 1860s made it easy for peasants to migrate to
the cities and to the Russian interior. Money rent predominated, but labour
rent and other feudal obligations survived until the early 1900s.6
Besides tenant farmers and cottagers, the huge estates needed many agrar-
ian wageworkers. These workers constituted one-quarter of the local labour
force, by far the largest proportion of any workforce in European Russia.7 Thus
in the Baltic Provinces the so-called Prussian way to capitalism in agriculture
had progressed further than anywhere else in the empire. On one side there
was a conservative capitalist Junker-type class, on the other a growing class
of agrarian wageworkers. Commercialisation, however, occurred more slowly
3 Lettgallia was also a Latvian-speaking region, but the elites were Russian and Polish and the
villages were closer to the Russian type than were those in the Baltic Provinces.
4 Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966, 351–2.
5 In the Estonian-speaking areas, estate owners and their family members accounted for 0.7
percent of the total agrarian population in 1916 (Siilivask 1975, p. 69); according to Koval’-
chenko and Borodkin (1979, p. 87), noble lands accounted for 49 percent of total lands at the
turn of the century. Local Estonian and Latvian historians give somewhat higher percentages,
often including state and church properties (Saat and Siilivask 1977, p. 27; Istoriia Estonskoi
SSR 1966, pp. 351–2; Draudin 1959, p. 21).
6 Anfimov 1969, pp. 175–6; Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966, pp. 69–80, 352–3, 361; Vilks 1962, pp. 83–7.
7 Koval’chenko and Borodkin 1979, p. 87; Siilivask 1975, p. 65.
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map 10 The Baltic Provinces (Estland, Livland, Kurland) and the border between Estonia
and Latvia after 1917
than in Germany, and traditional methods of exploitation – of squeezing sur-
plus out of the peasantry – lingered, despite the rapid expansion of new, capit-
alist ones. As production intensified, the Baltic barons sought tomaintain their
position by continuing to impose various traditional obligations and by using
strongpoliticalmethods to keep the labour force on the land. In aword, ‘labour-
repressive’ trends toward commercial agriculture dominated. These were guar-
anteed by the Russian state, which was actually, to use Barrington Moore’s ter-
minology, an agrarian bureaucracy. The estate owners depended on the central
authority for the extraction of the peasant surplus.8
8 Koval’chenko and Borodkin 1979, pp. 78, 86–91; Anfimov 1969, pp. 175–6, 360–81; Saat and
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The Germans came to dominate Baltic society through the agreements they
had concluded with representatives of Peter the Great at the beginning of the
eighteenth century and which they were able tomaintain in essence until 1917.
In annexing the former Swedish provinces, the emperor had granted them
extensive self-rule, thereby guaranteeing the rights and privileges of the Ger-
man nobles and burghers – an expedient that assured upper-class cooperation,
exactly as it would in Finland one century later with the Swedish-speaking
upper classes. The agreements guaranteed the nobles an oligarchic system of
government, the German judicial system, the use of German as the official lan-
guage, and control over the church, which was Evangelical-Lutheran. In each
of the Baltic Provinces, the Landtag, or the assembly of the province’s nobil-
ity, functioned as the highest administrative organ. Local government was also
in German hands – in the cities through guilds and councils, and in the coun-
tryside through parishes led by German pastors. Much like Finland, then, the
Baltic Provinces were in the interface between two established states: they had
an alien upper class whose position was first guaranteed by the Swedish crown
and then by the Russian autocracy.9
The German estate owners may have dominated the capitalist transforma-
tion,10 but commercialisationoccurred in another formaswell, as the landown-
ing peasantry increased in importance. In the 1810s the Baltic serfs had been
formally emancipated, and during the 1850s and 1860s the Estonians and the
Latvians hadobtained the right to purchase land. By 1900 an independent peas-
ant class had grown up, with a smallGrossbauer stratum at its top. The progress
this class made may be seen in the rapid development of a network of eco-
nomic and professional organisations in the early decades of the twentieth
century.11
A conflict existed, then, between theGerman landlords and the largemasses
of landless labourers and poor tenants. Hunger for land was common among
the latter: the Baltic countryside was ‘bound by semi-feudal relationships and
suffering from the dearth of land’.12 Additionally, a tension developed between
the estate owners and the new indigenous peasant proprietors, who were
encumberedwithmortgage payments. The peasant landowners felt the weight
of the former group’s privileges and increasingly challenged its authority. The
Siilivask 1977, p. 26; Moore 1966, pp. 420, 434, 459, 473, 478; Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966,
pp. 69–80, 352–3; Draudin 1959, pp. 7, 16–17, 31–5.
9 Haltzel 1981, pp. 112–14. Kurland, however, was taken from Poland (in 1795).
10 See Koval’chenko and Borodkin 1979, p. 89.
11 Kahk 1982, pp. 83–104; Kahk and Vassar 1970; Rosenberg 1985; Loit 1985, pp. 64–7.
12 Saat and Siilivask 1977, p. 26.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
206 chapter 11
prevailing order had lost the support of the upper crust of the peasantry, which
was emancipating and organising itself. As BarringtonMooremaintains, this is
one of the greatest dangers for an ancien régime.13
The landless and the poor peasants had ties with the growing industrial
working class. After a period of very rapid growth at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the Baltic Provinces were among the leading industrialised and
urbanised regions of the Russian Empire and a central way-station in com-
merce with Western countries. Thanks to the region’s position as an interface
between the West and the interior of Russia, much of the empire’s modern,
foreign-dominated industry, ‘implanted ready-made from abroad’,14 was loc-
ated there, producing for the internal Russian market. The Baltic Provinces
were thus part of Russia in a much stricter sense than was Finland, not only
politically but also economically.15 Riga, the capital of Livland, specialised
in engineering and metallurgy. With 530,000 inhabitants in 1914, it was the
fifth largest city of the Russian Empire, and its industrial proletariat was con-
centrated in large mills and factories. The situation was analogous in Reval,
although on a smaller scale. The Kreenholm cottonmill in Narvawas reputedly
the largest in the world. The labour force required by the swelling industrial
centres was recruited above all from among the landless and poor peasantry.
In Reval, for example, two-thirds of the population in 1897 had been born else-
where, with nearly 40 percent coming from the rest of the guberniia of Est-
land.16
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an indigenous bour-
geoisie emerged, made up of merchants, minor officials, artisans, and a pro-
fessional middle class of teachers, lawyers, and physicians. The clergy did not
figure prominently in the formation of the native middle class owing to the
Germans’ hold on the church.17
All in all, late nineteenth-century capitalist development created various
groups of Estonian- or Latvian-speakers who were increasingly opposed to the
existing system of (German) domination: in the middle and upper echelons
of society, the peasant proprietors, the urban and rural bourgeoisie, and the
middle classeswere obvious challengers. At the same time, the industrial work-
13 Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966, pp. 71–2, 83, 362–4; Draudin 1959, pp. 16–17, 25; Balevits 1962,
pp. 171–3, 177, 196–7; Moore 1966, p. 474.
14 Pollard 1981, p. 240.
15 See Karma and Köörna 1977, pp. 50–62.
16 Vilks 1962; Karma 1963, pp. 110–20, 335–47; Pullat 1976, p. 53; Schram 1957, pp. 55–60; Pol-
lard 1981, pp. 240–1.
17 Kruus 1935, pp. 131, 179–81; Plakans 1981, pp. 248–9; Jansen 1985, pp. 48–9.
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ing class, drawn primarily from the lowest strata of the peasantry, grew rapidly
and came to be concentrated in a few large centres. And of great importance,
all the native groups were highly literate.
The class structure here differed fundamentally from that in Finland. In
the nineteenth century both Finnish and Baltic societies were predominantly
agrarian, but in Finland the prospering indigenous peasantry was the domin-
ant landowning class. Consequently, the peasant landowners’ relationship to
the crofters and the landless became the prime source for social conflict in
the late nineteenth century. These landowners, together with the increasingly
Finnish-speaking upper classes, played a central role in the process of national
integration. Together they introduced, in the form of Fennomania, an agrarian
‘civic religion’ which guided the integration of the state.
In the Baltic Provinces, the independent peasantry remained small and
suffered greatly from the dominance of the German landowners. There, the
peasant proprietors played a significant role in the national movement for self-
assertion and liberation from the 1860s and 1870s on – that is, almost immedi-
ately after they had obtained the right to own land.Whereas in Finland during
the last decades of the nineteenth century the wealthy peasants were a dis-
tinctly conservative force, in the Baltic Provinces they were pivotal in challen-
ging the prevailing order. They came into conflict much more with the domin-
ant German classes than with the working classes because they did not have
an established position in the local political and economic structure. The eco-
nomic and social aspect was very pronounced in their nascent opposition, and
the anti-German struggle was considered more important than opposition to
administrative Russification from the 1880s to 1905.18 The emerging indigenous
middle classes, too – particularly the teachers, who were often of peasant ori-
gins – played a central role. Moreover, the elimination of the prevailing order
was certainly in the interest of the poor and landless peasants, and the indus-
trial workers as well.19
This is not to say that the various indigenous groups shared common class
interests. Rather, it illuminates thepointmade inChapter 5 about theprecondi-
tions formovements of national self-assertion and liberation, thatmobilisation
across class boundaries – the creation of an interclass community – is essen-
tial. In the early phase, clearing theway for social and national liberation in the
18 Kruus 1935, pp. 133, 153; Plakans 1981, pp. 225, 241, 255–7. Toivo U. Raun says (1981, p. 340):
‘Before the Revolution of 1905, the great majority of the [Estonian] intelligentsia and the
masses regarded the administrative [if not cultural] Russification as an important means
to break Baltic German hegemony over local institutions’.
19 Hroch 1968, pp. 72–80; Kruus 1935, pp. 133, 181–7; Plakans 1981, p. 249.
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Baltic Provinces fell to the strongest indigenous groups – mainly to the middle
classes and the peasant proprietors, as Miroslav Hroch suggests in his study.
What the coalition was to do in the later phases of organisation and mobil-
isation is, however, quite another question. In the Baltic Provinces, the inde-
pendent peasantry and the middle classes, by contributing to the challenge
against the prevailing order, were actually opening the way for a more radical
protest. It was argued above that the temporal conjunction of the rise of the
peasantry and the emergence of popular organisations, including the worker
movement, lent popular legitimacy to the latter in Finland.20 In a sense this
appears to have been true in the Baltic Provinces as well: the peasant landown-
ers and the indigenous (petty) bourgeoisie took the lead in a movement which
nevertheless included, at least in principle, the indigenous working classes.21
Butwhereas in Finland this coincidence ultimately served to integrate the pop-
ular classes into the state, in the Baltic Provinces it opened the way for a much
more thorough challenge, one that grew partly out of the national movement
itself.
In the Baltic Provinces the national movement was unambiguously a liber-
ation movement; it was also anti-clerical because of the German dominance
of the church. The adoption of a socialist ideology seems to have been easier
there than in Finland. Socialist propositions became increasingly popular in
the 1890s, notably among the Latvians, as the urban intelligentsia and other
middle-class groups grew. By this time, continuing differentiation within the
peasantry had created amorediscernible proletarianpopulation in agriculture,
and an industrial working class was emerging in the big cities. Moreover, the
indigenous groups were still excluded from local political institutions. A new,
more radical generation of intellectuals was willing to include the proletariat
and semi-proletariat in the national movement.22 Among the Estonians, then,
two main groupings gradually emerged, and among the Latvians the entire
movement experienced considerable radicalisation.
Among the Estonians, the bourgeois-national movement was based on the
bourgeoisie and wealthy peasantry, with the university town of Dorpat serving
as its main centre. The movement’s aim was to overcome the Germans peace-
fully and gradually to replace them with an Estonian landowner class and
an Estonian bourgeoisie that would dominate local political institutions. But
another, more radical centre grew up in the industrial city of Reval. This move-
ment had various tendencies, including social democratic ones inspired by
20 This was originally Francis Castles’s idea (1978, p. 14); see above, Chapter 6.
21 Kruus 1935, pp. 181–2.
22 Plakans 1981, pp. 254–62; Kruus 1935, pp. 188–91.
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German and Russian socialism (the radical currents of Russia being far bet-
ter known here than in Finland). Unlike the more conservative movement,
this grouping of intellectuals attempted to unite the radical petty bourgeoisie
and the urban and rural working classes, which all suffered, their very dif-
ferent class interests notwithstanding, from the same political oppression. In
1904 this group, in coalition with local Russians, won control of Reval in the
municipal elections.23 It is important to note that, although Marxist-inspired
currents ran through the radical wing, this was not a socialist movement. Nev-
ertheless, the Estonian intellectuals were more susceptible than the Finnish
to socialist ideas. Besides the two nationalist tendencies, there was also an
unequivocally socialist group of intellectuals in Dorpat, with its own journal.24
‘The casual circumstance that the social problem is at the same time a national
one lends the movement its singular coloring. [The coincidence of these two
problems] rendered excellent service to the Social Democrats’, a German pro-
fessor, writing on the Baltic Provinces, bitterly pointed out a little later.25 In
an opposite perspective, this remark means that because of severe oppression
along national lines, the radical bourgeoisie was able to attract the Estonian
working classes and retard the development of their class consciousness.26 In
any case, a part of the national movement clearly had a radical hue.
Among the Latvians the process went much further. In the 1890s the so-
called New Current emerged, attracting the most active representatives of the
younger generation and soon becoming the dominant intellectual movement.
Ideologically it drew primarily on German social democracy, and the national
emphasis was much less evident than in the Estonian movement. In 1904 the
Social Democratic party was founded from within the New Current; this party
immediately surpassed all other Latvian political groupings, rapidly gaining
support from the urban working class.27
All in all, then, in the Baltic Provinces both the class structure and the char-
acter of the local polities tended to radicalise the nationalmovement. The class
23 Kruus 1935, pp. 182–91; Nodel 1963, pp. 123–4, 129, 133–4. The two tendencies were led,
respectively, by Jaan Tōnisson and Konstantin Päts.
24 Kruus 1935, pp. 191–2. There had already been a radical national current in the 1880s when
socialist ideas were put forth (Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966, pp. 217–18, 236–8; Nodel 1963,
p. 118).
25 TheBaltic-bornT. Schiemann,writing after the 1905 revolution inRussia (cited inMeiksins
1943, p. 25).
26 Istoriia Estonskoi SSR 1966, pp. 405–6.
27 Germanis 1974, pp. 52–3, 149; Ezergailis 1974, p. 114. There was also a more nationalist rad-
ical group, which based its ideology on the interests of the Latvian working class, but it
remained weak (Germanis 1968, pp. 27–8).
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structure bore deep marks of the feudal past, and the weak local polities were
much more open to Russian influence than was the case in Finland. Equally
important, the indigenous groups here had great difficulty penetrating into
established political institutions.
It is in this context that the third condition – the presence of an upper class
that was alien but not of metropolitan nationality – played its role. In Finland
the Swedish-speaking upper class, first, had no monopoly on the ownership of
land but had to reckonwith indigenous peasant landowners; and second, it had
vested interests in the consolidationof the already existing state. Consequently,
it almostwillingly nationalised itself, greatly facilitating the process of national
integration. In other words, in Finland the combined effect of the two other
conditions, agrarian class structure and political autonomy, tended to neutral-
ise the effect of the superimposition of national and social boundaries within
the country. The Baltic German upper class had no comparable reason to sur-
render to the indigenous challengers, thanks to its class domination, whichwas
embodied in (weak) local political structures. It therefore seems that in the
Baltic Provinces, unlike in Finland, the combined effect of the three conditions
served to generate wide opposition to the local upper class and to unite the
radical challengers with the anti-tsarist Russian groups. These features became
more salient in 1905 and 1917–18.
2 Revolution in the Baltic Provinces, 1905 and 1917–18
In 1905 and 1917–18, although the opportunity for collective action was rather
similar in Finland and in the Baltic Provinces, the structural and institutional
conditions varied, and with these also the basis for organisation and mobil-
isation. The question then is, what sort of working-class movement emerged
in the Baltic Provinces and under what conditions was it to act in 1905 and in
1917–18?
The 1905 challenge found ‘a fully prepared ground’28 in the Baltic Provinces,
where several Estonian and Latvian groups saw it as a chance to alleviate their
specific grievances, whether economic, political, or cultural. The unrest began
with large-scale strikes in themajor cities, immediately after January’s so-called
Bloody Sunday massacre had provoked a strike in St. Petersburg.29 The indus-
28 Kruus 1935, p. 200.
29 For the sake of conformity, all dates to the end of 1917 are provided according to New Style,
although in the Baltic Provinces, unlike Finland, Old Style was used in this period.
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trial proletariat took the lead, but thereafter the countryside followed. Tenant
farmers wanted the vestigial forms of corvée to be abolished and the tenancy
agreements to be revised; the landless demanded better working conditions
and better wages. Other peasants, except the uppermost stratum, also parti-
cipated in themovement.30 Rural unrest climaxed in the summer and autumn,
and in the Baltic Provinces thewhole revolutionarymovement took on a strong
agrarian flavour. Increasingly the poor and landless peasants played the most
active role – a feature that differentiated the region from the interior of Russia,
where middle-peasant unrest, to use Eric Wolf ’s terminology, predominated.
Lands were confiscated, and the expropriation of all noble, state, and church
landwas demanded. In the fall jacqueries occurred: nobles were killed, manors
burned, records destroyed, churches sacked. The destruction was much more
widespread in the Latvian part of the Baltic Provinces, where the German pres-
ence was larger. There, 38 percent of the estates were destroyed or damaged,
compared to 19 percent in the Estonian countryside.31
Among the organised political groups, the Social Democrats and the rad-
ical wing of the Estonian nationalist movement gained ground. Demands were
made for universal suffrage, the convocation of a constituent assembly in
Russia, and the rights of free speech and free assembly. In the autumn the
overthrow of the autocracy, the supply of arms to the masses, and the abol-
ition of taxes were added to the other claims. In many districts elementary
education in Estonian and Latvian was reintroduced for the first time since
its suspension during the cultural Russification of the previous decades.32 In
the Latvian areas the Social Democrats, with their main base in Riga, def-
initely took the lead. Among the Estonians the corresponding process was
slower and less complete, but during the latter part of 1905 both the Esto-
nian Social Democratic party (founded only in this year) and the Estonians
associated with the Russian Social Democrats operated quite openly.33 They
alone agitated for the continuation of the revolution, surpassing the radical
group of the nationalists, who dominated the city council of Reval. But in the
earlier months of 1905 revolutionary demands grew louder among the radical
nationalists, too, and their majority envisaged, for national reasons, cooper-
ation with the revolutionary movement in Russia. In the All-Estonian Con-
30 Karjahärm and Pullat 1975, pp. 48–58; Kruus 1935, pp. 198–202; Ezergailis 1974, pp. 5–6.
31 Von Pistohlkors 1978, p. 229; Draudin 1959, pp. 7–8, 34, 37–9, 47; Ezergailis 1974, pp. 6–7,
13–14; 23; Karjahärm and Pullat 1975, pp. 117–24; Kruus 1935, pp. 198–202, 208; Raun 1984b,
pp. 461–3.
32 Draudin 1959, pp. 44–6; Ezergailis 1974, pp. 6–7, 13–14; Kruus 1935, pp. 200–8.
33 Karjahärm and Pullat 1975, pp. 106–7; Raun 1982, p. 52; Raun 1984a, pp. 132, 137.
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gress in December, themajor divisionwas between the radical nationalists and
the socialists on the one hand, and the more conservative nationalists on the
other. Although their economic and social demands differed greatly, the main-
stream of all three orientations stressed Estonian cultural and administrative
autonomy.34
The socialists were supported by urban intellectuals and workers; the latter,
who had many connections in the villages, were then instrumental in extend-
ing political organisation into the countryside. In the autumn, trade unions,
other associations, and even elected committees and popular militias were set
up in the cities and the countryside.35 The agrarian movement seems to have
had more of a socialist character in the Baltic Provinces that in most of the
other gubernii. In Lenin’s assessment, the Latvian proletariat and peasantry
played a leading role in the whole revolutionary movement of 1905.36 And
G.T. Robinson states in his classic account that the social democrats ‘attained
their greatest success’ in the Baltic Provinces. There, where ‘agriculture was
organized so largely on a capitalistic basis … the mass of landless agricultural
laborers furnished just the soil that the Social Democrats liked best to cultiv-
ate’.37
But the devastating agrarian revolt soon expanded beyond the organisa-
tional capacities of the social democrats and other radical groupings: their
attempts to restrain disorder and pillaging met with little success. In the Esto-
nian areas, urban workers from the largest cities joined the peasants in the
jacqueries, or even took the initiative in starting the violence. In the Latvian
countryside the destruction of landed estates appears to have occurred inde-
pendently of urban support; the socialists also disagreedwith the peasantswho
had confiscated land.38
A severe repression followed the re-establishment of imperial authority. At
least 300 Estonians were murdered or sentenced to death, and the popular
organisations were proscribed. Among the Latvians, 2,000–2,500 persons were
executed and 5,000 exiled because of their active role in the revolutionary
34 Von Pistohlkors 1978, pp. 231–7; Karjahärm and Pullat 1975, pp. 113–16; Kruus 1935, pp. 203–
8; Raun 1981, pp. 320, 338–9; Raun 1982, pp. 62–5. As to administrative autonomy, the
Bolshevik-oriented Estonian Social Democrats differed from the others in their insistence
on an all-Russian, centralist perspective (Raun 1984a, pp. 137–8).
35 Draudin 1959, pp. 39–42; Kruus 1935, pp. 200–2.
36 Germanis 1974, pp. 53–4; Apine 1970, pp. 213–14.
37 Robinson 1932, p. 158.
38 Kruus 1935, p. 208; Nodel 1963, pp. 143, 152–3; Ezergailis 1974, pp. 6–7, 13–14; Raun 1984b,
p. 461.
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movement. Underground activity continued, especially in Latvia, but the pop-
ular organisations, which had grown so rapidly, were liquidated.39
In both Finland and the Baltic Provinces, the 1905 revolution launched a
mass movement that, although supported initially by the industrial working
class, quickly spread to the countryside, involving not only themiddle strata of
peasants but also – or even especially – the landless. At least part of the explan-
ation for the ability of the poorest rural strata to act on their own behalf lies, in
both cases, in the sudden collapse of government and in their strong links with
the industrial workers.
But then the differences must be examined. The Baltic reaction was im-
mensely more rapid, more spontaneous, and more powerful than the Finnish:
large-scale agrarian capitalism, combined with lingering feudal methods of
exploitation, created a strong potential for endemic peasant unrest (as in a
number of other ancien régime societies). Soon the nationalist bourgeoisie
found that they could not control the revolt, and a large proportion of the
national bourgeois groups joined the popular challengers (in Estonian areas),
or entire middle-class groups were overwhelmed by radical intellectuals from
the outset (in Latvian areas) – in both cases, to a much greater extent than in
Finland. In the Baltic Provinces, the indigenous bourgeois and middle classes
had practically no institutional positions to defend in the local polities. More-
over, the emergingworking-classmovement did not have effective control over
the mass movement. A large-scale socialist organisation was totally unthink-
able before 1905, and the notoriously oppressed rural masses could not be
organised and disciplined in only a fewmonths. The situationwas radically dif-
ferent in Finland, where the Social Democratic agitators’ main worry in many
areas was how to activate the crofters and landless to vote in the elections of
1907 (a process depicted in Ilmari Kianto’s 1909 novel The Red Line).40
Lastly, in the Baltic Provinces the main non-national target was initially the
local German upper class, whereas in Finland it was the Russian autocracy. The
intrasocietal aspectwithnational overtoneswasmorepronounced in theBaltic
Provinces than in Finland, where the Swedish-Finnish division was of sec-
ondary significance. What counted in Finland was the defence of the Finnish
polity and, for the working-class movement, its internal transformation. The
Social Democrats’ national orientation was strong and authentic. In the Baltic
Provinces, in contrast, what counted was the removal of the (German) eco-
nomic and political oppression, which soon led to demands for radical political
39 Karjahärm and Pullat 1975, pp. 150–3; Kruus 1935, pp. 210–11; Germanis 1974, pp. 56, 77–8;
Karjahärm, Krastyn’, and Tila 1981, pp. 74–6.
40 Cf. Hamalainen 1978, pp. 66–7.
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reforms on a pan-Russian scale but only secondarily to a call for the reversal of
Russification. Given these ends, connectionswithRussian revolutionarieswere
natural.
In early 1917 thepopular groups and the radical, notably socialist, challengers
were in a situation very similar to the one of twelve years earlier. Again the
masses were unorganised and entirely unrepresented in the Baltic political
structures, and again the radicals remained scattered, with no established links
to popular groups. The Latvian Social Democrats had been forced to go under-
ground. The Estonians, for their part, had made a ‘quantum leap’ towardmuch
greater political awareness and sophistication after the revolution of 1905,41
and the most influential current, the radical Young Estonia cultural move-
ment, was clearly socialist in hue. The most marked institutional difference
between 1917 and 1905 lay in the position of the national bourgeoisie, and
even this distinction was confined primarily to the Estonians. Estonian state-
making and nation-building had progressed from about the mid-1890s on, but
they gathered momentum after the first Russian revolution: by 1914 the Esto-
nian nationalists had won control of six of the ten major cities in Estland and
northern Livland, thereby obtaining a definite share of political power. But this
was just one aspect of how the locus of Estonian public life shifted to the cit-
ies. A network of cultural and professional organisations also grew up, and
Estonian culture made rapid progress in literature and education as well. At
the same time, agricultural societies and cooperatives spread throughout the
countryside. In thepolitical sphere, the conservativenationalists’ EstonianPro-
gressive People’s party, founded in 1905 and the only legal Estonian party until
the February revolution, played the main role.42 A civil society, based on the
national bourgeoisie, the independent peasantry, and the middle class, was
clearly consolidating itself.
Unlike Finland, the Baltic Provinces were directly affected by the war. Esto-
nian and Latvian conscripts served in the Imperial Army, and, more important
still, with the continuation of the war both nationalities acquired their own
troops. The Latvian Riflemen’s battalions, later renamed regiments, were cre-
ated in 1915 after the successful German counter-offensive. The same occurred
in Estonia, but only after the February revolution, and then on a smaller scale.43
In any case, during the critical summer and autumn of 1917, both nationalit-
ies were to have a domestic apparatus of violence. Also, the German menace
was far more real in the Baltic regions than in Finland. By March 1917, half of
41 Raun 1982, p. 65.
42 Kruus 1935, pp. 193–6, 219–20; Raun 1981, pp. 308, 322, 332, 339; Raun 1982, pp. 65–71.
43 Ezergailis 1974, pp. 167–9; Kruus 1935, pp. 236–7.
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Kurland was occupied and Riga evacuated; moreover, the German occupation
forces were nationally close to the local – German – upper class. Finally, these
regions suffered economically muchmore than Finland. But while the war cer-
tainly hurt the Estonians and the Latvians more than the Finns, short-term dif-
ferences are presumably of secondary importance when explaining variations
in the revolutionary process. As Andrew Ezergailis points out in his study of
the Latvian revolution, ‘The war did not create Latvian radicalism; it was there
already in 1905.’44 Long-term factors conditioned the Baltic developments in
1917 in very essential respects.
Of the two nationalities, closer to the Finns in their political development
in 1917 were the Estonians (as they incidentally were in a linguistic and geo-
graphical sense, too). Not surprisingly, it was the nationalist Estonian Pro-
gressive People’s party – the only organised indigenous political force – that
took the initiative after the February revolution. Already in April the bour-
geois groups succeeded in establishing self-government for the Estonian areas.
The Provisional Government of Russia abandoned the local Germans com-
pletely and formed a new guberniia out of Estland and the Estonian-speaking
part of Livland, with its own governmental organ, the Diet. In the elections
of early June, the bourgeois parties gained half the seats, the other half being
divided between the Estonian Socialist Revolutionaries and the social demo-
cratic groupings. Although these parties had originated in earlier years and
subsequently developed connections with the revolutionary Russian parties,
theywere all organised or reorganised only after the February revolution.45 The
Bolsheviks gained just one seat. It is true that the electoral systemwas based on
indirect (if universal) suffrage, that it disfavoured the industrial proletariat in
the short run, and that the turnout was low, but this result gives a fairly accur-
ate picture of the parties’ relative strength in the spring.46 In other words, the
well-organised bourgeoisie was in the best position to exploit the opportunity
created by the war, but in a few months more radical indigenous challengers
were able to draw even with it.
Soviets were now being set up, first in towns and then, to a lesser extent, in
the countryside, as elsewhere in the empire.The Socialist Revolutionaries dom-
44 Ezergailis 1974, p. 204.
45 Raun 1981, pp. 339–40; Raun 1982, pp. 70–2.
46 Arens 1978, pp. 19–23; Kruus 1935, pp. 230–4; Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 63, 65, 76–85,
100, 140–6, 163. Urban deputies to the Diet were elected in the late summer and autumn
only (see Arens 1978, pp. 23, 26). The Estonian Socialist Revolutionary organisation at first
included both Russians and Estonians, but during the summer the Estonian section broke
off and became the overwhelmingly stronger faction (Saat and Siilivask 1977, p. 104).
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inated all the soviets except one in the spring and summer, as they dominated
political activity among the Russian troops that were stationed in Estonia. Dur-
ing this initial phase the Russian soldiers and sailors played a significant role
in the principal soviets. The Estonian participants and supporters were mainly
factoryworkers: the soviets were linked to collective action in the towns, action
that had begun with the revolution in Petrograd through the form of strikes,
demonstrations, and trade union activity. As in 1905, poor peasants, cottagers,
and the landless figured among the rural challengers, demanding the confisca-
tion and distribution of noble, state, and church lands, reduction of working
hours, and higher wages.47
The Estonian polity, established at last, was valued by the non-bourgeois
groups, and the other parties gradually came to accept the bourgeois national
programme of substantial governmental autonomy in a federal Russia. In the
spring and early summer there were no irreconcilable disagreements within
the Diet or between it and the majority of the soviets, with the notable excep-
tion of Reval.48 It is indicative of the limited scope of conflicts that a newpolice
force, replacing the tsarist police, was successfully organised in most cities by
the town councils and town soviets. In the countryside the police force was
administered by the new organs of local government that emerged linked to
preparations for the Diet elections.49
But, as inmany other parts of Russia, a dual power began to take shape. Dur-
ing the summer and autumn the masses were so thoroughly radicalised that
the non-bourgeois parties were largely overwhelmed by a more extreme chal-
lenge. The Estonian Bolsheviks, starting frommodest beginnings in the spring,
were able to take over the soviets and organise themasses, first in the cities, but
then even in the countryside. Significantly, they gained control of the national
troops in September and earlyOctober, a couple of months after the troops had
been created.50 In August, Bolshevikmembership figures surpassed those of all
other parties, thanks largely to the support of urban workers. The Bolsheviks
became the largest party in the soviet of Reval inAugust and gained an absolute
majority in September. The same development occurred in soviets in a number
of other cities. In the municipal elections, too, the Bolsheviks made increasing
47 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 40–57, 63–4, 67, 116–17, 126–31, 178; Arens 1982, 295–301.
48 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 86, 100–4, 340–2. The first serious controversy occurred in early
June when the soviet of Reval unsuccessfully attempted to push aside the local Estonian
government and to delay the elections to the Diet (Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 146–52;
Kruus 1935, p. 231).
49 Arens 1978, p. 24.
50 Saat and Siilivask 1977, p. 235; Kruus 1935, p. 239.
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progress as the summer wore on and autumn approached.51 In the elections to
the Russian Constituent Assembly, twoweeks after the October revolution, the
Bolsheviks gained 40 percent of the vote and became by far the largest party in
Estonia – a performance equalled or surpassed in very few other gubernii. The
bourgeois parties won only 29 percent of the vote, with the remaining 31 per-
cent divided among various social democratic parties and the Estonian Social-
ist Revolutionaries. In all electoral districts but one, theBolsheviks gainedmore
votes than any other party.52
The Bolsheviks gained ground mainly at the expense of the other left-wing
parties. In half a year they were able to defeat their competitors not only in the
cities but also in the rural areas; indeed, in the Constituent Assembly elections
they became the largest party in the countryside.
How did all this happen? Crucial, of course, was the Bolsheviks’ ability to
capture the soviets – that is, the key loci of popular organisation – and the
national Estonian troops. But their success both in the soviets and among the
masseswould not have been possible had their programmenot strongly corres-
ponded to popular grievances. Their consistent anti-government and anti-war
line, together with their revolutionary demands, won them large-scale support
among the urban workers; and their agrarian programme for expropriating
the big properties without indemnification, in accordance with the so-called
April theses of Lenin, met with resounding approval among the ‘toiling peas-
antry’. In August they extended the list of agrarian enemies from the nobles,
the church, and the state to the wealthy Estonian peasantry. Attacking the
landlords more uncompromisingly than any other party brought considerable
support for the Bolsheviks, even if their eventual plans to distribute expropri-
ated lands remained vague and at best limited.53
When the revolution occurred in Petrograd in early November, the local
Bolsheviks took power in Estonia. Unimportant as this move was in terms of
the Russian Constituent Assembly elections, in a larger sense it was a water-
shed. The Estonian Bolsheviks’ national programme had been limited, aiming
at self-determination and local autonomywith anEstonian administration and
school system, whereas the other parties had advocated an autonomous Esto-
nia within a federative Russia.54 The Bolsheviks’ electoral success seems to
indicate the secondary role of national considerations. But after the Bolshevik
takeover the national question became salient: before its dissolution by the
51 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 189–96, 212–16, 228–30; Kruus 1935, pp. 234–5, 239.
52 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 257–60; Radkey 1950, pp. 78–80.
53 See Arens 1982, pp. 303–8; Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 182–4, 200, 235–6, 325–6.
54 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 340–2.
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Bolsheviks in the end of November, the Estonian Diet declared itself entitled
to wield supreme power, and all non-Bolshevik parties included, more or less
clearly, Estonian independence in their programmes, thus emphasising their
distinctiveness from the Bolsheviks.55 It was presumably this turn that led
to the defeat of the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Estonian Constituent
Assembly in January 1918. Also the poor peasants’ thirst for land seems to have
been detrimental to the Bolsheviks: in December and early January it had
become clear that the Bolsheviks intended to preserve the large estates and
transform them into collective farms.56 The turnout rose to 75 percent (from 57
percent in November), but the Bolsheviks’ proportion declined, and the elec-
tions were stopped. They lost mainly to other leftist parties, especially in the
countryside.57 The tide perhaps began to change, then, following the October
revolution. But what remains important to note is the Bolsheviks’ phenomenal
capacity to supplant the more moderate Left within just a few months in the
summer and autumn of 1917.
The Latvians were won over to revolutionmore easily andmore thoroughly.
Already in 1905 the Social Democrats had become the most powerful political
force, and they maintained this position throughout the later years of clandes-
tine activity. In April 1917 the party, which had earlier joined forces with the
Bolsheviks, merged with them more definitely than ever. This Social Demo-
cratic party took command immediately after it came above ground in March,
and it generally won the majority of both the urban and the rural vote in the
various elections held in the summer and the autumn, reflecting weak popular
support for the LatvianMensheviks and the bourgeois parties.58 As a matter of
fact, the Latvian areas were the first in the whole of Russia to be bolshevised,
and arguably the partywould already have been able to seize power in the sum-
mer had there been no Russian troops. Of crucial importance in this respect
was the early dominance of the Riflemen’s regiments by the Bolsheviks.59
Just as the outbreak of revolution in Estonia and Latvia was determined
by the international power constellation, so too was the final outcome. In
the power vacuum following the February revolution, the local revolutionar-
ies were able to win considerable popular support and then, at the time of
the takeover in Petrograd, to seize power. But the German troops drove the
local Bolsheviks out in early 1918, and bourgeois organs declared their countries
55 Aun 1982; Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 374–7; Kruus 1935, pp. 240, 244.
56 Saat and Siilivask 1977, pp. 329–32, 381.
57 Saat and Siilivask 1977, p. 379; Kruus 1935, pp. 242–3.
58 Ezergailis 1974, pp. 192–3; Germanis 1974, p. 248; von Rauch 1977, p. 47.
59 Ezergailis 1974, pp. 134, 179–83, 204, 251; Ezergailis 1982.
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independent. After Germany’s collapse, the Entente guaranteed the survival of
the new, bourgeois republics as a part of their efforts to make the Baltic area ‘a
barbed wire entanglement’60 protecting the West from Bolshevik Russia. The
German troop withdrawal was delayed until the local bourgeois governments
could establish themselves and the Entente and neighbouringWestern powers
could give material and other assistance. This greatly contributed to local abil-
ity to repulse the attacks by Bolshevik troops, which were partly – or, in the
Latvian case, overwhelmingly – composed of indigenous groups.61
To conclude, the context – the power struggle in Eastern Europe in 1914–
20 – was common to Finland, Estonia, and Latvia alike. Decisive for each was
the collapse of the two main warring partners, first Imperial Russia, and then
Imperial Germany. In every case the revolutionary situation was provoked by
the collapse of Russian autocracy, and in every case German troops defeated
or at least greatly contributed to the defeat of the revolution. Furthermore, all
were saved from German domination by the subsequent defeat of Germany a
little later. And finally, the victorious Western powers, in pursuing their own
interests, guaranteed the survival of the new states (in the case of Estonia and
Latvia) or influenced the orientation of internal politics (in the case of Fin-
land).
The similarity of the international context conceals marked differences in
the way the revolutionary process took place, however. The close parallel with
pan-Russian revolutionary developments was obvious in the Baltic Provinces.
Actually, the revolution inEstonia andLatvia in the autumnof 1917was a part of
theOctober revolution itself,whereasmost of theRussian influences inFinland
were mediated indirectly and primarily affected the Finnish state’s capacity
to maintain order. Also, the Baltic Provinces, like the rest of Russia, had been
wagingwar for three years, with ensuing suffering and economic deterioration.
These differences amount to saying that there was no separate polity in the
Baltic Provinces, such as there was in Finland. The corresponding structures
were more modest, and the indigenous groups’ position in them precarious at
best. The radical tendency in the Estonian and Latvian national movements
was attributed above to this condition. The Latvians’ position in the polity was
especially weak, and so national integration never became a key task for them,
as it did for the Finnish nationalists. The weakness of local polities also denied
theEstonian andLatvian radical parties theopportunity toorganise openly; the
Social Democrats were under the same repression as in the interior of Russia.
60 As Clemenceau put it (cited in Meiksins 1943, p. 172). See also E. Anderson 1977, pp. 340,
350, 363, 376.
61 Schram 1957, pp. 36–49; Kruus 1935, pp. 258–9.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
220 chapter 11
In these circumstances the Estonian – not to speak of the Latvian – Bolshev-
iks were able to head the mass movement in 1917 by capturing the support not
only of the industrial workers but also of the unorganised poor and landless
peasants.Theother, shallowly rooted left-wingpartieswerepushedaside rather
easily, at leastmomentarily, when theBolsheviks turned against the indigenous
bourgeoisie and wealthy peasantry. The Latvians and the Estonians followed
the ‘idealised revolutionary sequence’ muchmore closely than the Finns. True,
in all cases the process was launched by the collapse of imperial authority in
March. But the consequences were different in Finland, thanks to the distinct-
iveness of the Finnish polity. The restoration of Finnish autonomy, together
with growing self-assertion in the face of the Provisional Government, left the
Finnish state totally without control of the concentrated means of coercion
within the population. The process was completed by the dismissal of the ‘Rus-
sified’ police. In Estonia and Latvia, the main authority rested instead above
all with the Provisional Government, which maintained that authority up to
the autumn. The February revolution progressed from gradual mobilisation of
contenders, through a rapid increase in the number of people accepting their
claims, to the government’s incapacity to suppress the alternative coalition.
Finally, power was seized by the Bolsheviks.
This development resulted not only from the weakness of the local polit-
ies; the Baltic class structure was at least as important. In 1917 the landless and
poor peasants, suffering from a mixture of capitalist and semi-feudal methods
of exploitation, were again, as in 1905, ready to dynamite the existing order.
The industrialworking class,moreover, being concentrated in a fewbig centres,
above all in Riga, was in much the same position as the workers in Petrograd
and Moscow.
All this places the Finnish situation in 1917 in perspective. First, in the
Finnish polity, the socialists shared political power when they started on the
road to revolution. Second, in Finland the reformist working-class movement
was able to maintain its grip on the masses throughout 1917: the party effect-
ively held the radicalisation in check. Themilitants took over the worker secur-
ity guards only after a long struggle – and only after the bourgeois counter-
offensivehadbecomeevident. InEstonia, in contrast, the local Socialist Revolu-
tionaries and social democrats, whohadwon the overwhelmingmajority of the
proletarian and semi-proletarian vote in the spring, were rapidly eliminated by
amore revolutionary challenger. In Latvia the process was faster and still more
complete.
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3 Challenges in East-Central Europe
The generalised collapse in 1918 created favourable opportunities for popu-
lar collective action in East-Central Europe, the Balkans included. The crucial
issues were again the character of the worker movement before World War I
on the one hand, and the impact of the war on local power structures on the
other.These two factors are presumably central in accounting for the local chal-
lengers’ ability (or inability) to seize power in a sudden power vacuum.
The Habsburg monarchy provides an illuminating example of the fortunes
of a minority region that, at least politically, was far more dependent than
Finland: the Czech lands. While these had a strong linkage to a historically
remembered polity, the Kingdom of Bohemia, administratively they were
divided into three parts: Bohemia,Moravia, andAustrian Silesia. TheCzech ter-
ritorywas entirelywithin the boundaries of themonarchy,making theCzechs a
pure example of autonomist nationalism. In terms of class structure, the region
bore a certain resemblance to Finland. Bohemia was the most industrialised
part in the whole empire, and the Czech lands had an industrial working class,
a class of prospering peasants, and a high level of elementary education.62
The national movement, notably in Bohemia, was directed against the Ger-
manisednobility and theGermanbourgeoisie. In the 1870s and 1880s theCzech
Social Democrats, a separate section within the Austrian Social Democratic
party, had much the same national objectives as the nationalist Young Czechs;
then in the 1890s, with the national question generating more and more ten-
sion with the Austrian-dominated mother party, they gradually established
themselves as a separate party. The national orientation was facilitated by
radical tendencies in the nationalist movement, represented particularly by
various bourgeois and lower-middle-class groups having their origins in the
peasantry.63 In the 1890s the so-called Progressive movement strove to unite
social and national aims, and the Czech National Socialist party, supported
by the Young Czechs, was founded to compete with the Social Democrats for
the worker vote. Despite growing social differentiation among the Czechs, the
national flavour persisted in the working-class movement after the turn of
the century. In the first Austrian general elections with universal and equal
male suffrage, held in 1907, the Social Democrats gained 38 percent of the
Czech vote: they seemed indisputably a central force in a possible Czech – or
Czechoslovak–polity.During thewar, national fervour spreadamong thework-
62 Pollard 1981, pp. 222–5; Lemberg 1977, p. 323; Orridge andWilliams 1982, p. 21.
63 Hroch 1968, pp. 41–61; Koralka 1971, pp. 58–65; Lemberg 1977, p. 324.
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ing people, and socialist slogans in strikes and demonstrations were overshad-
owed by general enthusiasm for national freedom. In the period immediately
preceding the foundation of the Czechoslovak state in October 1918, ‘the work-
ing people became the main force of the Czech national liberation struggle’,
believing that an independent state would satisfy their social demands.64
There are considerable and illuminating differences between the Czech
and Finnish experiences, both in long-term political dependence and in the
way the collapse of the mother empire affected the national minority. In the
Czech case, social and national oppression largely overlapped, and there was
no autonomous polity. National oppression was associated with the dominant
metropolitan nationality. The Czech experience, moreover, shows how ‘relat-
ive over-development’ can give rise to nationalist movements for liberation
and self-assertion.65 Not surprisingly, although both the Czech and the Finnish
labour movements were nationalist, nationalism was more pronounced – and
presumably more aggressive – in the Czech Social Democratic party.
In Finland, when the metropolitan power collapsed, a separate polity exis-
ted and, significantly, the socialists had an important share of the power. There
was no Czech polity in which Czech socialists could act and make their influ-
ence felt. What occurred in the Finnish case was a contest for power within an
existing polity; in the Czech case the struggle was to create a new polity that
would grant the Social Democrats a share of the power and make democratic
reforms possible. The first and foremost concern of the Finnish socialists was
the preservation and extension of democracy; the first concern of the Czech
socialists was the establishment of a polity. Thus, differences in the context –
not differences in revolutionary inclinations or attitudes (which, in fact, were
quite minor) – led to varying roles for the Czech and Finnish Social Democrats
in 1917–18.
Much of what was just said about Czechoslovakia applies to the rebirth of
Poland as well, the large political and economic differences notwithstanding.
Common to the two cases was a lack of self-administration, which in the Pol-
ish regions was exacerbated by partition among three empires. Deep political
dependence was combined with an even more vivid remembrance of a histor-
ical polity. The dominant wing of the worker movement, the Polish Socialist
party, was markedly nationalist. It was unreasonable to expect that the small
revolutionary movement, consisting of Rosa Luxemburg’s Social Democrats
and the socialist Left, would have been able to penetrate peasant masses in
64 Koralka 1971, pp. 57–65, 69–73 (quotation from p. 73); Droz 1971, pp. 75–85, 87–9.
65 Nairn 1977, pp. 185–6.
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1917–18 or immediately after. The revolutionaries’ inability to co-opt the peas-
ants had been foreshadowed in 1905–7, when the first Russian revolution gave
rise to a strong but momentary wave of collective action in the Russian parti-
tion. Now for a sizable majority of the organised workers, as well as for a large
number of peasants, the rebirth of the Polish state seemed a necessary precon-
dition for all reforms and progress.66
Hungary, in contrast, was a countrywhere a powerful challenger armedwith
a revolutionarydoctrine and revolutionary long-termobjectives existed in early
1919 in a stricter sense than anywhere else in the region. Of all the successor
states, Hungary was the least politically dependent. A formal partnership had
prevailed in the empire since the Dualism creating Austria-Hungary in 1867.
Economically, Hungary was one of the East-Central European regions where
one-sided agrarian progress was the core of the process of capitalist transform-
ation, thanks to demand in themore industrialised parts of Europe. In this case
thedemand resulted from thewesternparts of theDualMonarchy,which as the
main purchaser of Hungary’s products effected a transformation in its agricul-
ture.The agrarian laws of themid-1800s assured thepredominance of capitalist
relations in the countryside, that is, the so-called Prussian pattern of develop-
ment, with noble latifundia on the one side, and a formally emancipated but
downtrodden peasantry providing cheap labor on the other. Only at the end of
the century did an industrial working class begin to develop, and then mainly
in large centres not directly connected with the agrarian population.67
These circumstances left their mark on the Hungarian Social Democratic
party, which from its inception in 1890 was a movement of the industrial pro-
letariat, rooted in a few main centres, most notably Budapest. No real attempt
was made to mobilise the oppressed rural masses, nor was the organisation
involved in their revolts after the turn of the century. The party was merely
semi-legal and was harassed incessantly by the authorities. Based on the trade
unions, it fought for improvements in working conditions and wage increases
and, in the political realm, for universal suffrage: in other words, it was ‘reform-
ist’ and ‘revisionist’. Few intellectuals figured in its leadership. In any case, it
was the only Hungarian party with links to popular groups.68
66 Ajnenkiel 1969, pp. 48–9; Kalabinski and Tych 1962, pp. 204–9, 226–7, 231–2.
67 Berend and Ránki 1974, pp. 31–3, 39–40, 47, 122–9. True, in terms of production there was
a connection between the agrarian transformation and industrialisation in that food pro-
cessing became the leading industry. But at the same time, food processing’s share in total
employment remained far below its share in production.
68 Erényi 1975, pp. 55–73; Nagy 1967, p. 159; Deák 1968, p. 134; Kenez 1972, pp. 64–5; Király 1977,
407–16.
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The party altered its position dramatically in 1917 as social and economic
problems worsened and the October revolution erupted in Russia. Workers’
councils were set up, and mass demonstrations, strikes, and trade union activ-
ity mushroomed, as did revolts and army desertions. But although the radicals
gained some ground, the party leaders remained well in control of the swelling
movement and maintained the traditional, non-revolutionary line. The decis-
ive change camewith the bloodless bourgeois revolution of October 1918. Lack-
ing a clear strategy – they ‘responded to the challengewith a sense of shock’69 –
the Social Democrats simply acquiesced and formed a coalition government
with the bourgeois liberals and radicals. They accepted a secondary role in the
new government, despite being practically the only viable political force in the
country, having brought together nearly a million organised workers.70
The situation was extremely grave for the new republic. Decay in the eco-
nomic and social fabric had been accompanied by the disintegration of the
army and the return of hundreds of thousands of armed soldiers from the front
or from captivity in revolutionary Russia. Together with workers, they played a
central role in councils and other organisations demanding rapid and thorough
social reforms. Moreover, external pressures added to internal ones. In Novem-
ber the government was obliged to sign an armistice agreement that divested
Hungary of about half of her former territory, leaving the country vulnerable to
an invasion by Romanian, Czechoslovak, Serbian, and French forces.71
While the Social Democrats were, with the bourgeois parties, trying to re-
establish the authority of the state, a new, revolutionary challenger emerged.
The Hungarian Communist party was founded in November 1918, mainly by a
group of former prisoners of war returned from Russia, where they had set up
a Hungarian group within the Bolshevik party. Their revolutionary programme
gave direction and coherence to the radicalised groups, whichwere by then dis-
appointed with the socialists’ policy. Being able agitators and organisers, the
Communists rapidly gained ground in the soldiers’ organisations and among
the active workers, both employed and unemployed, although their numbers
were small compared with those of the Social Democrats.72
In a few months the socialists found that the fate of the new republic
lay increasingly in their hands. With the gradual weakening of the bourgeois
parties, theybegan todominate thepolitical scene inDecember 1918. In January
the government was reorganised to the socialists’ advantage, and in February
69 Vermes 1971, p. 36.
70 Vermes 1971, p. 49; Nagy 1967, pp. 160–1; Tökés 1967, pp. 30–47, 85–7.
71 Tökés 1967, pp. 84–5; Nagy 1967, p. 162.
72 Tökés 1967, pp. 92–122.
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the leading Communists were imprisoned. But despite extensive membership
and growing power on all levels of central and local administration, the Social
Democrats did not succeed in consolidating their position or the authority of
the prevailing system (which amounted to the same thing). Internal order was
nearing total collapse in February and March.73
This situation may be compared with the post-war disintegration in Ger-
many and Austria, where, simultaneously, the social democrats were actually
saving the bourgeois states. The Hungarian party, however, lacked the political
experience and established membership in the polity that its brother parties
had. TheHungarian partywas unable to choose between firm action in defence
of the prevailing system and adoption of a definitely revolutionary policy; its
leaders abhorred the methods of Gustav Noske, but they also rejected the
Bolshevik example.74 In previous years the party had not gained membership
in the polity, but at the same time it had not really been persecuted. As a con-
sequence, it had developed a narrow trade-unionist perspective.
From the Communists’ point of view, however, the situation resembled the
one in Russia after the February revolution. They looked forward to seizing
power from the bourgeois-socialist coalition in the same way the Bolshev-
iks had taken it from the Provisional Government. This opportunity seemed
to present itself in March, when internal disintegration culminated, and the
Entente issued an ultimatum that would have opened the way for Czech,
Romanian, and French troops to occupy the bulk of the country. The prime
minister and other bourgeois ministers felt compelled to surrender power to
the only remaining organised force, the working-class parties. Béla Kun and
other Communist leaders were released from prison, and on 21 March power
was transferred to the Social Democrats and Communists. Not only did these
two groups then form a common government, but they alsomerged into a new,
unifiedHungarian Socialist party.The far smaller butmuchmore resoluteCom-
munist faction gained the upper hand, with Béla Kun becoming the leader of
the new Hungarian Soviet Republic.75 Thus Hungary followed the ‘idealised
revolutionary sequence’.
The national emergency helped the revolutionaries to stabilise the military
situation temporarily, and in June the Hungarians even extended the revolu-
tion into Slovakia.76 Fourmonths later, though, the revolutionwas defeated – a
failure in part a result of external pressure, but also of grave errors made by the
73 Vermes 1971, pp. 52–4.
74 Vermes 1971, p. 50.
75 Tökés 1967, pp. 129, 132–4.
76 See Toma 1958.
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revolutionaries themselves, who antagonised the rural masses by obstinately
advocating large collective estates despite the deep-rooted hopes of the poor
and landless peasantry for their own farms.77 In other words, although Hun-
gary did not follow the German social democratic example, it did not follow
the Bolshevik example, either.
InbothFinlandandHungary thenonrevolutionary social democratic parties
were driven to revolution. This development occurred under different condi-
tions, however. First, the Hungarian party had been marginal in the political
system; because it hadno establishedposition in thepolity, itwas unable, in the
tumultuous conditions of 1918–19, to resist the challengeof amore radical party.
Thus theCommunists could rapidly gain ground,make the socialists accept the
revolution, and finally enlist them in efforts to transform society from bottom
to top,78 a progression reminiscent of the Baltic developments in the summer
and autumn of 1917. The Finnish party, in contrast, was deeply rooted in the
population and comparatively well entrenched in the political system when
the crisis suddenly occurred. It was therefore in a much better position to con-
trol the radical but diffuse challenge of the worker guards. It also envisioned a
revolution that would extend democracy – but only within the bounds of the
capitalist society.
Second, the Hungarian state and society were in a state of dissolution at the
time the crisis occurred in October 1918. Hungary had collapsed, and the ruins
were left to the socialists simply because no other hope for survival existed. The
party had no choice but to take responsibility, first with the bourgeois parties
and then, after further deterioration of the situation, with the Communists. It
accepted power; it did not seize it as the Bolsheviks had done. The statement of
the provisional president, Count Károlyi, on 21 March 1919 is symptomatic: he
‘transferred the power to the proletariat of the Hungarian peoples’.79
The Finnish state, for its part, had one fatal weakness after the February
revolution: lack of control over the means of coercion. Otherwise the state
remained effective, and civil society, too, was well integrated and strong. After
socialists had penetrated into the very heart of the state, then, the bourgeois
state and civil society reasserted themselves, causing the socialists to attempt
to hold on to what they had gained in 1917. This was the road to revolution in
the Finnish case.
Thus, although at one phase both the Hungarian and the Finnish social-
ists were in coalition with bourgeois parties, after that their paths diverged. In
77 Tökés 1967, pp. 185–8.
78 See Eckelt 1971.
79 Cited in Toma 1958, p. 203.
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Hungary it was the combination of pressure from the left and fear of internal
anarchy and foreign occupation that drove the socialists to revolution; in Fin-
land it was the resolute bourgeois effort to recapture the monopoly on power.
Revolutionary determination on the part of the socialist parties on the eve of
the sudden collapsewasnot of primary importance.Therewasno suchdeterm-
ination in any serious sense in either the Finnish or theHungarianpartieswhen
the Russian and Habsburg empires collapsed.What matteredmost was simply
the existence of well-organisedworking-classmovements. In both cases a crisis
in the state finally drove the challengers to revolution, irrespective of their ini-
tial conceptions. Characteristically, in both Finland and Hungary the socialists
largely supported the decision about the revolution after it had finally been
made: dissenters were few.80 Only the position of the party and the character
of the collapse varied, and therefore also the road to the revolutionary situ-
ation.
The significance of the peasants’ passivity or hostility for the final failure
of the revolution was also similar in the two cases. As stated above, in anti-
colonial revolutions an alliance between the organised revolutionary party and
the peasantry has generally been forged well before the opportunity for revolt
has presented itself, and this alliance has been essential for victory. In Hungary,
power was instead granted to the revolutionaries without their having formed
any such alliance; nor had they any real willingness to do so, either before or
after their ascent to power. Indeed, the mere fact that power was granted to
the revolutionaries made an alliance with the agrarian masses a topic of little
moment. In Finland, an alliance did exist, but because a considerable part of
the SocialDemocrats’ agrarian following, the crofters,was attracted to theparty
for economic reasons, when the revolutionary encounter came their support
waned. In both Hungary and Finland, the presence of an organised challenger
per se was enough to provoke the revolution, but in the longer run the lack of
massive agrarian support caused it to be put down or at least greatly contrib-
uted to its failure.
In the Balkans, political dependence on theOttoman Empiremade for auto-
nomist nationalism in many cases. Although Romania, Serbia, and Greece
achieved independence in the 1800s and Bulgaria in the early 1900s, they
remained under the tutelage of the great powers and devoted substantial
resources to acquiring ethnically similar or related areas still under Ottoman
or Habsburg control. Here, political dependence and the way various regions
worked free from it brought about direct economic changes and affected local
80 On Hungary, see Deák 1968, p. 135.
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class structures. When the Ottoman export controls were abolished in
Romania, for example, the country was rapidly integrated into the Western
market. Grain tradewith theWest soon led to a true ‘second serfdom’ when the
powerful Romanian boyar class reimposed servile obligations on the depressed
peasantry. In the other cases the consequences were different because Otto-
man rule had not left the lands under indigenous landlords but had replaced
the local aristocracies with Turkish overlords. The achievement of political
independence was automatically accompanied by economic upheaval as the
Turkish landlords abandoned their estates to the peasantswhohad tilled them.
No strongdomestic landedclass sprangup instantly, and independentBulgaria,
Serbia, and Greece became essentially countries of small peasant propriet-
ors. The peasants’ economic backwardness and dependence were soon aggrav-
ated by increasing overpopulation, divided holdings, and indebtedness. Polit-
ically, however, the peasants could not be disregarded permanently.81 In Bul-
garia, most notably, the peasant party, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union,
emerged as the main popular opposition force at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century.82
Romania and Bulgaria suffered greatly from the war. Their armies disinteg-
rated in its final phase, and in 1918–19 both countries had a large number of
unemployed, armed ex-soldiers, many of whom were influenced by the Octo-
ber revolution in Russia. The same is true to a lesser extent of the South Slav
regions. Still, the socialists’ plans to seize power were inchoate and ineffect-
ive. In Romania and Bulgaria the social democratic parties were founded in the
1890s, and in Serbia during the next decade, but the industrial working classes
were small, having hardly emerged from the peasant base, and political pres-
sure and the low level of education made organisation difficult. The crisis of
1917–18 found the social democrats in the peninsula unable, even unwilling,
to organise the peasant masses, and also largely unwilling to follow a revolu-
tionary course. The Bulgarians were the strongest and most successful, the
Communist party having been founded in 1919, earlier than elsewhere, but in
all cases revolutionwas not feasible, for the extensive peasant unrest remained
divorced from socialist guidance. As was mentioned above, the peasant party
emerged from the war as the major organised force in Bulgaria; the compar-
atively weak upper classes were not in the position to control the situation,
and the peasants elevated Alexander Stamboliski, the leader of the Agrarian
81 P. Anderson 1974, pp. 390–4; Jelavich and Jelavich 1977, pp. 196–221; Bell 1977, pp. 4, 12–13;
Berend and Ránki 1974, pp. 49–52.
82 See Bell 1977.
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National Union, to power.83 In Romania the ruling elite had been frightened by
the great peasant revolt of 1907, and in 1917–18 it was prepared to concede to
land reform and universal suffrage and thereby assure its own existence and a
common front against external threats. Also of considerable significance is the
fact thatRomania emerged from thewar as a victoriouspower, thus doubling its
population and territory. The Romanians became enthused with the creation
of a Greater Romania.84
The Romanian and Bulgarian experiences demonstrate that governmental
incapacity to suppress commitment to alternative claims was not enough to
bring about revolutionary situations, even in fully formed polities. As in Hun-
gary, the war was not an encounter that would have brought liberation from an
earlier political subordination; instead, it seriously undermined the structures
of control in thepolities themselves. Apart fromgovernmental incapacity,what
was important was the presence or absence of a well-organised challenger. The
depressed Romanian peasantry had no such challenger before the war, and
none was able to emerge in only a few years. One did take power for a moment
in Bulgaria, but in this agrarian country it represented the small proprietors;
and however land-hungry they were, the land had already been distributed.
They were able to elevate the peasant party to political power for a moment,
but the party did not envision a new economic and social order.
In the South Slav regions the foundation of Yugoslavia, with Serbia as its
nucleus, took precedence over the other objectives of themajor politicalmove-
ments.The class struggle and struggle for national liberationwere, for the Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes, ‘inseparable’:85 not only had social and national oppres-
sion been generally superimposed under Ottoman or Habsburg rule,86 but in
a number of South Slav regions the religious division reinforced social and
national distinctions.
All in all, in East-Central Europe a revolutionary situation arose only in
Hungary, the country where the war had destroyed the state apparatus and
damaged the social fabric more thoroughly than anywhere else in the region.
Although the worker movement was comparatively well organised, it could
acquire power only after a total collapse of state authority – in which lay,
83 Bell 1977, pp. 82, 110, 122–53; Rankoff 1977, pp. 466–8, 476–7; Schärf 1967, 195–206.
84 Schärf 1967, pp. 195–9, 218–28; Musat and Zaharia 1980, pp. 44–50; Roberts 1951, pp. 21–32;
Chirot 1976, pp. 151, 155–6.
85 Portal 1971, p. 95.
86 Moritsch 1977, pp. 359–63, 366–71, 377–9, 388, 393–4; Portal 1971, p. 94; Kann 1964, pp. 30–
56, 243–6.Among theCroats,whohadaneffective self-administration, anative aristocracy
cooperated with Vienna and Budapest.
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moreover, a real risk that the whole country would dissolve. In the two other
fully formed polities, boyar-dominated Romania and the ‘peasant state’ of Bul-
garia,87 the worker movements were initially weaker and the pressures of war
on the polities themselves more limited than in Hungary.
In the cases in which no states or autonomous polities existed and polit-
ical dependence was deeper, the first concern of the socialists was to create,
or re-create, a (national) state rather than to contest for power in an already
existing one. But even after the national revolutions were completed (and, of
great importance, the political systems at least formally democratised), the
workermovementswere notwilling or able to convert popularmovements into
social revolutions. Actually, the weakness or moderation of the locally domin-
ant Polish, Czech, Slovak, and South Slav socialist movements in 1917–19 fits
in well with nationalism as a liberation movement (see Chapter 5): social and
national aspects were closely intertwined until the twentieth century. Small
revolutionary groupings could not harness extensive peasant unrest during the
brief period of opportunity at the end of the war.
This situationof course contrastswith that in theBaltic Provinces.TheLatvi-
ans and the Estonians also lacked established autonomous political structures
beforeWorldWar I, but the revolutionary upsurgeprovedpowerful and culmin-
ated in a revolutionary situation. The difference seems to stem from the nature
of class structure andpolitical dependence in theBaltic Provinces.The compar-
atively large industrialworking class and the labour-repressivemethodsused in
the commercialisation of agriculture played an important part, but they alone
were not enough. What is crucial is that there, and only there, a revolutionary
party existed that was based primarily on industrial workers and that at the
same time was able to forge an alliance with the peasant masses. The locally
dominant challengers, the Latvian and Estonian Bolsheviks, had their mother
organisation in Russia.
Why was it so easy for the local counterparts of themetropolitan challenger
to gain ground in the Baltic Provinces?The answer seems to be, first, that unlike
in the Polish, Czech, Slovak, and South Slav cases, the oppressive local upper
class was both alien and not of metropolitan nationality. Consequently, the
local national movements were not only radical, but they were also willing to
develop links with Russian socialist currents. Of no minor importance in this
respect was the ‘dress rehearsal’ of 1905, as Lenin called it, which reinforced
contacts with Russian radicals, made evident common interests in the anti-
tsarist struggle, and showed that the landless and poor peasants were ready
87 The phrase was coined at the end of the nineteenth century; see Sugar 1969, p. 53.
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to dynamite the existing order. Whereas in the Polish and Czech cases it was
themetropolitan nationalities – that is, the Russians and Germans – who were
opposed, in the Baltic regions it was the locally dominant nationality. Oppos-
ition to the metropolis was thus largely social in the sense that it was direc-
ted against the autocratic system that ultimately guaranteed the indigenous
groups’ economic and political subordination. Second, the Poles and Czechs
had a recollection of a national polity, whereas the Estonians and Latvians had
no such memory.
In short, in the Baltic Provinces grievances were widespread among the
industrial workers and the exploited peasant masses, national movements
were comparatively recent and defined primarily in terms of opposition to a
local alien nationality, and opposition to the autocratic systemwas sharedwith
radical Russian groups. When the revolutionary movement gathered momen-
tum in themetropole itself in 1905 and 1917, the local liberationmovements did
not, at least in the short run, undertake a determined course of action expli-
citly intended to create separate national states; rather, they simply opposed
the existing social and economic order.88The local ethnic and themetropolitan
challenges were fused to an extent that was exceptional in Eastern Europe.
4 Fascism in Eastern Europe
A revolution occurred in only a few successor states, and even in these it was
defeated. But in most cases the upheavals of the war and the disintegration
of the empires led to an extension of political democracy comparable to that
experienced in Finland in 1906 (Hungary being an exception).
In this sudden gaining of political rights culminated the specific character
of the collective action in the formation of the Eastern European latecomer
polities (see Chapter 1). In Western Europe, the working classes had gradually
organised and mobilised themselves, first in trade unions and then in polit-
ical parties, and in this way eventually gained membership in the polity. The
parliamentarian political system was basically the form that the balance of
power assumed in the state when the dominant groupswere forced to acknow-
ledge the popular challenge, or the way ‘the entrance of the masses onto the
historical stage’ was institutionalised in these countries. In the East, corres-
ponding systems did not develop in the sameway butwere instead copied from
88 In the Latvian areas,where internal oppressionby theGermanupper classwas accompan-
ied by an external German threat, the Bolshevik takeover actually advancedmore rapidly
than in the Russian interior.
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the West, achieved when the dominant classes were momentarily weakened
but not actually broken by the war. The traditional aristocratic elites, in rough
coalitionwith commercial andmanufacturing interests, retainedmuchof their
power despite the land reforms, which were carried outmerely to forestall new
revolutionary upheavals; most of these reforms were limited.89
It is in the position of the dominant groups that the basis for Eastern Euro-
pean fascism should first be sought. In all countries of the region, these were
to regain much of their political power after a few years. Yet a simple return
to the old order was not feasible: not only was it politically inconceivable, but
economically the need tomobilise resourceswas of paramount concern. These
countries faced during this period the serious dilemma of all backward coun-
tries in the international system, a dilemma that became more serious during
the Great Depression, which was far more damaging to Eastern Europe than to
Finland. Their economies, both agricultural and industrial, were at the mercy
of developments in Western Europe. Economic growth was slow, population
increasewas faster than in other parts of Europe, and the swelling agrarian pro-
letariat was largely doomed to remain in the countryside. In all the countries
of Eastern Europe except Czechoslovakia, the economic structure changed
little.90Thorough structural reforms, althoughneeded,were unthinkable in the
context of a reactionary coalition. The elites and various middle-class group-
ings recognised the necessity of modernising, but they tried to bring it about
without making fundamental changes in social structures. They tried to solve
a problem that was inherently insoluble.91
Here, then, is the twin basis for Eastern European fascism: the retention
by the traditional elites of a substantial share in power in an era of mass
politics, together with extreme economic dependence on Western Europe.92
In a number of East-Central European countries, consequently, the authorit-
arian regimes developed a sort of symbiotic relationship with the native fascist
movements, as the only acceptable way in which the masses could be mobil-
ised and economic and social stagnation overcome. To solve the insoluble, they
tried to make the reaction ‘popular and plebeian’ by promulgating, or at least
tacitly approving, the fascist parties or wings: these groups could ‘remain in the
ruling or local majority parties … they could find a place for themselves in the
new parties that the leaders of autocratic dictatorships created to give them-
89 In Romania and the Baltic states the land reforms were exceptionally far-reaching. See,
e.g., Simunek 1980, 73–4.
90 See Berend and Ránki 1974, pp. 143–257, 285–97.
91 As Barrington Moore (1966, p. 442) puts it.
92 See Moore 1966, pp. 437–8.
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selves the appearance of popular backing … or they could expect the dictators
to cooperate with them… or at least look tolerantly at their activities’.93
Relevant examples are Codreanu’s Iron Guard in Romania, Gömbös’s Party
of National Unity and Szálasi’s Arrow Cross in Hungary, and Dmowski’s move-
ment in Poland. Theywere distinguishable from the conservative upper classes
but linked to them, and in Depression-stricken Hungary the Party of National
Unity even had a fleeting taste of power. Gömbös had tried to mobilise the
masses in the 1920s, but the miserable conditions that prevailed in the coun-
tryside had frustrated his efforts. He therefore focused on fascistisation from
within the prevailing system, notably after the Depression had helped him rise
topower.Gömböshada clear visionof thenecessity of popularmobilisation for
modernisation, a course that, though alien to the conservatives, was of course
far preferable to socialist mobilisation.94 Yet the fascist-xenophobic attempts
to raise the country from a state of torpor were as temporary and ephemeral in
Hungary as elsewhere. In Poland fascist action was muchmore limited than in
Hungary;95 and in Romania the authoritarian elites finally put the Iron Guard
down, after it had started themarch to power in the late 1930s. But everywhere,
the same tendency –mobilisation of the masses using a native fascist ideology
in the attempt to solve problems of uneven modernisation – was discernible.
Finland’s differences vis-à-vis Germany and Italy were mentioned above. In
these countries, the fascist seizure of power was made possible by the upper
classes’ need to restore order after the working class had obtained political
influence in the wake of the world war. In Finland, no such need existed. Com-
pared with East-Central Europe, too, the basis for fascism seems to have been
rather weak in Finland, where there were no strong landed elites or vestiges of
labour-repressive agrarian systems andno common international position.The
‘nameless horror’96 among the upper and middle classes, provoked by revolu-
tionary unrest in 1917–18, was similar in Finland and other countries, but this
alone did not provoke a rightist dictatorship or provide the foundation for the
fascistisation of the political system.
The situation in the new Baltic states was seemingly different from that in
East-Central Europe because the German or Polish aristocratic classes were
eliminated and the land distributed to the peasants. The difference, however,
is more apparent than real. In these countries, too, there was an incongruity
between the political system and the social structure, thanks to the powerful
93 Sugar 1971, p. 149.
94 Janos 1982, pp. 244–7, 256–9, 287–9; Simunek 1980, 263–6, 295–302.
95 See Simunek 1980, 236–8, 248, 366–72.
96 Nolte 1968, p. 44.
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but transitory mobilisation of the working class. In its national, social demo-
cratic versions, the labour movement participated actively in the constitu-
ent assemblies, bringing ‘ultra-democratic’ constitutions to the new states.97
The political systems functioned ineffectively, however, and soon the strong
bureaucratic-military-agrarian coalitions began to usurp the powers of the
state. Authoritarian systems emerged in Lithuania in 1926–7, and in Estonia
and Latvia in 1934 in thewake of the Depression. In all these cases conservative
peasant parties took over initially, but later the systems assumed amore-or-less
open fascist character – even in Estonia, where the coup had been justified
as a move against a fascist-type threat.98 The need to reinvigorate the eco-
nomy and win popular legitimacy was as pressing in the Baltic states as in
East-Central Europe. As exporters of agrarian products, in which they almost
deliberately specialised (to the detriment of industrial production), the Baltic
states were also profoundly dependent onWestern Europe.99 Both in ideology
and in reality, then, the peasant landowners became ‘the base of the national
edifice’,100 though the peasant parties were largely manipulated by their non-
peasant leaders andwere less autonomous than theAgrarianUnion in Finland.
Certain affinities exist, however, between conditions in Finland and in the
Baltic countries. Svinhufvud was a conservative peasant leader comparable to
Päts in Estonia, Ulmanis in Latvia, and Smetona in Lithuania.101 The Lapua
movementhadapronouncedpeasantist flavour, andwell-to-dopeasant parties
participated in the Baltic coups. But whereas the Baltic attempts succeeded in
fundamentally changing the system and putting their leaders at the head of
new dictatorships, in Finland the Lapua movement succeeded only in elim-
inating the Communists from the political scene and in having Svinhufvud
elected president. Indeed, the Finnish attempt to overthrow the existing sys-
tem was rebuffed by Svinhufvud himself. There is no doubt that the ultra-
democratic nature of the Baltic constitutions, as compared with themore con-
servative Finnish constitution, was one factor contributing to the difference in
outcomes,102 but in a wider perspective even this is just another indication of
differences in the entire pre-worldwar state-making history and, consequently,
in the degree of continuity between the pre- and post-war political systems.
97 Schram 1957, p. 63; Hyvämäki 1977, 118–21.
98 On the authoritarian takeovers and subsequent fascistisation, see Schram 1957, pp. 63–7;
Remeikis 1977, pp. 252–63; Weiss 1977, pp. 211–19; von Hehn 1977, pp. 232–6.
99 Schram 1957, pp. 55–63, 67–70.
100 Cited in Schram 1957, p. 62.
101 Von Rauch 1967, pp. 146, 152–3.
102 Hyvämäki 1977, p. 135.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
eastern european revolutionary movements 235
All in all, the most salient feature in the Finnish case is the fact that fas-
cist intrusions remained limited despite the attempt at revolution in 1917–18.
Finnish fascism was basically a general bourgeois reaction aimed at the reas-
sertion of the Whites’ victory in 1918, which had been partly compromised in
1919 and which seemed threatened by the consolidation of the Soviet Union.
As such, it was a culmination of Finnish nationalism – an attempt to regain the
long-sought unity that had been lost in the traumatic experience of 1918. The
nature of the fascism in Finland resulted from the country’s social structure
and, notably, from the character of the peasantry. Well organised and mobil-
ised, and with a well-established position in the political system, the Finnish
peasantry was totally unlike the Eastern European peasantries, whichwere fre-
quently exploited by the political elites. Moreover, Finland, again unlike most
other successor states, had seen its working class defeated at the very outset
of the period. Thus, symbolic adjustments were enough, and increased pres-
sure could be placed on the left without fundamentally altering the prevailing
system.
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chapter 12
The Formation of Finland in Europe
In the wake of World War I, serious revolutionary challenges emerged on a
wide scale in the minority regions that were or had recently been parts of
the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires. In five cases – Finland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary – social revolution occurred, and then failed.
The war had led to the breakdown or elimination of the vestiges of all three
empires and released the minority regions and small polities from their polit-
ical dependence; but at the same time, it caused destruction and undermined
power structures in the dependent regions themselves.
The war occurred at a time when the various nationalities were in widely
differing phases of political development. Because of variations in local class
relations, distinctiveness of local state structures, and the character of national
and class-based organisation, the European latecomers reacted in divergent
ways to the common opportunity that arose at the war’s end. Finland’s reac-
tion was one variant among many.
In this final chapter, rather than simply recapitulatingwhat has been sugges-
ted in theprevious pages, an attemptwill bemade tohighlight a fewkey aspects
of both phases: Finland’s specificity as a ‘deviant’ Eastern European case before
the world war, and its reaction to the common opportunity in the wake of the
war. First, the region’s economic consolidation, the formation of the Finnish
state and nation during the nineteenth century, and the class-based challenge
preceding the collapse of the mother empire will be contrasted to develop-
ments elsewhere in Eastern Europe or Scandinavia. Then an attempt will be
made to delineate Finland’s position in a larger constellation of twentieth-
century revolutionary situations.
1 Economic Consolidation
The interaction between class relations on the one hand and economic and
political dependence on the other laid the foundation for the emergence of
an autonomous Finnish economy in the nineteenth century. In attempting to
understand the economic consolidation, it is reasonable to start fromFinland’s
position at an interface – that is, from the dominantly exogenous factors. But
it is essential to ask why certain exogenous forces were conducive to autonom-
ous development. The crucial question is how the exogenous forces – Russian
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domination and dependence on the capitalist world-market in the West –
weremediatedwithin Finnish society. Here the crucial endogenous factor, class
structure, comes into play.
The problem is reminiscent of Robert Brenner’s criticism of ImmanuelWall-
erstein’s work on the rise of the capitalist world-system. Brenner evaluates the
role of outside economic incentives and of the indigenous class structure in the
development of both the national economy and the state. ForWallerstein, the
position of a region or country in the world-market essentially determines its
class and state structure. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example,
the rural Polish nobility was in a position to export grain to the expandingmar-
ket in the capitalist core areas of north-western Europe by using traditional
means to squeezemore surplus from thepeasants – that is, by forcing them into
a ‘second serfdom’. Basically, themarket connection determined the strength of
the Polish agrarian upper class, the exploitation of the peasants, and the weak-
ness of the indigenous bourgeoisie.1
Brenner’s argument is just the reverse. He does not deny the importance of
market pressures and the like, but he says that the class structure itself tends
to shape society’s response to economic forces, rather than being shaped by
these forces.2 In our Polish example, then, more important than the impact of
the capitalist market as such was the previous agrarian class structure, which
determined the way market incentives were felt within society and how they
affected the course of development. Similar market incentives resulted in dif-
ferent outcomes inWestern Europe vis-à-vis Eastern Europe when the price of
food rose substantially in the sixteenth century. In short, without an analysis
of the endogenous factors, it is impossible to explain how the same economic
forces led to different outcomes in different countries. ‘It was not the fact of
production for export which determined export dependence; it was the class
structure through which export production was carried out … which determ-
ined that increasing export productionwould lead tounderdevelopment rather
than development’, says Brenner, criticising André Gunder Frank.3
Brenner’s argument provides a starting point for assessing the interplay of
exogenous and endogenous factors in the formation of the Finnish national
economy.Two factorswere crucial: (1) the pulling power of the capitalist world-
market that made Finland a raw-material producer for the Western countries,
and (2) its role as an exporter of processed products to Russia, made possible
by Finland’s position as an autonomous grand duchy in the empire.
1 Wallerstein 1974, pp. 94–7, 122, 155–6, 304–7, 309–11, 321–4.
2 Brenner 1975, p. 68.
3 Brenner 1977, p. 86.
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The critical question is, which groups were best placed to take advantage
of this type of market situation? As Brenner suggests, the previous agrarian
class structure seems to have been of strategic importance. An independent
peasantry existed that had prospered to some extent in the early nineteenth
century. But commercialisation and the increase in wealth gained momentum
only in the last decades of the century. A transition to dairy farming took place
then, aided by the income acquired from the sale of timber. These changes
increased the peasants’ purchasing power, which in turn spurred domestic
industry. The spread of incomes from forestry and dairy farming to a large num-
ber of landowners was important in helping Finland escape from the staple
trap, that is, from the dominance of a narrow export sector and from external
economic dependence.4
The Finnish landowning class was not comparable to the one in Poland dur-
ing the expansion of grain trade to theWest; nor was it comparable to the elites
in developing Latin American countries today. A situation in which a strong
agrarian upper class would have been able to obtain the wealth accruing to
exporters and to buy luxury goods rather than invest in domestic industry was
totally unthinkable in Finland. The peasant upper class grew stronger, but it
was never able to repress the other agrarian classes to the extent that the Pol-
ish nobles or, for that matter, the grain-exporting German landowners in the
Baltic Provinces of Russia were – just as the freeholding peasantry was in no
position to obstruct the emergence of a new industrial and commercial class.
Taken together, it seems reasonable to say that the specific set of class rela-
tions that existed in the countryside on the eve of the capitalist transform-
ation had a great impact on the process of autonomous economic develop-
ment. Brenner’s argument appears to apply in the Finnish case. The Finnish
class structure contributed greatly to economic consolidation by encouraging
the landowning peasants to diversify their activities and by strengthening the
homemarket – which, however, was not a market in luxuries. This process was
determined not by the expansion of international trade or by international
demand for timber and dairy products as such, but fundamentally by a class
structure that brought about the emergence of an internal dynamic of devel-
opment and at the same time ensured that the commercially induced dynamic
from outside would lead to progress, not retrogression.5
It is a reflection of Finland’s interface position that even such a crucial
internal factor as class structurehad its origins in anexternal influence. Its roots
4 Hoffman 1980, p. 175; Heikkinen and Hoffman 1982, pp. 65, 84. See also Rasila 1982b, pp. 159–
60.
5 Cf. Brenner 1977, p. 71.
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go back to the Swedish period, when peasant landownership was consolidated
and, concomitantly, economic and cultural conditions rose to levels that, by
Russian standards, were quite high.
This relative ‘overdevelopment’ vis-à-vis Russia, then, provided the second
crucial precondition for Finland’s economic consolidation. Thanks to it, Fin-
land became not only an exporter of raw materials to the West but also an
exporter of processed products to Russia, which stimulatedmanufacturing and
facilitated Finland’s autonomous economic development. In a word, the pos-
sibilities for taking advantage of market incentives had been created in the
earlier, Swedish period. Then came the Russian contribution: the creation of
a distinct political unit that served as the framework for this enterprise.
2 The Formation of State and Nation
Economic integration did not remain the only aspect of Finland’s consolid-
ation in the nineteenth century. Of all of Russia’s western borderlands, only
Finland could retain and even strengthen its autonomy in this period. The
Baltic Provinces, whose status was largely similar at the beginning of the cen-
tury,6 gradually lost the major portion of their institutional specificity. Con-
gress Poland, which initially enjoyed even more autonomy than Finland, was
finally incorporated into the Russian administrative structure. And Bessarabia,
acquired by Russia in 1812, had lost all autonomy by 1828.
What explains this unique success? In Finland, as in many other minority
regions, the Russian government relied on a co-opted local elite to maintain
both political order and the prevailing social relations. As Edward C. Thaden
has pointed out, the importance of this task explains better than anything else
the granting of a political statuswith special rights andprivileges to the elites of
the conquered, ethnically distinct borderlands.7 It is important to note that this
taskwas considerably less problematic for the elite in Finland than in the Baltic
Provinces. Because Finland had no heritage of a prolonged feudal class domin-
ation, there were no grounds for endemic peasant unrest against the ethnically
different upper class as in theBaltic Provinces.8 Instead, Finlandhad a free indi-
genous peasantry that strengthened its position in the course of the nineteenth
century, had a stake in the existing system, and successfullymasked the growth
of the landless groups developing outside the traditional peasant community.
6 Jussila 1985, p. 60.
7 Thaden 1984, pp. 4, 231–2.
8 Cf. Thaden 1984, p. 95.
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From the Russian point of view, then, the dominant class in Finland per-
formed its principal task well. The Russians never had to intervene in the reg-
ulation of relations between the landlords and the peasants, as they had on
the southern side of the Gulf of Finland. Moreover, the Finnish elite itself was
remarkably loyal to Russia, especially in comparison with the Poles. This is not
surprising, given the completely different character of the elites. The Polish
elite hadbeendeprived of its traditional independence andhad a sophisticated
culture and a collective memory of centuries of great statehood. In Finland,
rather the contrary was true. After having conquered Sweden’s mainly Finnish-
speaking regions in 1808–9, the Russian emperor had created out of them a
newpolitical unit and thereby elevated theFinnish elite into apositionhitherto
unknown. Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, the position of the Finnish elite
was based primarily on the administration of the new grand duchy.
Thanks to the stability of the internal social order and the loyalty of the local
elite – or, ultimately, to the class structure and the newly created state struc-
tures – Finland, ‘this quiet backwater of the empire and of Europe’,9 was never
a primary concern for the Russian government until the end of the nineteenth
century. Indeed, Emperor Nicholas I once remarked: ‘Leave the Finns in peace.
That is the only province of my great realm which has caused me no anxiety
or dissatisfaction throughout my reign’.10 Certainly one reason for the lack of
interference by the Russians was Finland’s peripheral geographical position,
making it strategically less important than the empire’s more southern border-
lands.11
Also, as stated above, the structural relationship between the Swedish-
speaking elite and the Finnish-speaking freeholding peasantry made the for-
mer exceptionally responsive to the Finnish national movement. As national-
ism gained ground within the two groups, a relatively strong foundation for
a common culture was created. Nothing comparable happened in the Baltic
Provinces, where participation by the German nobles in a national movement
was inconceivable. Consequently, the Estonian and Latvian national move-
ments both developed later and remained weaker than the Finnish one. In
other words, it simply was not possible to build a common cultural basis for
political distinctiveness in those regions, whereas it was in Finland.
Finally, an important further consequence of social tranquillity and of the
elite’s considerable loyalty in Finlandwas that national integration could occur
9 Ibid., p. 80.
10 Cited in Jussila 1984, pp. 96–7.
11 Paasikivi’s reflections, as cited for example in Tanner 1966, pp. 254–69, are enlightening in
this respect.
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without being noticed by the Russians (or, for that matter, by the Finns them-
selves, at least in certain respects).12 The Russians even inadvertently opened
the way for nation-building by supporting the increased use of Finnish, which
they saw as a means of counterbalancing the influence of Swedish and, ulti-
mately, of Sweden; Finnish was not seriously considered to be a potential lan-
guage of civilisation and culture. When the Russian government finally real-
ised, in the late nineteenth century, that a state was consolidating itself ‘some-
where behind Viipuri’,13 the development could not be easily reversed. The
national ideology, including the myth of irrevocably acquired constitutional
guarantees for Finnish rights, had become a powerful buttress for institutional
consolidation and a common rallying point for the defence of the nascent
Finnish state.
3 Political Organisation andMobilisation before 1917
The above comparisons with Eastern Europe illustrate the importance of a
Scandinavian-type class structure for Finland’s process of economic and polit-
ical consolidation. In order to see how this class structure affected the class-
based challenge within the country, we must change perspectives. Comparis-
ons with Scandinavia may show how Finland’s dependence on the East differ-
entiated it from the political pattern of neighbours to the west and south-west.
Given the Scandinavian class structure, it is not surprising that the party sys-
tem that emerged in Finland was quite similar to those in Scandinavia. The
basic similarity of social structures, level of economic development, and extent
of education was reflected in similarities in party systems, as Stein Kuhnle has
pointed out. Before 1918 Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland all had four
major parties: conservative, liberal, agrarian, and social democratic. The con-
servative and liberal parties emerged in the late nineteenth century, the social
democratic parties a little later, and the agrarian parties were formed after the
turn of the century. There were only two major exceptions to this pattern. In
Denmark, no purely agrarian party was founded: farmers’ interests were rep-
resented by the agrarian-liberal Venstre. The other exception was the small
Swedish party in Finland.14
12 Thiswas truenotably in the economic sphere. In anumber of cases, integrationwas largely
an incidental by-product of narrowly economic reform programmes (Pihkala 1985, pp. 28,
31–32).
13 Cited in Jussila 1984, p. 99.
14 Kuhnle 1975, pp. 25–6; Mylly 1980, pp. 277–89; Elder, Thomas and Arter 1982, pp. 34–42.
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But this is not to say that politicalmobilisation and collective actionwere sim-
ilar in all countries. These were dependent not only on social structures but
also on the state-making process, which was different in each of the four coun-
tries. This is evident from Kuhnle’s comparison: he traces the varying patterns
of political participation in the Nordic countries to differences in the level and
pace of urbanisation, economic development, and education; to varying insti-
tutional heritages; to the presence of mass parties; and to the centre-periphery
variation within the countries.15
In the Finnish case, the ‘institutional heritage’ seems particularly signific-
ant – that is, the timingof the extensionof political rights.Here, dependenceon
Russia is obviously important. As was suggested in Chapter 1, differing oppor-
tunity structures led to a major difference in the preconditions for collective
action in the established Western countries on the one hand, and in the late-
comers on the other. The distinction is relevant when comparing Finland with
the other Nordic countries: Sweden and Denmark were old national states,
whereas Norway and Finland were latecomers. Even Norway was in a quasi-
independent position from 1815 on, when it had to join a so-called personal
unionwith Sweden. (This included a commonmonarch – the king of Sweden –
but separate political institutions for the two countries.)
Although international crises contributed to the extension of political rights
in every case (after all, these were all small countries in nineteenth-century
Europe), the international linkagewas by far themost dramatic in Finland, and
nearly non-existent in Sweden. In Norway and Denmark, international crises
provided an initial impetus for democratisation, if only in terms of the rules
by which mass political mobilisation was to take place. In Finland, however,
the very process of political mobilisation itself was sparked by an international
crisis – the 1905 revolution in Russia.16
The only conflict that touched Sweden was the Napoleonic Wars. Even
though the loss of Finland in 1809 led to the elimination of the Gustavian
constitution, representation by estates was maintained until 1866, when it
was replaced by a two-chamber system and political rights were extended.
The system nevertheless remained conservative, and general male suffrage
was achieved only in 1909. Sweden was an established European national
15 Kuhnle 1975, p. 69.
16 See, for more detail, Alapuro 1985. On the timing of the extension of political rights and of
the mobilisation of the peasantry in Norway and Denmark, see Østerud 1978a, pp. 216–21.
Something comparable to theNorwegian andDanish developments took place in Finland
in 1863 when Alexander II agreed to the resumption and regularisation of parliamentary
sessions after the post-CrimeanWar crisis in autocracy.
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state, even a former great power, and its geographical location was exception-
ally secure. Here the working class had to struggle for political rights against
domestic powerholders who had been able to formulate the initial rules of
the political system and were safeguarded from international pressures. The
struggle resembled that in many other Western countries. The Social Demo-
cratic party, founded in 1889, was anchored in a strong trade unionmovement,
and the fight for universal suffrage was marked by strikes and demonstrations:
the general strike of 1902, for example,was instigated by organised labour. All in
all, Sweden, where international crises affected the political system only mar-
ginally,17 had the slowest andmost difficult time achieving political democracy,
as regards both universal suffrage and the adoption of the principle of parlia-
mentarism.
The workers’ struggle was easier in the two other Scandinavian countries,
facilitated by the fact that the political systems in the era preceding the period
of mass organisation and mobilisation were far more democratic than in
Sweden – a result, in turn, of international crises.WhenDenmarkwas defeated
in the Napoleonic Wars, it lost Norway; and the Norwegians instituted very
radical suffrage reforms. About 45 percent of all men more than twenty-five
years old became entitled to vote. The new electoral system remained in force
during Norway’s personal union with Sweden and was considered the most
democratic in Europe at the time.18 Later, in the 1880s, the principle of parlia-
mentarism was forced through rather easily by the Norwegians who opposed
the king of Sweden. The Labour party was founded in 1887 and was here, too,
based on the trade unions, which, to be sure, were at first dominated by the
liberal Venstre. The two parties cooperated in the struggle for suffrage reform
(1898) and thereafter until the dissolution of the personal union in 1905.
The Danish labour movement resembled the other Scandinavian move-
ments in that it too originated from and was based on the trade unions. Abso-
lutist rule came to an end after Denmark was defeated in the war with Prussia
in 1849, and the new constitution provided for nearly general (but not secret)
adult male suffrage in what was at the time one of the most liberal European
electoral systems.19 In these conditions the Labour party (founded as early as
1878) fought for final suffrage reforms and parliamentarism in alliance with the
Venstre.
In sum, then, largely internal conflicts conditioned the emergence and ex-
pansion of the labourmovement in the Scandinavian countries. In Norway and
17 See Castles 1973, pp. 314–15, 322; Tilton 1974, pp. 567–70.
18 Kuhnle 1975, p. 17.
19 Ibid.
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Denmark the achievement of universal suffrage and the adoption of the prin-
ciple of parliamentarism were facilitated by comparatively democratic polit-
ical systems, introduced as a result of international crises. But in all the Scand-
inavian countries themovement developed through alliances with the liberals,
through thepainstakingpooling of resources atworkplaces, through the found-
ationof political parties, and through theuseof organised labour in the struggle
for political rights. In Finland, in contrast, an international crisis led to uni-
versal suffrage only a few years after the labour party had been founded and
even before a nationwide trade union organisation had been created. The crisis
swelled the party’s ranks and made it focus on parliamentary work. No assist-
ance was needed from allies within the polity.
The rapid rise of the working-class movement as a consequence of inter-
national crisis is reminiscent of certain Eastern European regions. The social
structure linked Finland to Scandinavia; the role of sudden changes in the
metropolitan country linked it to Eastern Europe. The resemblance to Scand-
inaviawasobviously stronger in thepre-1917period, all thedifferences in timing
notwithstanding. The Finnish worker movement played a central role in the
national integration of the workers and in the process of class integration.
4 Revolutionary Situations in Small European Polities
Most revolutionary outbreaks in formerly colonial countries have been initi-
ated by one dominant challenger combining both national and revolution-
ary aspirations. In many cases such a situation is self-evident: a revolution-
ary situation could have arisen in Vietnam, Algeria, or Angola only because
a single powerful movement had asserted itself. Only such a challenger was
able to break the colonial or neo-colonial bonds, and nationalism was a nat-
ural ingredient in the revolutionary struggle. In Eastern Europe on the eve of
World War I the situation was very different. Various local challengers exis-
ted, many or all of them organised to some degree. Varying shades of national
and revolutionary aspirations were represented, and frequently the organised
expressions of the two strands stood in opposition to each other. In Romania
and Bulgaria, ties to themother empire (if not to the great powers) had already
been severed, and nationalism was increasingly becoming a civic religion for
the state. In these countries the local nationalist rulers therefore faced radical
opposition primarily within the polity. This was not the case among the Poles
and the Czechs, who fought for self-assertion against foreign rulers; but even
among them the idea of a national interclass community, implied by the liber-
ation struggle, was not as evident in 1914 as it had been in the previous century,
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having been confounded, but not overwhelmed, by a socialist challenge. Fre-
quently, middle-class nationalism and various socialist parties existed side by
side. Still another, and arguably themost notable, difference between the East-
ern European situation and the colonial one was the absence of an alliance
between the socialists and the peasant masses – in all areas except the Baltic
Provinces and Finland.
These differences between the colonial countries and the small nationalities
of Eastern Europe are obviously linked to differences in the nature of polit-
ical dependence. In theAfro-Asianpossessions of the Europeanpowers, groups
that were distinct both racially and culturally controlled and exploited territor-
ies far from their homelands. Imperial expansion within Europe, instead, gen-
erally proceeded through the annexation of geographically contiguous areas;
thus, cultures as well as economies were likely to be much more similar. In the
former cases, the gap between the rulers and the ruled, the colonisers and the
colonised, tended to be much greater than in the latter.20 There is no doubt
that clear-cut opposition between nationalist local revolutionaries on the one
hand and the metropolitan power with its local representatives and collab-
orators on the other emerged more easily in the colonial context than in the
European.
Furthermore – and most important – there was considerable variation in
the way in which the political arena was finally opened. The character of the
organised challengers is crucial in this respect. In the colonial cases a sort of
dialectical relationship existed between the indigenous challenger and metro-
politan repression, with the former contributing actively to the emergence of
the revolutionary situation itself. In Eastern Europe the decisive point was how
the generalised collapse in 1917–18 wasmediated through existing institutional
and class structures, and how existing forms of political organisation produced
or failed to produce a revolutionary situation. The crucial process was not an
interaction between two conflicting partners but rather a reaction on the part
of domestic challengers to the collapse of the metropole.
In other words, at issue in the peripheries under colonial control was a pro-
cess of organisation, mobilisation, and collective action in the face of repres-
sion. These countries were generally forced to go through a hard, painful, and
often slowprocess before final liberationor revolution; hence theparticular rel-
evance of the triple perspective of class relations, the capacity of themetropole
to exercise control, and nationalist and socialist political organisation at their
intersection. What counted in Eastern Europe was the opportunity, or, more
20 See Orridge 1982, p. 45.
Risto Alapuro - 978-90-04-38617-4
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 03:00:57PM
via University of Helsinki
246 chapter 12
precisely, the reaction to an opportunity: what kind of immediate repercus-
sions the opportunity had on organisation, mobilisation, and collective action.
All these rather evident differences point to the importance of accident
in determining the revolutions among the smaller nationalities of Eastern
Europe.Whether or not a revolutionary situation arose was determined by the
circumstances that happened to prevail in 1917, 1918, or 1919. A difference of a
decade or so in timing could easily havemade a great difference in the position
of the domestic contenders and hence in their capacity to react immediately to
an opportunity. Perhaps the only definite exception is Latvia, where the revolu-
tionarieswere easily able to forge a strong alliancewith thepeasants. But in Fin-
land, for example, domestic troops were still in the country at the beginning of
the century, and, despite theirmodest size, their presencewould have radically
altered the impact of the metropolitan collapse, had it occurred at that time.
In Estonia, national consciousness might have been much more developed
ten years later. In Hungary, the labour movement was poorly developed at the
turn of the century. And so on. For this reason, then, the sheer existence of
an organised challenger may have been more significant than the degree of its
revolutionary determination.Whether or not the organisation led to revolution
depended not somuch on the degree of revolutionary fervour as on the context
in which the worker movement acted. In the Czech context the rather non-
revolutionary socialist challenger was active in the gaining of independence,
whereas in Finland a comparable challenger spearheaded the revolution. In
these conditions even the ‘idealised revolutionary sequence’ was not necessar-
ily followed, as plausible and even self-evident as it may seem. Such a sequence
presupposes organisation and mobilisation in the face of governmental con-
trol or repression. But in Eastern Europe this development was not true to the
same extent as inWestern Europe or in former colonies – an idea that has run
through this entire book.
5 State and Revolution in Finland
In Finland, the pattern of class relations, state structures, and political organ-
isation differed from that in the other regions between Russia and the rest of
Europe. The existence of an autonomous polity within a multinational empire
at the outbreak of World War I was unique. The other nationalities either
had no comparable polity of their own (the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians,
Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes) or had already gained formal inde-
pendence (the Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and of course, in their specific
way, the Hungarians). The Finns were the only nationality to have a largely
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Scandinavian type of social structure and political system. The presence of a
strong landowning peasantry, together with the attachment of the Swedish-
speaking upper class to the state bureaucracy, had led to the easy adoption of
the Finnish language andFinnish culture by the latter group and to a rather fric-
tionless national consolidation by the beginning of the twentieth century. The
1905 revolution in Russia brought the Social Democrats into the Finnish polity,
but the party’s character was determined by the preceding state-making and
nation-building. The worker movement developed in close connection with
other types of popular organisation: it was national as well as reformist, much
like its Scandinavian brother movements, and it focused specifically on the
state. Ties between town and country provided it with massive agrarian sup-
port, which in 1916 helped it win an absolute majority in Parliament, but there
was little potential for violent agrarian unrest.
Being dependent onRussia, this polity, alongwith the rest of EasternEurope,
faced the opening of the political arena in 1917–18. But themode and the impact
of the collapse had a specific character in the Finnish case. The war had hit
the core territories of Russia and Austria-Hungary hard, bringing down an edi-
fice that had long been decaying internally; defeat in war, by eliminating the
main instruments of repression, caused the final collapse. Latecomer polities
and minority regions, in contrast, were not necessarily exposed to the war’s
ravages to the same degree. Many of them probably escaped the most severe
blows because they were not the main targets, and their social structures and
institutions may in any case have beenmore resistant than those of themetro-
politan countries. In aword, fissures in the power structuremaywell have been
initiated from the outside in a much more definite sense than in the mother
empires.
It is important to note that this characterisation fits Finland better than any
other small polity or minority region in Eastern Europe in 1917–19. The war
wrought economic and social damage on all the others before the revolutionary
situation emerged or revolutionary movements seriously threatened the exist-
ing order. This holds for the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, and the partitions of
Poland, variousminorities in theHabsburgEmpire, andRomania, Bulgaria, and
Serbia. Unlike them, Finland was not destroyed or subjected to severe damage
by theworldwar. Although a revolutionary situation did arise in Finland, it was
not, as in the Baltic Provinces and Hungary, the result of the disintegration of
metropolitan or domestic power. It resulted, rather, from the polity’s depend-
ence on Russia formaintaining order, combinedwith an internal precondition:
the exceptionally strong position of the working-class movement in the polit-
ical system. These factors permitted the Social Democrats to proceed and push
through reforms within the existing system. Finally, a revolution occurred in
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which the labour movement attempted to counter the bourgeoisie’s effort to
recapture political power. The party basically attempted to retain the power it
had gained after the February revolution. In the Baltic Provinces, instead, the
revolutionaries really seized power, and in Hungary they accepted it – in both
cases only after the state machinery had been destroyed in the war.
All this suggests that Finland was a kind of mixed case between West and
East. This interstitial position can be seen by relating the Finnish Social Demo-
crats to modern worker movements in both the core and the periphery of the
world economy. Melvyn Dubofsky has suggested that the development and
fluctuations of a world economy since the 1870s provided the larger context
in which regional and national working-class movements have emerged and
grown up. Moreover, he maintains that the most decisive shifts in class rela-
tions and in the development of workermovements have been associated with
war and its impact on domestic politics. And finally, he proposes that a fun-
damental difference can be identified between patterns in the core and in the
periphery: that in the former, workermovements have been gradually but thor-
oughly integrated into the prevailing system of power relations, whereas in the
latter, worker movements have been more closely related to the dynamics of
inclusive national movements and have also remained more prone to revolu-
tionary forms of action.21
On the whole, Finland fits into this perspective well. Understanding the
development of the world economy, mediated through the European state
structure, is absolutely necessary for understanding the emergence and devel-
opment of the Finnish worker movement. Likewise, the wars and their impact
on domestic politics decisively influenced class relations and the growth of the
Social Democratic working-class movement. And finally, in peripheral Finland
the labour movement was bound up with the dynamics of the national move-
ment and proved prone to revolutionary forms of action in 1918.
Interestingly, though, the third point – the only one that includes a hypo-
thesis about the difference between the core and the periphery – raises some
problems. Although Finnishworkers participated in a revolutionary attempt in
1918, they had been well ‘integrated into the prevailing system of relations’ in
the preceding years – a characteristic, supposedly, of the core. This deviation
illuminates the nature of state-making in Finland, or the fact that, in a sense,
Finland lies between the European core and its periphery. The Finnish social
structure, providing fundamental preconditions for state-making, was similar
21 Newsletter of the FernandBraudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and
Civilizations, no. 5 (15 August, 1981): 2.
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to that inWesternEurope. But the control systemand theopportunities open to
theworkermovementwere of an Eastern European type: in the early twentieth
century opportunities changed rapidly andquite independently of the strength
of domestic collective action. Basically, this pattern resulted from the country’s
interface position between a core state, Sweden,22 and a peripheral state, Rus-
sia. Under the former Finland’s social structure was established and the basis
for its economic and social development laid; from the latter it attained its
ultimate system of control, against which the worker movement was obliged
to mobilise, organise, and act collectively. In combination, the two conditions
created a worker movement that finally, in 1917–18, was forced to attempt a
revolution.
Finland was, then, a special case among the (Eastern) European latecomer
polities of the 1800s and early 1900s – which, in turn, were exceptional among
other peripheral states. But their opportunities differed not only from those
in the peripheries under colonial control but also from those surrounding the
post – World War II upheavals in East-Central Europe. In 1918–19, the rapid
and coincident disintegration of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany cre-
ated a power vacuum and opened the way for a contest between domestic
social forces that determined the nature of these countries’ political systems.
While the international system played an important role, direct foreign inter-
vention of the type experienced in the Baltic countries was not the rule – a
situation that was only natural, given that all the principal powers in Central
and Eastern Europe had collapsed and that theWestern powers were forced to
exert their influence more indirectly.
Correspondingopportunities didnot arise in thewakeofWorldWar II.Then,
too, the ravages of the war sealed the fate of the old, inter-war systems. But this
time the eventual victors not only brought about the ruin of the old systems;
they also shaped the new ones, thanks to the division of Europe into zones of
influence. Germany collapsed, but the Soviet Union consolidated itself. In this
perspective too, then, the opportunities created by the generalised collapse res-
ulting fromWorldWar I appear unique.
22 Wallerstein (1980, p. 203) argues that, from 1600 to 1750, Swedenwas a semi-periphery, but
nonetheless one that ‘clearly heads the list’ of the semi-peripheries.
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Postscript to the Second Printing
1 A Personal Note1
The origins of this book date to the academic year 1973–4, which I spent at the
University of Michigan, AnnArbor.2 InCharlesTilly’s seminars, I became famil-
iar with the resource mobilisation approach, which was later notably crystal-
lised inhis FromMobilization toRevolution.3Those responsible for theFulbright
program had decided to sendme to the Center for Research on Social Organiz-
ation run by this great scholar whom I knew only by name before visiting Ann
Arbor. The most appealing feature of his approach to collective action was the
idea that all forms of contention, both crises and politics as usual, are to be
understood and analysed in the same basic framework, as struggles defined
by the resources at people’s disposal; thus, there is no fundamental difference
between the forces at play in everyday political activity and in revolts, rebel-
lions, and revolutions. One can make sense of all these varieties of contention
by examining the hard facts stemming from people’s capacity or incapacity to
act on their own behalf. As I saw it, there was a sense of disillusionment in
this perspective that added to its strength, a sense of disillusionment that I had
found earlier, in amost impressive form, in BarringtonMoore’s clarity of vision
when analysing the social origins of dictatorship and democracy.4
Somehow this approach resonated with the sensibilities of someone raised
to adulthood in theFinlandof the 1960s.Oneof thebig questions of the epoch–
and an issue that typified the gap between the generations – was the stand
taken on the ‘problem of communism’, or on the large following enjoyed by
the extreme left, which, in Western Europe, was comparable in scale only to
the levels of support found in France and Italy. In Finland the emerging atti-
tude toward Communists stressed a ‘rational’ approach, by accepting them as
a legitimate political group. Consequently, in dealings with the Communists
the same rules were to be applied as in dealings with other political groups.
This integration strategy (which was to prove successful) was propagated by
the new social sciences, above all by Erik Allardt.5 It seemed to represent a
1 I thank Rod Aya and the members of the Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
2 I have drawn here on Alapuro 2004, pp. 139–41.
3 Tilly 1978.
4 Moore 1966.
5 See, e.g., Allardt 1962.
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cool, analytical approach to the Communists, in contrast to the emotional and
irrational anti-communism that had prevailed in Finland since 1918, when a
workers’ revolution was defeated by the bourgeoisie after a difficult and costly
war. The new perspective was like a breath of fresh air compared to the senti-
mental patriotism and anti-intellectualism of the older generation. Moreover,
it was in line with the literary modernism of 1950s Finland, an intellectual cur-
rent that strove to rid the language of all imprecision and dramatisation, as
a part of breaking with pre-World War II patriotism and its calls for rigorous
national unity.
Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, I found in Moore and the resource mobilisa-
tion approach (or so it seems in retrospect) the tools for constructing my own
sense of the political conflicts in Finland – inmy case not the ‘problem of com-
munism’ as it appeared in the 1960s or the 1970s, but the dramatic initial point
from which this problem derived, or appeared to have been derived, namely
the civil war of 1918. This conflict was the subject of reappraisal in the 1960s,
along with the emerging new attitude towards the Communists, and both phe-
nomena contributed to the erosion of the traditional nationalist culture in
Finland. Along with many of my peers, I shared these emerging views, as well
as sympathy toward the rebels of 1918.Moreover, of nominor importance to the
formation of these views was the notion of revolution present in the imagery
of the 1960s in Finland and elsewhere.
The latter phenomenonwas central toEricWolf ’s PeasantWarsof theTwenti-
eth Century,6 withwhich I became familiar atMichigan, alongwithTilly’s texts.
When reading his account of the revolutions that had marked the century in
Russia, China, Vietnam and elsewhere, the fervour and depth of the social con-
flicts in these countries seemed enormously more pronounced than those of
early twentieth-century Finland. This impression contradicted the view com-
monly held by Finnish historians that it was the depth of social cleavages,
the grievances of the industrial and agrarian workers, the food shortages and
unemployment provoked by the two revolutions in Russia in 1917, and finally
the breakdown of social control, that precipitated the Finnish civil war (see
below).
In other words, the resource mobilisation view of the political process,
cleared of all excessive dramatisation, and the impression I had of the com-
parative moderation of social conflicts in Finland combined to underpin my
dissatisfaction with the prevailing picture. Consequently, both these concep-
6 Wolf 1969.
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tions placed their stamp onmy interpretation of the civil war. I saw the Finnish
revolution not as a breakdown or a release of dark forces, but as the result of a
political process, of a struggle for state power that Finns were forced to wage
under the conditions imposed on them in 1917. Moreover, the Finnish revolu-
tionary movement was far removed from those that seized power in Russia,
China or Vietnam, as the latter were self-conscious revolutionary movements
with a doctrine and a political strategy.
2 A Recapitulation
Today, a quarter of a century since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is cus-
tomary to state that Finland is part of the West, or that Western Europe is its
proper reference group.The argumentpresented in thebook suggests, however,
that Finland should be viewed, especially froma long-termperspective, as lying
betweenWest and East.
In the nineteenth century, after Sweden ceded Finland to Russia as a by-
product of theNapoleonicwars, Finlandwas, likemanyEastern or East-Central
European minority regions, dependent on a large empire. Nevertheless it dif-
fered in two respects. First, it exhibited many more Western social and insti-
tutional structures (which it shared notably with Sweden) than these regions.
Moreover, it enjoyed the benefits of an exceptionally autonomous administrat-
ive framework; itwas a separate unit, aGrandDuchy in theRussian empire.The
Finnish combination of Eastern-style dependence and aWestern-style society
was therefore unique among the regions and polities that were to emerge as
so-called successor states in the wake of WorldWar I.
It was Finland’s position at the interface of East and West that provided
the basic preconditions for the Finnish revolution of 1918. The conflict was
unleashed by the paralysis of established means of coercion, due to East-
ern dependence, accompanied by the strong presence of a non-revolutionary
worker movement, developed on the basis of Western structures and institu-
tions.
During the nineteenth century, an ideology of integration was created for
the Finnish polity. Fennoman civil servants and other nationalists in the edu-
cated class developed an ideological position based on their cultural proximity
to the country’s Finnish-speaking majority. Their self-image was founded on
the supposed loyalty of the population towards its ‘own’ educated class. At the
turn of the twentieth century, a worker movement emerged as part of a wave
of economic, cultural and political popular organisation; it resembled the cor-
responding movements in Scandinavian countries.
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After Russia’s February Revolution of 1917, this Social Democratic move-
ment entered a coalition government, and the primeminister was chosen from
its ranks, thanks to the movement’s parliamentary majority. This occurred at
a moment when the Russian crisis had left Finland without any established
means of coercion – including the army or even the police. Together, these
two circumstances crucially advanced a process that consolidated an altern-
ative power centre in the country. A major step toward dual power was taken
when the Social Democrats were removed from government and defeated in
subsequent parliamentary elections. The party was removed frompower as the
result of a controversial conflict in which the Russian Provisional Government
refused to transfer imperial prerogatives to the Finnish Parliament and dis-
solved it with the support of Finnish bourgeois groups. In the autumn of 1917,
the conflict escalated to the point where the bourgeois government decided to
restore order and disarm the worker guards. The worker movement resisted,
and a revolution broke out, which was crushed in three months.
In this interpretation, the SocialDemocratswere simply attempting tomain-
tain the power and advantages they had gained within the political system by
the middle of 1917. Rather than actively seizing power, they were striving to
counter the bourgeoisie’s attempts to recapture it. What mattered most was,
first, the strong grip of the worker movement on state power, which had no
coercive apparatus of its own, and then the contested loss of this control.
The revolution was strikingly proletarian: unlike most revolutions, intellec-
tual groups were not involved.7 In Finland the intelligentsia had developed a
national ideology only a few decades earlier, and the entire ‘national’ educated
class was horrified by this breakdown in solidarity among the people. Indeed, it
was this shock that triggered Finland’s own version of fascism, the Lapuamove-
ment. The Lapuamovement was no distinct group or specific party, in contrast
to many other countries; rather, it was a common bourgeois reaction to the
Finnish communist movement, which originated in the harsh suppression of
the revolution andwhich enjoyed remarkably close ties to the new Soviet state.
For such an interpretation I found support, above all, in Charles Tilly’s
model of the proximate causes of revolutionary situations. Nevertheless, the
revolutionary process in Finland failed to follow Tilly’s ‘idealised revolution-
ary sequence’, which begins with the gradual mobilisation of contenders and is
followed by a rapid increase in support for their claims and, finally, by unsuc-
cessful government efforts to suppress the alternative coalition. By contrast,
a peculiarity of the dependent character of the Finnish revolution is that the
7 See, e.g., Goldstone 2003; Goldstone 2014.
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road to revolution began via the third proximate cause, the incapacity of the
government to suppress an eventual revolutionary contender. This contender
only appeared gradually, as a result of a laborious process of mobilisation.Thus,
Tilly’s model is useful not because of its consistency with Finnish develop-
ments, but because its three proximate causes and the Finnish deviations from
them shed light on the particularity of the Finnish case, allowing comparis-
ons with revolutionary situations in other places and times.What is crucial for
understanding the Finnish revolution is an appreciation of the specific inter-
connection between external and internal factors – the paralysis of the appar-
atus of coercion as a consequence of the crisis in Russia, on the one hand, and
the strongposition of the domesticworkermovement at the outset of the crisis,
on the other.
3 The Reception of the Comparative Perspective
3.1 Finland Compared
The goal of the book was comparative in two senses. The intended audience
was both non-Finnish social scientists and Finnish historians. For the former,
the book was an attempt to place the Finnish case within a larger framework
through theories of state-building and revolution, and for the latter it was an
attempt to demonstrate that the Finnish case was not as unique as Finnish his-
torianshad liked to think. Itwas anattempt to show that theFinnish experience
can contribute to the wider discussion on revolutions and their preconditions
and that the wider discussion on revolutions can contribute to understanding
of the Finnish case.
The former objective was the subject of comment from several social scient-
ists. For instance, John D. Stephens began his review by asking, ‘[w]hy should
you read a book about a small country that … has no apparent characteristic
that makes it a special case worthy of general attention?’8 His answer was
that Finland indeed has special characteristics which make it interesting to
comparativists, and that the book’s theoretical and methodological approach
provide an appropriate framework for demonstrating Finland’s comparative
relevance, as the study is an application of the ‘case in comparative perspective’
method.9 Similarly another sociologist, Francis G. Castles, welcomed the work
for being ‘explicitly comparative, facilitating the assimilation of knowledge
8 Stephens 1989, p. 483.
9 Stephens 1989, p. 484; quotation marks in the original.
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of the Finnish case into a knowledge-base consisting, only too often, almost
exclusively of the experience of themajor powers’.10 He also found essential for
understanding Finnish development and its many paradoxes the suggestion of
Finland being at the interface between East and West and the ensuing ‘subtle
interlinkages between endogenous social structures and exogenous factors’.11
In their reviews, Peter Kivisto and Lauri Karvonen also found the comparative
perspective crucial in an investigation focusing (primarily) on one case. Kivisto
characterised it ‘a comparative history of the middle range’, as the author had
appreciated historical contingency by adopting ‘sufficiently delimited compar-
ative parameters to enhance the distinctiveness of his case study’.12 Karvonen
considered the comparative design the ‘most obvious merit of the book’, and
described its comparative logic by saying that ‘the study as a whole lies some-
where in between a case study and a thoroughly comparative investigation’.
This logic was evident through the book’s presentation of three explanatory
factors – the processes of state-making, the external dependence of the coun-
try and the Finnish class structure – and two points of historical-geographical
comparison: Eastern Europe and Scandinavia.13
The comparative framework was also recognised by a number of historians.
Anthony F. Upton, the author of the most comprehensive scholarly history of
the Finnish Civil War of 1918,14 wrote, ‘[t]he merit of Alapuro’s book lies not
in any new material he presents but in his use of familiar material to produce
an explanatorymodel that can both give a coherent explanation of the pattern
of Finland’s development and be used to generate generalizations, on a com-
parative basis, about the politics of small nation states’.15 Furthermore, David
Kirby and Henrik Stenius, two experts on modern Finnish history, found that
the comparative perspective produced new insights, a view echoed by Jorunn
Bjórgum.16
10 Castles 1991, p. 57.
11 Ibid.
12 Kivisto 1989, p. 196.
13 Karvonen 1990, pp. 89–90.
14 Upton 1980.
15 Upton 1990, p. 1237.
16 ‘[The book] provides a new perspective to Finland’s emergence as an independent state;
comparisons with other new states are especially valuable’ (Kirby 1989, p. 319). See also
Stenius 1989, p. 143, and Bjórgum 1991, p. 892. Of the two established Finnish historians
who reviewed the book, Eino Jutikkala, (1989, p. 120) in his rather sceptical review, recog-
nised the fruitfulness of comparisons, whereas his colleague Jaakko Paavolainen (1988)
was mostly perplexed by them.
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3.2 Problems in the Use of the Comparative Approach
However, the comparative framework failed to receive a positive reception
from all quarters. Notably the historian Peter Baldwin voiced criticisms, even
though he too considered the idea positive. According to Baldwin, the compar-
ative perspective was the ‘main virtue’ of the book, and I had ‘sought to make
Finland amatter of concern even to those of us who are not Finnish specialists,
Balticists or even interested in Northern Europe’.17 Yet for him the problem lay
in the application of the comparative approach: the study was limited in ori-
ginality and ‘marred by its disjointedness’.18 Moreover, he pointed to a lack of
consistency in the analysis of the relationship between internal and external
factors.
In Baldwin’s view, the first half of the book was devoted to ‘a summary’ that
sets the scene for the explanation of the abortive revolution, and it is only in
the treatment of the revolution itself that the author ‘begins to engage with
other scholars’ arguments and develop his own’.19 Thismay be true in the sense
that the book only engages in explicit debate with other interpretations (the
prevalence of the ‘volcanic’ view of collective action, for example) over the
events in 1918. This does not mean, however, that the treatment of the devel-
opments in the nineteenth and early twentieth century merely summarises
earlier research. To take one example, the argument about the nature and pos-
ition of the upper classes in the nineteenth century and their relationship with
popular groups was key to understanding the radical political reforms of 1906
and the nature of the revolution in 1918. Moreover, the nature of the conflict –
in addition to Finland’s position between Scandinavia and Eastern Europe –
arguably helps elucidate Finnish fascism as a general bourgeois reaction at the
turn of the 1930s. Thus, the Lapua movement was included in the book as a
logical consequence of earlier events rather than being, as Baldwin claimed,
‘an afterthought, tacked on for the sake of some sense of completeness’.20
17 Baldwin 1990, p. 98.
18 Baldwin 1990, p. 99.
19 Baldwin 1990, pp. 98, 99.
20 Baldwin 1990, p. 99. The most appropriate point about disjointedness concerns the chap-
ters on the territorial integration and the regional consolidation of party support (Baldwin
1990, p. 99); Lauri Karvonen (1990, p. 92) shared this opinion. It is true that the narrative
could have been told without those two chapters, even though the chapter on regional
integration, in particular, adds one dimension to the consolidation of the perspective of
Finland being at the interface of East and West. Nevertheless, Peter Kivisto (1989, p. 196)
found thediscussionof regional differences ‘particularly noteworthy’ and thedescriptions
of variations in levels of political mobilisation and allegiance to the Social Democrats or
the Agrarian Union ‘especially insightful’.
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On the key issue of the relationship between external and internal factors,
Baldwin stated the following:
One of the major problems with the book is the ambivalence with which
Alapuro reconciles his major tension, that between internal and external
factors. It would, of course, have been perfectly reasonable to argue that
the story was one of both varieties of influence. The problem is that
Alapuro seems to argue both sides of the case with equal conviction,
but in different places, coming therefore to no consistent conclusion. His
main point, advanced above all in the chapter on the revolution, is that
external factors played the crucial role in small and dependent nations …
In the conclusion, on the contrary, Alapuro seems to have swung around
and now elaborates the significance of internal factors – although this
does not prevent him from tergiversating once again and tracing back the
determinants of Finnish class structure to external events.21
The last comment refers to a passage in which I write, ‘It is a reflection of Fin-
land’s interface position that even such a crucial internal factor as class struc-
ture had its origins in an external influence’ (p. 238). The formulation may be
misleading, but my point here, as well as in the book more generally, was, con-
trary to Baldwin’s argument, that there simply is no ‘consistent conclusion’ on
the relative role of internal and external factors in the Finnish state-building
process. Their respective roles must be analysed in each particular instance
separately, as they varied in different contexts and at different levels. In one
sense, Finland’s position at the interface of East and West is evident in the
way the social and economic structures and political institutions established
under Swedish rule met Russian autocracy to produce favourable economic
development in Finland in the nineteenth century. However, this position is
also relevant at a different level, in the way sudden crises in Russia in 1905 and
1917 dramatically affected theworkings of the political institutions and popular
organisation in Finland.
In my view, variation in the relationship between internal and external
factors appears, most graphically, in the role of accident in determining revolu-
tions among the smaller nationalities of Eastern Europe (see p. 246). The
precise manner of their unfolding depended, in no small measure, on the
internal socio-structural, institutional, and organisational circumstances that
happened to prevail at themoment of the international crisis, whichwas largely
21 Baldwin 1990, p. 99.
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independent of their internal developments; thus, the interplay between in-
ternal and external factors varied in those encounters.
3.3 The Unity of the Elites
A number of reviewers commented onmy interpretations – based on the com-
parative perspective – of historical developments or events. Criticism was dir-
ected particularly at the treatment of elites. This is important because the
perspective I present on elites is crucial for understanding Finnish national-
ism, the character of the revolutionary attempt and the Finnish variety of fas-
cism. Upton and Kivisto claimed that I exaggerated their unity by neglecting
the importance of the language-related cleavage dividing elite groups during
the latter half of the Russian period: ‘It might be difficult to find a historian
who agrees that the vicious Fennoman-Svecoman polemic and the language
disputes that it generated, which still rouse political passions in present-day
Finland, could be described as “rather frictionless” ’;22 ‘In my estimation, he
doesn’t pay adequate attention to the ethno-linguistic factor … Alapuro does
not deal with the political implications of these divergent positions because
he focuses solely on the Fennomen’.23
It is certainly true that heated disputes occurred between Fennomans and
Liberals, not to speak of the friction between Fennomans and Svecomans, but
it is equally true that they never transcended the limits of a basically civil-
ised and regulated political struggle. The intensity of the language conflict
should be assessed from a comparative perspective. In earlier historiography,
the scale of the conflict tended to be exaggerated, due to historians’ involve-
ment, either directly or indirectly, in the dispute itself. Significantly, however,
the conflict was a transient phenomenon, thanks to the comparatively easy
adoption of the majority language by the educated class. To cite Matti Klinge,
one of the foremost experts on the issue, ‘[i]t is fair to assess that in Finland
this process took place rather painlessly’.24 Klinge continues by asserting that
‘internal national consolidationprogressed inFinland in the course of thenine-
teenth century slowly and steadily. Viewed in an international perspective, the
development proceeded here without major conflicts’.25 In his comparative
account, Edward C. Thaden stresses the same feature in relation to the Baltic
Provinces of Russia: ‘The willingness of a significant number of individuals
from the Swedish-speaking middle and upper strata of the population to join
22 Upton 1990, p. 1237.
23 Kivisto 1989, p. 196.
24 Klinge 1975, p. 42.
25 Klinge 1975, p. 54.
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forces with the Finnish national movement tended to alleviate national, class,
and economic tensions’.26
The claim that the language conflict was relatively minor in scale and
thereby limited in its capacity to fuel intra-elite dissent is important for the
argumentation of the book in two respects. First, it supports the portrayal of
Finnish elites as a group whose structural position was weak – this fragility
presumably making them unusually receptive to adopting the language of the
majority as their own language. The second point concerns the nature of the
failed revolution. Revolutionary upheavals have commonly been preceded by
a crisis of elite relationships and the formation of an elite-popular coalition
in which discontented elite groups have joined organised popular groups in
attacking the authority of the state. Such an intra-elite division was clearly
absent from Finland in the approach to 1918.27
Lauri Karvonen concurred with Upton and Kivisto on the (dis)unity of
nineteenth-century elite, but he presented a more detailed critique by dis-
cussing the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. Again, I feel that much
depends on the framework chosen for judging the degree of unity. From the
Eastern European perspective adopted in the book, the most important point
is that there remained a rather limited hard core of reactionary forces in Fin-
land – implying greater unity among the Finnish elites than in Hungary or
Romania, for example. In my view, Karvonen’s observation on the distinct-
iveness of the right-wing extremism at the turn of the 1930s is reconcilable
with my thesis on the decisive role of the civil war experience in its forma-
tion. Here, Miika Siironen’s recent interpretation of the relationship between
bourgeois groups during the two inter-war decades is helpful.28 In the 1920s,
the experience of the civil war maintained the hegemonic position of ‘White
discourse’, which covered all bourgeois groups. It possessed such an aura of
sanctity that it seemed impossible to question, and the Civil Guard was its
most tangible manifestation. The situation only changed after the emergence
of the fascist movement at the turn of the 1930s. The movement attempted to
extend White discourse to cover the entire nation, and it turned against the
Social Democrats after the Communists had been eliminated from public life.
Thereby, it created a demarcation within the bourgeois camp and ‘secularised’
the White discourse and its central symbols. These were politicised in a new
way by becoming attached to one political group, the Patriotic People’s Move-
ment. Consequently, the hegemonic force of White discourse dissipated.
26 Thaden 1981, p. 6.
27 For more detail, see Alapuro 2011, pp. 140–3.
28 Siironen 2012.
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In other words, the rise of right-wing radicalism remained limited, and by
‘secularising’ White unity, it inadvertently entered a cul-de-sac. This interpret-
ation also stresses the important but transient role of thedefeated revolution. It
acted as the catalyst for a reactionary wing among the bourgeoisie and under-
girded its subsequent position as a part of the White camp. However, at the
same time, the crucial role played by the civil war in the promotion of Finnish
fascism explainswhy its influence could not be reproduced. As thewar receded
into history and the Lapua movement pressed the bourgeois camp to take a
stand on its legacy, the quasi-religious aura of White discourse began to wane,
and the extreme right wing in the elite was marginalised. To me, the interpret-
ation presented in the book, is entirely consistent with this view.
4 Structures and Actors
This remains the most serious and interesting criticism. It concerns the book’s
comparative methodology and views on the character of the Finnish revolu-
tion. These two related criticisms were not limited to the reviews; they also
surface in a number of other comments. At issue was the dynamics of the
revolution – the road to it, or its causes and actors. As to the methodological
dimension, it is entirely logical for a study that adopts a sociological-historical
perspective on revolutions to reflect on causes, preconditions, effects and con-
sequences. Their examination is suggested by the comparative approach impli-
cit in this perspective, even when no systematic comparisons are made.29
Moreover, when concrete arguments about causality in 1917 and 1918 are
presented, these necessarily impinge on the discussion of the conflict as an his-
torical event.
The most extensive comments on my view of the causes of the war were
offered by the historian Ilkka Liikanen in the 1990s, and his reflections remain
themost perceptive even from the perspectives of today (see below, p. 266). He
observed that scholars only began to take the social dimension of the war and
its dynamics seriously from the 1960s. Thereafter, notions of the class character
of the war gradually found greater acceptance as a part of amore wide-ranging
cultural and political liberalisation. Scholars pointed out that the inequalities
which had pitted the urban and rural proletariat against other social groups
had emerged along class lines, and they emphasised social problems as the
factors underlying this clash – both long-term polarisation and hardship, and
grievances stemming from 1917. Nevertheless, even though the roots of the
29 See, for example, Goldstone 2014.
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encounter were now seen to lie in social conditions – in the hardship and
distress that had prepared the ground for the upheaval – the genuinely polit-
ical dynamics of the process were not conceptualised or examined. Scholars
‘did not study the radicalisation of the worker movement in the light of the
organisationprocess or of the local power relations andpolitical oppositions’.30
The same held for the Marxist-inspired views of the 1970s: ‘Younger scholars
hoped to construct as materialist class struggle interpretations as possible and
stressed social antagonisms rather than interpreted the revolution as a political
process.’31
It was against this backdrop that a large-scale research project was launched
to study the administration, the army and the local organisation of the short-
lived insurgent regime. The findings, published in the 1980s,32 were significant
for highlighting the political dimensions of the conflict by demonstrating that
‘mainly the established professional and political organisations of the worker
movement’ organised the upheaval, even ‘with uniquely extensive and unan-
imous participation’.33 However, even these findings failed to undermine the
‘social background’ reasoning used to explain the road to thewar. They failed to
trigger political-level debate, thereby leaving a ‘black hole’ in terms of the reas-
ons for the outbreak of the war, which had originally been attributed to such
factors as tensions, disorder, or hardship.34 In other words, the relationship
between these factors and the organised worker movement was not seriously
analysed.
It is in this context of a black hole that Liikanen placed the reasoning of
State and Revolution in Finland. He observed that, in considering the war a
revolution, the book perceived it, positively enough, as a political process. Nev-
ertheless, he added that the book simultaneously and paradoxically ‘draws a
picture of a revolution without leaders and masses’.35 The book’s depiction of
the revolution appeared to him as a kind of passive takeover, as action without
actors.
Liikanen was not alone in levelling this criticism, as similar remarks ap-
peared in several reviews of the book, and it is certainly a highly relevant cri-
ticism from the perspective of the dynamics of the conflict. The point was put
most bluntly by George Ginsburgs, who wrote, ‘[a] vital human contest … is
30 Liikanen 1993, p. 573.
31 Ibid.
32 Theprojectwas fundedby the Finnish government. Its four voluminous accounts are sum-
marised in Lappalainen et al. 1989.
33 Liikanen 1993, pp. 576, 577.
34 Liikanen 1993, p. 576.
35 Liikanen 1993, p. 577.
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reduced to the incongruous spectacle of a stage filled with elaborate furnish-
ings and empty of players’.36 Jorunn Bjórgum regretted that the book’s ‘political
science framework with its focus on the state [tended] to lose sight of the act-
ing human beings in the rank and file’.37 Moreover, David Kirby considered the
approach to be methodologically problematic:
A question that is … waiting for an answer, is … in which goal the col-
lective action was directed. On this point there is, in my view, a weakness
in Alapuro’s research method that is above all focused on structures and
does not take into the account sufficiently perceptions and attitudes. Did
strikes, occupations of public buildings, butter riots, and finally worker
guards come up simply due to the absence of coercion and control? …
In other words, I believe that it is also important to call attention to the
thoughts which contributed to shape the action … What we have in the
book is an excellent structural analysis of the failed revolution; what is
missing is a reference to the character of the revolution, and it seems to
me that it is not sufficient to define revolutions solely as a struggle of the
state power.38
The same issue was central, from different points of view, to three Finnish
comments. Raimo Parikka argued that the workers constituted a proactive, in
36 Ginsburgs 1990, pp. 158–9.
37 Bjórgum 1991, p. 894.
38 Kirby 1989, pp. 315–18. The actor-structure controversy was linked to differences in ap-
proach between historians and social scientists. Most of those who complained about the
absence of acting human beings were historians. Peter Baldwin typified the attitude of
many inhis disciplinewhenhe remarked that sociologists tend to rely on theprimarywork
performed by historians, instead of doing the ‘mundane empirical spadework’ themselves
(1990, p. 100). Moreover, he continued by stating that ‘[o]n the crucial points where he
makes hismost important arguments, Alapuro [likemanyof his colleagues] brings nonew
evidence to bear. The bulk of his book is based on references to standard printed literat-
ure, toomuchof it ismere summary’ (ibid.). One can certainly find examples of superficial
exploitation of others’ work by social scientists who have made attempts at comprehens-
ive interpretationsof historical processes.However, if oneaccepts synthesis as a legitimate
genre, the touchstone is not so much the ‘new evidence brought to bear’ as the success
in constructing a historically coherent story in which familiar elements may have a new
or unfamiliar role. Furthermore, those reviewers who were knowledgeable about Finnish
history disagreed with Baldwin on this point: ‘Comparative studies … have the quality of
pointing at new and interesting aspects of previously known facts and sources, and this
is precisely the case with Alapuro’s work as well’ (Karvonen 1990, p. 89). See also Upton
1990, p. 1237, cited above on p. 255, and, from among the other critics, Bjórgum 1991, p. 892:
‘Alapuro’s method is to systematize and interpret in new ways existing research results’.
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fact, revolutionary force, and that this was true already in the spring of 1917.39
He stressed, in turn, their active role in the struggle to dismiss the ‘Russified’
police, then their participation in the local takeovers during the general strike
in November and finally the emergence of a radical nucleus that challenged
the party leadership in the autumn of 1917. Parikka’s study of a commune on
the outskirts of Helsinki provided the stimulus for his objections to my view
and for his own interpretation. In this commune he found that the workers’
militant spirit was already well developed in 1917 and that it stemmed from a
‘culture of contestation’, a deeply engrained popularmentality of opposition to
those in power.
Jari Ehrnrooth described my position – that the war ‘was not based on
deep contradictions and no grass-root discontent underlay the Finnish worker
revolution’ – as a ‘reassuring and sympathetic drifting log theory of the worker
revolution’, in the spirit of reconciliation.40 He related my work to the social
backgroundexplanationestablished in the 1960s and 1970s and the atmosphere
of reconciliation which developed at the same time. In Ehrnrooth’s view, my
approach, which he depicted as downplaying the whole revolutionary fervour
and painting in rosy colours the violence and thirst for revengemanifest in the
upheaval, took the national consensus project of the epoch one step further.
It reinforced the ‘interpretation perspective inspired by national integration’.41
For his part, he wished to stress the centrality of working-class grudges and
hatred, released in 1918, in the attempted revolution.
A further criticism, presented by the legal historian Jukka Kekkonen, argued
that I presented the upheaval as an ‘accidental revolution’ (sattumavallankum-
ous) resulting from the sum of unfortunate coincidences. In reviewing a local
study of mine – whose basic argument was similar to that advanced in State
and Revolution in Finland – he considered my interpretation ‘neo-rightist’, in
keeping with the political mood of the post-Soviet era, as the study supposedly
attributed thewar to the collapse inRussia anddiscounted the role of real hard-
ships and grievances.42
39 Parikka 1990.
40 Ehrnrooth 1992, pp. 22–3. A part of Ehrnrooth’s irony lies in the expression ‘drifting log
theory’, which was originally used in an apologetic attempt to defend Finland’s entrance
into World War II in 1941 as an ally of Germany. In this view, Finland had no choice, but
was driven into the war by greater forces like a log in a torrent (the implication being that
the Finnish leaders were not responsible for Finland’s decision).
41 Ehrnrooth 1992, p. 23.
42 Kekkonen 1995a; Kekkonen 1995b; also, concerning more specifically State and Revolution
in Finland, see Kekkonen 2016, pp. 314–15, 435.
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What is common to these three comments is that they rely on the ‘social
background’ argument, criticised by Liikanen, whereby the outbreak of the
war is primarily ascribed to the grievances and the discontent of the working
people and at best secondarily to (unspecified) political processes. Neverthe-
less, this argument had a different tone in each of the three cases as theworking
class were variously described as people capable of creation and contestation
(Parikka), a social group in which archaic hatred underlies modern class con-
sciousness (Ehrnrooth), and people revolting against difficult living conditions
(Kekkonen).
5 The Associational Tradition in the Political Process
Whatwas Liikanen’s own viewof how to fill the ‘black hole’ betweendiscontent
and the political action it inspired? For him the key factor characterising the
political action in 1917 and 1918 were the structural qualities of agency, mani-
fest in the mode of organisation:
It can…benoted in a comparative perspective that peculiar to the revolu-
tion in Finland was, first, that the established organisations of the worker
movement with their unique extent and unanimous support organised
the takeover, and, second, that the mobilisation of the population in the
revolutionary armyand administrationwas successful in an exceptionally
large scale in the basic areas of the revolution.43
He even went so far as to maintain that it was the ‘exceptionally far-reaching
[degree of] organisation’ that plunged Finland into war.44
In a similar vein, the primacy and nature of the political process appears in
a number of publications by another historian, Pertti Haapala. According to
him, in late 1917 the country was drifting in a ‘strange interregnum’, in which
the power vacuum was increasingly filled by volunteer guard units, founded
on both sides. Two power centres emerged, both based on established organ-
isations, and ‘neither the socialists nor the bourgeois parties had exact plans
or an idea of the future’.45 In 1917 the Social Democratic party was the best-
organised political force in the country, and in 1918 ‘the Red Guards and the
43 Liikanen 1993, p. 577.
44 Liikanen 1998, p. 28.
45 Haapala 1995, pp. 44, 46.
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Red civil organisations…were based on the organisational structure and activ-
ity of the previous years’.46
Furthermore, at the local level, the execution of the revolution relied on
established organisational models – a crucial point for the argument stressing
the continuity in popular action. To cite Liikanen, ‘[i]n Finland responsible for
the organisation of the takeover and the erection of the [local] revolutionary
administration were mainly the established professional and political organ-
isations of the workermovement, evolved to the highest degree as a part of the
formation of civil society and the nation’.47 Indeed, examples of such organisa-
tional practices are easy to find.48
In my view, the interpretation advanced in State and Revolution in Finland
is in line with the views of Liikanen and Haapala (despite Liikanen’s objec-
tions).49 Rather than being a deliberate push toward revolution, the conflict
indeed emerged and culminated within the associational framework of the
Social Democratic worker movement, and it lacked ‘exact plans or an idea of
the future’. It was the labour movement that primarily channelled the collect-
ive action of those suffering hardship and distress in 1917.
This view highlights certain specific features of the Finnish revolution. The
collapse of an empire seized the Finnish state and Finnish society, whose cohe-
sion was underpinned by a strong tradition of popular organisation.When the
state’s ability to act gradually declined, the conflict increasingly crystallised
around those actors still able to function in an otherwise disintegrating soci-
ety. In 1917, both the worker security guards and the bourgeois civil guards
evolved from the organisation of civil society, and the same is true for the
organisational principles in 1918. The revolution was neither accidental in the
sense of being random or arbitrary – even though several ‘what if ’ situations
preceded the outbreak of the war50 – nor was it predetermined. It was a contin-
gent event whose parties emerged within the framework of established organ-
isational activity. Revolutionary determination only developed in the largest
urban centres. Agency was not directly based on grievances but on the polit-
ical process stemming from a crisis in the state’s capacity to act. Power was not
seized by a revolutionary party with a revolutionary doctrine and a clear polit-
46 Haapala 2014, p. 32.
47 Liikanen 1998, p. 27.
48 E.g. Rentola 1992, pp. 625–75; Alapuro 1994, pp. 192–201; Lindholm 2005, 20–89; Hoppu
2009; Heimo 2010, 102–15.
49 It is perhaps no accident that Jukka Kekkonen (2016, p. 435) considers Haapala, besides
myself, to be a proponent of the ‘accidental revolution’ theory.
50 Haapala 1995, p. 154.
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ical strategy deriving from it; rather, the working-class movement was drawn
into the revolution within a framework established in the preceding decades.
From this perspective, it is inappropriate to stress the Social Democratic lead-
ers’ capitulation to radical Red guards. On the contrary, the worker movement
was able to delay the outbreak of the revolution to the pointwhere it conceived
the takeover as a defensive act. The postponement was made possible by the
strong tradition of associational organisation.
6 Causes and Scripts
The views of Liikanen and Haapala on the causes and dynamics of the war
appeared in the 1990s. Interestingly, they still seem to be the latest serious
reflections on the subject; indeed, since the period from the 1960s to the
1990s, no explicit debate on the reasons for the revolution has been conducted.
Instead, the subject has assumed a secondary position in the scholarly work of
recent decades, or, more typically, to cite one historian, there is simply ‘silence
on the breakout of the war and its causes’.51 Thus, the road to war is usually
described without explicit analysis of the different (causal) elements or levels
in the process.52 This waning interest in causes seems partly a side effect of the
decreasing interest in attributing blame for thewar. This is certainly a welcome
reorientation: instead of accusing one or another party, even indirectly, schol-
ars have turned to the themes of violence, trauma, andmemory; as ‘Practically
all the major theatres of war have received a detailed analysis of the military,
social, and cultural aspects of the conflict’.53During recent decades, thewar has
frequently been approached through individual experiences, with exhibitions,
documentaries and novels presenting numerous accounts of local events and
stories of victims, executioners and the suffering in the prison camps.
Nevertheless, there are other reasons for the abandonment of reflection on
causes, one being a shift in scholarly emphasis. The interest in causes and
effects typical of the sociological-historical and comparative perspective of
this book has been complemented and in part replaced by perspectives that
eschew why-questions in favour of studying actors’ experiences and practices
and their cultural determinants. ‘Theories of revolution are … causal explan-
ations of revolution’,54 but today historically sensitive comparative accounts
51 Häikiö 2008, p. 47.
52 Esim. Kekkonen 2016, pp. 43–65, 332–7; Siltala 2009; Siltala 2014.
53 Tepora and Roselius 2014, p. 14.
54 Aya 2015, p. 627.
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of revolutions address themselves, for example, to the ‘scripts’ revolutionaries
adopt in their actions, by creatively reinterpreting the unfolding of previous
revolutions.55 This approach feels well-suited to the atmosphere following the
‘linguistic turn’ and dovetails with current interest in transnational history and
conceptual history.
Nevertheless, the two comparative perspectives are not mutually exclusive.
For example, in studying the states thatwere born, reborn or liberated upon the
collapse of the Soviet Union, one can reflect both on the circumstances lead-
ing to revolution (the stance adopted in this book) and on the notions activists
held about those upheavals as revolutions. The former perspective leads to a
comparison of post-socialist liberation with the upheavals following the col-
lapse of empires in World War I. The latter perspective focuses on the sources
of inspiration – ideological or otherwise – drawn upon by revolutionary actors
when defining their situation and on the projected narratives of their actions
produced at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.
55 See Baker and Edelstein 2015.
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